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ABSTRACT 
 
Climate change is a critical issue for the Pacific Islands, in terms of  its current and future 
impacts. However, many journalistic and academic accounts reiterate an ‘inevitable inundation 
discourse’: a narrative that represents Pacific Islanders as hopeless and helpless victims of  
climate change and their homelands as already lost to rising seas. To further critique this 
inaccurate and disempowering discourse, this research explores counter-narratives that can be 
offered in its place. Emphasising the status of  those affected by climate change as political 
actors, and recognising the shortage of  research into civil society responses, I concentrate on 
the understandings and practices of  Pacific Islander climate activists.   
Ethnographic research and interviews were conducted with a Pan-Pacific network of  Islander 
climate activists – Pacific Climate Warriors – who had converged in Australia to campaign 
against coal. Analysed using Hau’ofa’s ‘Sea of  Islands’ vision, these Warriors embodied forms 
of  Oceanic regionalism through the forging of  kin-like connection and expressions of  
composite Pan-Pacific identities and enacted forms of  world enlargement, countering the 
belittlement of  the Pacific perpetuated by the inevitable inundation discourse. Their 
manifestation of  regionalism was predicated upon difference rather than homogeneity, in terms 
of  their ‘relative altitudinal privilege’, complicating representations of  them as equally on the 
front lines of  climate change.  
Further research was conducted in Vanuatu, with a particular focus on priests. Reductive 
analyses that present religion as a barrier to climate change adaptation are challenged. Instead, 
the complexity and heterogeneity of  religious responses to climate change are demonstrated 
through the identification of  multiple articulations of  the Noah story and their corresponding 
ethical and political imaginaries. All these retellings in their own ways foreground Islander 
agency, providing locally meaningful and morally compelling counter-narratives of  climate 
change in the Pacific Island region.  
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1. Not drowning but fighting: searching for counter-
discourses of climate change in the Pacific Islands 
 
October 7th 2015, Vatican City: Pope Francis rides out into St Peter’s Square to deliver his Papal 
Audience, surrounded by throngs of  believers, and encircled by guards. Three guards refuse a 
missive offered from the audience until eventually a fourth guard accepts it, following the Pope’s 
assent. The bundle, proffered by Sylvester Loloa from Tonga, consists of  a traditionally woven 
mat from Sylvester’s home island which he and his companions have sat upon during prayer 
vigils for the past two days, and a handwritten supplication addressed to the pontiff, thanking 
him for his leadership on climate change. Affixed to the back of  the letter is a bright orange 
sticker bearing the words ‘Pacific Climate Warriors’. The letter is signed not with the names of  
the Warriors but their countries of  origin: Kiribati, Niue, Samoa, Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon 
Islands, Marshall Islands, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Palau, Nauru, Federated States of  Micronesia and 
Papua New Guinea.  
This moment of  encounter between an assortment of  Pacific Island climate activists and the 
Bishop of  Rome points to many of  the questions and ideas that permeate through this research. 
Exploring why these Warriors would travel 17,000 kilometres to share their words opens up 
questions of  responsibility and accountability for climate change. What does it mean for Pacific 
Islanders – who are often positioned as being on the front line of  climate change – to bring 
their concerns home to those nations historically responsible for ever-increasing carbon dioxide 
emissions? What connects these Warriors who come from so many different island nations? 
What does it mean to be and become a Warrior, and thus what does climate activism look like 
in a Pacific Island context? And given the spiritual focus of  their pilgrimage, what is the role of  
faith in terms of  institutional capacity, scriptural knowledge and personal belief  in responding 
to climate change? Can prayer be seen as a form of  action? In what ways are Pacific Islanders 
expressing agency in the face of  climate change, rather than passively accepting their fate? And 
how do Pacific Islander understandings of  climate change compare with media portrayals of  
drowning islands and prospective climate refugees?  
1. Climate change as a critical issue 
 
The 5th Assessment Report of  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
declared that there is ‘clear’ human influence on the climate, with ‘unequivocal’ warming 
caused by concentrations of  carbon dioxide as well as other greenhouse gases that are 
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‘unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years’ (IPCC 2014: 2, 4). The IPCC identifies the 
diminishing of  glaciers, ocean acidification, increasing ocean temperatures and sea level rise as 
current and future potential consequences of  this warming. This scientific concern has been 
mirrored by recent responses on an intergovernmental level. The Paris Agreement, that 
emerged during the 21st Conference of  the Parties (COP) of  the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ambitiously declares a commitment to ‘holding 
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and 
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’ (United 
Nations 2016) in order to reduce the impacts of  climate change.  
Concern regarding climate change extends well beyond the plethora of  aforementioned 
acronyms. Climate change is not only a paramount issue of  our times but has ‘become an idea 
that now travels well beyond its origins in the natural sciences’ (Hulme 2009: xxvi). It has been 
forewarned by economists that climate change presents risks to economic growth as dire as ‘the 
great wars and the economic depression of  the first half  of  the 20th century’ (Stern 2006: ii). 
It has become a rallying point for social justice activists, who declare that climate change will 
change everything about our current ways of  life, and thus necessitates social, political and 
economic transformation (Klein 2014). And it has even become a matter of  spiritual concern. 
Part of  the rationale for the Warriors’ presence at the Vatican in October 2015 emerged from 
the release of  the encyclical Laudato si’: On Care for Our Common Home by the Pope earlier that 
year. This text directly addresses issues surrounding climate change, biodiversity loss and global 
inequality, and argues that these issues cannot be under the purview of  scientists alone. Instead 
the Pope issues a demand for ‘a conversation which includes everyone, since the environmental 
challenge we are undergoing, and its human roots, concern and affect us all’ (Laudato si’ § 11). 
Recognising that climate change is a critical issue not just for natural scientists but has the 
potential to affect many areas of  social life, an interdisciplinary response is imperative. Social 
science has a fundamental role to play in the project to ‘reclaim climate from the natural 
sciences’ (Hulme 2008: 6), and to recognise the local meanings, understandings and responses 
different communities bring to climate change. Consequently, I am not attempting to address 
climate change purely on a global scale, but to explore responses to it on a regional and local 
level, situating my analysis in one of  the areas often deemed most vulnerable to climate change 
impacts: the Pacific Island region.  
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2. Focusing on the Pacific 
 
First, a note on terminology. Jolly (2007) highlights the extent to which discussions of  the ‘Pacific 
Rim’ have marginalised and occluded that which is contained within the rim: the Pacific Islands 
(see Figure 1). Throughout this research my usage of  the term ‘Pacific’ seeks to re-centre that 
peripherialised centre, referring as shorthand to the Pacific islands, including both sovereign 
countries and territories of  larger states. I recognise the larger nations of  Australia and New 
Zealand are situated ambiguously in relation to the Pacific Island region, and this ambiguity is 
explored empirically and analytically during the thesis. I synonymously deploy the term 
‘Oceania’, based upon eminent Tongan anthropologist and novelist Epeli Hau’ofa’s (1994) 
formulation of  the term as one that embraces the sea, land, and people of  the Pacific Island 
area as an interconnected continent, not a fragmented patchwork of  isolated pockets of  land. 
This understanding of  Oceania will be further examined in Section 3A of  the literature review 
and will form the conceptual background of  the first empirical chapter. Oceania is frequently 
subdivided into its three constituent sub-regions (Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia), 
illustrated in Figure 1. These categories have been problematised, as I will explore further in 
Chapter Four. 
 
 
Figure 1 - The Pacific Island region 
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2A. Climate change and the Pacific: projected impacts 
 
The countries of  Oceania exhibit clear geological differences, encompassing low-lying coral 
atolls, volcanic islands with highland areas and plate-boundary islands (Barnett and Campbell 
2010), yet all fall within the category of  Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Oliver-Smith 
identifies the three primary threats climate change presents to SIDS: ‘a loss of  ecosystem 
services’, such as food, water supply, and cultural connection to the natural environment, ‘loss 
of  land’, and ‘increase in the intensity and frequency of  climate-based natural disasters’ (2009: 
117–118). The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report elaborates upon these dangers. According to 
Working Group II, Chapter 29, which focuses upon climate change impacts, adaptation and 
vulnerability in small islands, these major risks include ‘sea-level rise, tropical and extra-tropical 
cyclones, increasing air and sea surface temperatures, and changing rainfall patterns’, in 
addition to the loss of  adaptive capacity and ecosystem services (Nurse et al. 2014: 2). There is 
‘high confidence’ that the global rate of  sea level rise is accelerating and that this, in 
combination of  with extreme sea-level events, puts low-lying coastal areas at severe risk from 
sea-flooding and coastal erosion (ibid). The report is similarly confident that island communities 
will be negatively affected by the salinisation of  groundwater sources and arable soil through 
waves and storm surges, and the degradation of  coral reef  systems (a source of  livelihood and 
storm protection) caused by increased sea and air temperatures. Barnett and Campbell (2010) 
highlight the predicted increase in intensity and decrease in frequency of  rainfall as particularly 
harmful to the Pacific, as it could result in floods, droughts and unreliable agricultural 
irrigation. These geophysical changes are also likely to have significant negative health impacts 
and economic consequences through the increase in vector-borne diseases, risk of  increased 
food insecurity and the erosion of  livelihoods and loss of  infrastructure. Concerns regarding 
the impacts of  sea level rise should not be limited to the atoll states: while many Pacific Island 
countries are mountainous (such as Fiji, Vanuatu or Tonga), populations, economic activity and 
roads tend to be concentrated along coastlines (Nunn and Mimura 1997).  
The 22 Pacific island states and territories encompass a population of  less than ten million 
(Barnett and Campbell 2010: 5), out of  a global population of  seven billion. Despite its 
relatively small population, however, further research on this area remains crucial. 
Consequently, I will now explore what makes these places important and meaningful in a global 
context. 
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2B. Oceania: political, academic and moral significance 
 
The logic for focusing this research on the Pacific is threefold. Firstly, there is much to be learned 
from islands, and island nations in the Pacific in particular. Secondly, there is a moral 
responsibility to do so. And thirdly, while there is already a substantial body of  literature on the 
Pacific and climate change, some of  this literature could have unintentional consequences, and 
may in fact be harmful to those that it depicts.  
Firstly, research in Pacific Islands has ramifications beyond Oceania. Kelman (2007) argues that 
other marginal or remote communities adapting to climate change have much to learn from 
island examples. For instance, threats of  coastal erosion and sea level rise are not limited to 
islands, as ten percent of  the world’s population live in the ‘low elevation coastal zone’ (less than 
ten metres above sea level) (Oliver-Smith 2009: 118). According to Lazrus (2012) islands and 
climate change are a critical focus both because of  the extremity of  socio-environmental threats 
and their role in the global imagination. This significance is evidenced through the permeation 
of  ideas of  islands and islandness throughout popular culture (Mezzana et al. 2012), and 
particularly through the influence that literary and cultural representations of  islands as 
paradisiacal, isolated, small or primitive have had upon contemporary climate change 
discourses (Farbotko 2010; Barnett and Campbell 2010).  
Island countries are also significant on a geopolitical level, due to their forthright stance on 
tackling climate change. As part of  the Alliance of  Small Island States (AOSIS) at the annual 
UNFCCC negotiations, the Pacific nations have been some of  the most vocal about the need 
to curb emissions (Farbotko and McGregor 2010). Evidence of  their influence can be seen in 
the COP21 summit, with Pacific Island delegations playing a crucial role in successfully 
securing reference to efforts to prevent a temperature rise of  greater than 1.5 degrees above 
pre-industrial levels. Fiji’s chairing of  the 23rd COP, held in Bonn, further magnified the role 
of  Pacific Island nations in climate geo-politics.  
Secondly there is the question of  moral responsibility. From a climate justice perspective, 
(Chatterton et al. 2012), the inequity between the responsibility for anthropogenic climate 
change (in terms of  emissions) and the severity of  impacts can be seen in some of  its starkest 
terms in the Pacific. As Dasgupta and Ramanathan note, the world’s poorest three billion 
people are responsible for only 5% of  emissions, yet are most at risk of  climate change impacts, 
both due to their ‘direct reliance on natural capital’ and their limited financial capacity to 
contend with extreme weather events (2014: 1458). While countries such as Tuvalu have not 
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been entirely innocent of  environmental degradation (Connell 2003), within a global context 
the negative atmospheric impacts of  Pacific Island countries are negligible (Barnett and 
Campbell 2010: 10), as they are responsible for 0.04% of  global emissions, compared with the 
United States’ 30.3%. The concept of  ‘climate debt’ illustrates how wealthier nations owe a 
debt to Global South countries both through damages caused by climate change, and 
disproportionate levels of  emissions. This argument is not without sound criticism (Simons and 
Tonak 2010), yet there is a clear case for the moral responsibility of  the Global North to the 
Pacific. Conducting further research that tackles existing research gaps and is guided by affected 
communities’ concerns is one small way of  beginning to address this debt. However, that 
research should not be based on the assumption that the communities in question share the 
same analysis of  responsibility and blame - this nuance is explored throughout the empirical 
chapters.  
Finally, while Oceania’s population may be small, the same cannot be said of  the journalistic 
and academic consideration that it has received in relation to climate change. SIDS have been 
a focus of  especial attention although many of  the threats they face are not unique to island 
communities (Mortreux and Barnett 2009). It seems that Pacific islands are often presented as 
‘an archetypical “vulnerable-to-climate-change” place’ (Webber 2013: 2717). Central to this is 
the dramatic potency of  sea level rise (Mortreux and Barnett 2009), even though many other 
climate impacts are more imminent and can occur regardless of  rising sea levels (Barnett and 
Campbell 2010). The prospect of  entire nations being engulfed under the waves appears to 
have captured cinematic, journalistic and academic imaginations. The status of  the Pacific as 
a climate cause célèbre does not in itself  legitimate further research. Yet there is the potential to 
problematise how much of  the debate is currently framed. There is a common scholarly and 
media narrative of  inevitable loss, victimhood and island expendability - the ‘inevitable 
inundation discourse’ -  that should be both empirically and politically challenged. It seems that 
this current dominant narrative is not facilitating effective action in terms of  mitigation or 
adaptation, nor is it enabling a sympathetic understanding of  the meaning of  climate change 
for threatened communities. Thus, much of  the current representation may be doing greater 
harm than good. 
3. Drowning islands and Anthropocenic story-telling  
 
Following Rudiak-Gould’s assertion that climate change can be understood as ‘a yardstick, 
metonym, or epitome of  the Anthropocene more generally’ (2015: 48), I situate this concern 
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about representations of  climate change and Pacific Islands within literature exploring relations 
between narrative and the concept of  the Anthropocene (the notion that we have entered a 
new geological epoch in which humans are acting as a dominant force upon the Earth’s 
systems). Acknowledging geological debates regarding the epoch’s starting date and social 
science contestations over the nomenclature of  this new age, I focus on authors who contend 
that the Anthropocene needs new narratives (Tsing et al. 2017; Haraway 2016a) and is itself  
produced through narratives (Buck 2015). I outline Buck’s presentation of  ‘horror stories’ of  
the Anthropocene, those that centre the apocalyptic, that exclude forms of  knowledge beyond 
the natural scientific, and those that isolate humanity from the richness and wonder of  everyday 
life. I recognise the resonance between this critique of  current stories of  the Anthropocene and 
Bennett’s (2001) idea of  enchantment, as well as Hulme’s (2009) emphasis upon multiple 
framings of  climate change.  
I return to a regional concern with the Pacific, recognising that the drowning island or 
inevitable inundation discourse – the dominant media narrative that presents Pacific Islands as 
already doomed due to climate change and their inhabitants as passive, prospective climate 
refugees – is itself  a horror story of  the Anthropocene. I unpick this horror story further, 
exploring how it relies upon a simplistic and environmentally determinist understanding of  
migration, discourages effective responses to climate change, and disempowers and silences 
those it depicts. Fortunately, this dominant discourse has received substantial critique, from 
academics such as Farbotko (2005; 2010) Baldwin (2012; 2013), Bettini (2013a) and Barnett 
and Campbell (2010). Through a focus upon Oceania, this research contributes to this critical 
scholarship. However, I do not wish to just reiterate and refine existing refutations of  this 
dominant narrative. Critical researchers have clarified why the current discourse should be 
rejected, but not highlighted existing counter-discourses that could go in its place. This work 
thus aims to break through this academic impasse, exploring what alternative framings or 
narratives regarding Oceania and climate change are being circulated by Pacific Islanders.  
4. Research aims, questions and objectives 
 
To reiterate, my overall research aim is to explore narratives of  climate change and the Pacific 
Islands that challenge or contest the inevitable inundation or drowning islands discourse. 
Narrowing from this broader aim, and through engagement with the literature, three key areas 
for exploration were identified with regards to potential Pacific Islander-led counter-narratives: 
Epeli Hau’ofa’s highly influential ‘Sea of  Islands’ vision and manifestations of  Oceanic 
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regionalism; Pacific Islander-led climate justice1 activism; and faith-based understandings of  
and responses to climate change, all of  which are discussed at greater length in the literature 
review (Chapter Two).  
Turning to the first key aspect, Hau’ofa (1994) argues that there is a persistent belittlement of  
the Pacific Islands, emerging from the colonial subdivision of  the region and persisting to this 
day. This belittlement is exacerbated by the inevitable inundation discourse. Yet Oceania is far 
larger, stronger and more powerful if  understood as a united and interconnected continent of  
land, sea and air – ‘a sea of  islands’ - as opposed to an assortment of  fragmented and isolated 
sites; ‘islands in a far sea’. Linked to this, I also draw upon his concept of  ‘world enlargement’, 
as he argues that through the movements of  the Oceanic diaspora further territories are 
enveloped within Oceania as a large and ever-engulfing growing continent, a further rebuttal 
of  representations of  the Pacific Islands as insignificant, weak and small.    
Secondly, I focused upon climate justice activism for three reasons. Firstly, it addresses a current 
gap in the literature: much of  the existing scholarship regarding climate change and the Pacific 
Islands concentrates largely on governmental actions and perspectives, with limited attention 
to civil society responses. Consequently, the narratives produced and disseminated by grassroots 
climate activists are under-researched. Secondly, it theoretically responds to two interlinked 
concerns: the depoliticisation of  environmental discourse (Swyngedouw 2010) and extent to 
which narratives of  island vulnerability entail a ‘foreclosing [of] alternative and empowering 
political identities’ (Webber 2013: 2720). I seek to counter these two tendencies by 
concentrating upon the understandings and practices of  Pacific Islander climate activists as 
explicitly political subjects, a perspective currently lacking in the Pacific Islands and climate 
change literature (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015). Thirdly, it builds upon my pre-existing academic 
and personal interest in climate activism. My background in UK-based environmental 
campaigning provides both the contextual understanding to recognise the distinctions and 
convergences between Western and Pacific modes of  activism and a basis of  connection 
between me and my research participants. 
Finally, the focus on religious perspectives emerges as a response to the shortage of  social 
scientific research into how religious understandings inform what people are saying and doing 
about climate change (Haluza-Delay 2014), the failure of  existing secular approaches to climate 
                                                        
1 I explore the contested and polysemous nature of ‘climate justice’ in Chapter Two, Section 3B. 
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change adaptation in the Pacific Islands (Nunn 2017) and the reductive approach of  many 
academic accounts of  religious responses to climate change in Oceania, which tend to 
homogenise religious understandings and treat them as a barrier to climate adaptation (Kempf  
2017), as opposed to as a resource (Hulme 2017).  
Thus, the focus upon these three areas in turn is designed to address re-evaluations of  the power 
of  Oceania as a region vis-a-vis climate change, to rethink the capacity and attitudes of  those 
within the region confronting climate change, and to challenge the purely scientific framings of  
climate change that underpin the inevitable inundation discourse.  
Consequently, my three research questions are: 
1. To what extent can contemporary climate justice networks in the Pacific be understood 
through the Sea of  Islands vision, as a form of  Oceanic regionalism? 
2. How does engagement with climate change activism in a Pacific Island context shape 
political and activist identities and subjectivities?  
3. How do religious beliefs inform understandings of  climate change in terms of  
responsibility and the capacity for action? 
Through answering these questions, my research makes original contributions in three areas. 
Firstly, that of  Pacific Studies, through the empirical and analytical evaluation of  Hau’ofa’s Sea 
of  Islands vision. Secondly, I wish to contribute to the critical literature (that straddles Human 
Geography, Anthropology and broader social science) that is challenging the inevitable 
inundation discourse, through providing not just further refutations, but empirical examples of  
counter-narratives, and particularly highlighting political agency. In doing so, I wish to 
contribute to the broader literatures concerning narrative and the Anthropocene and the 
different communicative framings of  climate change, through documenting locally meaningful 
stories and understandings of  climate change, and actions and practices that emerge from 
those. Finally, I wish to further the field exploring the relationships between religious 
perspectives and climate change, and in doing so, showcase both the heterogeneity of  religious 
viewpoints as well as challenge their academic marginalisation.  
5. Research design 
 
As detailed in Chapter Three, I ascertained that verbal, face-to-face methods would be 
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necessary to elicit the data required regarding practices, narratives and understandings of  
climate change in the Pacific Islands. After considering and eliminating alternative approaches 
I concluded interviews and participant observation were the most suitable methods. In 
determining a field site and case studies, I reasoned that my analytical emphasis upon 
regionalism and interconnection also methodologically necessitated multi-sited research 
(Marcus 1995), as while the connection between mobility and Pacific identity is regularly noted, 
a lot of  research still concentrates on single areas, perpetuating an isolated understanding of  
them (Teaiwa 2005).  
My desire to explore regionalism and activism as well as faith in the Pacific Island region drew 
me to the Pacific Climate Warriors, who I first encountered via their youtube videos. They are 
a network of  Pacific Islander climate activists from across the region, who cohere around a 
campaign slogan of  ‘we are not drowning, we are fighting’, which suggests some level of  
contestation of  the inevitable inundation discourse. In accordance with my first two research 
questions, I wished to explore the perspectives and actions of  this group in terms of  regionally-
coordinated manifestations of  climate activism. This therefore took me to Australia for the first 
leg of  my fieldwork, where during October 2014 members of  the Pacific Climate Warriors 
from twelve different countries assembled for the ‘Stand Up for the Pacific’ campaign, a mass 
demonstration and awareness raising tour. While this first period of  fieldwork (Phase I) gave 
me some insight into the impact of  Christian faith on climate responses, to investigate my third 
research question in sufficient depth I needed to conduct research with a broader range of  
participants and be immersed in a Pacific Island context, and thus conducted four months 
research in Vanuatu (Phase II).  
6. Background to case studies 
 
6A. Phase I case study: the Pacific Climate Warriors 
 
Throughout this thesis I predominately use the phrase ‘Pacific Climate Warriors’ or ‘Warriors’ 
to describe those volunteer activists who came from different parts of  the Pacific Island region 
to participate in the campaign and actions in Australia (detailed below), and the phrase ‘350 
Pacific’ to refer to the paid employees of  that group who had a managing and co-ordinating 
role in the campaign2.  
The Pacific Climate Warriors are members of  350 Pacific, a regional chapter of  350.org. 
                                                        
2 During this period three of the four 350 Pacific staff/ organisers were Pacific Islanders.  
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350.org - named after their target number of  parts per million of  CO2 in the atmosphere -  
formed in 2008 and organises online petitions around climate issues, coordinates global days 
of  protest, and has a substantial presence at UNFCCC negotiations as a civil society 
organisation. 350 Pacific, which at the time of  my fieldwork (2014-2015) had a small paid staff  
of  four and many active volunteers, emerged in 2009, and prior to the Climate Warriors 
campaign organised a number of  workshops around climate change leadership in Fiji and New 
Zealand.  
The initial idea for the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign emerged in 2012 and culminated in 
a ‘day of  action’ in March 2013. Based on that day of  action, a three-minute video ‘We Are 
Not Drowning – We Are Fighting’ (350 Pacific 2013a) was produced, that premièred at 
350.org’s international climate activist gathering Global Power Shift in Istanbul in June 2013, 
bringing 350 Pacific’s campaign international attention. The Not Drowning but Fighting day 
of  action involved activists from 14 different Pacific island states and territories performing 
ceremonial dances and performances of  defiance towards the threat of  climate change, 
deliberately invoking and identifying with warrior imagery, in a manner that was tailored to the 
different cultural traditions of  the respective islands (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 - The Tokelau ‘We are not drowning, we are fighting’ day of action 
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Having first viewed the Not Drowning but Fighting video in mid 2013, I was intrigued by the 
Warrior narrative, one that explicitly presents images of  strength and power, as opposed to 
reproducing a narrative of  victimhood. It stands in bold contrast to the inevitable inundation 
discourse perpetuated by many academic and media sources. Through it aspects of  
confrontation and antagonism are explicitly incorporated into 350 Pacific’s strategic approach. 
This is evident in the proposed qualities of  a Pacific Climate Warrior: ‘A warrior stands their 
ground against an adversary, against injustice and against oppression’ (350 Pacific 2013b: 4). 
While antagonistic, the violent associations with the phrase ‘warrior’ are explicitly rejected, as 
a Climate Warrior is defined as ‘not aggressive, but is assertive’ (ibid).  
Following the launch of  the campaign, ‘Warrior trainings’ were held across Oceania, educating 
communities about the threats climate change poses to their particular country, and 
encouraging them to establish their own local 350 groups and participate in the upcoming tour 
in Australia. As part of  350 Pacific’s three-year campaign strategy, April 2014 saw a traditional 
canoe building day of  action, in which different communities identified suitable trees, 
performed preparatory blessings or began felling the selected tree (see for example Island Reach 
2014a).  
The campaign climaxed in October 2014, when thirty Warriors from twelve different island 
nations gathered in Australia for two weeks of  training (explored in detail in Chapter Five), 
including a visit to Maules Creek, in northern New South Wales. Maules Creek is the site of  
the Tarrawonga coal mine as well as the location where, in 2014, Whitehaven Coal were 
planning to open one of  Australia’s largest open cast mines and were facing fierce resistance 
from local Aboriginal and environmental activists. The training was followed by a series of  
direct actions. Direct action can be defined as ‘a matter of  taking social change into one’s own 
hands, by intervening directly in a situation rather than appealing to an external agent (typically 
the government) for its rectification’ (Gordon 2009: 254-255). There is often in practice an 
overlap between direct action and civil disobedience, yet the two are not synonymous. While 
the latter by definition involves deliberately refusing to comply with a law and openly accepting 
the consequences of  that, direct action can but does not need to involve these components, and 
instead the emphasis is upon the direct remedying of  a problem (Trapese Collective 2007: 263). 
However, in many cases actions labelled ‘direct action’ are in effect still mediated, symbolic and 
form part of  an appeal to an external authority (Graeber 2009). The actions taken by the Pacific 
Climate Warriors and their supporters combine elements of  symbolic action, governmental 
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lobbying, direct action and transformation of  the self  (as discussed in Chapter Five).  
The largest action - and primary focus of  my first and second empirical chapters -  took place 
in Newcastle, New South Wales, the site of  the world’s largest coal export port. There the 
Warriors, supported by a few hundred local Australian activists, blockaded the coal port for 
most of  the day, using a flotilla of  hand-carved canoes (produced during the aforementioned 
canoe building day of  action) and kayaks, and managed to prevent the majority of  coal ships 
from leaving or accessing the port. While there is some debate over the precise numbers, it has 
been claimed that ten coal ships and 578,000 tonnes of  coal were prevented from leaving the 
port by the flotilla (Fox 2016). This is the standard numeric of  success shared by the Warriors, 
and suggests a direct impact of  the action. This flotilla was the sixth of  its kind to take place in 
Newcastle Harbour, but the first to be led by Pacific Islanders. The use of  the flotilla as a site-
specific tactic can be situated within a clear Australian activist genealogy (Evans 2010), 
stretching back to the 2008 Camp for Climate Action held in Newcastle, New South Wales, a 
week-long radical environmental protest camp held to coincide with the British-based camp of  
the same name that operated annually from 2006-2010, and which, coincidentally, was my 
entry point to climate activism and to grappling with understandings of  climate change.  
Following the main action in Newcastle, pairs of  Warriors (who had been trained as media 
spokespeople) departed for Perth, Canberra, Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne (with the 
remaining nineteen Warriors holidaying or visiting family in Sydney). In each city a speaking 
event was organised for the general public, the Warriors met with members of  the Pacific Island 
diaspora and sometimes additional influential figures (such as one of  the Green members of  
parliament in Canberra) and a solidarity action was held, targeting different aspects of  
Australian fossil fuel infrastructure. In Canberra this was at the National Minerals Council; in 
Sydney the offices of  Whitehaven Coal (who were constructing the Maules Creek mine); 
Melbourne, the headquarters of  ANZ Bank (who were helping to finance the mine); Perth, 
Buru Energy’s offices (due to their involvement in unconventional gas in Western Australia), 
and Brisbane (where they participated in another flotilla). All these actions (with the exception 
of  the symbolic Brisbane flotilla) were intended to risk the arrest of  Australian participants but 
not the Warriors themselves, unlike the Newcastle flotilla.  
The Pacific Climate Warriors have received some coverage in academic literature. Steiner 
(2015) discusses the early stages of  the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign, conducting a close 
reading of  the Tokelaun and Fijian performances that formed part of  the ‘We are not drowning, 
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we are fighting’ day of  action in 2013. I wish to build upon Steiner’s work in a number of  ways. 
Firstly, chronologically, as she only discusses the campaign up until the building of  the canoes. 
She pays significant attention to the potential of  the Fiji to Australia voyaging dimension of  the 
campaign which did not in the end materialise. In my work I have the opportunity to discuss 
the next stage of  the campaign: the Newcastle blockade.  
Secondly, Steiner invokes Epeli Hau’ofa’s most famous work – Our Sea of  Islands – in her title ‘A 
Sea of  Warriors’ and applies his ideas in terms of  emphasising the importance of  connection 
between Pacific Islanders and drawing a parallel between the dichotomy of  the Sea of  Islands/ 
Oceania and drowning islands/ united Warriors. However, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, 
I believe his ideas can be taken much further, in terms of  unpicking how these connections and 
regional identities are formed, how this strengthened Oceania manifests, and identifying 
empirical shortcomings of  Hau’ofa’s vision. Steiner also signposts the significance of  faith and 
controversy surrounding the story of  Noah, which will be explored further in Chapter Six.  
Thirdly, I wish to expand upon her work methodologically. Similar to McNamara and Farbotko 
(2017), Steiner contends that through the use of  war dances, the Warriors are ‘constructing an 
identity of  unity and empowerment’ (154), an analysis that I generally concur with, and which 
adds further justification to my choice of  case study. However, I wish to look beyond the press 
releases and campaign videos, and through the use of  interviews and embedded participant 
observation more deeply understand the lived practices of  the Warriors as they generate these 
alternative narratives, including obstacles they encounter that may be excluded from their 
media messages. My project is consonant with Steiner’s, as she concludes with the hope that 
her piece will inspire the sharing of  further stories.  
Meanwhile, McNamara and Farbotko (2017), two scholars who are key to the contestation of  
the inevitable inundation discourse, contend that the Pacific Climate Warriors are a group that 
are challenging the inevitability of  climate migration, reaffirming their suitability as a case study 
for my research. Indeed, there is congruity between my own objectives and that of  the Pacific 
Climate Warriors. While I argue the existing framing of  the Pacific Islands in relation to climate 
change is insufficient within academic and media accounts, the Pacific Climate Warriors are 
also explicitly trying to challenge and reframe the narrative. As one 350 Pacific organiser 
described in a speaking event after the blockade, the campaign’s focus was on ‘owning the 
narrative and challenging what we’re told about the future of  the islands in the media, and 
fracture the direction we’re told we’re going in’. Thus, my research responds to this by 
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documenting this alternative narrative and channelling those voices, rather than producing a 
new narrative myself. 
I also wish to build upon the existing literature’s initial examination of  the Pacific Climate 
Warriors as political actors. As McNamara and Farbotko (2017: 21) note ‘the Pacific Climate 
Warriors have been acclaimed in climate debates for their clear assertion and exercise of  
political agency’. The question of  their ‘political agency’ deserves further investigation. I concur 
with McNamara and Farbotko that the category of  ‘Warriors’ can be unpicked further, but 
while they explicitly focus upon ‘the image of  the Pacific Climate Warrior’ (21), I wish to go 
beyond presentation and explore the process of  becoming and being a Pacific Climate Warrior, 
in terms of  political subjectivity, as documented in Chapter Five.  
6B. Phase II case study: climate advocacy and adaptation initiatives in Vanuatu 
 
While I concentrate on the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign in the first two empirical 
chapters, in Chapter Six I turn to my second case study: climate advocacy and climate 
adaptation initiatives in Vanuatu, with a particular focus upon religious responses. Vanuatu is 
an archipelago of  82 islands, 65 inhabited, located in the South West Pacific Ocean, 
approximately 1,750 kilometres east of  Australia. It has a population of  272,459, of  which just 
under 25% live in an urban centre, including 50,944 in Port Vila (Vanuatu National Statistics 
Office (VNSO) 2017), the capital city on the island of  Efate, where I conducted the majority 
of  my fieldwork. It is a lower middle income country, with a gross national product of  
US$ 774,000,000 (World Bank 2016) and its major industries are tourism, forestry, fishing, 
exporting coffee, kava (a narcotic root) and copra, and offshore financial services. However, a 
majority of  the population wholly or primarily engage in subsistence agriculture (Government 
of  Vanuatu 2011a). 
Vanuatu, which has a tropical climate and experiences the El Nino-Southern Oscillation, is 
affected by earthquakes, volcanoes and cyclones (Walshe and Nunn 2012), and is considered 
vulnerable to a number of  climate change impacts including increased droughts, flooding and 
sea level rise (Government of  Vanuatu 2011b). The country was struck by a category five 
cyclone – Cyclone Pam – in 2015, just a few months before the beginning of  my fieldwork, 
which was the severest the country had experienced since Cyclone Uma in 1987, and was 
explicitly linked by the nation’s prime minister to climate change (Walker and Farrell 2015). 
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Figure 3 - Map of Vanuatu 
Vanuatu became an independent nation state in 1980. Prior to that it was a joint colony of  the 
French and British empires – the Anglo-French condominium of  the New Hebrides. As a 
consequence of  its dual imperial heritage it has three official languages: English, French, and 
Bislama. Vanuatu also boasts at least 80 native languages, giving it the highest per capita 
indigenous language density in the world (Crowley 2004). Bislama emerged as a pidgin 
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language in the late 19th century, as an evolution of  South Seas Jargon, as plantation workers 
from linguistically diverse parts of  the archipelago sought a means of  mutual intelligibility 
(ibid). While its vocabulary is close to English, its pronunciation and grammar are very distinct, 
and it acts as the lingua franca of  the nation. As a further consequence of  its colonial past, the 
Ni-Vanuatu population is overwhelmingly Christian, but there is also strong maintenance of  
pre-colonial beliefs and practices (known in Bislama as kastom). The different belief  systems of  
Vanuatu are discussed in greater length in Chapter Six. 
Early anthropological accounts of  the New Hebrides paid significant attention to the 
phenomena of  cargo cults, predominately those that emerged in the southern island of  Tanna 
(Guiart 1956; Worsley 1968; Lindstrom 1981). These cults were millenarian, centred around 
charismatic individuals, and have been interpreted by some as a form of  anti-colonial 
resistance. The most famous of  these cults, the John Frum movement, still has an ongoing 
spiritual and political presence on Tanna, though its membership has significantly waned. Due 
to the small size of  the remaining cults and their geographical location (far south of  where I 
conducted my fieldwork) they do not feature in my thesis, yet they highlight the continuing 
academic interest in religious movements in Vanuatu and their visions of  the future, a tradition 
that I continue in Chapter Six. Since independence there has been greater academic attention 
on the role of  kastom in nation-building, as well as its relationship to Christianity and modernity 
(Tonkinson 1982; Jolly 1992; Taylor 2016a). 
There is substantial research into climate change responses and understandings in Vanuatu. 
This includes explorations of  networked governance approaches to disaster management in 
Vanuatu, particularly the integration of  disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation 
by governmental and non-governmental actors (Vachette 2017), as well as examinations of  local 
knowledge, including traditional calendars, that can facilitate effective responses to climate 
change (Granderson 2017; Mondragón 2004). Meanwhile Warrick (2011) has focused on 
community-based adaptation to climate change in the northern island of  Mota Lava, noting 
the discrepancy between international discourses of  adaptation that determine the causes of  
vulnerability to be biophysical climatological phenomena that demand technical solutions, 
compared with local understandings that emphasise the social basis of  vulnerability. Already 
this indicates the diversity of  narrative framings and epistemologies of  climate change in a 
Vanuatu context. There is an opportunity to explore religious responses to climate change 
further, while also building on the traditions of  earlier anthropological work. 
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7. Outline of chapters 
 
In Chapter Two, my literature review, I begin by highlighting the role of  narrative in debates 
surrounding the Anthropocene, and the significance of  how climate change is narratively 
framed. I introduce the ‘inevitable inundation discourse’ as a Pacific Island example of  an 
apocalyptic ‘horror story’ (Buck 2015) of  the Anthropocene, and highlight its various 
shortcomings as an inaccurate and disempowering narrative.  
Having established the value of  investigating alternative discourses and counter-narratives of  
the Pacific Islands and climate change, I identify three key areas to explore. Firstly, I consider 
the contributions of  Pacific perspectives, focusing on Epeli Hau’ofa’s highly influential Sea of  
Islands vision, and its challenges to the belittlement of  the Pacific, a belittlement exacerbated 
by the inevitable inundation discourse (Section 3A). Reflecting upon the post-political critique 
of  dominant climate migration discourses outlined in Section 2, I turn to literature concerning 
climate activist movements (Section 3B), pairing this with a focus on the emotional geographies 
of  climate change and the role of  affect in social movements (Section 3C), noting the absence 
of  literature that explores activism in a specifically Pacific context. Finally, I explore the 
potential for religious understandings of  climate change in the Pacific Island region (Section 4), 
looking to redress the shortage of  literature concerning religious practices and climate change, 
as well as challenging reductive analyses of  religion as a barrier to climate action. 
Turning from the theoretical to the empirical, I begin Chapter Three, my methodology, by 
presenting my research method rationale and reviewing my data collection process. My 
qualitative case study research was conducted in two phases, in two different sites, working in 
partnership with two main civil society organisations and one international development 
agency. I used participant observation and semi-structured interviews as my primary research 
methods. Using ‘purposive non-random sampling’ (Davis et al. 2007: 166) I interviewed over 
60 individuals from a range of  demographic categories: active and former members of  350 
Pacific and 350 Vanuatu; governmental and chiefly authorities; local and ex-patriate NGO 
workers involved in climate change adaptation and advocacy; and priests and religious 
authorities.  
For the final section of  my methodology chapter I reflect in greater depth upon the ethics of  
my research practice. In particular I examine three areas that emerge from the indigenous 
research methods literature: problematising anonymity, embracing sagacity and practicing 
reciprocity. While not claiming to situate myself  as a practitioner of  indigenous research 
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methods, I evaluate the efforts I have made in these three areas. 
In the following two chapters, I focus on the Pacific Climate Warriors as a case study. In Chapter 
Four, I examine the Pacific Climate Warrior campaign through the lens of  Epeli Hau’ofa’s 
(1994) Sea of  Islands vision. Recognising his vision’s potential to contest the inevitable 
inundation discourse, as well as the region’s general belittlement, I explore to what extent 
features of  this Sea of  Islands vision are being realised on the ground. I identify manifestations 
of  Oceanic regionalism via the formation of  familial bonds (highlighting the significance of  
kinship to a Pacific mode of  activism) and through performances of  fluid, composite pan-
Pacific identities, using traditional garments, flags, song and dance. I also rework Hau’ofa’s 
concept of  world enlargement – the all-engulfing expansion of  Oceania’s reach to include 
diasporic Pacific communities – to consider the ways in which the Warriors’ campaign 
subverted power relations between the Pacific Islands and Australia, as well as the rest of  the 
world. I identify how the process of  world enlargement manifests firstly via Pacific Island 
concerns being brought home to Australia, secondly through the Warriors acting globally, 
rather than only in their own nations’ interests, and thirdly through their stance on re-educating 
Australia. Finally, I raise questions about inequalities in both Hau’ofa’s model of  regionalism 
and the Warriors’ embodiments of  it, in terms of  power differentials along gendered and 
geographic lines. I introduce the concept of  relative altitudinal privilege to highlight the manner 
in which the Warriors’ model of  regionalism is predicated upon difference in degrees of  
exposure to risks such as sea level rise, a predication that challenges representations of  the 
Warriors as on the front lines of  climate change.  
I continue with this focus on the Pacific Climate Warriors in Chapter Five, examining the 
Warriors as political subjects, as a response to the depoliticisation of  the inevitable inundation 
discourse, gaps in existing climate and migration literature, and the demand for the re-
politicisation of  the climate debate emerging from the post-politics literature. I combine ideas 
of  the political from Swyngedouw (2010) with Bennett’s idea of  enchantment3, through 
contending that activist identities that compel individuals to ethical action are produced 
through transformational affective encounters. I document three of  the major emotions the 
Warriors experience – sorrow, fear and anger – and the effects of  these affects on their actions 
and political identities, as well as the disciplinary acts involved in the processes of  becoming 
Warriors. I contextualise the Warriors’ experiences using literature on the role of  affect and 
                                                        
3 Concepts that will be fully introduced in Chapter Two. 
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emotion in social movements, yet note the Western bias in the majority of  this literature. By 
contrast in this chapter I identify some of  the potential defining features of  an emergent Pacific 
mode of  protest, including an emphasis upon connection to land, kin and faith. In 
foregrounding affectual encounters in this chapter, I also contribute to a rejection of  purely 
rationalist, secular and science-driven narratives of  climate change. 
I take this rejection further in my third and final empirical chapter, in which I turn to my second 
case study – climate initiatives in Vanuatu – and build upon the recognition of  the importance 
of  faith in Pacific activist movements in the previous two chapters. Here I explore the potential 
for religious responses to climate change, particularly biblical narratives, as counterpoints to the 
inevitable inundation discourse. I establish the significance of  Christianity in Vanuatu, and the 
tensions and convergences between Christian and kastom belief  systems. I note the 
marginalisation within the literature of  religious responses to climate change, highlighting 
concerns raised about the story of  Noah utilised as a means of  climate denial across the atoll 
states of  Oceania. I follow Kempf  (2017) in arguing that these academic responses to the Noah 
story have largely treated religion as a barrier rather than a resource and therefore insisted upon 
a purification of  science and religion. Instead I argue for a tufala save approach, one that 
balances scientific, kastom and Christian epistemologies of  climate change. I also contend that 
biblical stories are themselves polysemous and can be told in myriad ways to reach different 
political and ethical conclusions, demonstrating the heterogeneity of  religious responses to 
climate change. To evidence this, I recount three tellings of  the Story of  Noah I encountered 
during my fieldwork – rainbow covenant as denial, Noah as preparation, and Islanders as 
unjustly outside of  the ark. I examine the political imaginaries that are both generated and 
foreclosed by these different articulations of  the Noah story, exploring questions of  trust in the 
divine, the sin of  carbon emissions and divine accompaniment in suffering. I conclude by 
recognising that each telling in its own way foregrounds islander agency and does contest the 
inevitable inundation discourse, highlighting the richness of  locally meaningful and morally 
compelling counter-narratives of  climate change in the Pacific Island region.  
I conclude by outlining my five main theoretical contributions: i) contributing towards a ‘third 
wave’ of  critique of  the inevitable inundation discourse, by not further dissecting the discourse 
but highlighting alternative narrative framings of  climate change and the Pacific; ii) 
interrogating Hau’ofa’s work in light of  an empirical case study and expanding his notion of  
world enlargement; iii) combining Swyngedouw’s notion of  the political with Bennett’s vision 
of  affect and enchantment in order to further discussions of  those who experience climate 
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change impacts as political subjects; iv) documenting the diversity of  religious narratives of  
climate change in the Pacific, thereby demonstrating the compatibility of  climate change 
adaptation and biblical understandings, and the importance of  balancing multiple 
epistemologies of  climate change, an approach I dub tufala save; v) advancing the literature 
concerning the Anthropocene and narrative by demonstrating what Anthropocenic story-
telling might look like, through an emphasis upon plurality and care.  
In this final chapter I also unpick questions running throughout my thesis about representation 
and the process of  representing, and identify further potential areas for investigation, including 
a focus on the more-than-human in the context of  climate change in the Pacific, and a further 
appreciation of  the heterogeneity of  religious responses to climate change through greater 
engagement with evangelical Christian denominations.  
 
2. Anthropocenic narratives, drowning islands and 
religious responses: a literature review 
 
I open by exploring three central debates surrounding the Anthropocene (Section 1): questions 
over its starting date, nomenclature and the role of  narrative. Focusing on this latter question, 
I critique existing dominant narrative framings of  the Anthropocene and recognise that the 
same lessons apply to narrative framings of  climate change. I establish that a purely science-led 
approach to climate change is insufficient, and instead encourage a focus upon ethics and 
enchantment.  
I then situate these theoretical concerns in a Pacific context (Section 2), highlighting the 
pervasive nature of  the inevitable inundation discourse, an example of  the ‘horror stories’ or 
inadequate dominant narrative framing of  the Anthropocene discussed in the previous section. 
I dissect this dominant discourse that presents the Pacific Islands as already lost and Pacific 
Islanders as helpless potential climate refugees. I outline the first wave of  critique, focusing on 
miscalculation and environmentally deterministic understandings of  migration. I then turn to 
the second wave of  critique, which emphasises the political disservice the inevitable inundation 
discourse performs for those it represents, in terms of  the disempowering of  Islander 
communities.  
Based on this examination of  the literature, I establish my overall research aim, which is to 
explore narratives of  climate change and the Pacific Islands that challenge or contest the 
inevitable inundation discourse. I contend that rather than refining existing refutations of  this 
discourse, highlighting alternative existing narratives could form the basis for a third wave of  
critique. Consequently, I identify three key areas to explore with regards to potential Pacific 
Islander-led counter-narratives. First, I consider the contributions of  Pacific perspectives, 
focusing on Epeli Hau’ofa’s highly influential ‘Sea of  Islands’ vision and its challenges to the 
belittlement of  the Pacific, a belittlement exacerbated by the inevitable inundation discourse 
(Section 3A). Reflecting upon the post-political critique of  dominant climate migration 
discourses outlined in Section 2, I turn to literature concerning climate activist movements 
(Section 3B), combining this with a focus on the emotional geographies of  climate change and 
the role of  affect in social movements (Section 3C), and noting the absence of  literature that 
explores activism in a specifically Pacific context. Finally, I explore the potential for religious 
understandings of  climate change in the Pacific Island region (Section 4), looking to redress the 
shortage of  literature concerning religious practices and climate change, as well as challenging 
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reductive analyses of  religion as a barrier to climate action.  
1. Narrating the Anthropocene: challenges and possibilities 
 
The Anthropocene, as both a geological epoch and wider sociopolitical construct, is at the 
centre of  multiple intersecting debates. I begin by navigating two of  the main areas of  debate: 
when the Anthropocene began and what we call it, noting how both are underpinned by 
questions regarding the attribution of  moral responsibility. Anchoring my research in the third 
area of  debate – what narratives the Anthropocene requires or generates –  I explore the power 
of  narrative, noting the limitations surrounding dominant framings of  the Anthropocene. 
Understanding climate change as a metonym for the Anthropocene, I focus in on the 
significance of  narrative framings of  climate change. As an alternative to these dominant 
framings, I examine calls for a focus upon care, ethics and enchantment, and to move from 
understanding climate change as a problem to recognising what work it can do for us.  
1A. Beginnings, nomenclature and narrative assemblages: debating the Anthropocene 
 
Ever since Paul Crutzen’s famous announcement in 2002 that we have left the Holocene 
behind, and are now living in an age where humans are acting as a geological force upon the 
planet (Zalasiewicz et al. 2008), the question of  when such a time began has been pivotal. While 
a minority of  scholars advocate an early starting event such as the megafauna extinction or the 
Neolithic revolution (see for example Ruddiman 2003), the most popular theories all centre on 
actions within the past five hundred years. Thus the major contenders include the mixing of  
previously separated biota in the early 17th century initiated by European imperialism (the 
‘Orbis’ theory as proposed by Lewis and Maslin 2015a), the rise of  carbon dioxide emissions 
resulting from the invention of  the steam engine and the Industrial Revolution (Crutzen 2002), 
the Great Acceleration of  economic growth, technology, communications and fossil fuel 
consumption from 1945 onward (Steffen et al. 2015), and the peak in levels of  radioactive 
isotopes, following two decades of  nuclear testing (Lewis and Maslin 2015b). Central to this 
debate is a question not just of  metrics (with Steffen et al. (2011) advocating the use of  a Global 
Strategic Section Age in contrast with Lewis and Maslin’s (2015a) commitment to a Global 
Boundary Strategic Section and Point) but also morality, as the choice of  starting date shapes 
one’s understanding of  who constitutes ‘the Anthropos’ and who consequently should be held 
to account for our current ecological predicament, particularly with regards to anthropogenic 
climate change.  
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Consequently, it is unsurprising that this controversy exceeds the merely geological. Not just 
the starting date, but the very nomenclature of  the Anthropocene is a site of  contention. 
Geographical and anthropological literatures currently abound with alternative eras. While 
some authors favour an emphasis on the complicity not of  our entire species, but particular 
socio-economic systems, be it the ‘Capitalocene’ (Moore 2016; Altvater 2016; Parenti 2016) or 
the ‘Plantationocene’ (Haraway et al. 2016), others hold culpable specific sub-sets of  humanity, 
with the terminology of  the ‘Anglocene’ (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016) or the more sardonic 
‘Manthropocene’ (Raworth 2014). By contrast, McBrien (2016) reframes the debate in terms 
of  consequence rather than cause, championing the ‘Necrocene’ as a recognition of  the mass 
biological and cultural extinction that characterises our current epoch.  
Through this research, I do not intend to add another name to the pile. As Bonneuill and 
Fressoz (2016) have illustrated through structuring their work around a succession of  neologisms 
(including the increasingly poetic ‘Thanatocene’ and ‘Polemocene’), the potential variations in 
nomenclature appear endless. Instead, I wish to acknowledge my relationship to this literature 
in three ways.  
Firstly, when referencing these debates regarding our current unprecedented epoch, I favour 
the language of  Anthropocene, as opposed to its many alternatives. In this I follow Chakrabarty 
(2009), who critically interrogates the figure of  the Anthropos as agent, recognising a need to 
bring histories of  capitalism into our understanding of  the Anthropocene, while not making it 
synonymous with capitalism. He recognises the role of  capitalism in the intensification of  fossil 
fuel consumption as well as critiques of  the Anthropos, namely that poorer nations and poorer 
populations within richer countries should not be equally blamed for the climate crisis, yet 
argues that a species view is not incompatible with a recognition of  the workings of  capitalism 
and imperialism, and with a common but differentiated responsibility approach. Moreover, he 
argues that there are boundary conditions for human life on our planet (such as temperature 
and ocean acidity) that are not connected to the logic of  capitalism or any political ideology or 
form. While not all of  humanity is equally responsible for our current state, he takes a species 
viewpoint in terms of  our ‘shared catastrophe that we have all fallen into’ (219). However, as 
well as diversely differentiated responsibility, I would argue that we also need to recognise 
diversely distributed outcomes: that some have fallen further into this catastrophe than others, 
irrespective of  their degrees of  responsibility, something which Chakrabarty does allude to in 
his acknowledgement that climate change has the potential to exacerbate existing capitalist 
inequalities. Chakrabarty draws a distinction between the climate crisis and other forms of  
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capitalist crisis, with the argument that the wealthy are less able to use the forces of  capital to 
extract themselves from the former. However, with respect to the politics of  climate adaptation, 
the discrepancy between the adaptation of  the rich and the poor must still be acknowledged. 
In Chakrabarty’s work there is also a convergence between a concern with climate change and 
with the Anthropocene, one that my work mirrors, following Rudiak-Gould’s recognition that 
climate change is often embraced as a ‘yardstick, metonym, or epitome of  the Anthropocene 
more generally’ (2015: 48).  
Returning to a geological lens, this combination of  anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist critique 
with a species-level analysis is also found in Lewis and Maslin’s ‘Orbis’ theory (2015a), as they 
propose 1610 as the beginning of  the Anthropocene, both due to the mixing of  previously 
continentally-separated biota and because of  the dip in carbon dioxide concentrations 
occasioned by the enormous loss of  indigenous human life in the Americas. These two factors 
are temporally aligned and united by their origins in European colonialism, which is also 
recognised by the Orbis proponents as a foundation for the development of  industrial society, 
and thus the ensuing acceleration of  fossil fuel consumption.  
Secondly, while many scholars are engaging in discourses of  the Anthropocene, there is a 
question over whether it is a publicly circulating discourse, particularly for my research 
participants. They are actively receiving, engaging, constructing and contesting discourses of  
climate change, yet all the many ‘cenes’ appear absent. Yet, as noted above, there is a theoretical 
convergence between ideas of  the Anthropocene and understandings of  climate change. Thus, 
through this research, which is focused upon discourses of  climate change, I recognise that 
debates around climate change can be conceptually contextualised in wider discussions about 
human-planetary relations without claiming that my research participants are themselves 
intentionally debating the Anthropocene. Consequently, throughout this research I will 
primarily focus upon narratives of  climate change, but intend that their wider Anthropocenic 
significance remains clear. 
Finally, having reconciled my use of  the term Anthropocene with my participants’ lack of  direct 
engagement with it, I wish to look beyond questions of  date or name. It is a third dimension to 
the Anthropocene debates that concerns me: understanding the relationship between the 
Anthropocene and narrative. I follow Donna Haraway, Anna Tsing, Elaine Gan, Heather 
Swanson and Nils Bubandt in understanding the Anthropocene as both requiring narrative 
(Haraway 2016a; Tsing et al. 2017) and as an assemblage of  narrative (Buck 2015).  
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Story telling for earthly survival (Terranova 2016), a feature-length documentary focused upon 
Donna Haraway’s most recent work, as well as Tsing et al.’s (2017) project Arts of  Living on a 
Damaged Planet with its call for ‘new creativities for worlds that are possible’ (2017: 176M4), both 
suggest narratives play a crucial role in negotiating our way through this new epoch. Moreover, 
this desire for narrative extends beyond the social sciences. Tsing et al. (2017) also recognise the 
value of  fiction as an Anthropocenic endeavour as they argue that ‘creative writing invites us to 
imagine the world differently, to listen beyond newspaper headlines to hear those quiet stories 
about the Anthropocene whispered in small encounters’ (2017: 9M). Similarly, Donna Haraway 
(2015) invokes the thoughts and works of  Ursula Le Guin and Octavia E. Butler, famous figures 
of  feminist sci-fi, for her Cthulucenic enterprise. In her coinage of  the ‘Chthulucene’, Haraway 
brazenly rejects the starting date debate, instead declaring this epoch an ‘everwhen’. This 
alternative neologism decentres the anthropos and invokes the ancestral and ongoing 
connections between beings, crystallised in the metaphors of  spider webs and tentacles, thereby 
suggesting a blueprint for interspecies care and compassion. In this work, Haraway explicitly 
resists explanation of  the acronym ‘S.F.’, utilising it to simultaneously evoke speculative 
fabulations/ feminisms, science-fiction and string figures (one of  her latest core metaphors), 
again suggesting the centrality of  narrative.  
Meanwhile, Buck captures this notion of  Anthropocene as narrative most succinctly in her 
claim that ‘it is more useful, though, to see the Anthropocene as a collection of  multiple, related 
stories, each calling up the reference of  another… the whole narrative assemblage adding up 
to something more than its pieces’ (2015: 369-370). Similarly, Haraway (2016b), explicitly 
positions the Chthulucene as a third story, in contrast to the stories of  Anthropocene and 
Capitalocene, indicating the inextricability of  this debate from questions of  narrative. Akin to 
this, Pratt invokes the notion of  the Anthropocene as chronotope ‘a particular configuration of  
time and space that generates stories through which a society can examine itself ’ (2017: 170G), 
particularly as it positions itself  from the future looking upon our present. Thus, at once the 
Anthropocene is seen as a collection of  narratives, the generation of  narratives, and a 
requirement for narrative.  
Amongst the different dimensions of  the Anthropocene, it is the spectre of  climate change I 
                                                        
4 Arts of Living is divided into two halves – Ghosts and Monsters – that each begin at different ends of the book 
and work towards the centre. Consequently, most page numbers appear twice. To clarify citation, I include a G 
for Ghosts or an M for Monsters to identify the respective half of the volume.  
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wish to focus on. Understanding the Anthropocene as both requiring narrative and being itself  
discursively produced resonates with Hulme’s (2016) understanding of  climate as always 
cultural. I wish to follow Hulme (2009) in pinpointing and elucidating different narratives of  
climate change, and in recognising climate change as both a narrative and physical 
phenomenon. Moving from the broader concept of  the Anthropocene to the specificity of  
anthropogenic climate change helps to highlight the next key aspect of  discussion: the power 
and importance of  narrative.  
1B. Framing climate change: the power and potential of narrative 
 
A thread that seems to connect the work of  Haraway, Tsing et al., Hulme and Buck is the 
centrality of  narrative to either living with climate change or living through the Anthropocene. 
For instance, with Arts of  Living on a Dying Planet, narrative is presented as inextricably entangled 
with the potential for ethical action. Tsing et al. move away from definitions, and towards ethics, 
asking ‘not what the Anthropocene is but how it will be lived’ (Pratt 2017: 170G). This ethical 
practice is intimately tied to the production of  narrative as ‘the question of  how to live the 
Anthropocene is inseparable from the question of  how to write it. Indeed, writing becomes the 
way of  posing the question of  how to live’ (ibid). This relationship between ethics and narrative 
will examined in greater detail in Section 1C. 
Meanwhile, Buck emphasises the importance of  narrative through recognising the power and 
material impacts of  discourse. She argues that ‘Anthropocene storylines have fiscal, ecological, 
psychological, and other practical effects. These imagined futures shape present and future 
human and nonhuman ecologies, and geographers are well poised to examine them’ (2015: 
370). Tsing et al. concur, arguing that ‘material worlds and the stories we tell about them are 
bound up with each other’ (2017: 10M).  
The importance of  narrative is also particularly apparent with respect to climate change, 
especially if  one accepts Hulme’s thesis that climate change now has more power ‘as a 
mobilising idea than it does as a physical phenomenon’ (Hulme 2009: 328). He argues that the 
idea of  climate change can now be found across the full spectrum of  human ‘endeavours, 
institutions, practices and stories’ (2009: 322), but that this idea is far from unitary. The spread 
of  climate change as a polysemous idea is evident in the upsurge of  ‘creative carbon 
compounds’ (Koteyko et al. 2010), new lexical combinations that use carbon as a base (e.g. 
carbon footprints, carbon guilt), and that through different metaphorical associations shape 
understandings of  climate change in terms of  financial processes, lifestyle choices or sceptical 
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attitudes. Mundane everyday objects, such as cattle grids, are also embroiled in different 
storylines about climate change and landscape (Leyshon and Geoghegan 2012). The 
polysemous nature of  climate change is particularly pertinent to the case studies that I explore, 
as Hulme argues that ‘the diversities of  meanings attached to this expression expands further 
if  one moves outside these formalised webs of  exchange, into communities less exposed to 
globalised knowledge, politics and entertainment’ (2009: 325). There is increased academic 
interest in indigenous communities’ varied understandings and framings of  climate change 
(Rudiak-Gould 2012; Crate and Nuttal 2009), as well as multiple, potentially contradictory 
ontologies of  climate change (Goldman et al. 2016).  
Thus, climate change according to all these authors is a powerful idea, and one that can carry 
many different meanings. Yet the power to enlist climate change in service to a particular 
meaning or agenda is not equally distributed: what is central to this is the control of  climate 
change narratives, particularly through the media. As a case in point, in a study of  the US 
prestige press, Boykoff  and Boykoff  (2004) found that journalistic norms of  balance in 
representations of  climate science and climate denial had led to significant discrepancies 
between public and scientific climate change discourses. The prestige press’ attempts to situate 
themselves as neutral on the validity of  climate science had led to inaccurate coverage in terms 
of  informational bias, and impeded proactive responses to climate change. Indeed, Hulme 
argues that no climate change narrative is neutral, as different aspects of  a story can be framed, 
filtered and amplified in different ways to emphasise or de-emphasise different aspects, thereby 
encouraging or discouraging certain courses of  action and designations of  responsibility. Thus, 
he emphasises the need to ‘understand who controls these narratives and the way they influence 
what people believe about climate change and its significance’ (2009: 215). The significance of  
media narratives will be reiterated in Section 2 in relation to dominant media portrayals of  the 
Pacific Islands and climate change.  
One way of  negotiating the many different meanings climate change holds is through story-
telling, as through the telling of  new stories, we can embark on different projects, directions and 
solutions, and understand climate change in a different way (Hulme 2009). The increasing 
volumes of  climate change fiction, theatre and poetry (Johns-Putra 2016; Tuhus-Dubrow 2013), 
as well as recent work to rethink classic literature in the light of  climate change (Martin 2016), 
suggest that ever-expanding numbers of  authors and academics are engaged in this project of  
climate story-telling. This emphasis upon the need for new stories suggests some discontent with 
the existing framings of  climate change in circulation, leading to my next area of  enquiry: what 
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problems do these authors find with current tellings of  the Anthropocene?  
The problems these authors highlight with existing dominant narratives centre on three key 
concerns: an emphasis on the human in isolation from the rest of  the living world; on the 
rational and scientific at the expense of  wider cultural meaning; and upon the doomed and 
inevitable as opposed to narratives of  hope and wonder.  
The first concern is highlighted with respect to the problem of  ‘hero stories’, which through 
their preoccupation with a central human protagonist neglect the richness and wonder of  
everyday life. For Haraway (2016a), stories of  the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene both fall 
into this trap, as they centre the destructive actions of  the human in a way that replicates the 
human exceptionalism that has seemingly guided us on our course towards anthropogenic 
climate change. Tsing et al. concur with the damage wrought by hero narratives, explaining 
that ‘modern heroes – the guardians of  progress across disciplines – are part of  the problem’ 
2017: 8M), as ‘liveability in the Anthropocene is threatened by just those heroic story lines and 
practices that are thought to have made Man great’ (2017: 10M). As an alternative, Haraway 
advocates Ursula Le Guin’s (1996) carrier bag theory of  fiction as a model for Chthulucene 
storytelling (2016b: 39). The metaphor of  the carrier bag (used for transporting children or 
food) in opposition to the spear (the symbol and apparatus of  the violently rapacious hero) 
conveys a need for storytelling as world-building, which collects up the many components of  
life and all their rich interconnections. It also speaks to Jane Bennet’s (2001) emphasis upon the 
moments of  wonder found within everyday life, a source of  enchantment, as she invokes an 
everydayness that can be captured in the carrier bag, but eludes the hero’s tale. As she explains 
it, ‘The experiences that I recycle…are not invaders of  the major tale but underground or 
background residents of  it’ (2001: 8). Meanwhile Tsing et al. (2017) use the metaphor of  weeds 
when they describe the need to gather up ‘the small, partial, and wild stories of  more-than-
human attempts to stay alive’ (2017: 6M), again a metaphor akin to the carrier bag and at odds 
with the spear.  
The second concern is that, according to these researchers, the problem does not just lie with 
heroes, but the ‘horror stories’ in which they figure. Curiously, while images of  horror suffuse 
through the work of  Tsing et al. (2017), whose project is framed around themes of  ‘Ghosts’ and 
‘Monsters’, and Haraway’s alternative epoch of  the Chthulucene is littered with spiders, 
tentacular ones and denizens of  the deep (at an uncomfortable and unresolved distance from 
H.P. Lovecraft’s work), these figments of  horror are antithetical to the horror stories Buck 
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invokes. For Buck, the Anthropocene ‘horror stories’ (370) that we must write against rely upon 
a Weberian notion of  disenchantment, and domination of  the planet: they are the tales of  geo-
engineering fallout, of  numbing disconnection from the natural world, of  the elevation of  
scientific knowledge above belief  and ethics, and an emphasis upon the secular, rational and 
bureaucratic. For Buck, central to this disenchantment is an alienation from our own labour, 
and its consequences upon the planet. As she frames it, ‘in popular representation, the more 
alienated a phenomenon is, the more Anthropocene it gets. Gathering firewood seems quite 
Holocene in its immediate labor’ (2015: 372). For me, this opens the question of  what an 
alienated, disenchanted Anthropocene looks like from a non-Global North or non-Western 
perspective. Focusing on subsistence agricultural societies – where the gathering of  firewood is 
a contemporary reality – might bring into view some of  the alternative Anthropocene retellings 
that Buck seeks, a contribution that I aim to make. 
This latter problem with Anthropocenic narratives – that they focus exclusively upon the 
scientific, secular and rational – is also pertinent to narratives of  climate change. Hulme argues 
that a purely scientific framing of  climate change is insufficient, as ‘science may be solving the 
mysteries of  climate, but it is not helping us discover the meaning of  climate change’ (2009: 
325). The provision of  greater scientific information alone cannot resolve the political and 
ethical questions climate change poses, as they are fundamentally questions about how we wish 
to live in the world. Barnett and Campbell (2010) concur, arguing that while natural science 
has enormously furthered our understanding of  global warming, its dominance is inhibiting 
the generation of  other forms of  knowledge about climate change. As an alternative, drawing 
upon the work of  Anderson (2015), Geertz (1973) and Ingold (1994) in his understanding of  
culture, Hulme argues for the need to move away from a disenchanted view of  climate change 
and instead begin ‘re-situating culture and the human spirit at the heart of  our understanding 
of  climate’ (2009: xxxvii), as, through this cultural perspective climate is rendered meaningful, 
since ‘all knowledge of  climate is cultural’ (Hulme 2016: 7). For this to be achieved, Hulme 
believes the full gamut of  disciplinary expertise is needed to really understand ‘the phenomenon 
and discourse of  climate-change’ (Hulme 2016: xiii). This concern for interdisciplinary breadth 
is shared by Tsing et al. (2017) in their collaborations forged between novelists, biologists, 
archaeologists and anthropologists.  
As a third concern, there is a particular strain of  horror story that Hulme’s (2009) work 
highlights and rejects: the apocalyptic. In his development of  four mythic forms of  climate 
discourse, he identifies ‘presaging Apocalypse’, a narrative utilised by journalists, campaigners 
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and politicians, and conveyed through the language of  fear, impending disaster and irreversible 
‘tipping points’ cascading into collapse. While this narrative communicates a sense of  danger 
and urgency, Hulme remains uncomfortable with repeated recourse to it as it can be 
disempowering. According to Salvador and Norton (2011) this can be seen in the case of  early 
2000’s blockbuster The Day After Tomorrow whose framing of  climate apocalypse and emphasis 
upon individual survival rather than collective action can actually discourage pro-
environmental behaviours. This stance is reinforced by O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009), who 
contend that catastrophic representations of  climate change can distance and desensitise the 
public or provoke feelings of  fatalism or apathy. Instead they advocate visual and iconic 
framings of  climate change that are personally salient: representations that individuals can 
meaningfully engage with on an everyday basis.  
Thus, the work of  these authors suggests a need to cast out the hero-protagonist, along with the 
stories of  ‘calculability or control, as well as stories of  despair and tragic guilt’ (Buck 2015: 376). 
Crucially, these works also help us to think through what sort of  stories can go in their place, 
and the other ways we can think about, feel and narrate climate. As Buck (2015: 370) so 
succinctly frames it, ‘If  the Anthropocene was not an anthology of  scary tales, drawn from an 
awkward bricolage of  science and preternatural fears, what else could it be?’. 
One answer emerges in the form of  the many contributions to Arts of  Living on a Dying Planet 
(Tsing et al. 2017), with stories of  tomatoes flourishing in borderlands in cracked cement, 
nuclear ghosts post-Chernobyl, lichen lifeworlds and new non-hierarchical biological 
metaphors. Meanwhile Haraway, as an example of  speculative fabulation and multispecies 
storytelling has co-created ‘The Camille Stories: Children of  Compost’ and demands that we 
interrogate ‘Which stories story stories’ (2016b: 39). Similarly, Buck (2015:369) argues for 
‘aesthetic and cultural production’ around alternative visions of  the Anthropocene, premised 
on Jane Bennett’s concept of  enchantment and an ethic of  care. 
Enchantment, as envisioned by Bennett, is premised upon ‘a reawakened sense of  wonder’ 
(Buck 2015: 369), which is accessed through affective sensory experience – allowing one to be 
struck with wonder in everyday life – and a rejection of  cynical alienation and fatalism. Bennett 
identifies moments of  ‘crossing’ or sensuous (as opposed to purely rational) encounters with 
objects or other beings as generative of  enchantment, and consequently transformation 
through wonder, enabling ethical life. Moreover, Bennett’s work also reveals an underlying 
preoccupation with narrative, as she describes her rejection of  discourses of  disenchantment 
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and her retelling of  the situation as an ‘alter-tale’ (2001: 8) or ‘counterstory’ (2001: 9).  
While the concept of  enchantment is not directly addressed, Tsing et al.’s (2017) emphasis upon 
the curiosity needed to limit environmental destruction and survive the Anthropocene echoes 
Bennett’s idea of  wonder and being alert and open to the particular singularity of  the natural 
world. They define curiosity as ‘an attunement to multispecies entanglement, complexity and 
the shimmer all around us’ (2017: 11), which resonates with Bennett’s command to cultivate 
enchantment through honing ‘sensory receptivity to the marvellous specificity of  things’ (2001: 
4). One of  the contributors, Mary Louise Pratt (2017), also partially echoes Bennett’s words, as 
she presents the production of  narrative as a process of  enchantment, as landscapes are created 
through writing. Meanwhile, Nils Bubandt’s (2017) essay in the volume concerning Lusi, an 
Indonesian mud volcano, whose causes are mired in a mix of  spiritual revenge, geological 
activity and political corruption, suggests what an account of  the Anthropocene that is awake 
to everyday moments of  wonder might look like. Appeals to enchantment are also present in 
literature concerning narratives and framings of  climate change. De Goede and Randalls bring 
together this present concern with enchantment with ideas of  post-politics, to be discussed in 
Section 2. They explore the ‘banality of  catastrophe’ (2009: 871) produced by the connected 
discourses and practices of  climate change precaution and security preemption, a banality that 
could both depoliticise and lack enchantment, and thereby, according to Bennett’s analysis, 
inhibit ethical action. Moreover, Smith (2014: 23) echoes previously mentioned concerns about 
discourses that exclusively focus upon the scientific and rational. He argues that new stories 
need to be told about climate change that reject the emphasis upon scientific research as a 
completed project. Instead climate change research could itself  become enchanting, through 
transparently revealing the uncertainty and processes of  risk assessment involved in climate 
change research, across all disciplines.  
1C. Ethics of care and ethical choices 
 
Having established the potential for enchantment as a counterpoint to the horror stories of  the 
Anthropocene, I further unpick the role of  ethics, both as a crucial dimension of  enchantment 
and as a broader concern of  the climate change and narrative literature. A key dimension of  
this alternative Anthropocene as demanded by Buck is an underlying ‘ethic of  care’ (2015: 369), 
as engendered through a renewed sense of  enchantment. According to Buck’s adaptation of  
Bennett’s principles, enchantment springs from intimate and unmediated relations with nature, 
which then act as a springboard to care and/or revulsion, which in turn inspires action. Here 
 42 
Tsing and Haraway’s projects again both resonate, in terms of  demands for an ethics of  
compassion for human and non-human others, as well as a recognition of  species and bodily 
interdependence, what Haraway sees as ‘making kin’ (2016a: 5).  
However, this is far from the only relationship that can be found between ethics and climate 
change narratives. Hulme’s (2009) analysis of  framings of  climate and climate change also 
considers the place of  ethics, but not in terms of  a pre-given emphasis upon care, but as an 
examination of  the ethical choices open to us as humans in terms of  how we choose to live with 
climate change. Central to this again is Hulme’s emphasis upon the limitations of  scientific and 
economic framings of  climate change: these articulations provide some insights, but they cannot 
tell us what constitutes the ‘good life’ that we should aspire to. The place of  narrative and 
representation is again central. For Hulme, the arts have the potential to ‘provoke reflection on 
the profound questions climate change presents: the good life to be admired, the future to be 
aspired to and the responsibilities they have to others, both human and non-human’ (Hulme 
2016: 9). Miles (2010) has questioned the extent to which art can engender a shift in thought 
and attitudes surrounding climate change, postulating that art could reinforce the distance 
between the viewer and climate change as a phenomenon. However, Dunaway (2009) takes a 
more hopeful stance, arguing that art can be used to produce new perspectives on climate 
change. As well as the catastrophic, art can showcase hopeful and empowering visions of  how 
life could be sustainably lived, and in doing so, move beyond treating climate change as an 
abstract global issue, instead locally situating it. However, Hulme (2016) disputes the didactic 
nature of  the arts, suggesting that these can provoke reflection, but neither they nor climate 
science provide easy answers for us, suggesting a limitation to the role of  narrative. This is even 
the case with regard to what he highlights as explicitly moral and ethical framings of  climate 
change, as will be discussed further in Section 4, exploring the relationship between climate 
discourses and religious understandings.  
Consequently, as well as recognising it as a narrative assemblage, we reach the conclusion that 
an alternative Anthropocene requires alternative tellings, counter-discourses and new stories 
that potentially embody these ethics and qualities of  wonder and care rather than defeat and 
despair, or at least guide us in our search for a good life in a climatically changing world.  
1D. Further directions for research 
 
Thus, in following these authors it is possible to conclude that narrative plays an essential, 
powerful, and potentially destructive or restorative role with respect to the practices of  living 
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with climate change and in the Anthropocene. Yet Buck (2015) concludes that narrative alone 
is insufficient. She issues a call for both storytelling and action, as she argues that ‘we need to 
not just retell the Anthropocene but redo it’ (2015: 372). For Buck, enchantment as an art of  
living (to borrow Tsing’s phrase) in the Anthropocene can and should be combined with 
systemic political change, and can provide a momentum for it. Consequently, in this research I 
examine both discourses and practices, convergences and discord between theory and action, 
looking at those who are both advocating for systemic change and producing new discursive 
formations in resistance towards existing narratives.  
When considering how to bring these ideas of  the role of  climate narrative from the theoretical 
to the empirical, it must also be recognised that that these calls for narrative themselves take 
narrative forms. For instance, with Tsing et al.’s (2017) project there are shades of  both what 
Hulme (2009) has categorised as metanarratives of  lamenting Eden, in their demand for a 
‘return to multiple pasts’ (Tsing et al. 2017: 2G) and a presaging Apocalypse model of  urgency, 
with their emphasis upon the need to ‘protect the Holocene entanglements that we need to 
survive’ (ibid). Consequently, Tsing et al.’s project still sits within a problem/ solution framing, 
envisioning climate change as a problem to be solved, as opposed to a condition under which 
we have to choose how we want to live. Yet, as Hulme highlights, with this problem framing 
there is a danger that climate change is fetishised: that it is blamed for all our contemporary 
woes, leading us to the naive conclusion that ‘if  climate-change can be stopped then the world 
would become a safer, more just and desirable place to live’ (2016: 78).  
By contrast, Hulme provocatively suggests that ‘we need to ask not what we can do for climate 
change, but what climate change can do for us’ (2009: 326), through recognising that ‘the idea 
of  climate change is an imaginative resource around which our collective and personal identities 
and projects can, and should, take shape’ (xxxviii). Klein’s (2014) polemical work takes heed of  
this potential, mobilising climate change as an opportunity for widespread socio-economic 
transformation.  
Drawing upon Tsing and Haraway, I recognise the need for alternative narratives, and following 
Bennett and Buck, I also advocate the rejection of  the apocalyptic and the embracing of  
enchantment and sensuous engagements that lead to action as a feature of  these alternative 
framings. Moreover, I wish to bring these ideas in dialogue with Hulme (2009), by 
understanding these alternative narratives not as a solution, but as a facet of  what climate 
change can potentially do for us. Bearing these concepts in mind, I now focus in on the Pacific 
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Island region and upon climate narratives, recognising climate change’s metonymic relation to 
the Anthropocene (Rudiak-Gould 2015), as well as the prominence of  the Pacific Islands in 
climate change debates (as discussed in the previous chapter). I look first at one particular horror 
story and then alternative possible framings that embody these concerns with ethics, 
enchantment and the more-than-scientific. I focus upon the inevitable inundation or drowning 
islands narrative, as an example of  a fatalistic, apocalyptic and ultimately damaging dominant 
discourse. I also recognise the secularity of  dominant climate discourse as a facet of  the 
Weberian disenchanted rationalist horror stories, and recognise this absence of  spiritual 
thought as a shortcoming of  many approaches to climate change internationally, and 
particularly with respect to the Pacific. A recognition of  biblical approaches also presents a 
further avenue for embracing the mythical potential of  narrative (as advocated by Tsing et al. 
and Hulme) and adds a sense of  spiritual wonder to Bennett’s secular vision of  enchantment. 
Following this, I focus on the work of  Pacific theorist Epeli Hau’ofa and literatures of  climate 
change and religion, in order to look the potential role these ideas play in the generation of  
alternative narratives that re-enchant, re-inscribe power relations, and open up theological 
possibility.  
2. Helpless, immediate, inevitable: narratives of climate change in the 
Pacific Islands 
 
Having established the power and significance of  how climate change is narrated, as well as 
some of  the shortcomings of  dominant discourses and potential alternative approaches to 
storying the climate, I focus on these questions of  climate and narrative in the Pacific. The 
Pacific Island region is a key site for exploring climate narratives, due to its visibility in discourses 
of  climate vulnerability and the extreme disproportionality between its responsibility for 
emissions contributions and its exposure to potential and current climate change impacts. 
Consequently, I begin by outlining a horror story of  climate change in the Pacific – the 
inevitable inundation discourse – and discuss many of  its critiques, observing as a gap in the 
literature the need to explore alternative narratives of  climate change in the Pacific, rather than 
merely further critiquing the dominant discourse.  
2A. The inevitable inundation discourse 
 
High tide in Tuvalu: In the tropical Pacific, climate change threatens 
to create a real-life Atlantis.  
(Price 2003, cited in Barnett and Campbell 2010: 168) 
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Media outlets have been suffused with dramatic images of  sea level rise and mass forced 
relocation in the Pacific, with the prospect of  whole countries disappearing beneath the waves 
(Farbotko 2005). Academics, politicians and journalists have coalesced around this dominant 
discourse of  inevitable total inundation and the creation of  climate refugees (Farbotko and 
Lazrus 2012). Barnett and Campbell (2010) identify the key features of  this discourse, which 
they claim has persisted for over a decade: that it often focuses upon geographical places (e.g. 
the islands), but not the people connected to them; that it homogenises islands and islander 
communities; that it is concerned with the environmental causes of  vulnerability, divorced from 
social conditions; that in its emphasis upon climate change as a crisis, the potential for local 
adaptive solutions is overlooked; and that it presumes that island systems are small and 
powerless in the face of  global forces. As a consequence, the ability to practically respond to 
climate change is jeopardised. But precisely where is this discourse articulated? 
Firstly, there are some strong cinematic examples. According to Chambers and Chambers, 
Tuvalu in particular has become a ‘poster child’ for climate catastrophe (2007: 294), with at 
least five films made in less than five years about the threat of  global warming to this country 
of  less than 12,000 people. The film titles give an indication of  the narrative that is dominating 
accounts: Paradise Drowned, That Sinking Feeling, The Disappearing of  Tuvalu and Before the Flood. 
There is an undeniably eschatological tenor to these words. Moreover, many of  these films 
emphasise the powerlessness of  Tuvaluan communities, the imminence of  Tuvalu’s demise, and 
sometimes reduce documentary participants to ‘a scripted dramatic device conveying the theme 
of  impending loss’ (2007: 299) rather than enabling islanders to speak for themselves. According 
to Chambers and Chambers, Before the Flood is one of  the worst offenders. It portrays migration 
as inevitable, Tuvaluan culture as barely worth saving, and overlooks the responsibility of  the 
Global North for the intensified environmental challenges that Tuvaluans face.  
This discourse of  helpless islanders and inevitable inundation is also a media favourite. As 
Connell wryly notes, ‘within journalistic arenas...there is certainty that the demise of  Tuvalu is 
imminent’ (2003: 102). Farbotko’s (2005) analysis of  coverage of  Tuvalu and climate change in 
the Sydney Morning Herald found that the country was repeatedly constructed as small, 
marginal and inevitably endangered. This representation was portrayed in contradistinction to 
presentations of  Australia as strong and unthreatened by climate change. Moreover, migration 
was again presented as the only option, as Tuvalu’s situation was framed in terms of  
helplessness and tragic loss. Notably, these representations did not acknowledge the role of  
Australia’s fossil fuel heavy economy in Tuvalu’s predicament. Similarly, Barnett and 
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Campbell’s (2010: 168) analysis of  media representations of  the Pacific and climate change 
identified the trope of  ‘titanic states’ inevitably sinking, a metaphor that reinforces the 
helplessness of  the countries concerned. Meanwhile, other news accounts have treated island 
futures in an even more blasé way, such as in the flippant headline ‘Tuvalu Toodle-oo’ (Barnett 
and Campbell 2010: 169).  
This narrative also has currency within academic analyses, as can be seen in Parenti’s work. 
His book Trophic of  Chaos dramatically explores climate change as a ‘catastrophic convergence’ 
(2011: 7) of  political, economic and natural disasters. While he has a number of  detailed 
geographically specific sections, the Pacific receives a glib reference as a victim of  inevitable 
relocation. He claims that ‘twenty-two Pacific Island nations, home to seven million people, are 
planning for relocation as rising seas threaten them with national annihilation’ (ibid). The 
Pacific nations in question are unnamed, homogenised and characterised purely in terms of  
their relocation efforts. 
This discourse appears not just as a means of  analysing climate policy, but also seems to be 
perpetuated or even generated by those who are integral to the current climate governance 
system. Al Gore in An Inconvenient Truth displays images of  a king tide5 in Tuvalu and claims that 
‘citizens of  these Pacific nations [of  course unnamed] have all had to evacuate to New Zealand’, 
which is in fact a convenient lie (Farbotko 2010). Similarly, McNamara quotes the 
Undersecretary General of  the UN Office of  the High Representative for Small Island 
Developing States, who claims that ‘climate refugees for the small islands is a reality and they 
cannot deny it’ (2008: 39). McNamara understands the mobilisation of  this discourse as part 
of  a pragmatic approach by UN diplomats to put the burden for responding to climate change 
onto small island states, through adaptation strategies, thereby evading the wider international 
issue of  climate justice and the need for mitigation. 
This discourse does not just appear to be deployed in order to avoid taking action. It also fits 
into a humanitarian narrative mobilised by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in order 
to encourage further emissions reductions. While largely rejecting this framework, Farbotko 
and Lazrus (2012) acknowledge that disappearing islands are a more accessible way of  engaging 
with the threat of  climate change than global mean temperatures. Discourses of  climate 
migration crisis have been deliberately employed by the governments of  some SIDS. Former 
                                                        
5 King tides are particularly high tides that can be expected to occur around twice a year. 
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Maldivian president Mohamed Nasheed vowed to establish a Sovereign Wealth Fund in order 
to finance the purchase of  a new homeland (Kothari 2014), Tuvaluan ministers have publicly 
evoked a sense of  tragic vulnerability (Farbotko 2005) and the Kiribati government has also 
aired the need to possibly relocate (Loughry and McAdam 2008). Tuvalu has even begun 
exploiting the potential of  last chance tourism (Prideaux and McNamara 2013). Shibuya argues 
that this narrative of  ‘apocalyptic urgency’ (1996: 548) has been used in order to challenge the 
largely economic and sceptical framing of  climate change proposed by developed nations. 
McNamara (2008) has also observed this approach by Pacific ambassadors, and interprets it as 
a counter to delay by wealthier countries. 
However, the effectiveness of  this approach must be questioned. As Barnett and Campbell 
(2010) highlight, this narrative of  climate emergency has not been matched by an equivalent 
degree of  governmental action, and in many ways this discourse could be harming rather than 
benefitting those it concerns. This narrative of  inevitable loss, victimhood and island 
expendability should be both empirically and politically challenged, especially as in this 
discourse of  drowning islands it is often the voices of  Pacific Islanders themselves that are 
drowned out.  
Fortunately, this alarmist narrative is not without its critics. While not belittling the threats posed 
by climate change, many researchers have sought to challenge this vision due to empirical 
uncertainties; its potential for justifying inaction or action that is damaging for affected 
communities; its emphasis on victimhood; and its failure to encompass the perspective of  
Islanders themselves, particularly their conceptions of  mobility and their capacity to adapt.  
2B. Questionable calculations 
 
As Bettini (2013b) identifies, there have been two waves of  critique, and this research attempts 
to formulate a third6. The first contests the inevitable forced migration narrative due to the 
empirical uncertainties and unpredictability, both in terms of  climate change impacts and the 
processes of  migration. For a start, the predicted number of  climate migrants has been a point 
of  contention. Former United Nations adviser Norman Myers’ (2002) figure of  200 million 
                                                        
6 My proposal for a third wave of critique is distinct from Arnall’a (2015) suggestion of a third wave of climate 
and migration research. Arnall advocates greater emphasis upon the experiences and perspectives of those 
potentially affected by climate change-induced migration, a concern I share, yet my focus is more upon the next 
step that can be taken in challenging the inevitable inundation discourse, as opposed to a general direction 
climate change and migration research could move in.  
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climate refugees by 2050 is commonly cited, with one million predicted to be faced with 
displacement in small island states (Myers 1993). Myers’ overall estimate has since increased to 
250 million by 2050 (Christian Aid 2007). Meanwhile, Parenti (2011) forecasts 700 million 
climate migrants by 2050, as well as 500,000 million deaths per year caused by climate change. 
Not only do these figures not match up, but the logic behind them is questionable. In Myers’s 
work, Tacoli (2009) identifies a conflation of  the number of  individuals living in areas 
vulnerable to sea level rise with the expected number of  migrants, implying an environmentally 
determinist relationship between climate change and movement. McNamara (2008: 33) also 
suspects that Myers’ work relies upon an overly ‘simplistic causal relationship’ between climatic 
events and migration. There is a danger that these numbers can also conceal the extent to which 
many displaced individuals are likely to stay within national borders (Kothari 2014). They can 
also overlook immobility as a response to climate change (Randall et al. 2014) as many who 
may be motivated to move may lack the resources to do so (Tacoli 2009).  
These numbers have been further problematised due to the challenges in precisely predicting 
climate change impacts. With regards to the Pacific in particular, climate modelling approaches 
have been critiqued due to their poor applicability to very small island locations (Kelman and 
West 2009; Lazrus 2012). There is uncertainty regarding where the impacts will be severest, 
and when the point of  uninhabitability on different islands could be reached (Campbell 2010). 
According to Mortreux and Barnett, this narrative of  inevitable migration is perpetuated 
through, rather than in spite of, this uncertainty, as ‘this unhelpful sensationalism surrounding 
climate change and migration in the Pacific flourishes in the absence of  evidence’ (2009: 106). 
These criticisms highlight more than a basic miscalculation. The challenge of  meaningfully 
predicting the scale of  climate-induced migration partly hinges on the difficulty of  modelling 
the complexity of  social, cultural and economic factors that affect individuals’ motivations for 
moving or remaining. Castles (2011) situates this issue within a broader disciplinary divide. He 
identifies an academic schism between environmentalists who emphasise climate change as a 
new, primary motivating factor in migration, and social scientists, particularly migration 
researchers, who advocate a multi-causal approach. This is also mirrored by a methodological 
divide between the use of  deductive methods to map and model future displacement, and 
localised understandings of  vulnerability. Clearly aligned with the second camp, Tacoli (2009) 
argues that there are many other factors beyond the environment that impact the likelihood of  
migration. For instance, Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop (2010), in their study of  Tuvaluan 
migration, found that climate change was rated as the least significant motivation for moving, 
 49 
ranked below that of  education, work, health and family. This suggests that climate change is 
not seen as such an imminent risk in Tuvalu as it is represented as being in international and 
governmental literatures. Smith’s (2013) work on internal migration in Kiribati and Tuvalu also 
supports Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop’s findings, as again climate change was not the major 
motivation for relocating. The challenge of  distinguishing between environmental and other 
factors in inducing migration, the lack of  agreement over definitions and typologies of  
environmental refugees and the empirical weakness of  many of  the extant cases of  
environmental refugees has led Black (2001) to dispute the very efficacy of  the term.  
2C. A second wave of critique 
 
But there is more to the critiques of  the dominant discourse than just understanding why people 
migrate or getting the numbers right. As Bettini (2013b) highlights, there is a second wave of  
critique, which focuses on the political disservice this dominant narrative does to Pacific 
communities. This narrative disempowers islanders, committing an act of  epistemic violence 
that deprives them of  their agency. It enables countries such as Tuvalu or Kiribati to be used 
as poster children (Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010) for catastrophic climate change, rather 
than valued in and of  themselves. And ultimately, through its invocation of  total inundation, it 
presents the Pacific as already lost. I will explore these main critiques, looking at how the 
discourse reduces the incentive for action, and will consider the contentious figure of  the 
climate refugee, the absence of  Islander voices and the dominance of  ethnocentric conceptions 
of  migration. 
Firstly, the dominant inevitability narrative can be challenged from a political perspective, on 
the grounds that it can reduce the motivation for acting on climate change. For a start, the 
effectiveness of  harnessing fear in order to mobilise environmental action has been questioned. 
It can unintentionally result in disengagement and apathy (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009). 
The discourse of  mass climate migration may also have its own particular unintended 
consequences. It could fuel xenophobic and racist fears about increased immigration, leading 
to reactionary, securitised responses, rather than encouraging action that benefits threatened 
communities (Hartmann 2010). Indeed, Hartmann argues that the alarmist narrative resonates 
so strongly because it draws upon racist fears. Instead, there is a need to interrogate the 
presumed and naturalised link between environmental degradation, migration and conflict 
(Bettini 2013a) and to beware of  the increasing militarisation of  climate change adaptation 
narratives (Hartmann 2010). Urgent responses also may not lead to the best decisions for island 
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communities (Kelman and West 2009). For instance, discourses of  climate urgency can be used 
to justify unpopular internal migration policies. Kothari (2014) explores the example of  the 
Maldives, where ongoing economically-motivated attempts to consolidate dispersed 
populations have been given a new legitimacy through being couched in environmental 
reasoning. 
There are further issues. The propagation of  an inevitable migration narrative can be seen as 
admitting defeat for many island nations (McNamara and Gibson 2009). It can also diminish 
support for further social and economic development, as countries such as Tuvalu can seem 
like a lost cause (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Through an excessive focus on climate change, 
the other current social and economic challenges faced by SIDS are occluded (Kelman and 
West 2009). And due to the future orientation of  the dominant migration narrative and 
fascination with sea-level rise, more immediate and already occurring impacts of  climate 
change, such as freshwater salinisation, are overlooked and adaptation strategies other than 
migration are marginalised (Farbotko 2005). This issue is critical, as while total inundation in 
the Pacific is not scientifically inevitable, many islands could still be practicably uninhabitable 
due to other impacts of  climate change (Kelman and West 2009). 
Prospects of  migration are shaped by the political action that is taken now on climate change, 
both in terms of  mitigation and adaptation (Hartmann 2010). Thus, the propagation of  a 
climate refugee narrative, including humanitarian promises of  protection for refugees, has the 
potential to become self-fulfilling (McNamara and Gibson 2009). The proposed inevitability of  
relocation also suggests mitigation efforts are hopelessly inadequate and thereby legitimises 
inaction by carbon-intensive countries. This enables the perpetuation of  climate injustice, 
leaving those nations least responsible for anthropogenic climate change to experience the 
worse impacts.  
Farbotko (2010) sees the use of  an inundation narrative as more than a potentially 
counterproductive rallying cry. She argues that the threat of  island inundation and population 
displacement is required in order to legitimise and maintain a global climate change narrative. 
There is both a desire to avert sea level rise and a degree of  impatience and expectancy – of  
‘wishful sinking’ – as Tuvalu is deemed as expendable and thereby an acceptable price to pay 
for the global wake-up call that its devastation would produce. Thus, Pacific nations become 
valuable through their loss. 
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For Farbotko, Tuvalu is indeed being treated as the ‘canary in the coal mine’. It acts as a 
warning to the rest of  the global community of  the extremity of  the threat of  climate change, 
and like the proverbial canary, it can be sacrificed. Tuvalu acts as proof  and validates the fervent 
predictions of  environmentalists worldwide. It almost makes climate change comprehensible 
and manageable, bringing it forward in time, giving it an immediacy, and concentrating it in 
space, turning a cause of  global concern into the affliction of  one of  the world’s smallest 
sovereign states. This narrative draws upon ideas of  islands as natural laboratories, understood 
as clearly bounded and isolated (a vision that is challenged in Section 3A). Tuvalu is discursively 
produced as a microcosm of  global climate impacts, as can be seen in the display of  ‘We are all 
Tuvaluans’ placards by participating NGOs at the 2009 Copenhagen climate change 
negotiations (Smith 2013). Smith argues that this an example of  Tuvalu’s future being co-opted 
to ‘further the broader arguments of  the international environmental movement’ (2013: 27). 
This raises difficult questions. Tuvaluans are called upon by NGOs to speak for the climate, but 
what happens when Islander testimonies diverge from the preferred media message (Farbotko 
and Lazrus 2012)? Yet is it also possible to challenge the construction of  ‘the environmental 
movement’ and Tuvaluans as mutually exclusive groups? 
These attempts to frame Pacific islands as microcosms are part of  an ongoing literal and 
political belittlement of  Oceania (Kempf  2009). These contemporary discourses around 
climate vulnerability evoke former colonial representations of  Pacific Islands as ‘sites of  
backwardness, insularity, constraint, fragility and weakness’ (Barnett and Campbell 2010: 2). 
Thus, the climate debate is reinforcing pre-existing notions of  vulnerability, or even producing 
it. Mansfield (2013) argues that climate change is commonly presented as revealing and 
exacerbating the existing and inherently vulnerable nature of  Kiribati, not causing it, thereby 
placing the blame for this vulnerability on Kiribati. In the case of  Sri Lanka, Yamane (2009) 
found that discourses of  climate vulnerability were used to reinforce existing narratives of  
certain places and groups of  people as vulnerable, hazardous and disadvantaged. This 
approach overlooked the adaptive capacity of  the communities designated as vulnerable, and 
the potential vulnerabilities of  other areas, and thus reflected pre-existing stereotypes rather 
than responding to climate change as a new form of  threat.  
This last example can be understood through Webber’s (2013) concept of  ‘performative 
vulnerability’. She explores how vulnerability is enacted by the Kiribati government in order to 
receive development funding. Crucially in Webber’s view, vulnerability is performative and 
produced, and ‘not simply an objective fact in the world’ that can be ever more accurately 
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assessed (2013: 2718). This performance has some benefits in terms of  funding secured, and 
can provide more opportunities for economic migration (Connell 2003). Yet this performance 
of  vulnerability leads to the ‘foreclosing [of] alternative and empowering political identities’ 
(Webber 2013: 2720). And ironically, through performing climate vulnerability in order to 
access funding, in some cases other developmental concerns, such as maternal health, were 
sidelined, in a way that could in fact increase the overall vulnerability of  Kiribati society. Thus, 
these performances of  vulnerability can perpetuate existing notions of  vulnerability, 
disempower and depoliticise, and unintentionally exacerbate existing socio-economic 
problems.  
2D. Interrogating the figure of the climate refugee 
 
Central to this second wave of  critique is a problematisation of  the figure of  the climate refugee. 
This label and that of  the ‘environmental migrant’ have been at the centre of  academic 
controversy. Climate refugees are not legally recognised and are consequently not offered UN 
protection, partly because they are not experiencing persecution due to their membership of  a 
particular social group (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012; McAdam 2011). Attempts in May 2014 by 
an I-Kiribati man, Ionae Teitiota, to seek asylum in New Zealand based on the threat of  climate 
change to his island were rejected by the New Zealand court of  appeal (Godfery 2014), a failure 
which Godfery attributes to the emphasis on climate change as external and environmental, as 
opposed to an internal source of  social and political persecution. Teitiota has since been 
deported back to Kiribati (McDonald 2015), yet New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern 
has recently mooted plans to introduce a Pacific Islander climate refugee visa (Pearlman 2017).  
One response to the current lack of  provision has been to advocate for extending existing 
refugee legislation to include environmental displacement (Kempf  2009). However, the 
practical impact of  this legal adjustment has been questioned. McAdam (2011) argues that 
there is a serious issue around effective implementation, given the current crises experienced by 
existing legally recognised refugees. The attempt to expand the definition of  ‘refugee’ could 
also be used as an opportunity to weaken states’ responsibilities to displaced peoples (Hartmann 
2010). There may also be significant political resistance to this extension as it could imply 
certain states are to blame for the existence of  the refugees (McNamara 2008). Bettini (2013a) 
challenges the logic of  the legal expansion demand, arguing that this small liberal reform is 
incongruous with the apocalyptic urgency of  the narratives surrounding it. Godfery (2014) 
similarly declares the extension of  refugee legislation as insufficient, arguing instead to 
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repoliticise the debate and extend the forms of  political action involved, including ‘social 
resistance’. Speaking as an indigenous journalist, he proclaims ‘the missing link isn’t some new 
legal rule, but mass action’. Godfery’s words highlight one of  the fundamental issues at stake: 
the question of  how to extend the political vision of  climate policy. 
The focus upon refugee status can also be seen as politically and morally problematic. There 
has been an overemphasis upon the legal possibilities of  migration and relocation, not the social 
and cultural aspects (Kelman 2011). Moreover, the label ‘climate migrant’ itself  can be taken 
to imply that the environment alone caused the displacement, overlooking the wider political, 
economic and social causes of  vulnerability (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012), or even naturalising 
them (Hartmann 2010). This sole emphasis on the environmental can further abnegate large 
polluting states of  their responsibility for this vulnerability, given that political and economic 
vulnerability is often found in places that have a history of  colonial domination (Lazrus 2009). 
The label ‘refugee’ is also potentially disempowering. Bettini (2013a) argues that the imagery 
of  waves of  undifferentiated refugees is de-individuating and de-historicising. It also elides the 
differences between the varied contexts and impacts of  climate change (Farbotko and Lazrus 
2012). According to McNamara and Gibson (2009), the climate refugee narrative also denies 
affected communities their agency, instead confining individuals to a position of  victimhood, 
although arguably becoming a refugee can itself  be seen as an act of  agency. Power inequities 
between island countries and wealthier continental nations can be maintained through the 
presumption that the former is helpless and must be protected by the latter (Farbotko and 
Lazrus 2012). Alternative framings of  Islander identities, such as those that incorporate strength 
and resourcefulness, are marginalised (Farbotko 2005). Affected Islanders are denied political 
subjectivities (Bettini 2013a) or subject positions beyond that of  victim or environmental 
protector (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Yet the active agency of  affected communities is critical 
to successful responses to the threat of  climate change (Lazrus 2012). While the speed and scale 
of  environmental change threatened by global warming is unprecedented (Mercer et al. 2007), 
indigenous communities have been adapting to environmental changes for millennia, so should 
not be presumed to be powerless (Crate and Nuttall 2009).  
The dominant discourse of  climate refugees can also be seen as an orientalising and racialising 
narrative, according to Baldwin (2012). Drawing on the work of  Edward Said and Franz Fanon, 
Baldwin argues that the climate migrant is produced as the differentiated Other to the 
environmental citizen. Through this process the climate migrant is racialised, yet what is distinct 
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from other instances of  colonial and post-colonial otherings is that this discourse draws upon 
future possibilities rather than a colonial past. What is central is the potential to become a 
climate migrant, and thus a figure associated with ambiguity, displacement and crisis. Baldwin 
understands securitised climate discourses as an attack upon this potential, as environmental 
citizens mobilise to prevent its fulfilment, and thus as a war upon the very potentiality of  race. 
Baldwin (2013) also incorporates humanitarian narratives into this approach, arguing that 
while not racist, the narrative of  climate migration victimhood is still racialising, as it defines 
those affected in opposition to Whiteness. Thus, his work indicates the danger that existing 
discourses of  inevitable climate migration may be perpetuating racial inequalities. However, 
Baldwin’s framework seems to presume that one cannot occupy the position of  environmental 
citizen and potential climate migrant, that of  self  and other, simultaneously. It fails to 
comprehend proactive responses to climate change in Oceania, by Pacific Island actors, a key 
aspect of  the third wave of  critique that I am articulating. My research challenges this supposed 
dichotomy, focusing on environmental advocacy groups and projects composed predominately 
of  Pacific Islanders, those iconically positioned as potential migrants.  
Not only is the refugee crisis narrative empirically contested and potentially politically 
counterproductive, it is also at odds with the views and wishes of  many affected individuals. 
This is perhaps unsurprising given that displacement and relocation can in some cases be a 
‘second disaster’ for those affected (Oliver-Smith 2009: 122). Farbotko and Lazrus (2012), 
Kempf  (2009), McAdam (2011) and McNamara and Gibson (2009) all attest to a rejection of  
the refugee narrative by Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati. Maina Talia, a Tuvaluan climate advocate, 
clearly states that ‘migration is not an option except as a last resort’ (2014). McNamara and 
Gibson’s (2009) work places this in context, as they argue that island perspectives and refugee 
narratives invoke very different visions of  the future, with the latter assuming passivity and a 
requirement to adapt, compared with that of  a sovereign and self-defining nation. This 
resonates with a broader concern within the literature: the need to actively incorporate local 
voices (Kelman 2010) and the perspectives and cultural understandings of  affected 
communities (Hulme 2008), as Islander voices are currently marginalised in the debate (Paton 
and Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010).  
Finally, it is not just the inevitability of  migration that can be questioned, but the question of  
what migration means within different Pacific Island contexts. Here there is a potential to 
challenge Western conceptions of  migration. Alarmist environmentalist narratives concerned 
with the number of  potential migrants reinforce the notion that migration is ‘intrinsically bad’ 
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(Castles 2011: 416). Yet there needs to be a move away from migration being necessarily framed 
as a problem for receiving countries or the migrants themselves (Tacoli 2009). Rather than a 
failure of  adaptation efforts, migration can be seen as a positive adaptation strategy that has 
historically long been adopted in the Pacific in response to environmental change (Oliver-Smith 
2009). The movement of  some workers overseas can be a positive and sustainable means of  
financially supporting communities in the country of  origin. Simati and Gibson (1998) refute 
the remittance decay hypothesis in the case of  Tuvaluan workers in New Zealand, 
demonstrating that remittances can be a stable source of  income. Hau’ofa (1994), in his seminal 
work Our Sea of  Islands, argues against an understanding of  remittances as a relationship of  
dependency on larger states, but instead insists they are hard-earned and demonstrate 
reciprocity and continuing community interdependence. This highlights the extent to which 
migration is not necessarily an erosion of  community identity or loss of  culture. As Lilomaiava-
Doktor argues, Western understandings of  migration as the ‘severance of  ties, uprootedness 
and rupture’ (2009: 1) can be at odds with local understandings of  mobility. They can be seen 
to reflect a sedentary bias (Farbotko 2005) that normatively values remaining in one place. 
Instead it is vital to recognise the long history of  mobility, migration and interconnection within 
Oceania, a history that is marginalised by climate refugee narratives (Farbotko and Lazrus 
2012). Migration can be seen as an integral part of  Pacific cultural practices, rather than a 
threat to them. This history of  active ties and links as opposed to isolation will be explored at 
greater length in Section 3A. This further demonstrates that there is no simple formula for 
migration, but that the history and cultural meanings surrounding movement and attachment 
to land within particular communities must be taken into account. 
2E. Oceania, climate change and the importance of the political 
 
As a final aspect of  this second wave of  critique, I consider how the inevitable inundation 
discourse has been analysed using a post-politics perspective, suggesting that a focus on the 
political provides the basis for an alternative framing of  climate change that contests this 
dominant discourse. I wish to follow Bettini (2013a) in understanding the dominant inevitability 
discourse as symptomatic of  what Swyngedouw (2010), developing the work of  Mouffe and 
Ranciere, identifies as the ‘post-political condition’. Swyngedouw presents this condition as one 
in which truly political debates, decisions and disagreements have been displaced by 
technocratic managerialism. There is space only for a bureaucratic consensus on policy that is 
in the interest of  a financial elite, not for dissenting politics. This is enabled through the use of  
a narrative of  apocalypse and emergency, which is mobilised in order to short-circuit debate 
 56 
and close off  discussion of  political options and alternatives. Thus, this eschatological approach 
depoliticises the governance of  climate change. Appeals to the authority of  science also play an 
important role in this political short-circuiting.  
Swyngedouw argues that climate politics is not only indicative of  the post-political condition 
but has also played a significant role in the maintenance of  it. This is partly through the 
populism of  climate change discourse. Social differences and inequalities are concealed through 
the presentation of  climate change as a global humanitarian threat: everyone is in it together. 
Consequently, there is no one political or revolutionary subject, such as the working class, that 
has the ability to present its own conflictual demands. The creation of  an external enemy – the 
fetishised object of  CO2 – also enables this populist approach, as it elides the extent to which 
the current crisis has emanated from features integral to the capitalist system. Environmental 
politics within the post-political condition patently lacks a clearly defined ideology. Thus, it 
becomes concerned with the management of  small, distinct problems, rather than the 
formulation of  an overall political vision. 
The resonances between this concept and the dominant climate migration narrative are clear. 
Bettini (2013a) observes how capitalist, humanitarian and radical framings of  climate change 
appear to have converged upon an apocalyptic narrative, again reminiscent of  the critiques of  
the horror stories of  the Anthropocene. This doomsday narrative hinders action, as the 
apocalyptic itself  is normalised through its constant evocation and postponement, 
Swyngedouw’s (2010) famous titular ‘Apocalypse Forever’. Post-politics declares that radical 
change is necessary, while in practice changing nothing at all, enabling business as usual and 
the maintenance of  the status quo. Bettini also understands attempts to legalise the status of  
climate refugees as post-political, as it naturalises these figures as victims and depoliticises them, 
establishing them as unproblematic and unquestionable. 
While there are definitely ways in which the inevitable inundation discourse displays post-
political tendencies, the post-politics literature has received substantial critique. Firstly, as 
Goldstein highlights, claiming climate politics is post-political is ‘a decidedly post-political 
gesture’ (2013: 31). It can be seen as too easily accepting the hegemony of  neoliberal thought 
(McCarthy 2013) and can dismiss existing radical and antagonistic manifestations of  climate 
politics (Featherstone 2013). For instance, Chatterton et al. argue that the excessive policing of  
the Copenhagen climate summit counter demonstrations, including the introduction of  new 
temporary public order laws and the installation of  cages to hold climate protestors, ‘emphasises 
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the work that is done to push antagonism out of  dominant constructions of  the political’ (2012: 
9). Post-political analysis also seems to define the ‘properly political’ in overly narrow ways 
(McCarthy 2013), in particular through its almost exclusive focus on state level politics 
(Featherstone 2013). 
McCarthy (2013) perceives a European bias in post-political analysis, arguing that the concept 
is not applicable to the US, as in North America there is not yet a positive political consensus 
around anthropogenic climate change (a point reaffirmed by the actions of  the Trump 
administration with regards to the Paris Agreement). Yet, arguably, US environmental 
governance is still embedded in a neoliberal management framework that is governed by a post-
political ethos. Swyngedouw himself  recognises that since the financial crisis, climate change 
has become a more marginalised governmental concern (Swyngedouw 2013a). However, he 
sees a continuity in the use of  apocalyptic rhetoric, as the decline of  civilisation is now framed 
in terms of  capitalist collapse. The temporality of  the apocalyptic has also shifted in 
Swyngedouw’s more recent work, as rather than an ‘Apocalypse Forever’ we have reached the 
point of  ‘Apocalypse Now’ (Swyngedouw 2013b). He argues that the doomsday vision invoked 
in the Global North is already a reality for some of  the Global South, in terms of  natural 
disasters and food shortages. 
I share these concerns about how Swyngedouw frames the political, and the population who 
are the audience of  these apocalyptic narratives. While I recognise the value of  a politics of  
antagonism, Swyngedouw’s wholesale rejection of  consensus has the potential to occlude 
solidarity and collaboration as forms of  the properly and radically political. I attempt to remedy 
this through combining a concern with antagonistic politics with a focus on collaboration and 
connection through drawing upon the work of  Epeli Hau’ofa (discussed in Section 3A). I also 
dispute the extent to which apocalyptic climate discourse is generalising and homogenising. For 
instance, Swyngedouw (2010) acknowledges that climate change is portrayed as having different 
impacts, geographically and socially, such as the poor being the worst hit, but argues that this 
invocation of  ‘the poor’ is used to rally everyone to act and show that everyone will be affected. 
Yet, actually, this seems to suggest that this discourse is directed at a group that considers the 
poor as ‘other’, thereby disaggregating, not homogenising populations in relation to climate 
change. What analyses of  representations of  the Pacific in media, film and academic accounts 
has shown is that it is particularising: the Pacific is othered and objectified through its 
construction as a particularly tragic victim of  climate change. This is perhaps part of  a wider 
issue with the post-political condition as a generalised, abstract narrative that does not heed 
 58 
different manifestations of  climate politics on the ground. The fetishism of  CO2 also seems 
somewhat overstated, as it overlooks the other external enemies commonly invoked in 
securitised climate discourses, such as the menace of  the climate refugees themselves. Moreover, 
some of  the characteristics Swyngedouw highlights of  the already occurring apocalypse, such 
as natural disasters and food shortages, are indeed already present in countries such as Vanuatu, 
partially as a result of  climate change. Yet it would be inaccurate, if  not hysterical, to declare 
Vanuatu already in the grip of  an apocalypse, and would reinforce rather than refute the 
drowning islands discourse.  
While I therefore would not propose it as an overarching framework for interpretation, there 
are certainly strengths to the idea of  the post-political, particularly as a way of  understanding 
certain discourses, as opposed to typifying an entire era as being ‘post-political’. The dominance 
of  the inevitable migration narrative shows that an alternative is necessary. And it is this aspect 
of  Swyngedouw’s work that I believe offers the most promise. He argues that we need to put 
the politics back into environmental politics and challenge the global social, economic and 
political structures that have enabled and continue to perpetuate environmental destruction. As 
activists, academics and concerned citizens we should be looking for alternative socio-natural 
visions of  the future, visions that recognise difference and conflict and that can be mobilised to 
create change. This question regarding the future that we wish to see and create again speaks 
to the questions regarding ethics posed by Haraway, Bennett and Hulme. Consequently, I draw 
from Swyngedouw the importance of  considering the political, but will place his work in 
dialogue with the above authors, particularly in terms of  ideas of  enchantment, as will be 
explored in Chapter Five.  
Thus, I have established the prevalence of  the inevitable inundation discourse and outlined the 
critiques it has received in terms of  its empirical uncertainties, simplifications of  the complexity 
of  drivers of  migration, disempowerment of  affected communities, and depoliticisation of  
climate change as an issue. It resembles the horror stories of  the Anthropocene in its invocation 
of  the apocalyptic, and in its emphasis upon unavertable loss, and it fails to open up questions 
about ethics, care or the lives we wish to lead in the time of  climate change. Consequently, I 
now turn to the question of  what alternative narratives can be offered in its place. As Barnett 
and Campbell (2010: 2) observe, ‘a new way of  representing Pacific island capacities and 
potential is required’. In particular, this raises the question of  how Pacific Islanders represent 
themselves. In order to explore these possible alternative framings, I begin with the work of  
Pacific artist and theorist Epeli Hau’ofa and his Sea of  Islands vision (Section 3A); then, 
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maintaining a concern with the political, I consider analyses of  environmental justice 
movements in the Pacific and elsewhere, and following Bennett, foregrounding the role of  affect 
(Section 3B). Finally, in response to the critique of  purely rational and scientific approaches to 
climate change in Section 1, I explore the potential for religious approaches to climate change 
(Section 4).  
3. Reframing narratives: interconnection, activism and affect 
 
In order to explore alternative narrative framings of  climate change and the Pacific Islands, I 
begin by considering Tongan academic Epeli Hau’ofa’s Sea of  Islands vision (Section 3A). 
Having outlined the ways in which his work has been applied to the climate change debate so 
far, I explore the questions it raises in terms of  geographical scale. Then, bearing in mind both 
Hau’ofa’s insistence on bottom-up movements and critiques of  the depoliticisation of  climate 
discourse (Swyngedouw 2010; De Goede and Randalls 2009; Webber 2013), I turn to attempts 
to re-inject the political into climate change in the form of  climate justice movements (Section 
3B). Finally, in response to Bennett’s model of  enchantment (that intense affectual encounters 
spur ethical action), I consider the role of  affect in protest movements as well as the emotional 
geographies of  climate change, another challenge to purely rational and scientific framings of  
climate change.  
3A. Oceanic interconnection: thinking through our Sea of Islands 
 
As a first port of  call, I want to think seriously about how climate change in the Pacific can be 
approached using Epeli Hau’ofa’s (1994) Sea of  Islands vision, a revolutionary text that 
attempts to rally the collective power of  Oceania. Hau’ofa’s thesis is that there is an ongoing 
marginalisation and belittlement of  the Pacific, and at the core of  this is an understanding of  
the Pacific as made up of  small, fragmented, isolated islands. Yet he argues that this 
fragmentation is the product of  the imposition of  colonial boundaries and that it neglects the 
history of  material, cultural and political interconnection; of  movement and epic voyages that 
historically characterised the region. Moreover, it fails to recognise the power and potential of  
Oceania as a large and ever-growing continent composed of  ocean, islands and the movements 
of  people, things and ideas across water and land. In his words, ‘Oceania is vast, Oceania is 
expanding’ (1994: 160). The contemporary movement of  migrants continues a ‘world 
enlargement’ (1994: 151), and the locations of  Pacific Islander communities in Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States become enveloped within this enlarging Oceania. According to 
Hau’ofa, too much emphasis is placed upon the macroeconomic perspective of  states and 
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international organisations in the analyses of  island countries. He argues for a reassessment of  
the Pacific that focuses upon the experiences and practices of  the everyday Islander, ‘ordinary 
people, peasants and proletarians’ (1994: 148) and that embraces the potential of  Oceania’s 
regional interconnection, cooperation and collaboration. 
While highly influential within the discipline of  Pacific Studies, Hau’ofa’s work has received 
some criticism. Kempf  (2009) highlights a regional bias, as seafaring traditions were perhaps 
more central to Polynesian and Micronesian experiences than that of  Melanesia. There have 
generally been concerns raised about its romanticising tendencies and the overlooking of  power 
differentials and relations of  dependency between islands (Lazrus 2012). Perhaps that can be 
understood in light of  the Sea of  Islands’ purpose. Hau’ofa’s work is rousingly polemical, 
propagandist, and prefigurative: it acts as a vision of  what Oceania could be, not necessarily a 
description of  what the Pacific is. This blend of  ‘poetics, imagination, optimism and utopia’ 
(Kempf  2009: 194) has the potential to challenge existing dominant representations of  the 
Pacific. 
Thus, this counter-narrative is undeniably relevant to the climate debate. Kempf  (2009) posits 
that climate-induced migration could act as a further expansion of  Oceania, although 
Mansfield (2013) disagrees, arguing that Hau’ofa’s vision of  migration is based on choice, not 
compulsion. Barnett and Campbell (2010) see Hau’ofa’s work as a means of  understanding 
adaptive capacity that does not conform to the economic norms and expectations of  
continental states, but instead draws upon reciprocity and kinship. Similarly, Lazrus presents 
the Sea of  Islands as a means of  describing the ‘resilience and adaptive capacity of  island 
communities that leverage global networks in the face of  local environmental destruction’ 
(2012: 289). This description highlights two pivotal aspects of  Hau’ofa’s ideas in this context: 
geographical scale and the potential of  grassroots networks in creating change. 
Firstly, Hau’ofa’s work directly engages with the question of  smallness, a key issue in 
representations of  climate change and the Pacific, as islands are commonly presented as small 
and thereby inherently vulnerable (Barnett and Campbell 2010). Some academics have 
challenged the equation of  smallness as weakness and embraced the Pacific’s diminutive 
landmasses as sources of  strength. For instance, Hereniko states that ‘like the majority of  Pacific 
Islanders I know, I see many advantages in being small, even dependent’ (2001: 167) yet those 
advantages are not clearly articulated. Kempf ’s work resonates with Hereniko’s statement, as 
he argues that Pacific Island nations have used their size as an ‘argumentative resource’ in 
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highlighting the moral responsibility of  larger nations to tackle climate change (2009: 196). 
Meanwhile, Mansfield (2013) observes that I-Kiribati climate campaigners have been 
mobilising an alternative discourse, that of  ‘small-as-adequate’, arguing that even though their 
islands are small, they have been sufficient to sustain their societies for centuries. Yet some of  
these re-evaluations of  the potential of  being small come close to the self-articulations of  
vulnerability seen by Pacific politicians, which so far have not engendered effective responses to 
climate change and, as discussed in the previous chapter, can actually inhibit action. 
By contrast, Hau’ofa’s work takes a radically different tack, rejecting the very notion of  the 
Pacific as small through arguing that ‘smallness is relative’ (1994: 152). His stance is supported 
by Baldacchino (2008), who postulates that islands are only small when there is a normative 
presumption of  largeness, a presumption created by the dominance of  continental thinking. If  
one considers the proportion of  sovereign states globally that are island countries, then small 
becomes average and normal. Moreover, through Hau’ofa’s theory of  ‘world enlargement’ little 
Pacific islands are transformed into the swelling giant Oceania. This subverts narratives of  
islands as laboratories or the climate-threatened Pacific as the world in microcosm, as instead 
Oceania becomes all-engulfing and macrocosmic.  
Considering scale in a different way, Nicole George (2011) argues that despite the ubiquitous 
citation of  Epeli Hau’ofa’s work in Pacific Studies, not enough people have heeded his words. 
Few serious attempts have been made to positively reframe the Pacific as a region from a 
bottom-up perspective, focusing on ‘ordinary people’ as political actors. She highlights the need 
for more work on the ‘informal sites of  regional cooperation’ (2011: 59) as there is an excessive 
focus upon connections forged through institutional relations. This is in spite of  the strong 
history of  Pan-Pacific community-level networks that have organised around militarism, 
independence, women’s rights and other issues. Kelman and West (2009) also acknowledge that 
SIDS research suffers from a top-down bias, and there is a need to bring together top-down 
and bottom-up approaches. 
If  one considers the existing academic accounts that foreground island perspectives in relation 
to climate change, there seems to be a disproportionate emphasis upon governmental 
representatives. For instance, Farbotko and McGregor (2010), Shibuya (1996) and McNamara 
and Gibson (2009) are all concentrated on the perspectives of  intergovernmental advocates, 
either within the context of  the UNFCCC negotiations or regional bodies such as AOSIS. Due 
to the reliance on formal spokespeople many journalists’ accounts also just reiterate a state-level 
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narrative on climate change (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Yet as Farbotko and Lazrus highlight 
in the case of  Tuvalu, there can be significant distance between dominant civil society framings 
of  climate change, focused around human rights and global citizenship, and governmental 
narratives that exploit images of  vulnerability. The failure to account for viewpoints below that 
of  the ministerial, or that incorporate politics beyond the formalised and parliamentary, is a 
particularly interesting lacuna within the literature. Moreover, as Shibuya (1996) observes, in 
countries with very small populations, single individuals can have significant impacts. Hence 
governmental approaches can be significantly affected by changes in appointments or 
administration. Consequently, so are academic accounts, if  they concentrate only on these 
governmental levels of  practice. 
Slatter and Underhill-Sem’s work on the relationship between the Pacific Plan (a framework 
agreed by Pacific Island leaders to work towards regional integration) and economic 
restructuring provides further evidence of  the need for bottom-up approaches. They argue that 
‘the challenge is to reclaim Pacific regionalism from the clutches of  neoliberalism’ (2008: 208). 
They contend it has undergone a shift from political solidarity to forms of  market and labour 
liberalisation that could be very damaging for sustainable development in Oceania and 
undermine the region’s self-determination. Critical to this is the role and position of  civil society, 
as the main challenges to the neoliberal agenda are coming from regional NGOs and their 
enactments of  political as opposed to market regionalism. Similarly, Smith (2013), quoting a 
member of  Kiribati Climate Action, notes the frustration with the current intergovernmental 
political process, and how greater attention is shifting towards NGOs, civil society and 
community-led action. In terms of  scale, therefore, focusing on civil society can address both 
an academic shortcoming and an emergent political trend. 
Kuletz’s (2002) research into the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement 
demonstrates what analyses of  bottom-up regionalism can look like. She documents the 
movement’s combination of  anti-nuclear and anti-colonial campaigning that emerged from the 
legacy of  nuclear testing in the Pacific and resistance to attempts to dump nuclear waste in 
Island territories. As an independence movement, NFIP sought freedom and self-determination 
not just in terms of  legal status, but also cultural and economic independence from former 
imperial powers, and saw this as only achievable through breaking the shackles of  nuclear 
colonialism. While Kuletz does not directly reference Hau’ofa, her analysis shows a clear 
affinity with his. She argues that involvement in NFIP enabled a redefinition of  identity beyond 
the local and national, creating a pan-Pacific identity politics based on challenging nuclear 
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waste. Moreover, she understands inter-island and inter-community cooperation as a form of  
‘globalisation from below’ (2002: 127). Kuletz situates NFIP as part of  a global indigenous 
rights network, thus understanding their campaigning as a form of  local resistance supported 
by global solidarities. Having established the significance and neglect of  bottom-up approaches, 
I now turn to further examples of  environmental activism and the alternative narratives of  
climate change activists are generating. 
3B. Movements for climate justice  
 
Focusing on activism and climate justice movements helps to address the concerns previously 
raised regarding the depoliticisation of  climate discourse. While there have been numerous 
ethnographic studies of  climate justice networks in the UK (Woodsworth 2008; Schlembach 
2011; Saunders 2012), the same cannot be said for the Pacific. This absence is tackled later in 
the thesis, as I recognise Pacific Islander modes of  climate activism as distinct and emergent. 
Yet there is potentially much to be learned from European accounts of  radical environmental 
activism. In particular, I explore the different meanings of  ‘climate justice’ social movements 
have employed, the place of  antagonism and scales of  solidarity.  
Firstly, the polysemic nature of  ‘climate justice’ must be addressed. As Chatterton et al. (2012) 
highlight, interpretations can include tackling the inequity of  climate change through market 
mechanisms, the Global South’s right to emit or the relative power between the Global South 
and Global North in the UNFCCC negotiations. However, their definition of  climate justice, 
and the one that is employed by grassroots networks such as Climate Justice Action (CJA), 
highlights the inequality of  climate change’s impacts combined with a demand for social justice, 
participation and democracy. It explicitly embraces an antagonistic framing of  climate politics, 
one that challenges the post-political consensus. Evans (2010), looking at Rising Tide Australia, 
an antipodean manifestation of  a global climate justice network, presents a similar 
understanding. He argues that climate justice is not a simple goal that can be achieved, but a 
political practice that involves connecting with other issues, empowering communities and 
addressing the systemic causes of  climate change in terms of  capitalist growth and corporate 
power. Employing a complex systems analogy, he claims that victories are achieved through 
many small disturbances to the system, that can, for instance, erode the coal industry’s social 
licence to operate. For Russell et al. (2012) the critical question is not how the term ‘climate 
justice’ is used, but whether it is useful. They argue that the massive street demonstrations at 
the COP15 temporarily disturbed neoliberal framings of  climate change, but that these were 
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reasserted at the Cancun negotiations one year on. From Evan’s perspective, these small 
disturbances are integral to how the politics of  climate justice functions, yet for Russell et al. it 
is not enough. They contend that perhaps ‘climate justice’ does not present a strong enough 
rallying point in order for movements to confront the capitalist system that is the source of  
anthropogenic climate change.  
A further key tension in the social movements literature is over the place of  antagonism and 
attitude towards the state, an issue I explore empirically in Chapter Five. At the COP15 counter 
demonstrations the issue of  whether to work with or against the state became highly divisive 
(Russell et al. 2012). Activists were torn between using direct action to shut delegates into the 
conference centre, in order to pressure them into reaching a decisive agreement, or to shut 
them out. The logic of  the latter approach is that decisions made within the context of  the 
COP would not impede runaway climate change but would simply bolster neoliberalism. This 
tactic was a keystone of  the alterglobalisation movement, an antecedent of  the climate justice 
movement, yet within a climate justice context a simple narrative of  ‘us versus them’ was not 
so easy. One solution was a ‘diagonalist’ approach (i.e. combining the efforts of  both vertically 
and horizontally organised groups), in which activists descended upon the Bella Centre, while 
sympathetic delegates who recognised the inadequacy of  the COP process left the conference 
centre in order to meet and discuss with those activists. This would create a liminal meeting 
point, between the conference centre and the streets, of  civil society and government, although 
this meeting was thoroughly undermined by the actions of  the Danish police. Another response 
was a schism, with Never Trust a COP, a collective with an explicitly anti-capitalist ethos 
emerging out of  the CJA network. This new group had felt that the confrontational politics of  
CJA were being compromised by the presence of  reformist NGOs within the network. This 
raises questions regarding the limits to transgression agreed by different groups and issues that 
arise when these are odds with individuals’ tactical preferences, as explored in Chapter Five.  
Another vital idea to engage with from social movements literature is the generation and limits 
of  solidarity. Hau’ofa’s vision provides a model of  solidarity that operates regionally. What 
Chatterton et al. (2012) present is one that is global and transcends differences of  race, gender, 
class, and geography. They argue that there is not one global climate movement, but many 
networks that are connected through the idea of  climate justice. International mobilisations 
such as at the COP15, can be powerful sites for generating these translocal solidarities. But they 
can also reveal disparities within these global supposedly horizontal networks. A case in point 
is the organisation of  the Reclaim Power action at COP15. Organisers stipulated that tactics 
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should be non-violent (i.e. no property damage), as otherwise Global South activists would be 
put at significant risk in terms of  their current or future visas. This attempt to negotiate an 
inequality between Global North and Global South participants occasioned a further one, as 
the latter were treated in ‘paternalistic and unitary ways’ (Chatterton et al. 2012: 14). They 
were spoken for, rather than giving a space to articulate themselves. This highlights a limit to 
solidarity, when it fails to challenge these inequalities and instead reproduces them. It opens the 
question of  what happens instead when the boundaries of  political action are defined in 
culturally meaningful terms by activists from the Global South, as I will explore in the case of  
Pacific Islander activists in Chapter Five. While existing social movement studies literature 
provides some insight into the actions taken and organisational structure of  climate justice 
movements, to fully consider the re-injection of  the political into climate discourse, I need to 
further explore the origins of  the impetus for political action. In order to do so, I now focus on 
literature concerning the affects of  social movements.  
3C. Emotional geographies of climate and affects of activism 
 
With regards to terminology, I follow Feigenbaum et al. (2013: 23), in exploring ‘affect in 
encounters and interactions that move, stir or arouse something in us and produce a change’, 
a gloss that resonates with Bennett’s vision of  enchantment. Meanwhile, following Clough 
(2012: 1669), I define emotion as ‘consciously experienced feelings such as love, hate, fear, 
exhilaration’.  
Early accounts of  protest movements were concerned with emotions, but largely framed in 
terms of  the irrationality of  the mob. As social movement studies moved towards analyses that 
emphasised the rational and strategic mobilisation of  resources and political opportunities by 
activists (Nicholls 2007), the place of  emotion was largely ignored (Jasper 2003). However, since 
the very end of  the 20th century, there has been increased interest in the role of  affect and 
emotion in protest, both from social movement studies and geographers (Aminzade and 
McAdam 2002). This has included examination of  emotional labour and emotional reflexivity 
in political movements (Brown and Pickerill 2009), as well as the visceral and bodily dimensions 
of  emotional identification with a social movement (Hayes-Conroy and Martin 2010). 
Meanwhile, Gould (2002) has explored the role of  grief  in sustaining social movements, 
through the generation of  an ‘emotional common sense’ (2002: 178) that encourages 
participants to feel and interpret events in the same way. The role of  activism in generating 
emotionally intense experiences that can have a transformative impact on participants has been 
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documented (Razsa 2015; Feigenbaum et al. 2013; Clough 2012; Jasper 2003), and it is this 
process that I explore empirically in Chapter Five, observing the resonances between it and 
Bennett’s concept of  enchantment that identifies the link between affectual encounters and 
transformation leading to ethical action.  
Affect is not only pertinent with respect to activism. Gorman-Murray (2010) argues that greater 
attention should be given to the emotional geographies of  climate change, incorporating the 
emotional responses and meanings of  climatic changes in specific localities and moving away 
from the rationalism of  climate risk analysis. The ‘emotional cost’ (2010: 76) of  climate 
adaptation needs to better accounted for. 
Farbotko and McGregor (2010) explore one such emotional geography in their account of  
Tuvaluan delegates crying at COP15. They argue that this action by government negotiators 
challenged the clear demarcations between emotion and science and the presumed rationalism 
underpinning the UNFCCC negotiations. These emotional encounters and experiences create 
opportunities for change and alternative political possibilities, however fleetingly, as Farbotko 
and McGregor acknowledge that Tuvalu’s affectual intervention was soon marginalised. These 
politicians’ tears were also not simply an attempt to emotionally manipulate wealthier countries 
in order to receive aid, as they formed part of  an active rejection of  Australian financial 
assistance in favour of  maintaining a target of  no more than a 1.5 degree rise in global average 
temperature. Instead this could perhaps be better understood through Kempf ’s (2009) 
arguments about the strength of  smallness, as the tears display a power and potency that is 
derived from the exposure of  vulnerability and weakness. The powerful symbolism of  tears in 
relation to the inevitable inundation discourse merits further enquiry, particularly in terms of  
how it relates to positions of  victimhood, frustration at inaction, or sadness at potential loss of  
land. Clearly there is a need for further work in this area, and an exploration of  the ‘reformist 
or radical potential’ (Farbotko and McGregor 2010: 164) of  emotional responses to the prospect 
of  climate change.  
3D. Further directions for research 
 
Returning to this section’s opening considerations, Hau’ofa’s work provides a much-needed 
corrective to representations of  the Pacific as small, isolated and powerless. It could play a 
crucial part in a third wave of  critique that doesn’t just deconstruct islander marginalisation but 
highlights means of  exploring and recognising islander strength. Thinking through Hau’ofa’s 
work also enables a ‘Nissological point of  view’ (McCall 1996: 78), one that studies islands on 
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their own terms rather than through continental frameworks. Yet in order to take Hau’ofa’s 
vision seriously, further analysis of  informal, bottom-up interconnections is needed. This can 
partly be achieved through a focus on protest movements and climate activism, which also 
brings into focus resistance to the depoliticisation of  climate discourse. Recognising the limited 
extant literature about Pacific Island manifestations of  climate activism, I am alert to the 
potential for specifically Pacific modes of  activism, and what Western traditions of  activism 
could learn from those, noting that the cultural importance of  Christianity in the Pacific Islands 
might entail different modes of  engagement to the overwhelmingly atheist movements studied 
for instance by Graeber and Clough. As a means of  rethinking narratives of  climate change 
and challenging the rationalist horror stories of  the Anthropocene, I will also consider the place 
of  affect and emotion, in terms of  how it relates to activism, transformation and the political, 
as well as the feelings engendered by the prospective or current impacts of  climate change. 
Three issues this section of  the literature review has raised – understanding climate change on 
Islanders’ terms, foregrounding the role of  ethics in narratives of  climate change, and 
contesting the secular rationalism of  current climate discourse – suggest a further critical area 
of  literature to consider: religious engagements with climate change.  
4. Recognising the potential for religious engagements with climate 
change 
 
Science has universalised and materialised climate change; we must 
now particularise and spiritualise it. (Hulme 2009: 330)  
 
At the beginning of  this chapter, I established that a purely science-led approach to climate 
change is insufficient to tackling the horror stories of  the Anthropocene, and then illustrated 
what those horror stories look like in a Pacific context, in terms of  the inevitable inundation 
discourse. I then began exploring the literature concerning what alternative narratives of  the 
Anthropocene might look like. Taking Hulme’s above provocation seriously, I have 
particularised climate change narratives through a focus on Pacific Islander perspectives, 
through engaging with Epeli Hau’ofa’s work. Now I turn to the final segment – the 
spiritualisation of  climate change – and explore the potential for religious understandings of  
climate change, particularly in a Pacific Island context.  
I begin by identifying the manner in which religion has been presented as a barrier to effective 
climate change responses by a number of  social scientists, and following Kempf  (2017) and 
Rubow (2009) contend that this rejection of  religious approaches is premised upon attempts to 
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purify science from religion. I dispute both this purification and this rejection, with reference 
first to the potential of  church-led responses to climate change on a global and regional scale, 
and then through presenting examples of  positive climate change responses emerging from 
religious engagement in a Pacific context. Following Hulme (2009) and Nunn (2017), I argue 
not just that religious engagements with climate change have the potential to be beneficial, but 
that they are essential given the ethical dimensions of  climate change and the shortcomings of  
secular messaging in Oceania. Following Haluza-DeLay (2014), I acknowledge a gap in the 
literature concerning not just institutional capacity, but how religious understandings inform 
what people are saying and doing about climate change, premised, as Hulme (2009) notes, on 
the need to recognise the heterogeneity of  religious responses to climate change. Returning to 
the centrality of  narrative and what stories story stories (Haraway, 2016b), I propose to begin 
addressing this gap through exploring the impact of  religious narratives of  climate change, 
noting the prominence of  the story of  Noah in the ‘religion as barrier’ social scientific literature, 
as well as in the potential counter-discourse supplied by Rigby (2008).  
4A. Religion as a barrier and the purification of religion and science 
 
Cultural and religious values have repeatedly been framed as ‘posing limits to adaptation’ 
(Graham et al. 2013: 8), a stance that I hope to challenge. Climate change has been interpreted 
as a form of  righteous punishment by some island communities (Loughry and McAdam 2008; 
Rudiak-Gould 2009). This narrative of  righteousness was very present in the Maldives 
following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, with the creation of  ‘Wahhabi islands’ dominated 
by radical imams who, having posed as aid-workers, attributed the tsunami to the island 
women’s impiety (Maldives High Commission, personal communication). Meanwhile, cyclones 
have been interpreted as a divine punishment for moral transgression by Cook Islander clergy, 
an interpretation that Taylor (1999) dismisses as ‘inappropriate and anachronistic’.  
In a Pacific context, much of  the controversy has centred around the utilisation of  the Noah 
Story as a basis for climate change denial. For instance, Peter Rudiak-Gould (2009) observes 
cases of  climate scepticism in the Marshall Islands, bolstered by the biblical promise that there 
would be no second flood (the Noahic covenant) and the belief  that the Marshall Islands have 
been given to Marshallese by God. Similar biblical assurances have also been observed in 
Kiribati (Loughry and McAdam 2008) and Tuvalu (Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010; 
Mortreux and Barnett 2009). This particular biblical narrative is explored in far greater depth 
in Chapter Six.  
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Both denial and doomsday interpretations can inhibit proactive responses to climate change 
and can in fact legitimise new oppressive social relations. Doomsday narratives can lead to a 
form of  ‘climate change pessimism’ through which the impacts of  global warming are brought 
forward in time and exaggerated beyond scientific predictions, rendering them so 
overwhelming and inevitable that mitigative action is impossible (Rudiak-Gould 2009). Indeed, 
pessimistic attitudes towards the possibility of  acting in response to climate change have been 
found to be incredibly widespread among University of  the South Pacific (USP) students, 
suggesting that the inevitable inundation narrative is also shaping the perspectives of  those it 
portrays (Nunn et al. 2016).  
Donner (2007) contends that one of  the reasons for limited belief  in anthropogenic climate 
change is the extent to which it offends a distinction between earth and sky that has been found 
across organised religions and indigenous belief  systems for thousands of  years: through 
suggesting human influence over the climate it undermines the extent to which the sky is an 
unreachable domain of  the Gods. While Donner suggests that this is a universal dilemma, he 
sees the problem as most intractable in a Pacific Island context, due to the presence of  
‘indigenous or strongly observant religious communities’ (233), and notes that ‘in most Pacific 
Island nations, educators argue that the commonly held belief  that the Christian God controls 
the weather is greatest obstacle to educating people about climate change’ (ibid).  
However, I argue that the problems lie not with religious belief  but with how it is being analysed 
and understood. I contend that these encounters with faith-based climate change denial have 
led to a dismissal of  the potential for religiously-informed responses to climate change. This 
can be seen in the case of  Kuruppu and Liverman (2011), who, based on their findings that 
20% of  I-Kiribati participants used religious convictions as justification for a lack of  concern 
about climate change, consequently accuse their interlocutors of  ‘adopting avoidant behaviour 
such as faith in God’ (2011: 666), suggesting the singular outcome of  faith practices is inactivity 
and denial. Meanwhile McAdam, in reference to Tuvalu and Kiribati, refers to ‘religion’ as one 
of  the factors that ‘contribute to a certain degree of  complacency about environmental change’ 
(2011: 114). Indeed, as Kempf  (2017: 23) notes, many social scientists appear to simply deem 
religious responses antithetical to the expression of  Pacific Islander agency.  
This belittlement of  religious thought seems to mirror wider sentiments in the literature. For 
instance, this seeming antagonism between Christian thought and the capacity for pro-
environmental behaviour echoes White’s (1967) famous declaration that our current ecological 
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predicament is a consequence of  Christianity’s anthropocentricism and its imperatives for 
humanity to exploit nature. White argues that the only route out of  the current impasse is the 
rejection of  Christianity, and the finding of  a new religion, or alternate value system. Moreover, 
Haraway, while so insightful of  the need for new stories to comprehend the Anthropocene, 
seems to reject the possibilities of  religious insights outright, as she patronises faith in God as a 
response to climate change, describing it as an example of  ‘touching silliness’ (2016: 3), and 
invokes Christianity as an exemplar of  inactivity and denial, claiming that ‘avoidance of  the 
urgency [of  population growth] can slip into something akin to the way some Christians avoid 
the urgency of  climate change because it touches too closely on the marrow of  one’s faith’ 
(2016: 6). Klein’s (2014) otherwise comprehensive and inspiring volume This Changes Everything 
has also been similarly critiqued for its myopia when it comes to religion (Hulme 2014a).  
This rejection of  religious perspectives appears to emerge from both a misunderstanding of  
religious thought and a desire to enforce the boundaries between the religious and the scientific. 
Kempf  in his review of  the existing ‘religion as barrier’ literature, notes how the attempt by 
communities to bring religious understandings to matters of  climate science is often treated by 
social scientists as ‘an illicit melange of  elements best left separate’ (2017: 23). According to 
Kempf, faith-based climate denial is treated by scholars such as Gemenne and Shen (2009), 
Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop (2010) and McAdam and Loughry (2009) as a problem and a 
consequence of  a deficit of  scientific knowledge, to be rectified by an increase in scientific 
information and a rejection of  religious knowledge in order to ‘counter any religious positioning 
of  this kind’ (Kempf  2017: 23). The Noah Story is delegitimised by reference to climate science, 
as the latter is treated as unquestionably epistemologically superior. Thus, social scientific 
responses to this biblical narrative centre around a purification of  scientific and religious 
knowledges, and an epistemological hierarchisation, which places religious knowledge on the 
very bottom tier, associated with ‘deviation, ignorance, passivity and maladaptivity’ (Kempf  
2017: 30). This purification of  knowledges is evident in Reed’s (2011) account of  Kiribati, 
which somewhat sensationally portrays the atoll nation as an ideological battleground, 
describing it as ‘a place where science clashes with religion’, suggesting the homogeneity and 
irreconcilability of  both concepts. Yet, ironically, many of  the same authors who are 
marginalising religious understandings are themselves also calling for greater recognition of  
local understandings of  climate change, and culturally appropriate and locally-led responses to 
it (Kempf  2017).  
Kempf ’s conclusions are supported by the work of  Rubow, who analyses a number of  studies 
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that emphasise how Christianity in the Pacific negatively impacts ‘attentiveness towards climate 
change and the ability to recover after a natural hazard’ (2009: 99). She particularly directs her 
critique at Taylor’s (1999) work on cyclone recovery in the Cook Islands, which has presented 
some religious understandings of  cyclones as an impediment to effective recovery. However, 
Rubow identifies some crucial analytical flaws in Taylor’s work. She firstly warns against his 
conflation of  the metaphorical and the literal, while recognising the difficulty of  distinguishing 
the two. She also highlights the importance of  acknowledging that community members may 
and often do hold self-contradictory beliefs, and that the application of  beliefs is contextually 
contingent. Following Rubow’s thoughts on this matter, in my exploration of  narratives, I 
recognise that participants may engage in different narratives at different points, occupying 
multiple points of  ethical understanding, some of  which are at odds with others.  
Moreover, Rubow rejects the presumption that divine causation mirrors direct processes of  
scientific causation. Instead she suggests that the two forms of  explanation occupy different 
domains, and that ‘the two domains are not competing, but remain as different traditions of  
knowledge kept at different levels of  social reality (or kept together as unsolved paradoxes)’ 
(2009: 102). This acceptance of  multiple and divergent knowledges counters the orthodoxy of  
knowledge purification within the literature (as highlighted by Kempf  2017), resonates with 
Kempf ’s relational ontology approach and indicates a path by which religious knowledges can 
be embraced as part of  a response to climate change and natural disasters.  
Bubandt’s vision of  ‘symbiopolitics’ (2017: 137G) goes one step further, suggesting not that 
religious and scientific knowledges should both be acknowledged in their respective domains, 
but that they cannot be disentangled: any attempt at purification is hopeless. He cites the case 
of  the explosion of  the Indonesian mud volcano known as ‘Lusi’ as an inextricable mixing of  
geology, politics and spirits, and therefore demonstrates the indeterminacy of  the 
Anthropocene and the porous boundaries between humanity and nature, science and faith. 
Meanwhile, Donner (2007), while providing explanations for religious rejections of  climate 
change, also refutes the need for purification. Rather than use the ‘domain of  the gods’ as an 
opportunity to condemn the place of  religion in scientific matters outright, Donner instead 
recommends partnerships between scientists and religious figures, arguing that ‘scientists should 
not be afraid to embrace religious or philosophical initiatives to address the fundamental 
understanding of  the human relationship with the climate’ (2007: 235).  
Thus, while many existing studies of  the relations between religion and climate change in the 
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Pacific present religious thought merely as a barrier, and thereby marginalise its place in climate 
responses, a minority of  scholars do advocate the entanglement rather than purification of  
scientific and religious knowledges, and I will follow this latter group in exploring the balancing, 
enmeshing and tensions of  multiple knowledges in my Chapter Six, through the notion of  tufala 
save. Moreover, given the centrality of  the Noah story to the dismissal of  religious knowledge, I 
will pay heed to this and other biblical stories, and the impacts they have on the reception of  
climate discourses.  
4B. Religious responses to climate change: institutional capacity and positive impacts  
 
Despite the aforementioned scepticism regarding faith-based engagements with climate 
change, other scholars have noted the positive potential for religious engagements with climate 
change, and encourage further efforts in this regard. I begin by outlining institutional 
engagement in climate change efforts by religious organisations, and then turn to the role of  
theology more explicitly. Partnerships between conservation organisations and religious groups 
have been advocated (McLeod and Palmer 2015) and in Science magazine religious institutions 
have been called upon not only to engage in climate change responses, but to offer moral 
leadership (Dasgupta and Ramanathan 2014). Pacific Island churches have been importuned 
to step up in the face of  climate change and spread a message of  hope, but one that is truthful 
about the dire predicament Tuvalu faces and that voices the concerns of  the people (Fusi 2005).  
Religious organisations have been identified as crucially influential actors in a Pacific climate 
change context, and many authors contend that they should be on the front line of  climate 
advocacy (Nunn et al. 2016). Part of  the potential for religious organisations to respond to 
climate change stems from their significant financial, political and institutional power (Hulme 
2017: 15). Reale’s (2014) work in the Solomon Islands highlights the importance of  the church’s 
role, arguing both that Christianity is an important part of  Pacific Island identity and that the 
church fills a ‘governance void’ (94) left by the more limited reach of  Pacific Island states, as the 
Church alone has influence stretching from an international to village level. She argues that 
churches build resilience to climate change through the other development work they are 
already engaged in, and may be able to engage most effectively when partnered with NGOs or 
government (2014: 107), suggesting a practical means of  channelling the Church’s potential for 
climate change adaptation. Douglas also affirms the role of  NGOs and the Church in providing 
welfare services in Melanesia, given the existence of  weak states, and the consequential ‘official 
institutional vacuum’ (2007: 165).  
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However, a number of  authors have also noted limitations to the Church as an institutional 
actor in a climate change context. Rubow and Bird (2016) note that Pacific Island churches 
often do not prioritise climate change because of  budgetary restrictions, shortages of  technical 
knowledge, or the lessened immediacy of  climate impacts compared with other threats 
parishioners face. Meanwhile, Reale (2014) acknowledges that during disaster recovery there 
can be a danger that communities favour rebuilding churches over and above their own 
wellbeing, leading to a greater emphasis upon the needs of  religious institutions compared with 
other facets of  community life. Moreover, a village’s religious composition can strongly impact 
the effectiveness of  church-based delivery of  disaster recovery efforts (McDougall et al. 2008: 
29), with villages united by a single church found to recover faster due to increased organisation, 
as compared with those divided between multiple denominations, suggesting a practical limit 
to ecumenicalism. These questions regarding organisational influence, the relative strength of  
the Ni-Vanuatu state and denominational difference inform my research into religious 
responses in an empirical setting. However, it is insufficient to merely highlight the institutional 
capacity of  religious bodies, but, as Rubow and Bird argue, attention must also be paid to the 
meanings religion imbues climate change with, what they refer to as the ‘cultural modelling of  
climate change’ (2016: 150).  
And turning from religious institutions to the impacts of  theology and religious thought, there 
are some examples of  positive ‘cultural modelling’: religious understandings can inspire rather 
than inhibit adaptation. Rudiak-Gould (2009) found that a minority of  Marshall Islanders 
combined scientific knowledge and religious faith as a springboard for action, positioning 
themselves as God’s stewards who were responsible for defending the planet. The promise to 
Noah that there would be no second flood also legitimated, rather than detracted, from 
scientific arguments, as it indicated that sea level rise was clearly anthropogenic rather than sent 
by God. However, such a conclusion would only be palatable within certain theological 
frameworks, therefore necessitating further empirical research into different Christian 
understandings in the Pacific.  
The biblical story of  the flood has also been recuperated as a basis for interspecies compassion, 
care and concern, as opposed to climate change scepticism, by environmental humanities 
scholar Kate Rigby (2008). She re-envisions the ark as a site of  counter-utopian possibility, and 
an example of  how we can positively transform ourselves. She does not accept it as a premise 
for denial, or for the premature ushering of  end times. Instead, in it she sees a model for a new 
form of  compassion and cosmopolitanism that transcends the anthropocentric. She sees the 
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flood as a model of  hope, because at the centre is human agency, that of  Noah, who achieves 
the impossible: he offers hospitality to a diverse multitude of  strangers, of  non-human others, 
when he is without a home of  his own. Rigby sees this radical act of  hospitality that considers 
the needs of  all species as instructive for how we can act in the face of  disaster, and one that 
resonates with Tsing et al. (2017) and Haraway’s (2016) calls for multispecies connection in the 
face of  the Anthropocene.  
Eco-theological texts in Oceania are also explicitly incorporating ideas about responding to 
climate change into a specifically Pacific context. Rubow and Bird note that these particular 
manifestations of  contextual theology draw on ‘traditional natural-cultural worldviews and 
practices, which include notions of  interconnectedness, belonging, sharing and reciprocity, 
respect, and the sacredness of  the land-sea-air domain’ (2016: 153). They reference Janet 
Guyer’s ‘evacuation of  the near future’, the notion that the Western ‘public culture of  
temporality’, evident in macroeconomic theory and evangelical prophecy, is polarised by a focus 
on ‘fantasy futurism’ and ‘enforced presentism’ (2007: 409-410). Rubow and Bird apply this 
concept to climate discourse, noting the emphasis on ‘urgent presentisms’ (the focus upon 
immediate mitigation and adaptation actions) and apocalyptic futures, leaving a temporal gap 
(Rubow and Bird 2016: 152). They argue for incorporating the notion of  ‘time as waiting’ (2016: 
153) to fill that gap, building upon Amanaki Havea (1986)’s ‘coconut theology’, which 
emphasises living and being in the present with the movements of  the natural world. In a way 
this also acts to mitigate the ‘Apocalypse Forever’ Swyngedouw (2010) identifies, which is 
replicated by the inevitable inundation discourse. Upolu Vaai’s (2015) embodied theology 
brings Samoan notions of  interconnected communality into theologies of  the Cross in order to 
make a religiously-based and specifically Oceanic argument for climate justice. However, while 
these are important contributions, Kempf  (2017), among others, argues that this gap in the 
social science literature cannot be filled by theology alone. Instead there is also a need to 
understand how people are articulating their understandings and acting in response to these 
religious narratives (Haluza-DeLay 2014), and what some of  their implications for political 
action are.  
4C. Further directions for research 
 
Clearly, there is a significant gap in the existing literature. Despite the imperative of  engaging 
with religious understandings of  climate change, particularly in a Pacific context, there has 
been little work in the field to date, and much of  it has sought to marginalise religious 
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understandings. Social science research into relations between religious organisations and 
climate change has so far been quite limited (Haluza-DeLay 2014). While there are some 
theological reflections upon climate change, not enough research concerns what ‘the world’s 
religions and their adherents are actually saying or doing about climate change’ (ibid), and in 
my exploration of  religious narratives of  climate change and their implications, I seek to 
address this gap.  
As Hulme (2014b) highlights, despite its significance, religious dimensions are largely absent 
from ‘modernist accounts of  climate change and its multiple causes’ (xii), such as those of  the 
IPCC. Yet, as highlighted in the context of  the Anthropocene horror stories, science cannot 
manage all of  the ways in which people engage with climate change, particularly as it is 
increasingly recognised as an ethical issue. Instead it is necessary to incorporate religious 
understandings because ‘effective climate policy need to tap into intrinsic, deeply held values 
and motives’ (xiii). Firstly, this is due to the ‘long history of  interdependency’ (xii) between 
religion and climate, as the former is used to find meaning in the latter. Secondly, this is due to 
the ‘thick’ accounts of  moral reasoning’ (2017:15) religion provides, which are embedded in 
local norms and beliefs, giving them a motivational force not mirrored by economics or science 
and other secular messaging. Consequently, rather than as a barrier, religion can be embraced 
as a ‘cultural resource’ (Hulme 2017: 15). Thus, Hulme advocates further research into 
‘religious filters’ through which scientific information is viewed and then transfigured into 
‘perceptions of  climate change both consistent and not consistent with the scientific narratives’ 
(2014b: xiv). The story of  Noah, as will be discussed in Chapter Six, can be seen as a crucial 
one of  these filters.  
This need for ‘thick’ moral accounts rather than thin evocation of  global values seems 
particularly pressing in the Pacific. Rubow (2009), in her study of  the Cook Islands, strongly 
advocates addressing religious dimensions when investigating climate change and resilience in 
a South Pacific context, as existing literature fails to heed the extent to which responses to it, 
and to extreme weather events, are shaped by myth and religion. She notes that divine relations 
to environment, including the links between gods and storms, figure strongly across many 
Pacific mythologies. Moreover, Nunn (2017) contends that a reason for the limited success of  
many climate projects in the Pacific Islands is the secularity of  the messaging, which fails to 
sufficiently engage communities. Instead he recommends that ‘the most influential messages 
are those that engage with people’s spiritual beliefs’, and therefore more work is needed in this 
area, particularly through the use of  messages that resonate with scriptural understandings. 
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Part of  the value of  religious messaging may stem from particular trends within Pacific 
Christianity itself, due to its lack of  separation between nature and culture. As Nunn et al. 
highlight in a survey of  USP students7, those who attended church more regularly were more 
likely to feel connected to nature and to actively reflect upon their relationship to their 
environment, and also be most concerned about climate change. Again, Rubow and Bird’s 
(2016) analysis of  Pacific eco-theology gives further evidence of  the potency of  Christian 
climate messaging in Oceania.  
In tackling the need to rethink ethical responses to climate change, I intend to be alert to the 
diversity of  religious thought and experience. Hulme (2017: 17), while noting that ‘religious 
engagement with climate change is both necessary and inevitable’, recognises that not all 
religious groups approach the morals and ethics of  climate change in the same way. Instead he 
highlights the potential for disagreements about possible responses, and the responsibility for 
delivering those responses, and on which terms and timescales (Hulme 2009). He therefore 
urges further research into ‘the religious heterogeneity through which climate change is 
experienced’ (2017: 17), an agenda I am contributing to through an examination of  the multiple 
and conflictual narratives through which climate change is made meaningful in the Pacific 
Islands. The need for narrative has also been noted by some religious organisations committed 
to confronting climate change, such as the Alliance for Religions and Conservation (2007), who 
encourage an engagement with ‘the narrative, the mythological, the metaphorical or the 
existence of  memories of  past disasters and the way out’. The story of  the flood, one of  the 
major focuses of  the current ‘religion as barrier’ approach and of  Chapter Six, can be seen as 
a manifestation of  all of  these categories. Moreover, as Kempf  has highlighted, the Noah story 
is used by social scientists as an argument for the purification of  science and religion. I wish to 
investigate this same story, but through a lens that recognises the entanglement of  multiple 
forms of  knowledge, and thereby use it as an argument against this same purification.  
Moreover, following Stenmark’s distinction between religion and theology, while the latter can 
be understood as doctrinal, the former is more engaged in story-telling, again highlighting the 
relevance of  narrative. She argues that storytelling is imperative in the face of  climate change 
as a ‘wicked problem’, as it works to ‘increase the plurality of  perspectives and open our minds 
to alternatives’ and thereby ‘help us judge and act in the midst of  uncertainty’ (2015: 935). 
                                                        
7 USP students are not necessarily representative of many island communities, yet are a significant population as 
they represent ‘future island decision-makers’ (Nunn et al. 2016: 477).  
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Thus, my focus is not upon theological examinations of  climate change, but the different stories 
told, and the different ways of  seeing the world that they capture.  
While there is some research identifying a productive interrelation of  scientific and religious 
understandings in the Pacific, it needs to be taken further. As part of  a third wave of  critique, 
one that foregrounds of  Islander understandings and agency, there is the potential here to 
rethink the place of  religious belief  as an enabler for action, and thereby a threat, not to 
scientific understandings or to effective adaptation, but to climate change itself. 
5. From the theoretical to the empirical 
 
I have established the significance of  how climate change is narratively framed, and highlighted 
the empirical, political and ethical problems with the inevitable inundation discourse, the 
dominant narrative framing of  climate change and the Pacific Islands. In doing so, I have made 
a case for exploring counter-narratives of  climate change in Oceania. I have explored a series 
of  literatures and areas – Hau’ofa’s Sea of  Islands vision, affect and enchantment, climate 
protest movements, and religious responses to climate change – that suggest potential avenues 
I could explore, in order to document these alternative narratives. Consequently, I now turn to 
the practice and process of  doing so, recounting my methodological challenges and 
achievements.  
 
 
 
 
3. Anonymity, sagacity and reciprocity: some 
methodological considerations  
 
Heaps of bush to be mulched. Improved machete swings. Seedlings 
sheltered by a canopy of dry banana leaves.  
 
My early field notes from Vanuatu capture the minutiae of  one community gardening project, 
replete with reflections, conversations and concerns regarding my own technical inadequacies. 
The pages are suffused with ambitious visions of  the future: how many vegetables will be grown, 
how much land will be sustainably cultivated, how many local participants will be engaged. 
Then garden-based entries cease for a number of  months as my fieldwork concerns and life in 
Vanuatu takes on new foci. When my notes finally return to the garden in question, the tone 
has dramatically shifted. My early hopes have been dashed. Failure by me and my friends to 
upkeep the garden has led to the forest’s relentless return. Nature has reclaimed all the ground 
we cleared, the banana leaf  shelter has shrivelled and fallen, and the majority of  the seeds I 
shipped in from Fiji have perished. Instead of  an abundant garden, teeming with a myriad of  
crops and vegetables, Moses and I are left with an armful of  cabbages. I open with the memory 
of  this disheartening horticultural endeavour, because then and now the parallels between it 
and the research process are evident. The act of  research involves both a reconciliation between 
original visions of  academic grandeur and more modest research outputs – one’s armful of  
cabbages – as well as an honest appreciation of  the value of  the latter. Thus, in this chapter I 
reflect upon the deviations from my original research design, as well as my positive 
methodological achievements.  
I begin by presenting my research design rationale and then reviewing my data collection 
process. I outline my approaches to sampling and negotiations with gatekeepers, justify my 
selection of  semi-structured interviews and participant observation as my main research 
methods, and then discuss my experience of  interviewing, analysing data and conducting 
fieldwork. For the final section of  the chapter I reflect in greater depth upon the ethics of  my 
research practice. In particular I examine three areas that emerge from the indigenous research 
methods literature: problematising anonymity, embracing sagacity and practicing reciprocity. 
While not claiming to situate myself  as a practitioner of  indigenous research methods, I 
evaluate the efforts I have made in these three areas. 
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1. Research design rationale 
 
As established in the literature review, my overall research aim was to explore narratives of  
climate change and the Pacific Islands that challenged or contested the inevitable inundation 
discourse (the narrative that portrays the Pacific Islands as hopelessly lost to encroaching waves 
and thereby presents Islanders as helpless victims, and discourages proactive responses to 
climate change). Narrowing from this broader aim, and through engagement with the 
literature, three key areas for exploration were identified with regards to potential Pacific 
Islander-led counter-narratives: Epeli Hau’ofa’s highly influential Sea of  Islands vision and 
manifestations of  Oceanic regionalism; Pacific Islander-led manifestations of  climate justice 
activism; and faith-based understandings of  and responses to climate change. Consequently, 
the three research questions I devised were: 
1. To what extent can contemporary climate justice networks in the Pacific be understood 
through the Sea of  Islands vision, as a form of  Oceanic regionalism? 
2. How does engagement with climate change activism in a Pacific Island context shape 
political and activist identities and subjectivities?  
3. How do religious beliefs inform understandings of  climate change in terms of  
responsibility and the capacity for action? 
Thus, the three research questions in turn were designed to address re-evaluations of  the power 
of  Oceania as a region vis-a-vis climate change, to rethink the capacity and attitudes of  those 
within the region confronting climate change, and to challenge the purely scientific framings of  
climate change that underpin the inevitable inundation hypothesis.  
In determining a field site and case studies with which to pursue these questions, I reasoned 
that my analytical emphasis upon regionalism and interconnection also methodologically 
necessitated multi-sited research (Marcus 1995), as while the connection between mobility and 
Pacific identity is regularly noted, a lot of  research still concentrates on single areas, 
perpetuating an isolated understanding of  them (Teaiwa 2005). My desire to explore 
regionalism and activism as well as faith in the Pacific Island region drew me to the Pacific 
Climate Warriors, who I first encountered via their youtube videos. They are a network of  
Pacific Islander climate activists from across the region (described in detail in the introduction), 
who cohere around a campaign slogan of  ‘we are not drowning, we are fighting’, which suggests 
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some level of  contestation of  the inevitable inundation discourse. In accordance with my first 
two research questions, I wished to explore the perspectives and actions of  this group in terms 
of  regionally-coordinated manifestations of  climate activism. This therefore took me to 
Australia for the first leg of  my fieldwork, where during October 2014 members of  the Pacific 
Climate Warriors from twelve different countries assembled for the Stand Up for the Pacific 
campaign, a mass demonstration and awareness raising tour. While this first period of  fieldwork 
(Phase I) gave me some insight into the impact of  faith on climate responses, to investigate my 
third research question in sufficient depth I needed to conduct research with a broader range 
of  participants than just the Pacific Climate Warriors and be immersed in a Pacific Island 
context, and thus conducted four months research in Vanuatu (Phase II).  
Conducting face-to-face research, a mixture of  ‘verbal research methods’ (Secor 2010: 194) 
and participant observation, was imperative. Many of  the existing studies of  the relationship 
between climate change, the Pacific and the spectre of  forced migration rely on critical 
discourse analysis of  newspaper articles (Farbotko 2005), popular and academic texts (Baldwin 
2013) or the printed testimonies of  relatively high-profile Pacific activists (Mansfield 2013). 
Central to my research contribution is a departure from this approach, as there is currently a 
disproportionate focus in this area on the public and the textual, as opposed to everyday lived 
practice, and it only through a focus on the latter that I would be able to explore the 
performance of  activist identities and Oceanic regionalism, or recognise how religious beliefs 
shaped actions. I recognise that both participant observation and interviews have the potential 
to reveal knowledge about lived practices (Hitchings 2012), or at least about how participants 
represent themselves as engaging in practices (Secor 2010). An ethnographic approach would 
enable me to recognise the convergences and divergences between how participants presented 
their practices in interviews, and how they behaved.   
Due to the small and specific research population in question, and the depth with which I 
wished to explore particular experiences and perspectives, questionnaires seem inappropriate, 
as they wouldn’t have enabled me to spontaneously explore emerging ideas, or seek further 
explanations (Secor 2010: 196). I also decided not to use focus groups, partially due to concerns 
raised by Warrick (2009) about participant reluctance to engage in a Ni-Vanuatu context, and 
logistical concerns about the possibility of  translating group discussions into multiple languages 
simultaneously, with the likelihood of  breaking the flow of  conversation (Bujra 2006). There 
was also the issue that I was working with pre-existing groups, and focus group participants can 
be less open when they are with a familiar set of  people (Bedford and Burgess 2001). Instead 
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of  artificially constructing a group scenario I was looking to observe the practices and dynamics 
of  pre-existing groups in action, as well as exploring the understandings and motivations of  
individuals in greater depth outside of  that group setting. Consequently, I determined that the 
most suitable methods were participant observation and semi-structured interviews. 
These methods are also compatible with a qualitative case study approach (Kees van Donge 
2006). Through my focus on particular groups of  people at particular times, I am not 
attempting to generate results that are statistically significant, but ideas that have a wider 
relevance, and that can be applied to other cases (Kees van Donge 2006). In this I follow 
Baxter’s (2010) argument that one of  the main roles of  case studies is to generate new 
theoretical insights, as well as confirming or challenging existing analytical viewpoints, which is 
therefore compatible with my overall research aim of  highlighting narratives that challenge 
existing analyses in the form of  the inevitable inundation discourse.  
Through these case studies I therefore hope to meet my research objectives, which are to make 
original contributions in three areas. Firstly, that of  Pacific Studies, through the empirical and 
analytical evaluation of  Hau’ofa’s Sea of  Islands vision. Secondly, I wish to contribute to the 
critical literature that is academically challenging the inevitable inundation discourse, through 
providing not just further refutations, but empirical examples of  counter-narratives, and 
particularly highlighting political agency. In doing so, I wish to contribute to the broader 
literatures concerning narrative and the Anthropocene and the different communicative 
framings of  climate change, through documenting locally meaningful stories and 
understandings of  climate change, and actions and practices that emerge from those. Finally, I 
wish to further the field exploring the relationships between religious perspectives and climate 
change, and in doing so, both showcase the heterogeneity of  religious viewpoints as well as 
challenging the academic marginalisation of  them.  
2. Overview of data collection 
 
Across the two phases of  data collection, I conducted 61 recorded semi-structured interviews, 
in addition to three unrecorded interviews, and undertook five months of  participant-
observation, one month based in Australia, and the following four in Vanuatu. The Pacific 
Island based component of  my fieldwork was greatly enhanced by conducting a three-month 
Overseas Institutional Visit to USP, Suva Fiji campus, which enabled me to build connections 
with relevant academic and research contacts, acclimatise to the Pacific Islands (literally and 
culturally) and conduct a week-long pilot scoping visit to Vanuatu, which was crucial for 
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securing a research visa, and furthering research connections. 
 
Figure 4 - Gantt chart highlighting the different stages of data collection and research design (colour-coded by country). 
Phase I of  fieldwork consisted of  one month of  immersive participant observation with the 
Pacific Climate Warriors’ Stand Up for the Pacific campaign tour in Australia, during October 
2014, complemented by conducting fourteen semi-structured qualitative interviews, thereby 
interviewing just under half  of  the campaign’s participants. Phase II of  my fieldwork was based 
entirely in Vanuatu, where I acquired sufficient language proficiency to conduct all the 
interviews myself, either in English or Bislama, (although I hired a native speaker to transcribe 
the Bislama interviews). 
The bipartite division of  my fieldwork was designed to enable me to work with a broader range 
of  participants, active on different geopolitical scales, and involved in a variety of  organisations 
and institutions that engage with climate change in the Pacific Islands. Through using this 
model, I focused both on interviewing those who were most heavily involved in climate 
advocacy on an international level (through their paid employment or through their 
participation in the Stand Up for the Pacific tour – Phase I) and those who were active in the 
350 Pacific network and other climate change adaptation or advocacy initiatives on a regional 
or local level (Phase II). This bipartite fieldwork structure was also designed to provide a 
longitudinal perspective to my research. Longitudinal research gives insight into which 
phenomena and explanations are enduring, and which are more mutable (Baxter 2010). Rather 
than just a brief  ethnographic insight into the events of  Autumn 2014, the plan was to explore 
how the practices of  the campaign group and participants’ perspectives developed in the 
intervening time period, particularly through the use of  follow-up interviews. 
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3. Emergent research design: changes to my original plans 
 
The whole thing was sort of running on emergent design because 
there was just so much to organise and it was awesome not to have to 
stress about having everything planned out.  
(Daniel, 350 Pacific organiser) 
 
In many ways the spontaneous and mutable nature of  350 Pacific’s campaign and wider Pacific 
climate organising was mirrored by the emergent design of  my fieldwork process, as many of  
my original plans and ideas did not materialise, and I was forced to respond and adapt my 
research design throughout the data collection process. The key features of  my original research 
design are presented in Box 1.  
Phase I largely went as planned, although 
it did not include sailing with the Warriors 
from Fiji to Australia at the launch of  the 
campaign as originally hoped, as the 
voyaging component of  350 Pacific’s tour 
was dropped due to logistical and financial 
constraints. However, once I began 
preparing for Phase II during my Overseas 
Institutional Visit in Fiji it soon became 
clear that conducting the next stage of  
fieldwork in so many different national 
contexts was unfeasible. My Phase II 
Pacific Island fieldwork sites reduced to two 
and eventually to one, as I found the time 
and money constraints unmanageable. Within the scope of  my project it wasn’t possible to build 
a network of  research contacts, establish a sound understanding of  cultural, political and social 
context, and develop language skills across three different countries within the six months 
allocated. Thus, while trying to avoid understanding islands as small, fragmented and isolated, 
my data and the gaps in that to some extent embody that fragmentation. I also recognised that 
my research would benefit from greater depth rather than breadth in terms of  fieldwork focus. 
Consequently, I chose to focus on just one field site for Phase II, yet still maintained a regional 
perspective through my engagement with other pan-Pacific NGOs based in Australia and 
Vanuatu. I also chose to engage with a far greater range of  participants in Phase II (compared 
Box 1: Original Research Design 
• Multi-sited fieldwork in Australia 
and the Pacific 
• Interviews (target: 40) and 
participant observation as primary 
data collection methods 
• Phase I: Participate in the Warriors’ 
voyage from Fiji to Sydney, and 
then in the Stand Up for the Pacific 
tour in Australia (target: 18 
interviews) 
• Phase II: Fieldwork in three island 
countries, just interviewing 
members of  local 350.org groups in 
those different nations (target: seven 
interviews per country) 
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with the original focus simply on the Pacific Climate Warriors) giving me a more nuanced and 
representative understanding of  faith-based engagements with climate change.  
Due to the narrower geographic focus of  Phase II, I was only able to conduct follow-up 
interviews with a handful of  Phase I participants. However, in these cases the process enhanced 
the validity of  my research, as I provided participants with their previous interview transcripts 
and sought feedback, with one interviewee confirming that it was a ‘pretty clear and accurate 
reflection of  what I was thinking and feeling at the time’.  
Vanuatu became my primary case study for five mains reasons. Firstly, I was informed that its 
local group was one of  the strongest within the 350 Pacific network (350 Pacific, personal 
communication) and thus one of  the most interesting examples of  how contemporary Pacific 
climate activism can work in practice. The vibrancy of  the Vanuatu group is evident in the 
videos documenting their canoe building in preparation for the Stand Up for the Pacific tour 
(Island Reach 2014a; Island Reach 2014b). Secondly, I had made particularly strong links with 
members of  350 Vanuatu during the Stand Up for the Pacific tour and meetings while I was in 
Fiji, and they very generously encouraged me and supported me in bringing my research to 
Vanuatu.  
Thirdly, I wished to avoid conducting research in an atoll nation. In my choice of  countries, I 
avoided Tuvalu and Kiribati, as there is already significant literature on these two nations, to 
the extent that some research participants in these communities are now suffering from climate 
research fatigue, which could be skewing research findings (Mortreux and Barnett 2009) and 
having negative impacts on communities. Moreover, I wished to concentrate on a volcanic, 
mountainous island nation whose exposure to climate change impacts could not be discursively 
assimilated into a simple threat of  sea level rise and total inundation. Focusing on Vanuatu 
enabled me to avoid perpetuating a Polynesian bias in Pacific discussions of  mobility (Hanlon 
2009), although it is a crowded area academically, especially within Social Anthropology 
(Warrick 2011; Granderson, 2017; Hetzel and Pascht 2017).  
Fourthly, there is also the interesting geopolitical context of  Vanuatu to consider. Shibuya (1996: 
547) claims Vanuatu can be seen as a ‘leader among the island nations’ due to its historically 
radical anti-colonial and anti-nuclear stances, and therefore has the potential for also leading 
on climate change. But these conjectures about Vanuatu’s regional role are very much focused 
on a governmental level, as opposed to also considering civil society. This question around 
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leadership on climate change crystallised in the government and civil society responses to the 
devastation wrecked by the category five storm event, Cyclone Pam, which struck Vanuatu in 
March 2015 while I was conducting my Overseas Institutional Visit. Pam was the final major 
incentive for basing my research in Vanuatu, as it had made climate change a tangible point of  
discussion, following the Vanuatu Prime Minister’s identification of  the cyclone as a climate 
change impact (Walker and Farrell 2015), and I had been intrigued and impressed by the 
centrality of  the 350 Vanuatu group in the early post-cyclone response (350 Pacific 2015). 
However, Cyclone Pam also presented challenges for my research, as many climate change 
adaptation projects had been diverted into cyclone recovery efforts, and both the Vanuatu 
Climate Action Network and National Advisory Board (on climate change) suspended almost 
all meetings during my period in the field because of  their preoccupation with recovery. During 
my interviews, almost all discussions of  climate change returned to Pam, making the cyclone a 
lens through which climate change was understood, and thus a specific focus to my research 
that I had not anticipated.  
4. Access 
 
One of  the major potential challenges I faced was gaining access to participants, as I was 
seeking respondents from a relatively small pool of  actors. My primary solution to this was to 
work through organisations as gatekeepers, namely 350 Pacific for Phase I and both the 
Vanuatu branch of  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), 
the German government’s development agency, and 350 Vanuatu for Phase II.  
4A. Gatekeepers: Phase I 
 
Using my own social network of  climate activist friends and contacts, I identified acquaintances 
who were familiar with one or more of  the key 350 Pacific organisers, and encouraged them to 
set up a virtual introduction to some of  350 Pacific’s staff, and began regular communication 
with 350 Pacific via email and skype in Spring 2014. I also contacted all activist friends and 
acquaintances who I knew to have some connection to Australia, and began communicating 
with those friends of  friends. This gave me access to free accommodation across Australia 
during my visits and chunks of  my first fieldwork period, built a friendship and emotional 
support network that was relatively nearby that was vital when fieldwork got tough, and 
familiarised me with many of  the Australian climate activist networks who were supporting the 
Stand Up for the Pacific tour.  
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In April 2014, I conducted a pre-fieldwork scoping visit to Australia, holding a series of  three 
face-to-face meetings with the core 350 Pacific organisers. Crucially these meetings introduced 
me to the idea of  the flotilla, which had not yet been publically disclosed, and set in motion my 
plans for Phase I of  research. This visit also gave me the opportunity to observe an Australia-
based Warrior training, to familiarise myself  with Newcastle, New South Wales, the site of  the 
flotilla, as well as enriching my academic network through attending a Pacific Studies 
conference in Sydney, where I encountered staff  from USP, laying the foundation for the 
Overseas Institutional Visit the following year.  
During the April 2014 meetings I received approval and encouragement for my research from 
the 350 Pacific staff. I also received consent and encouragement from the Warriors participating 
in the Stand up for the Pacific tour in advance of  the flotilla (see Appendix 3), and numerous 
invitations to conduct my follow-up interviews in the Warriors’ home countries. I recognise that 
through establishing this relationship, 350 Pacific was acting as a gatekeeper. However, 350 
Pacific is a voluntary organisation and volunteer advocates are offered no financial incentive to 
be involved in its advocacy work, although they are encouraged to participate through the 
possibility of  otherwise hard-to-access opportunities for international travel. Unlike with some 
gatekeepers, there are far less issues of  dominance, coercion or power imbalances, which 
minimised the risk that participants had been made to participate by 350, rather than actively 
consenting to be involved. 
Yet working through NGOs can create further challenges. As Mercer (2006) highlights there is 
a danger that NGOs will seek to control research. However, given the very limited time and 
resources of  350 Pacific, I thought it was highly unlikely that they would attempt to manage 
my research, although as discussed in the later section on reciprocity, I was keen on being able 
to fulfil the NGO’s wishes in gratitude for their support of  my work. As a non-Pacific Islander, 
and as someone who came at a late stage to the group’s activities and who was explicitly 
introduced and positioned as a researcher throughout, I feel there was very little danger that I 
would be perceived by participants as a representative of  350 Pacific, and that this would thus 
colour their responses.  
Yet a more intractable issue is the extent to which my involvement with the campaign made it 
harder to reflect critically on their actions, due to feelings of  potential betrayal (Taylor 2014). 
This impact is most keenly felt in terms of  my research outcomes. Initially I had envisioned 
submitting a report to 350 Pacific with an evaluative dimension. Thus, I had hoped my research 
 87 
would be constructively critical (Halvorsen 2015), highlighting issues that arose during the 
campaign, but with the purpose of  helping 350 Pacific reflect on how they could improve their 
work, rather than as an ad hominem attack, as researchers have a responsibility to represent 
participants respectfully even if  they are critiquing them (Secor 2010). However I discovered 
that the process of  ‘being useful’ (Taylor 2014) in relation to 350 Pacific was far more 
challenging than it was with GIZ or 350 Vanuatu, and was accomplished largely through 
practical rather than academic outputs, as I recognised that my expectation of  an evaluative 
contribution emerged from a misplaced sense of  the additional perspective accorded by the 
Ivory Tower, and underestimated the extent to which these participants as members of  social 
movements are already reflecting upon their own practices (Halvorsen 2015). Consequently, 
my acts of  giving back consist of  accounts of  350 Pacific’s campaigning that are intended to 
bring awareness about their work to a broader audience, as opposed to that which is helpful for 
a process of  internal review. 
Working through 350 Pacific as a gatekeeper has also had some impact upon the contents and 
focus of  my analysis. Unsurprisingly over the course of  eighteen months of  communicating 
and working with them, there were points of  difficulty and disagreement, and for some time I 
was torn about how much I should incorporate a critique of  this group’s overall working 
practices into my thesis. Following consultations with my supervisor and other researchers 
working in similar fields, I reached the conclusion that those particular arguments and materials 
(which considered questions of  the politics of  the campaign’s leadership) were neither pertinent 
to my research questions, nor breaking new academic ground and were not helpful to my 
participants (given the aforementioned existing processes of  self-reflection). Thus, my 
entanglement with a gatekeeping NGO has impacted my research experience, in terms of  
provoking a moral quandary about my ability as a researcher to helpfully provide critique 
without ‘betraying’ those who have supported me, but has not negatively affected the material 
within the thesis, as these quandaries were incidental to the questions I was answering.  
4B. Gatekeepers: Phase II 
 
In Phase II, I worked through two organisations, 350 Vanuatu and GIZ, both of  whom I was 
introduced to by my incredibly helpful main fieldwork contact. The same concerns regarding 
350 Pacific are mirrored in terms of  350 Vanuatu, except that I felt more confident about 
achieving a mutually reciprocal relationship, as discussed further in Section 8C. With GIZ, the 
situation was less complicated. I was physically hosted by them (I was able to work in their 
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office), and through my volunteer work I gained first-hand experience of  many climate 
adaptation initiatives and was able to positively and practically contribute to them. 
Volunteering with them also enabled me to embody the position of  ‘development volunteer’ 
alongside the potentially extractive role of  researcher. However little of  my research directly 
reflected upon their work, and my recruitment of  interviewees was also largely independent of  
them, so my relation to them does not present a moral quandary in terms of  the results.  
4C. Sampling 
 
I used ‘purposive non-random sampling’ (Davis et al. 2007: 166) as interview participants in 
Phase I were predominately identified and recruited based on their involvement in or 
connection to the 350 Pacific advocacy network. I snowballed from my existing established 
contacts in the 350 network (two of  the paid organisers), meeting people through their 
involvement in the Stand Up for the Pacific tour, and using those to build connections with 350 
Vanuatu, and other climate change advocacy and adaptation organisations in Vanuatu. This 
approach was both a pragmatic one and to some extent reflected the phenomenon being 
observed, as I was looking at the different scales of  a campaigning network, moving from 
international to regional and then local. Twelve of  my Phase II research participants were 
current or former 350 Vanuatu members, reflecting the initial sample population I intended to 
interview in my original research design.  
However, as a consequence of  focusing Phase II solely upon Vanuatu I decided to also explore 
the impact and reception of  350 Pacific’s advocacy work within a wider community setting. 
Therefore, I engaged with a much broader range of  participants than in my original research 
design. I also included government officials (particularly from the Departments of  Energy, 
Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)) as well as figures of  chiefly authority, and 
local and expatriate employees of  national and international NGOs working directly or 
indirectly in the climate change adaptation and advocacy sector, particularly seeking those who 
had somehow interacted with the work of  350 Vanuatu. My identification of  key organisations 
from which to source my NGO participants was greatly aided by Vachette’s (2014) social 
network analysis report, which mapped relations between different actors in the Vanuatu 
climate change adaptation and DRR sectors prior to Cyclone Pam, and which included 350 
Vanuatu as a node, which enabled me to follow the connections from it to other groups, forging 
a coherence between my selection of  350 Vanuatu-based participants and broader set of  Phase 
II interviewees.  
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In addition to these categories of  interviewees, while in the field I chose to also engage with 
priests and church officials. From my initial literature review and Phase I of  my research it had 
been apparent that religious understandings of  climate change were a key research concern, 
and in all interviews I asked participants for their views on how religion could be brought into 
relation with climate action. However, as it became clear how under-researched and under-
utilised this approach was, I also sought to turn the question on its head, seeking to find how 
climate change as an issue could be brought into religious practice, thus soliciting views from 
those whose primary focus was the latter.  
With the priestly participants I also snowballed from existing contacts and interviewees, but 
attempted to cover a particular range of  denominations in my sample (all of  the major 
churches) and also to engage with religious leaders from some of  the smaller charismatic 
churches as well. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, in my analysis of  religious responses to 
climate change I embraced the concept of  tufala save, a balancing of  multiple modes of  thinking 
(secular, kastom, and Christian). In line with this model of  tufala save, there is a distinct bifurcation 
within my pool of  interviewees. For the majority I followed a movement from climate to faith, 
interviewing those actively and/or professionally engaged in climate change advocacy, 
awareness and adaptation. While our topics of  discussion were broad ranging, it is specifically 
their views on and engagements with faith-based responses to climate change that forms the 
substance for Chapter Six, my Vanuatu-focused chapter. To complement this, I also conducted 
interviews that moved from faith to climate, soliciting the wisdom and reflections of  pastors 
from a wide range of  denominations with regards to church responses to and biblical 
interpretations of  climate change. I contend that the first category of  interviewees constitutes 
the dominant voices within Vanuatu with regards to climate discourse, whilst the latter category, 
the pastors, represent figures of  great significance and social influence who are in many ways 
still at the margins of  climate discussion. Consequently, my third and final empirical chapter 
does not just present a descriptive account of  church engagements with climate change 
hitherto, but through the bridging of  these two perspectives articulates the potential of  what 
could be realised if  the meeting of  the tufala save is seriously attempted.  
I exceeded my original target number of  interviewees (40), although I interviewed fewer within 
Phase One than I had hoped for (14 as opposed to an estimated 18). With retrospect, the 
original interview plan (to just interview around seven people per 350 Pacific national group, 
with a total of  three 350 Pacific national groups) would have created an overly narrow pool of  
people, with potentially too great a diversity of  social and cultural contexts between them to be 
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able to situate their views meaningfully. 
One limitation of  my Phase II sampling is that it is almost exclusively Efate-based (the central 
island of  Vanuatu). However, this reflects the phenomenon at hand, as the vast majority of  the 
actors actively involved in constructing widely circulated climate narratives are based in the 
nation’s capital.  
One of  the most challenging groups of  interviewees to gain access to was the government 
officials, especially as I was seeking interviews with particular senior figures who had had some 
personal direct involvement with 350 Vanuatu. Although I was physically well positioned to 
meet them (I was volunteering in the same building as the Climate Change department), I 
encountered many of  the issues commonly highlighted with elite interviewees; that of  
requesting their time and expertise in the manner of  a supplicant, as there was little that I could 
offer them in return (McDowell 1992: Desmond 2004), and consequently I did not manage to 
interviewee two particularly key figures.  
The broad demographic characteristics of  my Phase I and Phase II interviewees are recorded 
in the table below.  
Table 1 - Interviewee Demographics 
Fieldwork Stage Number of interviewees Demographics 
Phase I 14 Countries of origin: Federated 
States of Micronesia (1) Fiji (2), 
Kiribati (1) Marshall Islands (1) 
New Zealand (1), Niue (2), Samoa 
(1), Solomon Islands (1), Tokelau 
(1), Tonga (1) Tuvalu (1), Vanuatu 
(1). 
Phase II 53 Positions: Former or current 
members of 350 Vanuatu (12), Ni-
Vanuatu NGO workers (12), ex-
patriate NGO workers (14), chiefly 
or governmental authority (7), 
priests and figures of religious 
authority (8). 
 
5. Interviews 
 
5A. Rationale for interviews  
 
Interviews enabled me to explore in-depth the ‘complex behaviours and motivations’ of  
participants (Dunn 2010: 102), a crucial component to being able to understand and 
foreground Islander perspectives. Following Willis (2006) I used a semi-structured interview 
format, due to the balance between having clear topics to explore and the flexibility to follow 
new directions. I developed different interview schedules for use with the four main categories 
of  interviewees (Pacific Climate Warriors, 350 Vanuatu members, NGO workers, figures of  
religious authority) (see Appendix 4). The use of  interview schedules prevented me from having 
to formulate all my questions on the spot, without leaving me rigidly tied to these questions 
alone, unlike a structured interview. Following Dunn’s (2010) recommendations, almost all my 
questions were open, and I began with relatively straight-forward and un-intimidating 
descriptive and story-telling based questions and moved onto more complex and potentially 
sensitive issues. As predicted by Dunn (2010), the interview schedule evolved from interview to 
interview as I became more attuned to which questions were effective and significant to 
participants, and which seemed less relevant.  
5B. Interview practice 
 
With the participant’s consent, I recorded the vast majority of  interviews, as it enabled me to 
engage more fully with the interview, facilitated a more natural flow of  conversation, and helped 
me to retain verbatim responses, as opposed to being interrupted by note-taking (Dunn 2010). 
On the other hand, participants can find recording devices off-putting or intrusive (Barrett and 
Cason 2010), and that seemed to be the case for a few. In these situations, I instead used note-
taking, although I wasn’t able to capture as much detail that way. Some data was lost in the first 
phase of  interviews due to recording them using inadequate equipment (my phone) in noisy 
environments, a misfortune I learned from, consequently purchasing a Dictaphone for the 
second phase. 
Very few Phase I interviewees indicated a desire for privacy and most interviews were 
conducted in public spaces with many other participants around, including the locations where 
workshops had been held, or communal parts of  the accommodation the Warrior team were 
staying in. This initially surprised me but provided a public accountability to participating in 
the process as a whole. In Phase II, I held the majority of  governmental, NGO or faith leader 
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interviews in the participant’s office or church. This both enabled the comfort of  the 
interviewee, as we were on their ‘turf ’ so to speak, and facilitated the sharing of  materials, as 
they often had resources to show me near at hand. Otherwise I held them in cafes in the centre 
of  Port Vila, where I was able to thank them for their time by buying them coffee or lunch. 
With the 350 Vanuatu volunteers, some of  these interviews also took place in offices where they 
had previously been through their volunteering (as a number of  large NGOs shared spaces with 
350 Vanuatu when needed) or occasionally in outside spaces. These were also suitable interview 
locations, as they were familiar spaces to the participants, and also public, to avoid any 
accusations of  impropriety.  
On many occasions interviewees turned questions back on me, soliciting my thoughts, feelings 
and knowledge on issues. While these questions were sometimes unexpected and challenging, I 
enjoyed the extent to which the participants disrupted the power dynamics of  the interview, 
ensuring that it was not simply following my agenda, but we were more actively co-constructing 
knowledge, in line with an indigenous research methods inspired approach (Chilisa 2011). The 
response of  interviewees to the different research questions strongly influenced the direction of  
my research. For instance, some participants strongly affirmed certain questions, with one 
remarking that a question that brought in the place of  prayer was a ‘very, very important 
question’, another responding that my question regarding the cultural significance of  canoes 
on his home island was ‘a really good question and I think I have some really good answer to 
that’. The affirmation of  certain questions helped me to recognise what ideas were meaningful 
and important to my participants: indeed, it was the degree of  enthusiasm for religiously-
focused questions, and the additional inclusion of  faith-based material in Phase I that 
encouraged me to focus upon that aspect in Phase II. I also recognised that in focusing upon 
questions of  faith and biblical knowledge in relation to climate change I was in a small way 
readdressing the bias in existing climate research in the region on scientific modes of  knowledge 
that may be less significant for participants. 
While the vast majority of  my interviews were with single participants, on three occasions I 
held conversations with multiple interviewees at once. On two occasions this was really 
successful as the two participants in question knew each other well, were able to bounce ideas 
off  each other and the interview became more of  a free-flowing discussion, and again involved 
a ‘collective construction of  knowledge’, that is more in line with a postcolonial research 
methodology (Chilisa 2011: 206). However, on another occasion my field notes are filled with 
frustration at an interview gone awry. Holding the interview in a popular cafe with a Ni-
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Vanuatu NGO worker, an expatriate NGO worker who I was familiar with unexpectedly joined 
us, and I was initially pleased because of  the second interviewee’s wealth of  knowledge and 
experience, and I was hopeful that the free-flowing discussion format of  the previous multiple 
interviewee scenarios would be replicated. However, the second interviewee soon dominated 
discussions, with my original interviewee adding little. The second interviewee began an ad 
hominem attack on a mutual acquaintance that put me in a very uncomfortable position, took 
the conversation completely off-topic to the extent that I gave up all hope of  re-directing it, and 
at the end requested a retraction of  all comments made about his work or any named 
individuals (a request I have complied with). I later heard from a mutual friend that the second 
interviewee had spoken positively of  our interview, and how much helpful information he’d 
provided me with. This suggests the potential gulf  between a participant’s experience of  the 
interview and that of  the interviewer. Despite the calls of  both feminist and postcolonial 
methodologies for the interviewer to relinquish control of  the interview process, I realised I was 
actually very uncomfortable and unhappy with the results when things became totally out of  
my hands.  
5C. Interview challenges 
 
Many of  those that I interviewed in Phase I were also acting as media spokespeople and were 
already giving many interviews to local and international news outlets, or had previous 
experience of  giving interviews to researchers in their home countries. At one point an 
interviewee asserted the direction of  the interview by beginning by giving her full name, age 
and country of  origin, thereby mirroring an expected interview format. As a consequence of  
my participants’ familiarity with interviews they seemed comfortable talking with me, although 
there is a danger that their statements rarely diverged from the group’s agreed key messaging. 
One participant even highlighted the consistency of  her own interview response, remarking 
‘like I’ve said in all my other interviews... I just wanted to remind everybody that…this is not a 
fight that’s only for the Pacific’. In this the use of  participant observation as a means to challenge 
or verify interview findings, going beyond simple soundbites was crucial. Indeed, with one 
interviewee I found direct contradictions between the positive statements he expressed in our 
interview about familial support for his actions and what he confided during our more informal 
conversations. A final danger of  interviewing those who are also actively engaged in media 
work is that the words of  a few prominent charismatic individuals can be used to speak for 
whole populations and to give an exaggerated impression of  how large and active Pacific 
Islander climate movements actually are. I hope that I ameliorated this to some extent by 
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seeking a far wider pool of  interviewees for Phase II, who were not as consistently media-savvy 
as the majority of  Phase I interviews. On the other hand, a focus upon media spokespeople is 
justified if  one considers the extent to which they are having an actively shaping effect upon 
climate narratives.  
One ethical and logistical obstacle I encountered when conducting interviews were general 
cultural disinclinations both towards punctual appointment keeping and towards potentially 
displeasing others through direct refusal. Rather than explicitly saying no, sometimes 
participants would decline interviews through not attending them. Consequently, when 
participants cancelled meetings at short notice or simply didn’t appear, it was difficult to 
determine whether they wished to not participate or whether they had simply forgotten or been 
unable to attend. My general approach was to attempt to reschedule all missed or cancelled 
interviews once, and if  the same problem occurred a second time to interpret it as an implicit 
disinclination to participate, and thus I would no longer discuss meeting for an interview with 
those individuals unless they themselves proposed it, as I wished to avoid pressuring my 
participants or causing them distress.  
6. Participant observation 
 
6A. Rationale for participant observation 
 
There are two main reasons I chose to undertake participant observation. Firstly, unlike the 
more artificial environment of  the interview, participant observation provides an insight into 
‘social life as it unfolds in the practices of  day-to-day life’ (Kees van Donge 2010: 180). In Phase 
I it enriched my insight into the social dynamics, everyday experiences and lived practices of  
350 Pacific activists in a way that could not be achieved through interviews or analysis of  
documents. Participant observation exposed me to new and unexpected developments that I 
may not have encountered through my selected interview questions. Secondly, one of  the main 
purposes of  participant observation is to provide ‘complementary evidence’ (Kearns 2010: 
242). Thus, information gained through observation helped me to verify the conclusions I had 
reached based on the interviews. The combination of  a formal interview method with more 
informal data collection via participant observation also has the potential to show the 
‘discrepancies between what people... say and how they act’ (Kees van Donge 2010, 182). This 
is particularly pertinent given the emphasis upon both practice and discourse in my research 
questions, as I was exploring the shaping and performance of  political identities, as well as 
religiously-informed responses to climate change.  
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6B. Participant observation: Phase I 
 
Kearns understands participant observation as a form of  ‘strategically placing oneself  in 
situations in which systematic understandings of  place are most likely to arise’ (2010: 246). I 
conducted my first period of  observational fieldwork during the Stand Up for the Pacific 
campaign tour, a highly strategic time and location. The tour brought together activists from 
across the Pacific in an unprecedented way, to explicitly confront the role of  the Australian coal 
industry in fuelling climate change. Thus, it gave me an almost unique opportunity to study 
climate activism in relation to Oceanic interconnection.  
Participating in this tour also provided an opportunity to build rapport with participants, 
creating connections necessary for Phase II. Conducting ethnographic studies of  activism is an 
established approach (Schlembach 2011; Saunders 2012; Chatterton et al. 2012), as sharing in 
and sympathising with activists’ political experiences can be integral to forming research 
relationships of  trust.  
During the month of  intense campaigning activity, I attended and engaged in workshops, 
training days, awareness raising events, publicity stunts, social events and planning meetings. I 
aimed to observe and record the social dynamics of  the group, ideas expressed, points of  
contention within the campaign and practices enacted in relation to climate change activism. I 
took detailed observational notes whenever possible and appropriate (such as at the end of  the 
day or through nipping to the bathroom), writing down ‘scratch notes’ (Allsop et al. 2010: 209) 
which I then expanded upon when typing up my field notes each night. However, I didn’t use 
an audio or video recorder during participant observation, nor did I openly write extensive 
notes, as this can be disruptive and can distance the participant observer from those that she is 
working with (Kearns 2010). Indeed, some participant reactions suggested that avoiding overt 
note-taking was the right course of  action. On my first day with the Warriors, one jokingly 
warned two of  the others to tell stories in their own language as I’d be writing notes about it, 
suggesting through humour some level of  discomfort about me acting as an observer. On 
another occasion one of  the 350 Pacific organisers found me typing up notes by myself  and 
questioned me about it, and then asked me to write a blog post about my experiences, which I 
willingly did. His request thus managed his seeming unease with my overt note-taking and 
made the process of  writing both more transparent and productive, as I channelled my thoughts 
both into my research and the blog post.  
In addition to the conducting of  interviews and participant observation during the Stand Up 
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for the Pacific tour itself, I have also supplemented my understanding of  350 Pacific through 
reading and analysing their website content, publicly broadcast social media outputs and media 
coverage. As I am Facebook friends with many of  the Warriors, the major means by which I 
maintain relations with them, I have also seen their posts over the past three years, some of  
which also concern their involvement with 350 Pacific. While these posts may have influenced 
my analysis somewhat, I do not directly quote or reproduce any material I encountered via 
Facebook, as while it can be seen as being within the public domain, it was not intentionally 
posted for a public audience (Zimmer 2010), and I do not have their consent to do so. 
6C. Participant observation: Phase II 
 
Rather than acting as a removed observer, I actively participated in the activities in which I was 
interested in, and contributed as much as to the groups in which I was interested as possible. 
This was in line with a Pacific research ethics approach. Consequently, during my four months 
in Vanuatu I acted as a full-time volunteer with one climate change adaptation project, and 
devoted considerable time to 350 Vanuatu, the original organisation I had sought to work with. 
As a participant observer I participated in workshops and workshop planning, created surveys, 
produced press releases, sorted seeds and transported wheelbarrows, as well as any other 
activities that emerged through my involvement in 350 Vanuatu or GIZ.  
At points I encountered conflict between a desire to research and analyse, and a collaborative 
imperative to act. One key moment emerged when I was asked to help draft the next twelve-
month strategic plan for 350 Vanuatu, a document which could have formed interesting 
material for analysis, but which I was now being asked to shape and essentially produce. Given 
the unfamiliarity of  the rest of  the 350 Vanuatu group with strategic plans (a reasonably alien 
concept which had been emphasised to them by the regional 350 Pacific organisers), their desire 
to have one, and my confidence in writing such a document, it seemed an unethical act to refuse 
to assist, even if  it undermined my ability to analyse its contents.  
Following calls to decolonise methodologies (Smith 1999), there has been significant 
investigation into specifically Pacific research approaches including informal, authentic and 
culturally meaningful discussion-based methods, such as talanoa and faafaletui in Samoa, Tonga 
and Fiji (Vaioleti 2006; Otsuka 2006; Suaalii‐Sauni and Fulu‐Aiolupotea 2014). However, there 
were obstacles to my incorporation of  Pacific research methods, the first being the cultural 
specificity of  the methodologies in contrast to the planned geographic breadth of  my study. 
While talanoa has been applied across Polynesia, it potentially seemed inappropriate and 
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obscuring of  cultural difference to try to implement it in Vanuatu. I also questioned the 
suitability of  me as a white non-Pacific Islander utilising Pacific methods. However, through 
Warrick’s (2009) work, I encountered storian, a Ni-Vanuatu practice of  free-flowing sharing and 
discussion. Warrick (2009: 83) defines storian methodologically as ‘an umbrella term indicating 
semi-structured interview, informal interview, and opportunistic discussion as part of  
observation’, which is pleasurable, dialogic and builds rapport, as it is based upon storian as an 
existing highly valued cultural practice, which can be defined as to ‘chat, yarn, swap stories’ 
(Crowley 1995: 235). Consequently, as Warrick notes, it can be understood as a Vanuatu-based 
equivalent to talanoa. Storian was a feature of  most days, as I chatted and discussed ideas with 
friends and new acquaintances over kava (a drink produced from a culturally significant 
narcotic root) either in the capital city, or when out in the islands.  
7. Data analysis 
 
Following Secor (2010), I recognise that my analysis did not simply begin once I had left the 
field and my data were neatly transcribed, but that analytical processes are part of  the data 
collection process itself, in terms of  how I chose to design my interview schedule, sought 
clarification during participant observation and how I then transcribed my interviews.  
Once I had completed data collection, I thus moved onto the next stage of  interpretation and 
understanding, beginning a formal process of  content analysis, identifying the presence (and in 
some cases absence) of  certain signifiers in my interview transcripts and field notes (Dixon 
2004). Even though I worked predominately with the interview data in transcript form, I also 
repeatedly re-listened to the interview recordings in order to identify tone and nuance. To 
identify signifiers, I thematically coded my data, using both what Cope (2010) identifies as 
deductive and inductive or ‘in vivo’ codes, thus those themes that I had already identified 
through my engagement with the existing literature and preliminary analysis (such as ‘regional 
identity’ or ‘familial solidarities’), and new ideas that emerged from the empirical material itself  
(such as the notion of  ‘Warrior Time’). As my analysis progressed, I began to group the different 
codes, and identify the links between them, running across the different interview transcripts 
and field notes, and noting which codes were present or absent in which demographic of  
interviewees (discovering for instance that the ex-patriate NGO professionals had the least 
engagement with biblical approaches to climate change). I began by coding manually, simply 
copying and pasting relevant portions of  text into sub-divided Word documents, but when these 
documents became exceedingly long and unwieldy I transferred my remaining uncoded data 
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to NVivo instead. Using NVivo made it easier to move between the full transcripts and material 
ordered by codes, thereby retaining the context of  all the extracts I focused on.  
As I began to move from coding to writing, I retained my focus on narrative, and began to 
group some of  the key themes into core narratives, such as the three tellings of  the Noah story 
in Chapter Six. I also tried to highlight my participants’ own stories and understandings of  the 
flotilla, thematically grouping elements of  their stories in the first two empirical chapters, while 
placing these stories in dialogue with my wider theoretical concerns.  
8. Ethics 
 
Having accounted for my methodological design and practice, I now wish to examine the 
ethical dimension of  this project in greater detail. This project adopted both the principles 
outlined by the UCL Ethics Committee (with whom an application was approved in July 2014), 
and the human research ethics guidelines issued by USP (2009). The latter was incorporated 
due to the ethical particularities of  conducting research with Pacific communities. The principle 
of  respect for indigenous epistemologies, cultures, and traditional practices is fundamental to 
USP’s guidance and an indigenous research methods approach (Homerang 2014). Through 
my focus upon the cultural significance of  climate change, and Pacific approaches to climate 
advocacy this emphasis upon respecting indigenous knowledge was not just ethically significant 
but methodologically integral to my work.  
Both models include the importance of  informed consent, privacy and confidentiality. I ensured 
ethical practice in these areas through providing participants with clear information sheets 
(Appendices 1 and 2), obtaining consent from the group and from individuals in the group in 
advance of  beginning my fieldwork, and through anonymising the names of  participants.  
8A. Problematising anonymity 
 
However, this latter point, a mainstay of  research ethics procedures proved more practically 
and morally challenging than I had anticipated. Many researchers are questioning the default 
presumption of  anonymisation as positive for research subjects, as well as how achievable full 
anonymity is in the context of  qualitative social science (Van Den Hoonaard 2003).  
First there is the question of  the extent to which anonymity can be guaranteed. As Tolich (2004) 
highlights, ethical codes of  practice place a far greater emphasis upon ‘external confidentiality’ 
(ensuring that those outside of  the research project cannot identify participants) as opposed to 
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‘internal confidentiality’ (guaranteeing that research participants will not be able to identify 
each other in the research outputs). The latter is far more challenging, particularly when 
working in small communities, as there may be breaches of  confidentiality through processes 
of  ‘deductive disclosure’ (Kaiser 2009: 1632) as fellow participants may decipher pseudonyms 
based on other pieces of  contextual information. Breaches of  internal confidentiality can be 
very damaging for the relations within the community and between the community and the 
researcher herself, as is illustrated in the case of  Ellis’ (1995) study of  the Fisherfolk, where some 
of  her participants’ confidential disclosures were outed to their neighbours when the members 
of  the community accessed her academic publications, highlighting the importance of  
recognising participants as a future readership (Brettell 1996).  
Even if  anonymity can be achieved, its very merits have been disputed. The use of  pseudonyms 
can cause unintentional harm for participants if  they feel that the false names undermine their 
ownership of  their own stories (Grinyer 2002). Anonymisation can be particularly 
disempowering if  participants are already in a position where they feel they are systematically 
denied a voice (Saunders et al. 2015). This is particularly sensitive in relation to working with 
indigenous communities, where the forced anonymisation of  data could be seen as paternalistic 
or as a ‘stealing’ of  stories (Svalastog and Eriksson 2010). Chilisa’s (2011: 206) guide to 
indigenous research methodologies further affirms this point, insisting that if  participants wish 
to be named their names should be included, as it enhances accountability, both of  researcher 
to participants and participants to their community. However, this does not resolve the problem 
of  internal confidentiality raised by Tolich (2004), namely the negative impact of  participants 
being made accountable to their community, and thus potentially quashes the potential for 
participants to express dissenting opinions. 
Attempts to remove all identifying information may curtail the usefulness of  the findings that 
can be gleaned from research, as in the case of  Kasier (2009) where suggestions for improving 
care for LGBT patients could not be communicated to healthcare providers out of  fear of  
risking the anonymity of  the one lesbian research participant. To resolve some of  these issues 
Kasier proposes a more complex informed consent form, that discusses the different ways in 
which participants’ information may be used and lets them consent to different degrees of  
anonymity in different contexts. This approach opens up an ongoing dialogue with participants 
about anonymity, which is vital given that all research outputs may not be anticipated at the 
beginning of  the research process, and because the researcher may not be able to accurately 
discern what information would be embarrassing if  shared under the participant’s own name, 
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and what non-anonymised disclosures the participant would be comfortable with (Grinyer 
2002).  
These concerns, and particularly the recommendations of  Chilisa (2011) and Svalastog and 
Eriksson (2010) that indigenous participants should be named if  they wish to be so, presented 
me with an ethical conundrum. The vast majority of  my research participants chose to reject 
anonymity, and suggested the use of  their actual names. For many of  those in Phase I I suspect 
this emerged from their role as media spokespeople, as they were already presenting similar 
statements to the press with their actual names attached. For others, it emerged from a sense of  
moral conviction. As one ecumenical official explained: 
Don’t worry, just use my name. We are the church. We want to make 
known to the people everything we say or do or influence the world 
with.  
 
In another case, it was not religious conviction, but divine guidance that resolved the question 
of  interviewee anonymity. One interview concluded with the participants seeking holy 
intercession to determine whether or not their real names should be used, and received a direct 
message from Christ that ‘it’s good to have your name in this interview’. However due to the 
nature of  the informed consent form I used (which does not specify in depth the manner in 
which different pieces of  information may be used in different contexts), and my agreement to 
comply with UCL research ethics and data protection procedures, I cannot reveal the names 
of  my participants, despite their desires for recognition. Yet choosing to both go against the 
recommendations of  indigenous research methods scholars, and the faith-based resolutions of  
my participants in order to comply with UK data management regulations feels uncomfortably 
at odds with a model of tufala save. In hindsight, trialling a consent form modelled on the 
suggestions of  Kasier (2009) would have been most appropriate to my research.  
Consequently, I have used pseudonyms throughout for all the participants. Choosing 
appropriate pseudonyms can be challenging, in terms of  reflecting the cultural background of  
the participant without revealing their identity or using a name that the participant may find it 
distressing to be labelled with (Grinyer 2002). Moreover, due to the wide range of  participant 
nationalities there are many different cultural backgrounds to consider. To manage this, I have 
chosen to give all participants biblical, particularly Old Testament names, in recognition of  the 
significance of  Christianity in their lives and the prevalence of  such names in their respective 
home nations, as well as the suitability of  such names when considering religious discourses.  
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However, I have not anonymised the major organisation I have analysed (350 Pacific) due to 
the media visibility of  the Stand Up for the Pacific campaign, which would make 
anonymisation impossible without major distortion of  the data. My research does face issues 
of  ‘internal confidentiality’, due to the small pool of  participants, the use of  snowball sampling 
and the documentation of  the flotilla as a reasonably unique event (Van Den Hoonaard 2003). 
However, I am not unduly concerned about the risk of  deductive disclosure, given that the 
majority of  the participants are willing to be named, and therefore are likely to be happy to be 
recognised by others that know them (although for those participants who have requested 
anonymity far greater steps have been taken to remove all potentially identifying contextual 
information).  
8B. Embracing sagacity 
 
During the interview process, I encountered a number of  hurdles concerning ‘knowledge 
testing’ questions. Many potential participants seemed unwilling to be interviewed due to a fear 
that I would be testing their knowledge of  climate change as a scientific process, and other 
participants when asked directly about climate change impacts began a form of  mechanical 
listing, that seemed divorced from their own personal experiences. One Phase I participant who 
was due to present at a speaking event later that day, explicitly defaulted to her prepared speech 
when presented with this topic, responding ‘There’s a lot of  impacts. I will read it to you then. 
My impacts. Yeah. You gonna write it down?’. I suggested that I could take a photo of  that part 
of  her speech instead, which she agreed with, but I then failed to do so, and then during her 
presentation in the evening she chose to cast aside her prepared words, and instead ‘speak from 
the heart’, so the impacts were in fact never shared.  
This reticence suggested that the forms of  knowledge I was seeking weren’t necessarily 
meaningful for my participants: rather than eliciting their particular perspectives and 
experiences, my questions were being interpreted as a request to recite information conveyed 
to them by an external Western authority. Consequently, I removed this topic from my interview 
schedule, and reflected upon how I could embrace principles of  ‘philosophical sagacity’ (Chilisa 
2011: 211), another element of  an indigenous research methods approach, that involves 
invoking the ‘wisdom and beliefs of  wise elders of  the communities’, as opposing to appealing 
to natural scientific knowledge. Both as a response to this idea and to the repeated significance 
of  religious ideas within my interviews and through my observational fieldwork, I chose to 
introduce priests as a new interviewee category, recognising them as figures of  wisdom and 
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sagacity. Moreover, in our discussions of  biblical approaches to climate change, the dynamic 
transformed from that of  simply interviewer-interviewee, to mirror that of  parishioner seeking 
guidance and pastor. Thus, the interviews emulated an existing form of  interaction which 
challenged the power dynamics between us, making the encounter more akin to that of  an elite 
interview (Desmond 2004; McDowell 1992), although I recognise that power relations that 
occur within an interview context are not as simple as the category of  ‘elite’ can imply (Smith 
2006).  
It was in some of  these discussions that I felt the interviews moved most towards a dyadic co-
construction of  knowledge, an approach to data collection that Chilisa (2011) advocates as part 
of  an indigenous research methodology. While the priests were generous in the wisdom they 
imparted, they also sought my knowledge and perspectives on these issues. As I had recently 
read Laudato Si, the Pope’s encyclical addressing climate change, as part of  a small weekly Ni-
Vanuatu Catholic reading group, I was able to share my knowledge about the Pope’s words 
with those of  other denominations, who had largely not engaged with the encyclical, as well as 
expressing my thoughts through participating in the reading group itself.  
However, while attempts to engage with participant sagacity were largely successful in dialogues 
with priests, some participants became resistant to discussions centred around religious 
understandings, seeing it as the domain of  priests alone and thereby outside of  their area of  
expertise. As one participant explained ‘I cannot put on my long socks as a pastor to 
respond…I’d prefer if  the pastors answered this’. Therefore, attempts to engage sagacity left 
some participants feeling unable to engage with certain discussion topics. Yet its success with 
the priestly interviewees strengthens the case for focusing on religious figures. Akin to the 
recognition that the Warriors who were media spokespeople would have a particularly shaping 
influence on contemporary discourses, similarly priests are likely to have a significance influence 
over Christian narratives of  climate change that circulate in particular communities.  
8C. Practicing reciprocity 
 
In terms of  Pacific research ethics, one significant aspect is the development of  meaningful and 
reciprocal social relationships between researchers and participants, based upon mutual trust. 
The two-part fieldwork structure (plus Overseas Institutional Visit to Fiji) enabled me to 
gradually build this trust, and to ensure a longer-term engagement with participants.  
Part of  this trust also depends upon an honest recognition of  my positionality as a researcher, 
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in terms of  the power dynamics between myself  and my interlocutors. Kearns (2010) argues 
that in observational research an ideal status is between that of  outsider and insider. While 
recognising the privilege I have as a white European researcher; privilege that makes me an 
outsider to the communities I was working with, I endeavoured to find points of  commonality 
and connection through my background and experiences as a climate activist, and attempted 
to usefully share knowledge and experiences with the activist groups that I worked with. My 
liminal status as insider-cum-outsider was tested at points throughout the Stand Up for the 
Pacific tour. For instance, while the women Warriors were very welcoming, for instance 
encouraging me to join them in a photo with all of  the female participants and in the women’s 
dances, one of  the organisers was keen that I maintain greater distance, and asked me to take 
a step back at points, which I then did. At points, participants were explicit about my 
positionality as a white researcher, and used it as a point of  critique, with one interviewee 
(himself  white) complaining that ‘so often it’s white people telling the stories of  the Pacific 
Islands or like interviewing Islanders’.  
My attempts at reciprocity had mixed results. In Vanuatu they seemed more successful, as I had 
an increasing sense of  utility as my Bislama improved, I was engaged as a volunteer from day 
one, and I had a sense of  where my skills would be most useful. Some of  the most successful 
moments were contributing to 350 Vanuatu’s strategic plan, developing an exercise to 
illuminate the links between ecological cycles and movements of  capital, and the co-
organisation of  a youth climate summit. I also shared stories of  UK climate activism with Ni-
Vanuatu climate advocate friends, through sending them videos or topical news stories. On the 
other hand, attempts to bring UK examples into a climate campaigning workshop led to very 
little engagement (the session was excluded from the minutes, and seemingly forgotten in the 
closing feedback). Positively contributing to 350 Pacific over a longer term was more difficult, 
both due to the challenge of  inserting myself  into the NGO’s more formal structures and also 
because of  a personal falling out with some 350 Pacific participants, which demonstrated how 
precarious some of  those relations of  trust were.  
The production of  non-academic articles also formed a part of  the Pacific research ethics 
process, as it was both a response to a request by a 350 Pacific organiser and an opportunity for 
openly feeding back ideas to participants, increasingly the transparency of  my analysis. I 
received really positive responses from the Warriors about one online magazine article (Fair 
2014), which many of  them shared and commented on via Facebook. However, I was unable 
to promote and circulate my second article (Fair 2015a), as I was very uncomfortable with the 
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editorial choice of  title, as I felt it perpetuated the inevitable inundation discourse that I was 
seeking to critique. While I eventually got the title amended, it made me recognise the challenge 
of  inserting myself  into the world that I was studying, in terms of  media representations of  
islandness. I distributed printed copies of  a third article (Fair 2015b) to contacts in both Vanuatu 
and Fiji, but received no feedback on it, suggesting that online materials more easily generated 
responses, and that there were limits to the extent to which participants wished to engage with 
my analysis. Through these short pieces of  journalism, I also endeavoured to make links 
between Pacific issues and activist communities in the UK, publishing about the Pacific Islands 
in left and environmental UK-based publications. Thus, these pieces were both a means of  
forging international political solidarities and an attempt to reconcile those geographically 
estranged parts of  myself.  
At the outset of  my fieldwork, I had aimed to make three main contributions to the groups I 
was working with: (i) to document their activities and (ii) to raise awareness through 
disseminating them to a wider audience, both of  which I feel I have achieved through my thesis, 
forthcoming journal articles and journalistic pieces. I also aimed to provide constructive 
feedback and analysis of  their practices, which would inform their future activism. However, as 
noted in the earlier discussion of  gatekeepers, I feel that my greater contribution was through 
practical action rather than academic critique, for example through helping 350 Vanuatu 
produce a budget that could also be used by other 350 Pacific local groups, providing food and 
venue space for workshops, and helping with workshop planning. These acts of  everyday 
assistance were the best means of  reciprocating the enormous kindness and generosity my 
friends in the Pacific showed me. 
9. Conclusion 
 
Thus, although my research deviated from the original plans, particularly in terms of  the 
number of  field sites covered, I successfully used interviews and participant observation as my 
main means of  data collection, conducting a greater number of  interviews with a broader range 
of  participants than initially envisioned, thereby placing me in a better position to address my 
research questions. Through this process I have wrestled with a number of  challenging ethical 
questions regarding Pacific research: notably the tension between indigenous demands for 
participant recognition and the enforced anonymity of  UK data protection procedures; the 
challenges of  meaningfully enacting reciprocity while mediating relations with gatekeepers; and 
the avenues for the fruitful co-construction of  different knowledges. Rather than being 
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contained within my methodological chapter, these concerns inform my work throughout the 
empirical chapters that follow.  
 
 
 
 
 
4. Their Sea of Islands? Oceanic identities and world 
enlargement 
 
 
Having established that the inevitable inundation discourse – the narrative circulating through 
journalistic, cinematic and academic accounts that portrays the Pacific Islands as helpless, 
hopeless and already lost to rising seas – can be seen as an example of  an apocalyptic ‘horror 
story’ (Buck 2015) of  the Anthropocene, across the following empirical chapters I explore three 
possible counter-discourses. Firstly, in this chapter, I examine the Pacific Climate Warrior 
campaign through the lens of  Epeli Hau’ofa’s (1994) Sea of  Islands vision, as discussed in the 
literature review. 
Central to Hau’ofa’s thesis that the Pacific Island nations are ‘not necessarily small or helpless’ 
(Hau’ofa 1993: 128) or dependent on the whims of  larger states, is the power that the region 
can grasp if  interconnected and unified as a ‘Sea of  Islands’, rather than vulnerable, isolated 
and irrelevant ‘islands in a far sea’ (1994: 152). This collective identity, power and place, 
Hau’ofa terms ‘Oceania’. He distinguishes Oceania from former examples of  Pacific 
regionalism, due to its emergence from ordinary lived experiences of  travel, interconnection 
and exchange, as opposed to bureaucratic colonial imposition, and because it seeks to place 
Oceanic8 interests first, rather than being mired in the politicking of  individual nation states 
(Hau’ofa 2008a). Most simply Oceania is ‘a world of  people connected to each other’ (Hau’ofa 
2008a: 50). Hau’ofa also introduces the idea of  ‘world enlargement’, reframing Oceania as both 
large and ever-engulfing, as through the movements of  the Oceanic diaspora further territories 
are enveloped within this growing continent. In his words, ‘Oceania is vast, Oceania is 
expanding’ (1994: 160).  
In order to recognise Hau’ofa’s vision as more than a ‘flight of  fancy’ (Borer 1993: 87), but as 
a credible alternative articulation of  power and possibility in the Pacific, one that challenges 
the previously mentioned inevitable inundation hypothesis as well as the region’s general 
belittlement, I explore to what extent features of  this Sea of  Islands vision are being realised on 
the ground. The Pacific Climate Warriors are an ideal test case, or vehicle to bring these ideas 
from the theoretical to the empirical, as many of  them could be presented as ‘ordinary Pacific 
                                                        
8 Throughout this chapter the proper adjective ‘Oceanic’ is used to refer to things pertaining to the region of 
Oceania, as opposed to that which is more generally related to oceans, but also following Stone (2011: 257) to 
indicate the vision of interconnected regional identity envisioned by Hau’ofa. 
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Islanders’ as opposed to the elite of  ‘politicians, bureaucrats, statutory body officials, diplomats’ 
(Hau’ofa 1994: 148) that Hau’ofa claims are blind to the existence of  Oceania. Moreover, they 
are explicitly engaged in an act of  resistance, both against the impending impacts of  climate 
change and the imposition of  a disempowering discourse of  drowning (through their campaign 
slogan ‘not drowning but fighting’). The extent of  their regional unity is fundamental as for 
Hau’ofa it is only when ‘united we can be sufficiently strong to resist more effectively than we 
have’ (1993: 128).  
Using Hau’ofa’s vision as a theoretical lens with which to examine the case of  the Pacific 
Climate Warriors, I will make three contributions. Firstly, invoking Hulme’s provocation to 
recognise not ‘what we can do about climate change, but what climate change can do for us’ 
(2009: 326), I argue that climate change activism creates an opportunity for the physical 
embodiment of  Oceanic alliance, connection and expression of  regional identity that Hau’ofa 
theoretically envisions. I identify the emergence of  these forms of  connection through familial 
modes of  bonding by the participants and contend that these sibling-like solidarities reflect 
actual kin relations within the 350 Pacific local groups. I explore the extent of  familial support 
for the campaign, marking kin relations as a substantive yet contentious feature of  a Pacific 
model of  protest, a tension that continues in the following chapter. Continuing to consider 
manifestations of  Oceanic regionalism, I turn to questions of  representation, and highlight the 
manner in which the participants, while situated as representatives of  their respective nations, 
began to enact forms of  composite, fluid and Pan-Pacific, as opposed to national, identities.  
Secondly, I contend that climate change creates an opportunity to not just reinforce existing 
power relations between the Pacific Islands and the rest of  the world (as the inevitable 
inundation narrative does), but to subvert and even invert them. To substantiate this, I invoke 
Hau’ofa’s concept of  ‘world enlargement’ as a foundation of  this counter-discourse that 
emphasises the potential for the Pacific Islands to confront climate change. However, I contend 
that Hau’ofa’s very notion of  world enlargement needs enlarging, and refashion this concept in 
light of  the Pacific Climate Warriors’ actions. I consider the role of  domesticity in the Warrior’s 
experiences of  climate change, and how the action can be understood as a means of  ‘bringing 
climate change home’, an action that therefore enlarges Oceania beyond its boundaries, as the 
Pacific and its problems can no longer be contained within its islands. I argue that the emphasis 
upon the Pacific as acting for and on behalf  of  the world constitutes a form of  world 
enlargement. I also identify the decolonising impulses at play, in terms of  the need to re-educate 
Australia in its ignorance.  
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While recognising these to be key features of  a Sea of  Islands approach, I acknowledge the 
limitations of  applying such a model to this case. For instance, I draw upon the oft-cited critique 
of  Hau’ofa’s work that its Pan-Pacific vision conceals intra-regional differences and inequities. 
I hazard this also to be the case with the Pacific Climate Warriors, noting the under-
representation of  Micronesia, the absence of  many countries, and the power differentials 
enacted along gendered lines. However, as my third contribution I argue that the model of  
regionalism being produced and performed through the flotilla is one that acknowledges 
inequalities and difference. Crucially I identify discourses of  relative altitudinal privilege, which 
engage empathetically with narratives of  submersion and loss, but with a specificity that rejects 
the reduction of  the Pacific to an anonymous inundated atoll. I also suggest that this 
acknowledgement of  relative privilege adds to the complexities of  climate change responsibility 
and blame explored throughout the empirical chapters. I conclude by situating Australia within 
this scale of  privilege, opening up the possibility of  a less conciliatory approach to the polluting 
nations by the Pacific Climate Warriors. Consequently, while I recognise shortcomings to 
Hau’ofa’s vision and to the Pacific Climate Warriors’ practices, in combination they lay the 
foundation for a Pacific-based counter-discourse that challenges the disempowering narrative 
of  inevitable inundation.  
1. Our Sea of Islands: unity, identity and regional interconnection 
 
 
I open with an investigation into the ideas of  unity and interconnection embedded within the 
Pacific Climate Warriors campaign. 350 Pacific’s work is rooted in an explicit emphasis upon 
united Pacific action. As part of  their 2013 Strategic Plan, the organisation argues that ‘as a region 
we stand in solidarity, calling for a new age of  connectedness between us all’ (350 Pacific 2013b: 
2). The organisation identifies one of  the Pacific’s strengths as ‘the unity of  our region – 
connected by the ocean’ (350 Pacific 2013b: 3). The latter statement resonates very directly 
with Hau’ofa’s work, which argues for ‘a regional identity anchored in our common heritage 
of  the ocean’ (2008a: 55). It also mirrors the call to forge connections with the more-than-
human issued by contemporary theorists of  the Anthropocene (Haraway 2016a). This regional 
connectivity is to some extent realised by the geographical breadth of  communities involved. 
According to the 350 Pacific website (as of  20149), its fifteen local groups are spread across 
Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia and include sovereign states and territories (see Figure 5). 
                                                        
9 As of 2018, 350 Pacific’s website no longer includes a map of the different local groups, hence the date of the 
included figure. 
 109 
Yet these written and cartographic nods to regional cohesion do not tell us enough about the 
extent to which supra-national connections are being enacted and performed. For this I begin 
by identifying the enactment of  Oceanic alliances and connections through familial modes of  
bonding by the Pacific Climate Warriors, and then explore the performance of  both national 
and regional identities. 
 
Figure 5- Locations of 350 Pacific local Climate Warrior groups 
 
1A. Familial Solidarities 
 
Kinship ties are undeniably pertinent in Hau’ofa’s work, both through his recourse to appeals 
of  Oceanic common heritage and through the practical pathways being traced across the ocean 
in order to maintain family relations that for him form the foundation of  Oceania. Borer (1993: 
84) has gently chided Hau’ofa for propounding a notion of  ‘mythical family consciousness’: 
divorced from strict rules of  consanguinity but still with the potential to inspire hope. Similarly, 
Stone (2011: 269) notes that in Hau’ofa’s work ‘Oceanic identity is an identity of  resistance and 
activity...through recourse to a heritage of  migration and unbounded kinship networks’.  
I contend that the family relations the Warriors produced both embodied Hau’ofa’s vision of  
Oceanic alliance through kinship, while creatively exceeding the manifestations of  this that 
Hau’ofa himself  presents. There is something far more ‘unbounded’, to borrow Stone’s term, 
about the Warriors’ new relations, than the routine examples of  visiting diaspora Hau’ofa 
provides, as the family the Warriors are forging through their collective struggle transcends a 
sense of  genetic literalism. Thus, this vision of  a newly conceived family, united in purpose, 
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acting collectively with mutual care and affection, but made of  figures that represent all corners 
of  Oceania, can be seen as a manifestation par excellence of  the vision of  Pacific unity Hau’ofa 
articulates. However, as well relating as family, the Warriors’ commitment to activism also 
produced some tensions with existing kin.  
Recurrent throughout the campaign were motifs of  family, particularly recognition of  each 
other as brother and sister (and one matriarchal figure as the ‘mother’ of  the group). For 
instance, one Warrior from Niue described the blockade itself  as ‘like a big huge family coming 
together, trying to portray a special message out to...out to Australia, out to Newcastle’. These 
familial connections were more than simile. Sibling-like attachments motivated the Warriors to 
take action. Another Niuean Warrior captures this explicitly: 
I am willing to fight. Because this is my family too. They are my 
family. Even though I came late I still feel so close to this and I call 
them my brothers and sisters. I really love them. (Samson, 350 Niue)  
 
The recognition of  each other as brother and sister was instrumental to the cohesion and 
solidarity enacted by the group. As Leah, from the Marshall Islands understands it: 
We were together like brothers and sisters and really connected. We 
really connected with each other. We did not leave anybody behind. 
We were checking on each other the whole time. Whenever someone 
fell, someone was there to help that person up. Whenever I failed to 
complete an interview, or had done an interview or turned down an 
interview my sister was there to help out. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands) 
 
For the Warriors, these familial-style relations are also crucially built upon a shared Christian 
faith. Religious foundations for unity are only given a passing reference by Hau’ofa, perhaps 
due to his avowed agnosticism and aversion to organised religion (2008b: 99). Yet shared 
Christian identity, as explored further in Chapter Six, was a linchpin of  connection for the 
Warriors, which formed a link between their family’s practices of  devotion and these new forms 
of  Oceanic regionalism. Many Warriors recognised that the regular acts of  collective worship 
that peppered the campaign were essential to group cohesion. These performances of  faith 
transcended denominational differences and cohered the group around the centrality of  
Christianity in their different island cultures10. As Joseph’s account testifies:  
                                                        
10 The significance of religious belief to the Pacific Climate Warriors’ campaign, and to potential understandings 
of and responses to climate change, will be explored in far greater detail in Chapter Six. 
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We all may have our differences but we all have faith. We all have 
religion. And we all believe in our faith. So, for us, the Pacific small 
islands, prayer is something that we all... it is part of our culture. It is 
part of our traditions. It is part of what defines who we are.  
(Joseph, 350 Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)) 
 
Yet these connections were not only optative (Heinrich 1963). These sibling-like solidarities also, 
to some extent, reflect actual kin relations within the 350 local groups. Warriors largely became 
involved in 350’s work through existing friends and family. For instance, Maria’s initial 
participation emerged not from previous engagements with social movements, but from strong 
encouragement by her affine:  
And then early April our coordinator Jonah whose wife is my auntie 
she was like...she wanted plenty people to attend this workshop, the 
350 workshop and then I had no intention of attending it, I wasn’t 
really into it and then on the day Jonah brother-in-law calls me up 
and tells me and ‘get your butt here! It starts at eight’.  
(Maria, 350 Fiji) 
 
The campaign also presented an opportunity to renew wider kinship ties, as after the main 
action in Newcastle, the majority of  the Warriors (all those who were not media spokespeople) 
were then free to visit family members based in Australia. Early on during the campaign, one 
Tongan Warrior was asked by another Warrior if  he would be staying with family in Sydney 
and he responded that he didn’t have any. Both then burst into peals of  laughter, imagining 
that absurd possibility given the strength of  the Tongan diaspora in that city.  
A substantive feature of  this case of  Pacific Island climate activism seems to be that it is socially 
embedded within kin relations. This was apparent through the centrality of  forging and 
performing optative kin relations among the Warriors, as well as the extent to which the 
Warriors encountered activism through existing family ties and activism provided them with an 
opportunity to strengthen those ties. This reflects what Toren and Pauwels (2015) highlight as 
the wider importance of  kinship networks in Pacific Island life.  
However, this relationship between the Warriors’ activism and family relations highlights a 
potential tension between their new Oceanic alliances and existing kin relations. Some Warriors 
received unconditional family support, in spite of  awareness of  the risks involved: 
Yeah, my family they supported me very well. And even all my 
friends and stuff because they support us very much and having the 
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group coming here...they know how dangerous and high risk of 
coming here, that they would end up in jail or something like that, 
but they keep supporting us to go. Don’t back down.  
(Tobiah, 350 Tonga) 
 
Other Warriors were more oblique about the nature of  their intended actions in Australia, for 
fear of  family disapproval, admitting that ‘I didn’t mention anything about protest’ when 
discussing their plans, or that ‘my mum had no idea what I was going to get involved in’. Even 
Leah, daughter of  a Pacific Island leader, who was publicly lauded by Radio Australia as 
coming ‘with the blessing of  her father, the President’ (Radio Australia, 2014) admitted that in 
fact ‘I told him...and he said ‘ok’ but I didn’t really mention the blockade, but I’m sure he found 
out soon after I got here’. These fears were in some cases well-founded as one Warrior admitted:  
My grandparents from both sides...they weren’t really supportive, I 
think they were scared for me because I told them that I was coming 
for a forum...and then when I told them about the protesting part 
they were scared because of the risk of me getting arrested, falling out 
the canoe into the sea, you know there’s sharks there, blue bottomed 
jelly fish, you know, all that kind of stuff. (Maria, 350 Fiji) 
 
For one Warrior, honesty about the true nature of  the trip led to open defiance.  
They [her parents] were a bit afraid, a bit frightened about what will 
happen next week. They tried...tried to stop me from coming but I 
insist. I believe that, I said to them, yeah. I believe that God will go 
with us, yeah. So, there will not...nothing will happen to me. 
(Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands) 
 
In some cases, the extent of  family approval the Warriors professed appears exaggerated. One 
Warrior claimed during our interview that his family ‘had their doubts at first but eventually 
after explaining everything to them properly then yeah, they have been supporting me, 
everyone’, yet in another conversation acknowledged he had an uncle working in mining in 
Australia who was opposed to the action, and had encouraged the Warrior’s parents to dissuade 
him from coming. The disagreement had reached the point that the Warrior would not be 
staying with his uncle when visiting Brisbane, thus the Warrior’s engagement in climate activism 
acted to rupture rather than maintain kinship ties. The Warriors also contended with this direct 
complicity of  Pacific Islanders in the fossil fuel extraction industry during their visit to the 
Whitehaven Coal mine in Maules Creek (Chapter Five).  
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This suggest that notions and enactments of  family were complicated and contested through 
engagement in the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign. On the one hand, we see the glimpses 
of  Hau’ofa’s idea of  Oceanic connection performed through forging familial relations with 
Pacific strangers. Further, we witness allegiance to kin respected through participants engaging 
in protest via family connections and explicitly taking action on behalf  of  their families 
alongside current and future descendants. Yet this stands in tension with a present subterfuge 
or disobedience towards family necessary in order to perform this concern for kin.  
1B. Performing national and Pan-Pacific identities 
 
A vital quality of  Hau’ofa’s work is that it advocates forms of  connection and regional identity 
that transcend and ‘blurs the boundaries of  nation-states’ (Jolly 2007: 530). This is also one of  
the key controversies surrounding Hau’ofa’s thesis. His vision of  Oceania has been accused of  
being predicated on ‘a homogenous Pacific Society’ (Ratuva 1993: 95-96), and thereby belying 
the cultural and linguistic diversity of  the region. If  this were to be the case, this would be 
concerning given that the homogenisation or creation of  a mythical and essentialised 
representation of  the Pacific has been a crucial component of  its belittlement (Fry 1997). Yet 
Hau’ofa’s work has also been defended on this point, through claims that the interconnections 
he draws are premised upon diversity, the inhabiting of  multiple identities, and reaching points 
of  commonality while still holding onto distinct island heritages (Jolly 2007; Stone 2011; 
Madraiwiwi 2010). Hau’ofa himself  unreservedly refutes this critique, arguing not only that 
homogeneity is ‘neither possible nor desirable’, but that ‘our diversity is necessary for the 
struggle against the homogenising forces of  the global juggernaut’ (2008a: 42). 
The Pacific Climate Warriors campaign engendered these forms of  non-homogenised Oceanic 
regionalism, as the Warriors, while formally positioned as representatives of  their respective 
nations, began to embrace forms of  composite, fluid and Pan-Pacific, as opposed to national, 
identities. This was achieved through the use of  customary dress, flags, and most significantly 
song and dance.  
Firstly, many of  the Warriors clearly understood themselves as national representatives, rather 
than merely individuals taking action, and took great pride in that role and identity. Indeed, 
many of  the Warriors actually referred to each by their countries as monikers, rather than their 
Christian names.  
Priscilla clearly grounded her presence in Australia in terms of  her regional and local 
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affiliations:  
As a young lady, to be a Pacific Climate Change Warrior, in my own 
opinion I would say that I must stand as a warrior representing my 
own country, my own land, my own family. Stand and must fight 
against it, climate change effects, that are affecting our islands. I 
would say that to be a warrior it’s a bit interesting because we are 
representing our own cultures here as well, our own unique customs 
here as well, and our own traditions here as well. So, it’s a good thing 
to be a Pacific Climate Change Warrior. I am proud to represent my 
own country and my own island. (Priscilla, Solomon Islands) 
 
Yet as she highlights, this patriotic act of  representation is premised on an articulation of  
difference from the other island cultures. This emphasis upon uniqueness as opposed to a unity 
founded upon uniformity is mirrored by the organisational attitude of  350 Pacific. For example, 
one of  the organisers presents this display of  plurality as intrinsic to the strength of  the 
campaign: 
Well I think......seeing the beauty and strength of culture and diversity 
of cultures, because often the islands get lumped into one, so actually 
within the islands there’s just fantastic diversity. So, showing that 
versus you know a few lumps of coal like, kind of a choice here. 
(Daniel, 350 Pacific) 
 
Yet this emphasis upon the Warrior acting as metonym for the nation also caused some 
participants conflict between their personal interest and national duty. For instance, Abel’s 
experience was a balance of  pride and also a burdening sense of  responsibility.  
And to be representing Tuvalu, as a climate Warrior from Tuvalu, it 
means a lot to me. I’m really proud of that. And it’s a burden that I 
have to carry, representing my island given the fact that I like to 
mingle and socialise with people in a very... strange way, people 
might call it. Yep. Most of the times I have to hold my flag up high 
and be an ambassador for Tuvalu. (Abel, 350 Tuvalu) 
 
His euphemistic allusions to ‘strange’ behaviour references his identity as pinapenaaine or 
occupying a specifically Tuvaluan non-heteronormative gender and sexual identity, (discussed 
further in Section 3B) and highlights the question of  whether the Warriors are seen by 
themselves or others as valid or authentic in their representation of  whole populations.  
This became pertinent in relation to one of  the most powerful of  national insignia: the flag. 
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One participant questioned her own legitimacy as a representative of  her country due to the 
incomplete truth with which she had presented the Australia trip to her family (like a number 
of  others she had inventively described the flotilla as a ‘conference’). Consequently, she didn’t 
feel she had genuine governmental endorsement for her actions, and thus felt unable to fly her 
national flag during the protest. To both her relief  and disappointment, her father gave her 
post-facto confirmation that the government was completely behind her and she should have 
held her flag high.  
Many of  the warriors recognised that they were representing not just their particular islands 
but the region as a whole. Leah, one of  the key media spokespeople, recognised her role as 
speaking for Oceania and even further afield.  
The Pacific Climate Warrior is not just the face of the Marshall 
Islands, it’s the face of the whole Pacific. It’s the face of Fiji, Tokelau, 
Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and standing up for the Pacific and also standing in 
solidarity with those around the world that are facing climate change 
impacts. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands) 
 
Another participant recognised her responsibility towards pan-pacific representation, while 
emphasising similarly to Priscilla that this sense of  over-arching identity was built upon a 
recognition of  difference, not sameness.  
I think when I’m speaking during talks, of course I represent Kiribati 
and as a culture we...but again with the other Pacific Islands we all 
have our different unique cultures and at the end of the day I’m not 
just representing Kiribati but I’m representing the whole Pacific 
Islands because we share the same spirit, different cultures, unique 
cultures but somehow similar in many ways. So, we represent our 
own countries as well as the Pacific Islands. (Eve, 350 Kiribati) 
 
Underlying this regional representation was an ideal of  Pacific unity, as already witnessed 
through the use of  family motifs. In his words Samson captures this while subverting notions 
of  nationhood as based on separate, independent jurisdictions. In his defiant proclamation all 
Pacific Islands are united under one nation:  
We are fighting for our lives, fighting for our people and if we stand 
together as one nation from different countries anything is possible. 
They will hear our voice. (Samson, 350 Niue) 
 
While the responsibilities of  representation were treated with much gravity, there was also an 
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evident playfulness and fluidity in terms of  the national and cultural identities performed. One 
participant from Tuvalu spent much of  our trip to Maules Creek draped in and posing with a 
Tongan flag (Figure 6), and also during the blockade became the official captain of  the Fiji 
canoe.  
 
Figure 6 - Abel from Tuvalu, adorned with the Tongan flag, looks upon the mounds of overburden 
 
Meanwhile Vanuatu kastom dress was gifted to one of  the Tokelaun participants who then 
proudly wore it throughout the ANZ action in Melbourne. These material acts of  exchange 
also disrupt the presentation of  authenticity and islandness. The Warriors’ campaign is couched 
in the language of  traditionalism: the media consumption focuses upon the ‘traditional dressed’ 
Warriors (Queally 2014) and ‘traditional canoes’ (Garrett 2014; Kelly 2014; Singarayar 2014). 
Yet unbeknownst to the majority of  the Western viewing public, through the borrowing and 
gifting of  fabrics and flags, in many cases, the traditions displayed are that of  another nation’s 
rather than the Warrior’s own. These gift-giving acts, undocumented in the media accounts, 
are performed not for audience consumption, but for the Warriors themselves in the production 
of  Pacific connections and Oceanic identities. Thus, while these performances of  Pan-Pacific 
identities act to homogenise to external audiences, internally there is still a recognition of  the 
diversity and uniqueness of  cultures.  
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These Oceanic identities were also performed through a powerful form of  musical bricolage. 
At the conclusion of  the blockade the Warriors sung a multi-lingual version of  the charity hit 
single We are the world (Jackson & Ritchie 1985), with each respective country group contributing 
a line of  the chorus translated into one of  their nation’s tongues. While originally developed as 
a celebrity fundraising response to famine in Ethiopia and later re-released in response to the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti, the appropriation of  the song for a moment of  Pacific indigenous 
resistance to the fossil fuel industry is apt in both form and content. In the act of  collectively 
singing in each other’s languages, the dissolution of  national and cultural boundaries between 
the Pacific Islanders is both imagined and enacted. The significance for Pacific liberation of  
speaking in indigenous rather than colonial tongues can also not be understated (Hao’ofa 
2008c; Waddell 1993; Kabutaulaka 1993). Moreover, the song’s key lyrics emphasise 
achievement through unity (‘Let us realize that a change can only come/ When we stand 
together as one’), that to some extent mirrors Hau’ofa’s claim that ‘Only in unity can we realise 
our full potentials’ (1993: 129). It announces the shared Christian identity of  participants (‘We 
are all a part of  God’s great big family’) and the current realities of  climate change impacts 
(‘There are people dying’). Most crucially in its transposition from Eighties’ American pop 
superstars to 21st century Islander climate activists it challenges notions of  victimhood and 
agency in accordance with the campaign’s mantra ‘We are not drowing, we are fighting’. It calls 
out the ongoing apathy of  Australia and other fossil-fuel intensive nations (‘We can’t go on 
pretending day by day/ That someone, somehow will soon make a change’) and transforms the 
otherwise glib and incongruous line ‘We’re saving our own lives’ into a cry of  action and 
defiance grounded in the lived experience of  suffering. Thus, this rewriting can be seen as part 
of  a discourse that challenges the inevitable inundation discourse, and provides a further 
example of  the role of  songs in challenging existing climate narratives (Kempf  2017).  
This Pan-Pacific cultural hybridisation also emerged through the haka (a ceremonial war dance, 
most commonly associated with Maori culture) which was devised and performed initially at 
Maules Creek (Figure 7) and then on the beach before the canoe launching (and later that 
evening in a local bar). With different participants leading different segments, all the men 
engaged in a dance that combined Tongan, Samoan, Fijian, Tokelaun, Solomon Islander, Ni-
Vanuatu and Maori ceremonial dance, a composite haka. In this act, simple representations of  
national identity dissolved, and instead a fearsome vision of  pan-pacific strength and unity was 
performed. The way in which flags, attire and dances circulated spoke to a group whose actions 
broke out of  national silos and instead performed a sense of  interconnected Oceanic islandness.  
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Figure 7 - The conclusion of the composite haka performed at Maules Creek 
 
This expression of  regional identity chimes with Hau’ofa’s work in three ways. Firstly, the spirit 
with which the Warriors contributed to the song, the haka and other dances that were performed 
during the campaign upon meeting new allies, concords with ‘the joy’ he identifies in USP 
students in ‘sharing aspects of  their varied heritage with each other and with us’ (1993: 131). 
Moreover, it centres exchange in the creation of  collective identity, as ‘our cultures have always 
been hybrid and hybridising, for we have always given to and taken from our neighbours and 
others we encounter’ (Hau’ofa 2008d: 63).  
Finally, the choice of  music and dance as the medium for forging these Oceanic identities is 
highly apt. Hau’ofa’s focus in his later years was on the creation and development of  the 
Oceania Centre for Arts and Culture at USP. His directorship of  the Centre and ongoing 
aspirations for region-building were explicitly interlinked, as he argued that ‘the centre’s 
emphasis on Oceanic forms and identity in artistic and cultural production should contribute 
significantly to regional cooperation and unity in our part of  the world’ (Hau’ofa 2008c: 87). 
In particular Hau’ofa saw the Centre as a site for cross-cultural fluidity and dialogue, for 
‘enmeshing, fusing, and hybridizing different aesthetic traditions’ (Naidu 2010: 118). In this the 
composite haka can be seen as an exemplar. The circumstances of  the songs and the haka also 
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resonate with Hau’ofa’s vision for the Centre, as he saw it as imperative that Oceanians ‘harness 
creativity to our practical struggle for survival’ (2008c: 87), particularly in response to ‘the most 
important global environmental agenda’ (ibid). This approach has continued to this day, for 
example through the 2015 ‘Communicating Climate Change’ exhibition held at the Oceania 
Centre, in which Pacific Island-based artists produced work which responded creatively to their 
changing environments (Figure 8).  
 
 
 
Figure 8 - ‘Under the Carpet’ by Cristina Gonzales Martin. Displayed at the Oceania Centre in Suva, Fiji in March 2015. 
 
Thus, overall, I contend that climate change activism, in the form of  the Pacific Climate 
Warrior campaign, created an opportunity for the physical embodiment of  Oceanic alliance, 
connection and expression of  regional identity that Hau’ofa theoretically envisions. The 
campaign emerged through and strengthened existing kinship connections (through 
opportunities to engage with family members in the diaspora) and led to the forging of  familial-
style connections between the Warriors, despite the diversity of  their islands of  origin. This 
therefore highlights the importance of  kinship in this expression of  Pacific Island activism, as 
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well as the importance of  kinship to Oceanic regionalism, yet a more unbounded form of  
kinship than that explicitly presented by Hau’ofa himself, in the sense that it extends notions of  
kinship beyond the consanguineous. However, due to the objections to the protest expressed by 
some of  the Warriors’ family members, obligations to family are also revealed to be a point of  
tension, that will be explored further in the following chapter. While the Warriors had strong 
national attachments, Pan-Pacific identity was also expressed through the exchange of  custom 
dress and flags, and through the production of  composite songs and a composite haka, highly 
pertinent art forms given Hau’ofa’s emphasis upon song and dance as mediums for the 
manifestation of  Oceanic identity.  
Returning to Hau’ofa’s overall argument, regional connection as a ‘Sea of  Islands’ as opposed 
to small, isolated nations in a vast sea, is the foundation for the collective power of  Oceania, 
and for an alternative understanding of  the Pacific Islands that rejects the idea that they are 
weak and helpless. Yet in order to understand how this vision of  Oceania could challenge the 
inevitable inundation discourse and realise its collective power, it is necessary to next consider 
Hau’ofa’s concept of  world enlargement.  
2. We are the world: Pacific Climate Warriors and ever-expanding 
Oceania 
 
The ‘O’ in Oceania is the ‘O’ in Om: and that is the entire universe.  
(Mishra, 1993: 22) 
 
I now turn to a second crucial facet of  Hau’ofa’s work, that of  ‘world enlargement’, bringing 
this poetic and polemic vision of  the ever-enlarging, ever-engulfing Oceania into dialogue with 
my empirical case study. Hau’ofa’s concept of  ‘world enlargement’ is somewhat hazy on the 
details, and seems to have received very limited critical reception compared to some of  the 
other key ideas in his work. He first introduces the notion in his seminal essay Our Sea of  Islands, 
when he refers to ‘the contemporary process of  what may be called world enlargement that is 
carried out by tens of  thousands of  ordinary Pacific Islanders right across the ocean...making 
nonsense of  all national and economic boundaries...crisscrossing an ocean’ (1994: 151). In his 
later work, he reiterates this notion of  enlargement through increased mobility and the 
expansion of  social networks and diasporas of  Pacific peoples (2008a: 41).  
This notion of  world enlargement as it stands has two clear shortcomings. Firstly, Hau’ofa has 
fallen afoul of  criticism for the overly optimistic view of  migration presented in it. Chandra 
 121 
(1993:77) takes Hau’ofa to task for failing to recognise the hardship emigration produces for 
those left behind, despite the flow of  remittances, alongside the suffering many migrants 
experience, exploited by their new host nations. Secondly, and most crucially, I contend that 
Hau’ofa’s very notion of  world enlargement needs enlarging. Compared to the ambition and 
poetry of  the rest of  the Sea of  Islands vision, there is something underwhelming and 
unfittingly prosaic about the notion that one of  the only ways the might, strength and size of  
the ever-growing Oceania is realised is through Islanders joining the transnational pool of  
cheaply available labour. It also sits awkwardly with the Warriors’ disavowal of  the prospect of  
becoming climate refugees.  
Looking instead to the poetry and near hyperbole of  Sudesh Mishra’s response to Hau’ofa’s 
work, above, I’d like to consider other ways in which the Pacific Islands transcend their 
smallness, other ways in which Oceania’s majesty and expanding magnitude can be realised in 
practice, and in turn counter the damaging inevitable inundation narrative. Thus, true to 
Hau’ofa’s form I also use the notion of  ‘world enlargement’ loosely, yet to differing effect. 
Through it I hope to convey a notion of  Oceania as being as uncontained and uncontainable 
as the waters of  its namesake, and as a specifically Pacific power from below. 
I contend that three processes central to this formulation of  world enlargement occurred 
through the Pacific Climate Warriors’ campaign: firstly, that the problems and concerns of  the 
Pacific Islands could not be contained within the islands, and through the action overflowed 
into Australia and further afield, an act that can be seen as ‘bringing climate change home’. 
Secondly, the Warriors situated their work as acting for and on behalf  of  the world, globalising 
their actions and intentions, and forging solidarities with indigenous Australian activists as part 
of  an expanding Oceania. Thirdly, through the blockade the Warriors sought to present the 
Pacific as an example to the world, as a form of  decolonising re-education for Australia.  
2A. King tides in our kitchens: bringing climate change home 
 
Firstly, the very act of  holding the blockade in Australia can be seen as a form of  world 
enlargement. It articulates that Pacific Islander suffering, due to intensified cyclones and 
unprecedented king tides, can no longer be contained within those islands, and instead is 
brought home to its source. In this movement, the Australian coal industry is enveloped by the 
ever-enlarging Oceania, bringing the industry to account for its actions. This incorporation of  
Australia into Oceania is key to challenging the Pacific Islands’ subordination, as much of  
Australia’s belittlement of  the Pacific emerges from a presumption that it is above and outside 
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the Pacific Island region, yet still has a special position as manager (Fry 2007).  
This enlargement of  Oceania beyond its boundaries can be understood as a means of  ‘bringing 
climate change home’. While obviously operating within a very distinct political tradition, in 
using this phrase I deliberately allude to the Weather Underground and the Red Army Faction’s 
modus operandi of  ‘bringing the war home’ (Varon 2004), a concept that violence can no longer 
be externalised, unseen and forgotten, but that those responsible for its production are 
confronted by its existence, experiencing it in microcosm. This can perhaps be seen most 
literally during the post-blockade action in Canberra where activists simulated waves in the 
offices of  the Australian Minerals Council, and more recently during an action held in New 
Zealand by some members of  350 Pacific who created a ‘Pacific Climate Refugee Camp’ on 
the streets of  Auckland.  
This notion of  ‘bringing climate change home’ has previously been utilised to somewhat 
different purposes by Slocum (2004). In her article the phrase indicates the necessity of  making 
abstract global climate change meaningful and local, and inspiring others to action, ideas 
echoed by Hulme (2008). This draws out the final element of  this tactic – the notion of  home 
– as it highlights the role of  domesticity in the Warriors’ experiences and fears of  climate 
change.  
The place of  home, both as a sense of  place in the world and as a household dwelling, appeared 
frequently in the Warriors’ accounts. For instance, Leah’s account ‘brings climate change home’ 
(in Slocum’s sense of  making it local and tangible) through the evocation of  the loss of  home, 
the word itself  appearing five times in quick succession. 
As you know, the Marshalls is barely three metres about sea level. It’s 
flat land. There’s no mountains, no hills, no rivers, no streams and it’s 
very narrow land. And so, when sea level rises and high tides come in, 
it washes into people’s homes, destroys their homes and they have to 
be...and they’re left displaced and so have to look for a new home. A 
new place to stay...it’s a very devastating situation because you live in 
a home where you...where you’ve been for your whole life and then all 
of a sudden, you know, the waves come crashing in and destroy 
everything...everything you’ve owned in that home. And you’re left 
with nothing. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands) 
 
Meanwhile Samson invokes home through its near synonymy with land and collective 
belonging.  
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Because it’s your land as well and this is my land and you don’t want 
your home to be swept away. Because your home, your land is yours. 
You lose your home you lose your land. I don’t want to feel in 
another country, that is not mine.  
(Samson, 350 Niue) 
 
In his use of  the second person, Samson both directly addresses me as Western continental 
interviewer, and imagined islander, with home and land to lose. He explicitly uses this tactic of  
bringing home climate change through asking me to put myself  in another’s shoes and crucially 
my home in another locale.  
Imagine your family, like you swap sides, if you were at the Pacific 
and we were at your house, just sitting there. How would you feel? 
Put yourself in their position. And I will tell you that you will fight. 
You will do the same thing. You should understand that.  
(Samson, 350 Niue) 
 
Finally, Maria’s words present one of  the most powerful articulations of  the polysemic concept 
of  home.  
The only thing that pushed us on was knowing we were there for a 
purpose. We were there to stop the coal mine, to stop the coal ships. 
And then going into the day when we saw the coal ship pass by we all 
cried, it was so emotional because like we know what those coal 
boats...what the coal does to us, the Islanders, and so watching it go 
by all that was in our head was like a family will lose their home 
today. A family will lose their livestock. A family will even lose their 
own livelihoods. Maybe their home. We just let one by. You know? 
(Maria, 350 Fiji) 
 
In her account, she envisions the disrupted domesticity of  a single family, with the loss of  home 
reiterated as one of  the most prevailing threats. In connecting the fossil fuel industry directly 
with this loss of  home (‘what the coal does to us’) she makes the consequences of  carbon 
combustion specific, localised and directly attributional: it is brought home, or made tangible 
to those who heed her words. And locating this direct impact not, for instance, in the erosion 
of  a specific patch of  coastline, but in the destruction of  family life, she presents the act as 
morally reprehensible. This thereby evokes the emotive resonances of  ‘home’ expressed in the 
above accounts by Leah and Samson. Thus in this passage we also witness this third form of  
‘bringing home’, the need to stop these acts of  violence at their source through direct 
intervention (‘we were there for a purpose...we were there to stop the coal ships’), and thus a 
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further indication of  world enlargement, as climate change as a problem is no longer contained 
within the Pacific Islands, but instead is brought back to Australia, engulfing Australia within 
this Oceanic concern.  
2B. Pacific for the world  
 
However, a further key element of  the Warriors’ messaging was that it wasn’t just their homes 
that were threatened. A second dimension of  Oceanic world enlargement revolves around 
bringing in global concerns as Pacific concerns, and linking up with other indigenous 
communities, as a further expansion of  Oceanic regionalism. Hau’ofa foresaw a need for 
Oceania to ‘link up with the rest of  the world’ in order to prevent environmental destruction, 
arguing both literally and figuratively that ‘the sea unites the entire world’ (1993: 139). The 
emphasis upon the need for the Pacific Islands to assist the rest of  the world also fundamentally 
challenges the presumption that they are small and isolated ‘islands in a far sea’ that require 
rescue. Instead it is those island nations united that are reaching out in order to assist their 
neighbours: a manifestation of  the powerful, ever-expanding and enlarging Oceania. 
I just wanted to remind everybody that this is not a fight that’s...this is 
not a fight that’s only for the Pacific. This is everybody’s fight. This is 
a common fight. And we’re just more...we’re just really passionate 
about it because our islands are at the front line. And we just want to 
get our message out there, get our stories out there so that more 
people can hear about them and join us because there’s not one 
country that’s not affected by climate change...This is a common fight 
that we all share. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands) 
 
Leah’s message was reiterated throughout the campaign: that the Warriors’ actions weren’t just 
motivated by their own self-interest and the interests of  their national communities but were 
taken for the sake of  the whole world, both now and for future generations to come.  
And this taking of  action is not just imagined as a petitioning to the larger states, but a direct 
intervention by the islands themselves. As Samson puts it: 
And there’s not only us in the Pacific but it’s affecting across the 
whole world, so we need to get that change now, we need to fight for 
it. No one says it’s going to be easy, but we need to fight for it. Pick 
the world up. (Samson, 350 Niue) 
 
This intent and ability to ‘pick the world up’ can be seen as part of  a wider challenge to existing 
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discourses that present the Pacific Islands as small and powerless, a refutation of  the 
Anthropocenic horror stories that the inevitable inundation discourse forms a part of. For some 
Warriors it was explicit that the Pacific Islands’ lowly place in the hierarchy of  nations had to 
change.  
Tell you the truth, I want to see the Pacific up top, and not on the 
bottom. I don’t want to see people getting hit by this global warming, 
these tsunamis, floods, no. (Samson, 350 Niue) 
 
Another key dimension to the process of  world enlargement was the forging of  indigenous 
solidarities, thereby bringing further communities into the enlarging Oceania. Hau’ofa’s vision 
of  Oceania is an inclusive one. He postulates that ‘as far as I am concerned, anyone who has 
lived in our region and is committed to Oceania is an Oceanian’ (2008a: 51). But he places 
special emphasis upon Islanders building connections with ‘the ‘tangata whenua of  Aotearoa 
and... with the Native Hawaiians’ (1994: 156). Consequently, the extent to which the Warriors 
embraced other forms of  indigeneity and built connections with Australian Aboriginal activists 
is highly relevant. Beginning from a position of  uncertainty and tension, this relationship 
became a central feature of  the unified action taken on the day of  the blockade.  
One of  the first events scheduled within the Warriors’ training was a visit to the Redfern 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Sydney, an ongoing occupation that opposed the gentrification of  
Aboriginal neighbourhoods, the racist policies of  the Australian state and the dispossession of  
Aboriginal land. A number of  the Warriors appeared uneasy in advance of  this meeting. In 
preparation we were asked to collect gum leaves (eucalyptus) for use in the Welcome to Country 
smoking ceremony11. The Warriors I was around explicitly established their distance from this 
alternative form of  indigeneity through emphasising their botanical ignorance of  which leaves 
were appropriate and one Warrior threatened that we would become like ‘Red Indians’ and 
performed a parodic whooping dance. This nervousness and anticipation continued in the drive 
to Redfern, as we were warned by one organiser to be careful about what we said, claiming that 
Aboriginal people easily took offense. There were slapstick moments just before our arrival as 
the finally identified branches of  gum trees accidentally spilled onto the minivan’s floor, leading 
to fears that the Elders would be incensed by such irreverent treatment.  
                                                        
11 A ritual by which an Aboriginal elder welcomes guests to their land and the guests are cleansed with smoke 
(Merlan 2014). 
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However, the smoking ceremony itself  was a celebration of  connection rather than difference, 
as the Elders expressed their shared experiences of  Blackness with the Warriors, placing 
especial emphasis upon the common heritage of  Melanesians and Aboriginal Australians. The 
Elders spoke movingly of  their struggles to resist racism and gentrification in Redfern, inviting 
prayers and contributions from the Islanders. While one Warrior later confided in me that she 
was uncomfortable with the pagan nature of  the ceremony, and feared that demons had been 
washed over her, the previous fears of  difference appeared to melt away. The Warriors' 
campaign formally linked up with Seed (the indigenous branch of  the Australian Youth Climate 
Coalition, now an organisation in its own right) bringing two Seed activists on the coach to 
Maules Creek, where the coal mine blockade already featured strong Aboriginal participation. 
The Warriors’ time in Newcastle also began with a formal Welcome to Country led by Gomeroi 
elders, and the procession to the water’s edge during the blockade itself  was led by a contingent 
from Seed, wearing body paint and ceremonially clearing the path with branches of  eucalyptus 
(Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9 - Activists from Seed lead the procession at the start of the Pacific Climate Warrior blockade. 
Australian understandings of  Pacific Islanders were also refracted through Australian relations 
to indigeneity by one Warrior, in a way that centred indigenous experience. In a discussion 
regarding Australians’ knowledge of  Pacific Islanders she stated: 
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I reckon that Australians do know about Pacific Islands because this is 
where most of the people derive from, Aboriginal from Australia, 
these are the people that are with us in this fight for our land, our 
identity, our people, so. (Delilah, 350 Samoa) 
 
In this brief  statement she not only highlights the comradeship between Aboriginal and Pacific 
allies, but marginalises White Australia, inverting hegemonic representations of  the country’s 
inhabitants by making Aboriginal Australians stand for all Australians. This solidarity with 
other indigenous struggles has continued as part of  350 Pacific’s work, including sending 
recorded messages of  solidarity to the Sioux activists at Standing Rock opposing the Dakota 
Access Pipeline in late 2016, and a visit by a few of  the Warriors to the Canadian tar sands in 
May 2017 (Embree and 350.org 2017).  
Thus, the expansion of  Oceania is apparent through the forging of  solidarities with Aboriginal 
Australian activists as Oceanic connections expand to include those beyond the Pacific Islands 
themselves, as well as through the Warriors’ claims that their campaign was on the behalf  of  
the whole world, not just Pacific Islanders. This acts as an example of  world enlargement, as 
Pacific Islanders begin to act globally, and Oceania’s concerns become a metonym for global 
concerns.  
2C. Pacific as example 
 
The final dimension to these practices of  world enlargement is the extent to which the Warriors 
were not just attempting to act on behalf  of  the world but to set an example to the world 
through doing so. This notion of  Oceania as exemplar involved both a showcasing of  superior 
Pacific values and a decolonising attempt to re-educate Australia, highlighting the folly of  its 
ways.  
In the Warriors’ approach, the Pacific acts as an example because of  its superior moral values. 
Joseph captures this in his comparison with Australia:  
We are small islands but... we are the mighty Pacific Ocean...even 
though you know they have the bigger land, but as Pacific Islanders 
we have biggest hearts. So, Australia they might have bigger land but 
compared to us Pacific Islanders we have much, much more bigger 
hearts. (Joseph, 350 FSM) 
 
His words, inspired by a speech by one of  the organisers, both seemingly explicitly reference 
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Hau’ofa’s work and emphasise the question of  relative land size, as will be discussed in Section 
3.  
Other Warriors echoed this ‘large-heartedness’ through reference to a more compassionate and 
down-to-earth approach to life found within the islands. Abel contrasted the abstract and 
uncaring nature of  Tony Abbot, then Prime Minister of  Australia, with the attitude of  his own 
nation’s leader:  
That heartless person. And at home you see our Prime Minister 
walking. You say ‘hi’ to him, and say hi back, without bodyguards. 
He drives his own car. He feeds his own pigs. (Abel, 350 Tuvalu) 
 
This emphasis upon the considerate nature of  the Pacific Island governments was most 
pronounced in the context of  proactive responses to climate change adaptation and mitigation. 
For Delilah it was unjustified that Australia and other industrialised nations would be so lax by 
comparison, as she asked, ‘If  our Pacific Island leaders are coming together to try and work on 
it, why not all the world’s high leaders?’. 
This sentiment was shared by Moses, who saw Tokelau’s steps towards renewable energy 
generation as an example both for the rest of  the Pacific and for the world.  
If our own country could all especially as taking the example from the 
Tokelau islands, I mean they’re already been 100% renewable energy 
and if the other Pacific Islands could follow that same step and then 
take the lead of renewable energy and then show us through that this 
is what we want, this is what we, this is what Pacific Islanders say this 
is what would be. And then it would really teach a good example to 
Australia, so they could see us and it would be really a good, an 
effective motivation also for Australia. (Moses, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
Crucially through this example-setting Moses also expresses a need to ‘teach’ and motivate 
Australia. Others echoed this explicit desire to educate: 
I hope they should learn from all the movements that we 
made...we’re here to give them lessons and for them to learn about all 
the impacts that we are, about the purpose of why we are here to 
highlight the impacts of climate change, that we are currently living 
with in Tonga at all times. (Tobiah, 350 Tonga) 
 
In a speech given after a solidarity action in Melbourne, one of  the Warriors reiterated this 
need for Australia to be re-educated by the Pacific Islands, but through an explicitly 
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decolonising rejection of  Australian modes of  education, compared with Pacific Island models 
of  knowledge. 
Colonialism is over. You don’t just tell us what to do. Because we 
know what to do. We are clever people in the Pacific. We are 
educated people. We are educated by guiding our canoes by the sun 
and the stars. We just have a different education. We want you to 
come and learn that with us. Not just learning in universities: that’s 
not as good as learning how to live a sustainable future.  
(Reuben, 350 Tokelau) 
 
This productive tension between different forms of  knowledge will be further explored in 
Chapter 6.  
The imperative to alleviate Australia’s ignorance was often tied to a call for polluters to bear 
witness to the impacts in the islands.  
These people or this industry they need to go to the islands to actually 
see the impacts that it’s causing. So, then they actually know what we 
are on about, instead of just saying ‘oh we don’t know what we’re 
doing. Why are you doing that?’. (Rachael, 350 Niue) 
 
This pedagogical overture towards Australia both demonstrates a decolonising impulse and a 
potentially naive presumption of  an information-deficit underlying existing actions. Beginning 
with the first aspect, Fry (1997) has identified the circulation of  a ‘doomdayism’ discourse about 
the Pacific Islands, that is broadcast by Australia media commentators and policy officials. This 
discourse presumes that the Pacific Islands are headed towards an inevitable ‘future nightmare 
of  overcrowding, poverty, mass unemployment, serious environmental degradation, and a 
decline in health standards’ (1997: 306) unless they heed Australia’s salvationary message and 
change their ways, particularly through structural adjustment policies. Fry sees this discourse as 
a continuation of  Australia’s belittling approach to the Pacific Islands during the Cold War, and 
one that stems from a racist presumption that Australia has the right to manage its island 
neighbours. Writing a decade after Fry, Jolly (2007) contends that this damaging discourse is 
well and alive in the 21st century. This doomsday discourse also resonates with the apocalyptic 
horror stories of  the Anthropocene, as explored by Tsing et al. (2017) and Buck (2015).  
In their attempts to re-educate, the Warriors actively subvert the doomsdayism discourse. No 
longer is ‘Australia...cast both as model and saviour of  the Pacific’ (Jolly 2007: 527). Instead it 
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is Australia who is held responsible for the impending apocalypse and Pacific Islanders that are 
presenting the message of  salvation. Moreover, it an opportunity to turn the tables and actively 
re-educate those nations who had for so long imposed their systems of  knowledge upon 
Oceania. One Warrior puts it explicitly: 
Developed and rich countries that are benefitting from this and I 
think it’s time for them to...you know in the past we sort of always 
listened, you know, the islands always listened to the Europeans, this 
and that, and I think it’s about time now for them to listen to us, to 
our call, to our need. (Eve, 350 Kiribati) 
 
Through their call, the Warriors highlight the parochialism of  ‘outlander’ thought (Borofsky 
2000), as Australia and other larger nations have failed to truly look beyond their own borders 
and recognise the consequences of  their actions. It stands as a further example of  world 
enlargement, as rather than being small and marginal, the potency of  the Pacific Islands is 
expanding to the point that they take the responsibility of  educating their neighbours.  
The power of  an enlarged Oceania vis-a-vis Australia was invoked in other ways. During a 
training event held in Sydney, the organiser declared that while Pacific Islanders won’t be at the 
big table, making decisions about the future of  fossil fuel extraction, ‘they can take action in 
their backyard: Australia’. The image of  Australia as backyard conveys Pacific ownership: in 
an inversion of  the attitude described by Fry in relation to doomsdayism, it inverts the relation 
of  centrality and peripherality between Australia and the Pacific (as through this metaphor the 
Pacific is presumably figured as the home), and it invokes the spectre of  NIMBYism, but in a 
manner that has been transnationally re-figured.  
Yet the desire to inform and re-educate Australia also relies upon an information deficit model 
(the notion that the solution lies in a simple increase in dissemination of  expert knowledge 
(Burgess et al. 1998)), in order to make Australian inaction (or perpetuation of  destructive 
action) morally comprehensible. Many Warriors suspected that large numbers of  Australians 
must not be truly conscious of  the consequences of  their nation’s actions:  
These things are contributing to climate change, just to, just to reduce 
them like radically and just getting more local community and people 
in these big, big countries to be more aware that these, you know, 
these things that are being done in the big countries, that are 
contributing to climate change, are really affecting our islands back 
home. Because I don’t think a lot of people... I mean a lot of people 
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are aware that we’re affected by climate change but I think there’s 
also a large population that are not, and just to make them aware and 
just to get our stories out there more, in the media and whatever, 
whatever channel that we can go through to get our stories out there. 
I think people will come to understand and try to take more action. 
(Leah, 350 Marshall Islands) 
 
Others cast the fossil fuel companies themselves, such as Whitehaven Coal, in a state of  explicit 
ignorance.  
What they don’t know is that they are not only harming us humans 
and other human beings but they are also hurting the environment. 
You know something that sustains us. (Maria, 350 Fiji) 
 
These accusations of  ignorance profess a faith in the underlying goodwill of  the fossil fuel 
companies.  
I believe that the Australian people understand us...understand what 
we are going through. I believe that one day they will put a stop on 
what they are doing because they already seeing that too many 
disasters are happening in our islands in the Pacific. And I believe 
they will take action in the future in order for us to live 
happy...happily in our own islands. I believe that they gonna respect 
us in this. (Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands) 
 
This appears as a form of  naive and overly generous rationalisation, as well as a homogenisation 
of  Australia as a nation and its capacity to act. It could perhaps be linked to the ambivalent 
and aid-intensive relationship between Australia and many Pacific Island countries and a desire 
to not bite the hand that feeds. Yet, ultimately, this manifestation of  a powerful expanding 
Oceania, that brings climate change home and acts as an example to and on behalf  of  the 
world, is potentially hamstrung by this presumption of  Australia’s innocence. This question is 
reckoned with in the following chapter, where the vision of  Australian goodwill will be revisited 
and challenged, centring notions of  antagonism, blame and affect.  
Consequently, the actions of  the Pacific Climate Warriors can be understood as a form of  world 
enlargement, and one that extends Hau’ofa’s original presentation of  the concept as simply the 
dispersal of  a Pacific workforce. Climate change activism provides an opportunity for the 
Warriors to display their region’s significance and place Oceania at the centre of  global 
concerns. I contend that these processes of  world enlargement were apparent in three ways. 
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Firstly, through bringing activism to Australia from the Pacific, the problems and concerns of  
Oceania could no longer be contained within the islands. Climate change was ‘brought home’ 
by the Warriors in a number of  ways, in a manner that engulfed Australia within Oceania’s 
concern. Secondly, the Warriors situated their work as acting for and on behalf  of  the world, 
globalising their actions and intentions, and forging solidarities with indigenous Australian 
activists. This can be understood as an expansion of  the world of  Oceania, as rather than a 
marginal locale, it assumes the potency of  a global force. Thirdly, this idea was extended 
through the Warriors’ presentation of  the Pacific as an example to the world, as a form of  
decolonising re-education for Australia, thereby further inverting power relations between 
Oceania and its larger neighbours. These acts of  world enlargement express Pacific strength 
and contest the inevitable inundation discourse: it is through displaying their potency as part 
of  an expanding, unified continent that the Warriors reinforce the claim that they are not 
drowning but fighting. 
However, there has been some scepticism about the extent to which a reframing of  Oceania’s 
power is geopolitically viable. Mishra applauds Hau’ofa’s vision for its ‘celebratory resistance’ 
(1993: 22) yet questions the extent to which the Pacific Islands have tangible control over their 
futures, compared with the power exerted by the Pacific Rim countries. Naidu (1993) has 
similarly warned that Hau’ofa, in his attempts to re-imagine the strength and significance of  
the Pacific, has underestimated the power of  the global capitalist system that the islands are 
ensnared by. As a further slight upon Oceania’s potency, Griffen, who declares Hau’ofa’s 
Oceania ‘romantic, appealing and perhaps fictional’ (1993: 59), argues that he obscures the 
extent of  urban poverty, exploitation and suffering in the Pacific through his focus on heroic 
self-sufficiency. She contends that the reality of  current social and economic conditions in the 
islands need to be brought into account (a view point echoed more harshly by Veitayaki 1993) 
and that ‘We need to be angrier over our present as well as pleased with the good things about 
our past and present’ (1993: 62). This leads me to consider in the next and final section some 
of  the shortcomings of  Hau’ofa’s analysis for this particular case.  
3. Regional inequities and relative altitudinal privilege  
 
These expressions of  world enlargement and Oceanic interconnection through the generation 
of  familial solidarities, the representation of  regional identities and the fluid intermingling of  
different cultures can be seen as key features of  a Sea of  Islands approach, and indicate the 
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potential for this approach as a counter-discourse to the inevitable inundation discourse. 
However, there are still limitations to applying such a model to this empirical example. I begin 
by drawing upon the oft-cited critique of  Hau’ofa’s work: that his Pan-Pacific vision conceals 
intra-regional differences and inequities. I hazard this also to be the case with the Pacific 
Climate Warriors, noting the under-representation of  Micronesia, the absence of  many 
countries in the campaign, and also the Polynesian bias in terms of  the inequitable number of  
participants, mirroring a further common critique of  Hau’ofa’s work. I also reflect upon power 
differentials enacted along gendered lines, and the extent to which the campaign reinforced 
traditional gender roles, acknowledging that these were to some degree subverted by the 
presence of  non-heteronormatively gendered Warriors.  
Rather than dismissing the Warriors’ actions or Hau’ofa’s approach because of  these concerns, 
I argue that the model of  regionalism being produced and performed through the flotilla is one 
that acknowledges inequalities and difference. Crucially I identify discourses of  relative 
altitudinal privilege, which engage empathetically with narratives of  inundation and loss, but 
with a specificity that rejects the reduction of  the Pacific to an anonymous submerged atoll. 
This thereby indicates that there is still potential for understanding the Sea of  Islands as a 
counter-discourse to the inevitable inundation narrative, and one whose many key tenets are 
being embodied and practiced by Pacific Islanders on the ground.  
3A. Whose Sea of Islands? 
 
Firstly, the true regionalism of  the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign must be questioned in 
terms of  how well it represented all parts of  Oceania, and the extent to which it perpetuated a 
Polynesian bias. The thirty participants hailed from twelve different nations, out of  a possible 
22 Pacific Island countries and territories (Barnett and Campbell 2010). Organisers were aware 
that there were gaps in their coverage, but identified these gaps as emerging from pragmatic 
concerns and limited capacity, as opposed to a lack of  enthusiasm for full continental 
representation. When asked about how well he believed the campaign included all the Pacific 
Islands and how representative of  the Pacific it was, one of  the organisers replied: 
Yeah, so we ended up with twelve islands. We could have got more. I 
guess at a push we could have got Nauru...easily got Nauru. Could 
have got Palau with a bit of a push. Cook Islands has been a bit of a 
gap lately. Guam’s just jumped on board, in more like connected 
way. We’re starting to build more momentum in New Caledonia. 
Haven’t had a lot happening in French Polynesia. We could have had 
someone from American Samoa. I think that about covers the sort of 
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gaps mainly. And but you know it just came down to sort of...the 
amount of budget we had to bring people over and also where there 
was...yeah, a lot of what we rely on is people in the islands just 
taking... taking up the call and doing stuff and so. Yeah, I think we 
did a pretty...pretty awesome job. 12 is well over...you know a 
majority of them. Yeah, I’m pretty stoked if I’m honest.  
(Daniel, 350 Pacific) 
 
While I concur that bringing together Warriors from so many different countries was an 
impressive feat, I contend these lacuna are not simply arbitrary or a result of  not pushing 
harder, but reflect inequities in terms of  350 Pacific’s relationship with different parts of  the 
region. None of  the above countries that Daniel identified as missing were successfully brought 
on board for the following year’s Vatican-based campaign, and none of  them had one of  their 
compatriots elected to the first Pacific Consultative Group in 2015. The absence of  the three 
French territories (New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia) suggests an 
absence that may emerge from language differences or a potential privileging of  sovereign states 
over territories. Moreover, there are also limitations to how much this uniqueness or diversity is 
realised when relying upon the nation state as a container, as many Warriors identified more 
strongly with their specific home island, as opposed to the nation of  which they were a citizen. 
For instance, joking questions were raised over authenticity and protocol regarding the Solomon 
Islands canoe: Priscilla was not suitable to be the captain given her gender, but the canoe was 
of  her province, not Jeremiah’s (her male companion from the Solomon Islands), thus the 
suitability of  his claim to captaincy was also in doubt. This was eventually resolved in Jeremiah’s 
favour, who excelled as captain of  his small one-person canoe during the flotilla. 
Moreover, within the composition of  the existing Warriors, there were clear discrepancies 
between the sizes of  different subregional contingents. Before delving deeper into this matter, I 
do acknowledge the contentions surrounding the labels Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia 
(Jolly 2007; Thomas et al. 1989), particularly in connection to Hau’ofa’s work. O’Carroll decries 
them as the remnants of  ‘nineteenth century evolutionist lingo of  biological racism’ (1993: 25), 
and uncompromisingly declares ‘Let’s not apologise for them: let’s get rid of  them too!’ (ibid). 
He critiques Hau’ofa’s employment of  them, arguing that those that still adhere to these 
colonial assignations are ‘exactly the people Hau’ofa is fighting’ (ibid). Instead to O’Carroll’s 
mind part of  the power of  Hau’ofa’s vision is that ‘Oceania...can, in fact, ultimately supersede 
this European trio’ (ibid). Hau’ofa justifies his perpetuation of  the colonial trinity on the 
grounds that they ‘are already part of  the cultural consciousness of  the peoples of  Oceania 
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(1994: 161) but in fact later replaces this terminology with the divisions of  West, North, Central 
and East Oceania (Hau’ofa 2008d: 77).  
Despite their highly dubious heritage, given the place of  these labels in ‘cultural consciousness’, 
and their role in positive Pacific self-identification (Kabutaulaka 2015), they are still meaningful 
in this context. Moreover, they were incorporated into the Warriors’ working practices. Three 
Warrior co-ordinators were chosen each day to lead the group through facilitating group 
discussions, and there was a conscious decision to make sure they represented different 
subregions of  the Pacific (as well as including at least one woman, discussed further in Section 
3B).  
While there were clearly attempts therefore to ensure balanced and equitable representation on 
the part of  the campaign, the overall composition of  the group indicated an overwhelming 
Polynesian bias. There were seven Melanesian participants compared with twenty Polynesians 
and only three Micronesians. This calculation places Fiji within the category of  Melanesia due 
to its membership of  the Melanesian Spearhead Group. If  I follow Hau’ofa’s argument that 
Fiji can also be included in Polynesia for ‘geographic and cultural reasons’ (Hau’ofa 1994: 161), 
then the disparity is further heightened.  
These numbers are partly explained by the different islands’ recruitment practices. While some 
national groups only allocated the two places funded by 350 Pacific, 350 Tonga encouraged 
community funding of  additional participants, sending their Warrior count into the double 
digits. 
However, this disparity also potentially reflects the systemic under-representation of  Micronesia 
(Hanlon 2009), compounded by its weaker status with regards to Australia, as it largely falls 
under an American rather than Antipodean sphere of  influence. This under-representation 
was felt keenly by one Micronesian Warrior.  
I was really you know amazed at that certain level. Until I met the 
other Warriors and you know of all the Warriors I only understand 
like share geographically location with one of them. The Marshallese 
Islander, but the others I have met some people just like them before, 
so I was expecting that it was going to be more than just the two of 
us12, coming from Micronesia. But then again, I am really glad that it 
                                                        
12 The discrepancy between Joseph’s figure of two Micronesians and mine of three I presume is due to him 
overlooking the presence of one of the quieter Warriors, who was from Kiribati. 
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wasn’t just myself. I had somebody else from Micronesia who can 
both support the movement. (Joseph, 350 FSM) 
 
This inequitable inclusion also highlights another key critique of  Hau’ofa’s regional vision. 
Namely that Hau’ofa wishfully overlooked existing tensions, hierarchies and rivalries in the 
Pacific, which have the potential to undermine continental unity (Naidu 1993; Borer 1993), in 
particular the belittlement of  Melanesians by Polynesians (Kabutaulaka 1993, 2010: 113)13. 
Hau’ofa’s work is seen by some as complicit with this, as the universality of  his Pacific vision 
can be questioned, due to the lesser involvement of  Melanesia and Micronesia in the region’s 
international kin-based connections (Thaman 1993: 43), and the focus on a seafaring tradition 
that largely excludes Melanesia (Griffen 1993). Perhaps the Warriors’ campaign is indeed very 
true to the Sea of  Islands vision therefore in its shared Polynesian bias.  
3B. Women at the end, halves in the middle 
 
Continuing to critically interrogate the points of  difference and division as opposed to unity 
within the Warriors as a collective, gender power dynamics are also crucial to consider. George 
(2014) has observed that in promotional materials released in advance of  the blockade, the 
campaign consciously rejected images of  women as weak in the face of  climate change. This 
runs counter to many climate change narratives that present Islander women as the most 
vulnerable of  the vulnerable (Mansfield 2013). On the other hand, the use of  a ‘warrior’ and 
‘fighting’ framing has the potential to rely strongly on predominately masculine tropes in order 
to achieve its message. The potential masculine bias of  the warrior discourse was addressed by 
organisers. 
And yeah in most of the islands traditionally women are not 
considered warriors, so that was going against the grain a bit. But we 
felt we could do that because you know because it was Pan-Pacific, it 
was across the region. (Daniel, 350 Pacific) 
 
Indeed McNamara and Farbotko interpret the Warrior’s actions (based on an analysis of  their 
media interviews and web materials) as an example of  the ‘blurring of  gender identities’ (2017: 
17), as they imbue the masculine figure of  the warrior with feminine characteristics such as 
caring and ‘maternal nurturing’ (2017: 21), and secondly because of  the many non-gender-
specific roles that the Warriors played during the campaign, such as being ‘a non-violent direct 
                                                        
13 Although I did not witness any such belittlement during the campaign. 
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activist, probably also a dancer, an orator and a youth leader’ (2017: 22). However, the gendered 
demographics of  the roles the Warriors played in the campaign does necessitate further 
examination.  
It was apparent that the organisers were conscious about gender balance in terms of  which 
Warriors acted as media spokespeople and who was selected to carry on to speaker events and 
actions in other Australian cities after the Newcastle blockade (as well as who acted as daily co-
ordinators). Daniel explicitly acknowledged this dimension of  the group’s composition and 
media engagement: 
From the outset we made it a priority for...our goal was to get one 
female and one male from each island...And you know some of our 
strongest spokespeople were Leah and Mary, and yeah so, we were 
able to up the strength, uplift their voice...so then in that way women 
were a strong front of the campaign. (Daniel, 350 Pacific) 
 
Yet in terms of  absolute numbers, the campaign was male dominated, with nineteen men 
compared to only eleven women (although three of  those men could also be considered outside 
of  the conventional category of  ‘male’, as discussed in detail on the following page). And while 
the term ‘warrior’ may be challenging some gender norms, in practice the action did seem to 
reinforce the traditional gender roles found in many Pacific Island societies. Women largely did 
not have a role in building the canoes (in some cases, such as in FSM, they were forbidden from 
participating in the process). Nor were any women captains of  canoes and they largely stayed 
on shore during the protest (although admittedly a few went out in vessels and women did have 
a very strong presence on the beach). Moreover, because of  the role of  the captains on the day, 
it was largely men who were in charge. However, this gendered authority was strongly 
correlated with age. There were many more older male participants than older female ones, 
perhaps because many women of  an equivalent age did not participate due to child-care 
responsibilities. Indeed, the intended female Warrior from Vanuatu was unable to attend 
because she became pregnant, whereas there were at least two male warriors who had very 
young children who came to Australia. 
The performances of  the composite haka, discussed in section 1B, became another site for the 
reinforcement of  gender boundaries. While developing the haka, the male Warrior from the 
Solomon Islands had been unable to think of  a suitable segment to contribute. As such, his 
compatriot Priscilla stepped up, teaching everyone a series of  verses and dance moves. In earlier 
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rehearsals and performances (including as a goodbye to the Maules Creek blockade camp) 
Priscilla jumped up to lead this section, thereby participating in the officially male-only space. 
Despite her expertise in the dance, in more official performances (such as that on the beach 
before the launching of  the vessels), she was not able to take part, and instead Jeremiah was 
called upon to lead the Solomon Islands section, as a Solomon Islander, despite being no more 
familiar with the dance than the other participants. Thus, the dance created an opportunity for 
a slight challenge to the boundaries of  acceptably gendered behaviour, yet ultimately these 
boundaries were firmly reinstated. Moreover, during the time at Maules Creek both the male 
and female Warriors separately worked on dance performances, which were shared with the 
whole camp. However, only the men’s dance was incorporated into the flotilla itself, 
perpetuating a masculine interpretation of  the essence of  what it was to be a Warrior.  
In spite of  earlier comments regarding the subversion of  women’s traditional non-warrior 
status, a white organiser was keen to defend these ongoing gender disparities with recourse to 
culture.  
In the facilitating the group and holding the group, it did become 
quite male-dominated. But that is quite bound up in a lot of cultural 
stuff which I guess I still haven’t really quite understood […] And 
then at the same time, it was just like out on the water, it was...yeah 
paddling those canoes, I guess it did become clear that it was a place 
where the men had to lead. And I think people were ok with that[…] 
and at the same time the, you know, the sort of idea that women and 
men should be able to do exactly the same thing is not necessarily 
culturally appropriate. And that it’s not necessarily a bad thing for 
women and men to have different roles. (Daniel, 350 Pacific) 
 
The perpetuation of  power inequities was further justified with regard to the time constraints 
of  the campaign.  
I think if we were going to have more time together we would have 
just started getting into talking more about the gender roles and how 
the group communicates and appreciates different forms of 
leadership I think. (Daniel, 350 Pacific) 
 
The crucial point here is not that of  passing judgement on the merits of  the campaign based 
on the relative power and prominence of  men or on the permissibility of  male dominance itself. 
Rather it leads to two important reflections. Firstly, a recognition that through this campaign 
familiar debates re-emerged, namely the heavily debated tension between cultural relativism 
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and gender equality (Rimonte 1991; Abu-Lughod 2002; Kabeer et al. 2011), and an emphasis 
upon the urgency of  acting upon one facet of  social injustice, while postponing further forms 
of  liberation. And that these create a potential for a clash between some Western and Pacific 
activist cultures. While none of  the Warriors expressed criticism to me of  the gender dynamics 
of  the campaign, the cultural sanctioning of  gender inequalities did emerge as a concern during 
my fieldwork in Vanuatu. There some women climate advocates expressed frustration at the 
barriers they faced in installing solar energy, especially the lack of  support they received from 
the community as it was not viewed as women’s work, as well as anger regarding the potential 
complicity of  the kastom marriage process in sexual violence. Secondly this suggests that all are 
not equal in our sea of  islands: regionalism and pan-pacific solidarity in and of  itself  does not 
transform gender relations (although there are examples of  powerfully women-led Oceanic 
struggles (De Ishtar 1998)).  
Finally, such a binary account of  gender is undeniably incomplete. As Besnier and Alexeyeff, 
alongside many others, have highlighted ‘non-heteronormative persons are present in virtually 
all island societies of  Polynesia and perhaps Micronesia, and increasingly visible in Melanesia’ 
(2014: 11), and there has been extensive if  perhaps not fruitful academic debate regarding the 
relationship between these indigenous practices and identities and those of  Western categories 
of  ‘homosexual’ and ‘transgender’. Following Besnier and Alexeyeff, I will eschew the 
commonly used category of  ‘third gender’ as I concur with their argument that it presents ‘the 
illusion that transcending the strictures of  binary gender is just a matter of  adding one more 
category’ (2014: 13). Instead I follow their lead in employing the umbrella term of  ‘non-
heteronormative’ as well as using the specific labels found within particular island nations.  
Thus, the Warriors also included three pinapenaaine or fakaleiti participants (labels deriving from 
Tuvalu and Tonga respectively), two of  whom were very prominent and were able to use their 
gender fluidity and multiplicity of  gender presentations to great advantage. One participant 
showed himself14 to be fully capable of  traditional masculine tasks, such as lifting, assembling 
and steering canoes, but also could opt out of  the demands of  masculinity, at points 
participating in the haka and at times explicitly self-excluding, and choosing to join the women’s 
dance rehearsals instead. He also had the ability to navigate between the men and women in 
the group with more ease and was welcome to enter the women’s spaces, such as hostel rooms, 
                                                        
14 While it is not uncommon for Pacific Islanders within these categories of indigenously defined non-
heteronormativity (all of whom are assigned male at birth) to use the pronoun ‘she’ (see for example Kuwahara 
2014), ‘he’ was the preferred pronoun of all those on the tour. 
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crucial for delivering the morning wake-up calls. One of  the Warriors who had not previously 
travelled outside her nation talked of  her parents’ reticence at her participating, especially when 
she mentioned she would be accompanied by a man also from her country. When it was 
revealed that the man was pinapenaaine the parents were hugely relieved, declaring that she 
wasn’t going with a boy after all and giving their full blessing. Consequently, the non-
heteronormative performances of  these Warriors were beneficial for the campaign.  
These non-heteronormative Warriors also brought a playful and flirtatious aspect to the 
campaign. While there was a strong emphasis on the platonic and sibling-like relations between 
the warriors, Abel, in his liminally gendered position, had the licence to make outlandish and 
licentious jokes, such as claiming that 350 got its name from the number of  people he had had 
sex with. These Warriors’ intermediary status was acknowledged by the group. Forced to 
evacuate flooding tents during a rain storm, the entire group sheltered in a giant barn at the 
Maules Creek blockade. One Warrior authoritatively designated one side as the women’s 
sleeping area, the other as the men’s (in order to preclude any sexual impropriety). One 
liminally gendered Warrior jokingly demanded ‘What about the halves?’, receiving the reply 
‘Halves in the middle!’. Their contributions were acknowledged by one of  the organisers who 
described how ‘they almost play like an intermediary kind of  role, which makes things really 
interesting and awesome and entertaining’, although it was not formally incorporated into the 
binary gendered division of  media spokespeople and Warrior co-ordinators.  
Returning to Abel’s previously expressed anxieties about his ‘strange’ behaviour and its impact 
upon his ability to represent Tuvalu, these performances of  gender fluidity were clearly in fact 
an asset for the campaign. Thus, being situated as he was, at this liminal point or ‘on the edge’ 
between binary constructions of  gender, can be seen as ‘both a position of  power and one of  
marginality’ (Besnier and Alexeyeff  2014: 1). Moving through this Sea of  Islands at a finer, 
interpersonal scale, these alternative expressions of  gender and sexuality were also a crucible 
for cross-cultural and intra-group interconnection and unity.  
Consequently, while the organisers did try to formally institute gender equality in terms of  the 
representation of  women as Warrior co-ordinators and media spokespeople, in many ways the 
campaign reinforced traditional gender norms and disparities between the sexes, particularly 
in terms of  the use of  canoes and performance of  dances. This disparity highlighted a wider 
tension between gender equality and culturally sanctioned behaviours, although the case of  the 
pinapenaaine and other non-heteronormatively gendered Warriors demonstrated a means of  
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challenging gender binaries within a culturally accepted form. Yet altogether this suggests that 
the relations of  alliance and connection forged between the Warriors did not eliminate 
gendered power differences. However, in the final section I explore the ways in which inequality 
and difference, as opposed to homogeneity, were key features of  the Warriors’ expression of  
Oceanic regionalism, and of  Hau’ofa’s Sea of  Islands vision, maintaining its potential as a basis 
for a counter-discourse.  
3C. Fortunate highlands and pitied atolls 
 
There were some clear inequities within the campaign in terms of  gender relations and the 
representation of  different island groupings. However, I contend that rather than a 
homogenising model of  Pan-Pacific unity, the form of  regionalism being produced and 
performed through the flotilla was one that acknowledged inequality and difference. Crucially 
this difference centred around perceptions of  relative altitudinal privilege. A common motif  
running through the interviews was the relative good fortune of  the volcanic island nations, 
compared with sorrow and sympathy for the low-lying atoll dwellers. For instance, Rachael 
contrasted the suffering she had personally experienced through extreme weather events with 
the greater suffering of  the atolls. 
Niue was hit by the cyclone, Cyclone Heta in 2004 and the impacts 
of that, we...we’re still living with it. And it’s not a good feeling, and 
being there at that time, being afraid and everything and waking 
up...and waking up and you walk out of your house and all you can 
see is rubbish, rock, coconut trees, you know bricks brought up to the 
driveway and all of this, this stuff. And it’s like how lucky I am to 
survive but then I was thinking about the other islands like Tuvalu 
who... since we’re a highland we have cliffs and all that. We’re lucky 
to have that, as for Tuvalu they’re actually like slowly sinking. 
(Rachael, 350 Niue) 
 
Thus, many Warriors, through engaging with these discourses of  relative altitudinal privilege, 
mitigated their own sense of  exposure to climate change impacts. In Priscilla’s account this goes 
to the extreme of  almost denying the Solomon Islands their status as a nation on the front line 
of  climate change.  
Actually, our government, they didn’t take strong action towards this 
because Solomon Islands are different from other Pacific countries. 
We have higher land. We have higher mountains. Our lands are just 
fine. We just have the sea level rise that are affecting our small 
villages in the provinces, but not seriously. We are definitely 
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completely ok but some of the climate changes that affect us which is 
such as the tsunami and all that, flooding and all that.  
(Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands) 
 
Similarly, one Warrior spoke of  his shame that Fiji was one of  the bigger islands and therefore 
less affected. This discourse was not just present within the interviews I conducted, but also 
found a wider audience. In a piece for a Brisbane radio station, one of  the Warriors reiterates 
these sentiments:  
In Papua New Guinea, because we have a big mainland, we are not 
as badly affected as the rest of the Pacific Islands. (Bowman 2014) 
 
One Warrior went as far as to consciously visualise himself  as an atoll dweller in order to 
engender a unity of  feeling with his fellow Warriors and motivate himself  to action.  
And I think I pretty much felt that spirit, that feeling that we all feel 
even though we might not, we might not be the same in relation to 
our island vulnerability and my island compared to their island they 
are much more rich than my island. My island we have mountains, 
we have high elevations but compared to the Marshallese and some 
of the Solomon Islands they all have flat, flat islands. So, I tried to put 
myself into their positions; if my island is their island or if their island 
is my island. I tried to put myself in their position, so we can both 
have the same mentality going through what we are here for. So, and 
I think up until yesterday, when we sailed out our canoes, I really felt 
how they felt about coming here: what they were pushing, what they 
are here for and their main purpose for coming here. I really felt what 
they feel. (Joseph, 350 FSM) 
 
Joseph’s words complicate the notion that all the Warriors are equally positioned as imminently 
and personally threatened by the impacts of  climate change. Through this downplaying of  lived 
experience in favour of  imagining oneself  in another’s less fortunate position, it subverts the 
campaign’s own claims to authenticity, grounded as they are in the presentation of  the Warriors 
as bona fide climate victims. It contrasts with the claims for example of  Jonah in the ‘Canoes vs. 
Coal’ video (Yacono 2014) that ‘Climate change is real, and we are here to put the message 
across that we live the realities of  climate change’. It also opens up questions of  how processes 
of  representation occur: whether the Warriors, as national representatives, were standing in for 
all those other Islanders affected by climate change, as symbols and delegates, or whether they 
as individuals embodied direct experiences of  threat and suffering?  
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Joseph’s statement also indicates that this hierarchy of  peril and suffering is far from objective. 
He explicitly designates one country (the Solomon Islands) as being worthy of  empathy, yet 
Priscilla from the Solomon Islands, as quoted above, explicitly disavows her nation’s position of  
need. This also resonates with Nunn et al.’s (2016: 477) identification of  ‘spatial optimism bias’ 
among USP students, as they observed that students tended to present unfamiliar locations as 
facing far greater environmental risks than their own familiar locations.  
This acknowledgement of  relative privilege also potentially plays a role in the complication and 
minimisation of  discourses of  blame, as explored in Chapter Six, as there is an implied 
spectrum of  responsibility and adversity, whilst simple binaries between the category of  climate 
victim and the category of  carbon perpetrator are eschewed.  
The narrative of  imminently sinking islands was presented in relation to the fate of  the atoll 
states, accompanied by a sense of  great pity, as can be seen again in ABC Brisbane radio 
interview: 
Well some of the islands like Kiribati, Tuvalu and Tokelau have been 
given a couple of years. Before you know their islands are covered by 
water. And for these people they have nowhere else to go… This is 
urgent for us. We need to find a way to keep their island above water, 
we need to find a way to make sure they have a place to call home, 
and their children and their children’s children also have a place to 
call home. (Bowman 2014) 
 
In drawing on these images, the Warriors engaged empathetically with narratives of  
submersion and loss, but with a specificity that rejected the reduction of  all of  the Pacific Islands 
to an anonymous inundated atoll. This approach complicates both the narrative of  inevitable 
inundation, and the ‘we are not drowning but fighting’ counter-narrative: it suggests ‘we are not 
drowning, they are’. In doing so, the authenticity of  the actions of  the majority of  the Warriors 
are again complicated, as they position themselves as acting for others rather than their own 
nations or themselves. 
These comparisons of  size flowed both ways along the scale. Warriors not only positioned 
themselves in relation to the flatter and less fortunate, but in respect to Australia as a giant of  
the region.  
A lot of our islands are sinking. I mean Australia is very fortunate to 
be such a big, big island. A really big island. Most of us our islands 
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are small enough that even a tsunami can come from one side and go 
to the other. It can cover the whole island. Australia need to 
understand that even though they think they are the mother of all 
Pacific Island countries they still have a responsibility to look after the 
small islands. So, I feel that. (Maria, 350 Fiji) 
 
Thus, emphasising Australia’s islandness gave it greater responsibility to its neighbours, and 
highlighted its complicity in rising emissions. Through this understanding Australia is brought 
into a Pacific Island context, engulfed within Oceania, reminiscent of  the movements of  world 
enlargement. And it challenges Australia’s tendency to position itself  ‘ambiguously as both 
inside and outside the region’ (Jolly 2007: 529). It also returns us to Joseph’s claim that 
Australia’s ‘bigger land’ is matched by Oceania’s ‘bigger hearts’, again reiterating the world 
enlargement of  Oceania. This understanding of  Australia also potentially essentialises it as a 
nation, in terms of  its values and capacity to act. While this can be seen as a rebuttal to 
Australian discursive essentialisations of  the Pacific (Fry 1997), a more complex understanding 
of  Australia will be explored in the following chapter.  
Consequently, while there are inequities and disparities within this expression of  Oceanic 
interconnection, both in terms of  regional under-representation and gendered power 
dynamics, this manifestation of  regional unity was itself  predicated upon forms of  disparity, in 
terms of  perceived vulnerability to climate impacts. While outwardly presenting themselves as 
on the front lines of  climate change, internally the Warriors, particularly from volcanic islands, 
were keen to emphasise their own relative altitudinal privilege with respect to those from atoll 
states. This act serves to further refute any labels of  victimhood, reinforces their campaign 
mantra that they are ‘not drowning’, and akin to Hau’ofa’s vision of  Pacific unity, emphasises 
island distinction rather than homogeneity. Moreover, it suggests that despite some limitations 
to Hau’ofa’s work and the Warriors’ actions, in combination they still provide a basis for a 
counter-discourse that contests the inevitable inundation hypothesis and thereby provides an 
alternative telling of  the Anthropocene.  
4. Their Sea of Islands? 
 
 
In this chapter, I have directly addressed both my overall research aim and one of  my main 
research questions. Following the exhortations of  Hulme (2009), Tsing et al. (2017), Haraway 
(2016a) and Buck (2015) for new narrative framings of  climate change and the Anthropocene, 
and the call for the critiques of  the disempowering representation of  Pacific Islanders in the 
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inevitable inundation discourse (Farbotko 2005; Barnett and Campbell 2010; Bettini 2013a), 
my research aims to investigate counter-discourses and alternative framings of  the Pacific 
Islands and climate change. Given the prominence and influence of  Epeli Hau’ofa as a radical 
Oceanic scholar, educator and artist, through my research I have attempted to answer the 
question of  whether the Pacific Climate Warriors’ actions can be understood as a form of  
Oceanic regionalism as envisioned by Hau’ofa in his Sea of  Islands. This regionalism is 
pertinent to the need for new narratives, as it can be understood as a foundation of  a counter-
discourse that contests the representation of  the Pacific as weak, marginal and helpless, a 
belittlement of  the Pacific that predates global concern regarding climate change but which is 
exacerbated through the inevitable inundation discourse.  
 To this end, I argue that climate change activism has created an opportunity for the physical 
embodiment of  Oceanic alliance, connection and expression of  regional identity that Hau’ofa 
theoretically envisions. This can be witnessed in the familial bonds and sibling-like attachments 
formed by the Warriors, and by their playful expressions of  Pan-Pacific identities using song, 
dance, flags and custom dress. This vision of  a newly conceived family, united in purpose, acting 
collectively with mutual care and affection, but made of  figures that represent all corners of  
Oceania, can be seen as a manifestation par excellence of  the vision of  Pacific unity Hau’ofa 
articulates. However, as well as relating as family, in some cases the Warriors’ commitment to 
activism also produced some issues with existing kin, and highlights the tensions surrounding 
familial obligations in this example of  Pacific Island activism: tensions that will be explored 
further in the following chapter.  
Secondly, I contend that climate change activism (and by extension climate change itself) creates 
an opportunity to not just reinforce existing power relations between the Pacific Islands and the 
rest of  the world (as the inevitable inundation narrative does), but to subvert and even invert 
them. This is evident in the processes of  world enlargement I have documented, borrowing the 
term from Hau’ofa’s work, but enlarging it to encompass the many ways in which the Warriors 
extended the potency and significance of  Oceania by making Oceanic concerns also Australian 
concerns and even global concerns. The processes of  Oceanic alliance and world enlargement 
are deeply intertwined: the first forms a basis for regional unity and strength, which is 
demonstrated by the latter, and together they demonstrate the manner by which the Warriors 
contest the drowning islands discourse, and instead proffer an account of  Pacific Islander power 
and agency.  
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I acknowledge limitations both to Hau’ofa’s argument and the Warriors’ practices, arguing that 
perhaps the Warriors’ campaign is indeed very true to the Sea of  Islands vision in its shared 
Polynesian bias, and worrying that despite efforts to ensure equality, to some extent the action 
did seem to reinforce rather than subvert traditional gender roles. However, I contend that 
rather than a homogenising model of  Pan-Pacific unity, the form of  regionalism being 
produced and performed through the flotilla was one that acknowledged inequality and 
difference. Crucially this difference centred around perceptions of  relative altitudinal privilege. 
Expressions of  this privilege complicate both the narrative of  inevitable inundation, and the 
‘we are not drowning but fighting’ counter-narrative: it suggests ‘we are not drowning, they are’. 
In doing so, the authenticity of  the actions of  the majority of  the Warriors are again 
complicated, as they position themselves as acting for others rather than their own nations or 
themselves, thereby highlighting issues of  representation that reoccur throughout my analysis. 
This indicates that the Warriors’ actions can be illuminated through Hau’ofa’s vision of  
Oceanic regionalism, and that there is still potential for understanding the Sea of  Islands as a 
counter-discourse to the inevitable inundation narrative, and one whose many key tenets are 
being embodied and practiced by Pacific Islanders on the ground. 
While I have examined some of  the dynamics within the group – their points of  interconnection 
as well as difference – and some of  the displays of  Pacific Island culture, such as dance, song 
and the use of  custom dress, which formed a significant and distinctive component of  the 
campaign, the direct action taken by the Warriors still remains to be discussed, and will 
consequently be the focus of  the following chapter. In doing so, Hau’ofa’s work will not be left 
behind. Indeed, the very format of  the blockade itself  also resonates with Hau’ofa’s vision. The 
Warriors’ fleet of  vessels - kayaks, canoes, surfboards and dingies - were individually small and 
precarious, compared with the bulk and power of  the coal barges. Yet the enormous coal 
barges, encircled and protected by the might of  the Australian police force, were turned back 
by the collective presence of  hundreds of  tiny, flimsy kayaks acting together, united by the 
waters. In that moment (captured in Figure 10) it is no longer the besieged Islanders who 
Canute-like attempt to hold back the waves crashing into their homes, but Australia that is 
attempting to confront and restrain the forces of  Oceania. Acting collectively, using the power 
of  the ocean, the Warriors’ blockade can itself  be seen as a visceral manifestation of  the Sea of  
Islands.  
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Figure 10 - The Warriors and their supporters form a sea of islands around the coal barge. 
5. Becoming Warriors: affect and the production of activist 
subjectivity 
 
Considering the actions of  the Pacific Climate Warriors through the lens of  Hau’ofa’s Sea of  
Islands vision enabled me to re-evaluate the power of  Oceania as a region vis-a-vis climate 
change, thereby demonstrating a potential counter-narrative that challenges the inevitable 
inundation discourse. In this chapter I continue with my focus upon the Pacific Climate 
Warriors, but concentrate less on a regional and more on an individual level, in order to rethink 
the capacity and attitudes of  those within the region confronting climate change. I examine the 
actions of  the Pacific Climate Warriors as political subjects, as opposed to helpless victims, in 
order to uncover further challenges to the drowning island discourse.  
In this chapter I make three key contributions. Firstly, I explore the production of  politics in 
action, and argue that affect plays a crucial role in the generation of  political subjectivities, 
empirically demonstrating this through a focus on three main emotions (sorrow, fear and anger). 
Secondly, through my analysis of  the process of  becoming Warriors, I contend that the political 
subjectivities produced are specifically Pacific in terms of  the relations to the state and to kin 
that emerge through activism, building upon the aspects of  Pacific identity explored in the 
previous chapter. This contributes to a growing concern regarding the decolonisation of  the 
climate justice movement (Virasami and Wanjiku Kelbert 2015) and the importance of  
indigenous-led struggles. Thirdly, I attempt to synthesise an understanding of  the political 
derived from the post-politics literature with research into the place of  affect in protest from the 
geography of  social movements literature, as well as Jane Bennett’s (2001) notion of  
enchantment: sensual and affectual encounters that lead to a transformation of  self  and 
consequent ethical action. I bring these three theoretical perspectives together to understand 
the production of  political subjectivities – becoming Warriors – through transformative 
emotional encounters. I recognise these expressions of  political agency as contestations of  the 
horror stories of  the Anthropocene, as identified by Buck (2015). Looking back to Hulme’s 
(2009) argument regarding what climate change can do for us, I also demonstrate that climate 
change presents an opportunity for the production of  political subjectivities. 
1. Chapter outline  
 
I begin by establishing my rationale for focusing on the production of  political subjectivities, 
arguing that there is a need for further research that considers those facing the prospect of  
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climate-induced migration as political subjects (Section 2). I outline the potential for a post-
political analysis of  the Pacific Climate Warriors’ actions, highlighting the importance of  
considering antagonistic feelings and practices. I place the post-politics literature in dialogue 
with Bennett’s concept of  enchantment, and with ideas emerging from the geographies of  
social movements, in order to better understand the production of  political subjectivities 
through transformative emotional encounters (Section 3).  
Turning to my empirical material, I explore the Warriors’ lack of  familiarity with protest prior 
to the campaign, to establish the basis upon which these activist selves were created (Section 4). 
I then consider in detail the training and self-discipline that was in entailed in the process of  
‘becoming Warriors’ (Section 5). Next, I centre my analysis on the role of  affect and collective 
emotional experience as transformational and critical to the formation of  subjectivity. While 
narrating the Warriors’ story chronologically, I also structure my account around three key 
emotions. The first - sorrow - in response to the witnessing of  coal mining at Maules Creek 
(Section 6), is followed by the collective sensations of  fear experienced in anticipation of  the 
flotilla (Section 7). This is succeeded by an account of  feelings of  defiance and rage during the 
flotilla itself, in relation to the actions of  the police (Section 8). I end by reflecting on how these 
transformational affective experiences have had an enduring impact upon the Warriors’ ethical 
actions (Section 9).  
Throughout my analysis, I raise the question of  what the distinguishing features of  Pacific 
Islander-led climate protest are, taking into account distinctive Pacific subjectivities. In 
particular, I raise the question of  who the Pacific Climate Warriors are in antagonism with. I 
contend there is a shift from focusing on the fossil fuel companies to the Australian state itself, 
as manifested in the form of  the Australian police. The Warriors express a sense of  blame and 
anger towards Australia which stands in contrast to the re-educational and goodwill-based 
stance towards the country explored in the previous chapter. I recognise the power of  the police 
as generative and productive - rather than merely repressive - in forging these political 
subjectivities. These antagonistic encounters lead to expressions of  what I frame as 
transformational excess: Warriors transgressing the limits to disobedience set by the organisers, 
reflecting a potent tension over who defines the parameters of  a distinctly Pacific mode of  
protest. This transformational excess again resonates with Bennett’s idea of  enchantment as 
through shocking affectual encounters with others – in this case the police – the Warriors’ sense 
of  capacity is transformed, galvanising them to further action in line with their ethical 
framework. Thus, the focus upon political subjectivities adds a new dimension to the 
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presentation of  the Warriors’ campaign presented hitherto, particularly in terms of  
problematising and complicating relations to the Australian state. 
2. Focusing on the political 
 
‘We are not drowning, we are fighting’. Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) pinpoint this key slogan 
of  350 Pacific’s as illustrative of  a new and emerging framing of  climate migration discourse, 
one that counters the inevitable inundation discourse (what they designate as a ‘victim’ framing) 
through its focus upon (potential) climate migrants as ‘political subjects’ (2015: 111). In this 
chapter I wish to move from mere catchy illustration to substantive analysis, providing a detailed 
examination of  the Warriors’ actions as political subjects, and in doing so contributing to this 
currently underpopulated field of  climate migration discourse.  
Ransan-Cooper et al. outline four major discursive framings of  potential climate migrants: as 
victims, security threats, adaptive agents and political subjects. They identify the as yet nascent 
and underdeveloped nature of  the final framing (political subjects) and situate my work (Fair 
2015b) within it as one of  its few existing contributions. While they critique the first three 
framings for relying upon a Global North/ Global South ‘‘us versus them’ dichotomy’ (2015: 
113) and producing policies of  ‘limited relevance’ (ibid) to affected communities, through 
notable omission, the political subjects framing is favourably excluded from these critiques. 
These factors, plus the article’s recognition of  this frame’s relevance to 350 Pacific’s actions 
(similar to George’s (2014) suggestion that 350 Pacific exhibit a politics of  resistance) suggest 
both space and need for a greater exploration of  political subjectivity. 
Returning to Webber (2013), the pertinence of  the political in relation to challenging the 
drowning islands discourse is clear. For Webber, a key consequence of  the performance of  
vulnerability by the I-Kiribati government is the ‘foreclosing [of] alternative and empowering 
political identities’ (2013: 2720). Thus, an inversion of  these disempowering discourses – a focus 
upon the ‘fighting’ rather than the ‘drowning’ - involves a deeper investigation into what these 
alternative political identities look like and how they are produced.  
Finally, a focus upon the political speaks to a malady that is seemingly afflicting both this corner 
of  academia and society at large. Andrew Baldwin contends that critical analysis of  power and 
politics in relation to climate change and migration are being neglected in the face of  demand 
for ‘‘urgent’ policy solutions’ (2015: 2019), a stance that Gemenne (2015) echoes in his fear that 
policies have overcome politics and that, in doing so, understandings of  migration have been 
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damagingly depoliticised. This spectre of  depoliticisation also resonates with theories of  post-
politics. Bettini (2013a), who echoes the concern about the denial of  political subjectivities in 
the context of  climate migration, recognises the drowning islands discourse as symptomatic of  
what Swyngedouw (2010) identifies as the ‘post-political condition’.  
Wilson and Swyngedouw (2014) argue that in an age that ideologically positions itself  at ‘the 
end of  history’ (Fukuyama 1992) with market-orientated liberal capitalist democracy as the 
seemingly unrivalled post-Cold War winner, and in an era that integrates the functions of  
governance with the institutions of  capital, politics has been usurped by policy and problem-
solving. Truly political debates, decisions and disagreements have been displaced by 
technocratic managerialism (Swyngedouw 2010). There is space only for a bureaucratic 
consensus, not for dissenting politics. This is enabled through the use of  a narrative of  
apocalypse and emergency, which is mobilised in order to short-circuit debate and close off  
discussion of  political options and alternatives. Thus, these theories of  the post-political give 
further impetus for a focus upon political subjectivities, in distinction to the dominant 
depoliticised paradigm. In this context, ‘drowning’ can be understood not as a unique affliction 
of  Oceania, but as part of  the apocalyptic and depoliticising condition characterising 
environmental politics. 
3. Post-politics, enchantment and the role of affect in social movements 
 
To explore the production and expression of  political subjectivities by the Pacific Climate 
Warriors, I am hinging my conception of  ‘the political’ on that proffered by the post-politics 
literature, as articulated by Swyngedouw (2010) and influenced by Mouffe (2005), Zizek (1999) 
and Ranciere (2001). I am intrigued by the notion that retelling the Anthropocene can be a 
means for challenging and transcending post-political stasis. With the aim of  translating 
Swyngedouw’s ideas empirically I identify three key aspects of  this challenge to post-politics: a 
refusal of  the apocalyptic; a rejection of  the populist conception of  the human as a general, 
universal subject of  climate change; and an emphasis upon antagonism, dissensus and 
confrontation (as opposed to bureaucratic consensus).  
Beginning with the first two dimensions, the actions of  the Pacific Climate Warriors suggest a 
resistance to the post-political. The anti-apocalyptic thrust of  the campaign is evident in the 
group mantra. The ‘drowning’ they are refusing is the eschatological future they are being 
offered in many mainstream media and policy narratives. While reiterating the crucial 
importance of  acting on climate change, they repudiate the familiar doomsday discourse, 
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offering a vision of  strength and possibility - ‘fighting’ - in its stead. Meanwhile the Warriors’ 
campaign straddles a connection to the universal and the particular: they situate themselves as 
being on the climate change front lines, especially affected, and able to respond in unique and 
particular ways through recourse to their island cultures, thereby articulating a Pacific 
specificity that shapes their resistance. At the same time, the universal impact of  the Warriors’ 
actions is highlighted, as discussed in relation to world enlargement in the preceding chapter, 
as they make explicit that they are acting not just for themselves or the Pacific, but for the world.  
It is the third aspect that I will analyse more extensively: the extent to which a politics of  
antagonism, confrontation, difference and dissensus is being articulated by Pacific Islanders 
engaged in climate activism. In particular, I will explore the relations and tensions between 
antagonism and the articulation of  a specifically Pacific mode of  protest. Consequently, this 
research can be situated within the recent turn from critiquing depoliticisation to documenting 
the return of  the political, as explored in the light of  the Arab Spring and the Occupy 
movement (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014). Yet in this turn, environmental politics, the core 
concern of  ‘Apocalypse Forever’ (Swyngedouw 2010), appears to have been lost, and the sites 
for the return of  the political appear to be fundamentally urban (Dikeç and Swyngedouw 2017). 
Thus, through the Pacific Climate Warriors, we can expand our notion of  the post-post-
political, demonstrating a re-injection of  the political into climate politics, and recognising 
spaces of  the rural as sites of  resistance, suggesting a relevance beyond the literatures of  climate 
migration and the Pacific Islands.  
Further conceptual tools are also required to explore the Warriors’ processes of  activist self-
creation. To investigate the place of  emotion and affect in their transformational experiences, 
I draw upon Bennett’s concept of  enchantment, and place it in dialogue with the affect and 
geography of  social movements literature, as well as the aforementioned post-politics literature.  
Enchantment, as envisioned by Bennett, is premised upon ‘a reawakened sense of  wonder’ 
(Buck 2015: 369), which is accessed through affective sensory experience – allowing one to be 
struck with wonder in everyday life – and a rejection of  cynical alienation and fatalism. Bennett 
identifies moments of  ‘crossing’ or sensuous (as opposed to purely rational) encounters with 
objects or other beings as generative of  enchantment, and consequently transformation 
through wonder, enabling ethical life. The concept of  enchantment is pertinent to my overall 
research enquiry into counter narratives of  the Anthropocene, as a focus on enchantment 
provides an ‘alter-tale’ (Bennett 2001: 8), one that has been used to challenge the rationalist 
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horror stories of  the Anthropocene (Buck 2015).  
The relationship enchantment identifies between affective encounter, transformation of  the self  
and ethical action dovetails with current research by geographers into the role of  affect and 
emotion in social movements. I am drawing upon three key dimensions of  this research: firstly, 
the recognition that the transformation of  the self  is a deliberate and necessary dimension of  
activism. Razsa recognises activism as a means by which individuals are ‘producing themselves 
as political subjects’ (2015: 101-102), as they are ‘engaged in efforts, sometimes more 
consciously, sometimes less, to remake themselves through direct action’ (2015: 138). Secondly, 
that activism involves numerous affectively charged encounters, that can be ‘emotionally 
exhilarating’ (Razsa 2015: 132). As Feigenbaum et al. (2013: 32) explain it, ‘actions... are often 
spaces of  intensity, where bodies enter vulnerable states that both produce and respond to 
affective sensations in the moment’.  
Thirdly, that these affectively charged encounters are fundamental to the transformation of  
subjectivity that plays such a crucial role in activism. Feigenbaum et al. have identified the 
presence of  ‘transformational affect’ (2013: 23) in protest encounters, and they argue that 
greater research is needed into these affective experiences, as ‘affect plays a transformative role 
in shaping political identities’ (2013: 34). According to Clough, emotion is not merely a by-
product of  direct action, but one of  the major reasons for engaging in it, as he argues that ‘we 
can understand anarchist direct action, at least in part, as a technique for activists to work on 
their own emotional states and connections with the hoped for effect of  increasing their power 
to act as a radical collective’ (2012: 1674). Clough also emphasises how the construction of  
‘new structures of  feeling and emotional bonds’ (1670) is crucial to movement growth, which 
resonates with the formation of  familial bonds discussed in the previous chapter.  
Jasper (1998) highlights the importance of  ‘moral shocks’ that illuminate the discrepancy 
between one’s values and events in the world, and can thereby viscerally move one to outrage 
and then action. He identifies the cultivation of  moral shocks by activists and the importance 
of  directing blame in order to bring others to their cause. However, Jasper does not see climate 
change as an issue that activists would be able to emotively mobilise in this way, suggesting 
instead that with ‘diffuse environmental threats…fear and resignation are more likely than 
outrage’ (1998: 411), a conclusion I will challenge empirically.  
The terms ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ are sometimes synonymous and sometimes strongly 
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differentiated within the literature. I follow Feigenbaum et al. (2013: 23), in exploring ‘affect in 
encounters and interactions that move, stir or arouse something in us and produce a change’, 
a gloss that resonates with Bennett’s vision of  enchantment. Meanwhile, following Clough 
(2012: 1669) I define emotion as ‘consciously experienced feelings such as love, hate, fear, 
exhilaration’. In this chapter, I am exploring both: the sensual moments of  encounter (affect), 
and their expression through three main emotions (sorrow, fear and anger).  
This concern with affect and climate activism also speaks to the question Latour (2011) poses 
in terms of  the fundamental disconnect that underlies the Anthropocene. He argues that part 
of  our impotence in the face of  climate change is the incongruity between the scale of  the 
problem and the proportionality of  our feelings in response to it. Consequently, perhaps one 
way to regain power is to allow ourselves to embrace this enormity of  feeling, to open ourselves 
to the sorrow and fear of  destruction as well as the joy and vitality of  life.  
In this chapter my major theoretical contribution is bringing together a concept of  the political 
from the post-politics literature, with an understanding of  transformation through emotion 
taken both from Jane Bennet’s concept of  enchantment, and existing geographical 
examinations of  the relationships between affect and protest movements. Bringing these three 
distinct bodies of  literature together through a detailed empirical case study, I elucidate further 
what the process of  activist becoming looks like in a specifically Pacific context, and contribute 
to the under-researched area of  climate migration literature that centres those threatened by 
climate-induced migration as political subjects. Thus, I will be exploring the production of  
transgressive, antagonistic and dissenting selves, as well as the enacting of  confrontational 
practices.  
4. Once were not warriors: the unfamiliarity of protest 
 
Turning to the empirical material, I begin by exploring the Warriors’ lack of  familiarity with 
protest prior to the campaign, to establish the basis upon which these activist selves were 
created. While a few of  the Warriors had significant backgrounds in advocacy or peace and 
conflict resolution, for many participants, the Stand Up for the Pacific tour (which climaxed in 
a flotilla of  canoes and kayaks blockading Newcastle Harbour for a day) was their first 
experience of  activism or direct action protest. Reuben’s experience in that sense was typical: 
This is the first time we’ve ever been involved in non-violent direct 
action. Or indeed ever of any protest or demonstration before. 
(Reuben, 350 Tokelau) 
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Moreover, prior to the flotilla many of  the Warriors seemed to lack a sense of  activist genealogy: 
a knowledge of  how to situate themselves within a history of  struggles for social change, 
particularly within the Pacific. For instance, during one of  the Warriors’ training sessions, held 
in Newcastle prior to the flotilla, the Warriors were asked to think of  examples of  non-violent 
direct action in the Pacific. The answers varied widely from anti-government riots in Tonga, 
ethnic tensions in the Solomon Islands, to adaptation strategies being implemented in Kiribati, 
but no mentions were made of  the Nuclear Free Independent Pacific movement as a 
comparable struggle. While the facilitators clarified that they were looking for stories of  change 
and people taking back power, many of  the Warriors seemed to struggle with ‘direct action’ as 
a category. Some of  the stories instead emphasised respect for elders, having faith, and discussed 
recent political events in terms of  government corruption or coups. Consequently, the answers 
given instead foregrounded significant features of  a culturally-sanctioned Pacific handling of  
difficult events, highlighting, for instance, the place of  religion and chiefly authority. Moreover, 
when I spoke at length with one Warrior, Moses, who did have more significant experience of  
activism, having been involved with 350’s regional activities since 2012, he recognised the role 
researching previous activist struggles played in the development of  his own understanding. Yet 
none of  his examples had been Pacific-based.  
This is significant, for as Razsa (2015) and Clough (2012) both argue, the story-telling of  
previous activist movements or the viewing of  documentaries of  previous protest successes or 
failures, play a critical role in the development of  activist subjectivities, as seen in their case 
studies of  anarchist groups in former Yugoslavia and the United States respectively. This 
suggests that the development of  activist subjectivities was a nascent process for the Warriors, 
and that the Warriors would not necessarily be bringing the same expectations to the campaign 
compared with those already rooted in a protest culture, expectations for example concerning 
the actions of  the police.  
The Warriors did not engage at all in certain elements of  lifestyle politics associated with 
Western activist culture, suggesting the distinctiveness of  a Pacific mode of  activism. For 
instance, in contrast to the predominance of  vegan spaces in British environmental activism, 
there were repeated reflections upon the alienness and absurdity of  vegetarianism, and I 
witnessed no critical engagement around the sustainability of  flying, with one Warrior aspiring 
to becoming a pilot, and due to soon begin employment as an air traffic controller. I became 
uncomfortable at points in mentioning that some of  the environmental activism I had 
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previously been involved in had also targeted airports, as flying appeared universally accepted 
as a necessity for maintaining connections to widely distributed family members. Very few of  
the Warriors had camped before, and some expressed distaste for this activity which seems to 
form the bedrock of  many Western protest movements (Feigenbaum et al. 2013).  
But perhaps the unfamiliarity of  protest for the Warriors also speaks to the novelty of  direct 
action protest itself  in a Pacific context. For instance, in Rudiak-Gould’s (2013) monograph of  
understandings of  and responses to climate change in the Marshall Islands, he argues that 
protest or civil disobedience are highly unlikely responses within that context, although he 
recognises one group as a potential outlier, Jo-Jikum. And it was indeed a member of  this group 
that represented the Marshall Islands and participated in the canoe action as a prominent 
media spokesperson.  
Rather than relegating the actions of  the Pacific Climate Warriors and Jo-Jikum to that of  a 
mere aberration, instead the flotilla and following series of  actions suggests that civil 
disobedience is a viable tactic in a Pacific Island context, despite the tendencies towards non-
confrontation or in-group blame identified by Rudiak-Gould. Perhaps the more pertinent 
question is not whether certain tactics are employed, but when and under what conditions. The 
newness of  the type of  action undertaken was also acknowledged by the campaign organisers 
as well. In a Huffington Post article released shortly after the flotilla one of  the core organisers 
claimed that ‘never before has the Pacific engaged in such a bold and unified act of  nonviolent 
direct action, but they showed they are leaders in it’ (Packard 2014). 
However, during the campaign there were tensions between the training and management of  
the protest by the organisers, and the Warriors’ emphasis upon their existing expertise, 
especially in relation to the canoes. As one Warrior put it, ‘we are adults, we have the 
knowledge’. During activities such as the creation of  the Warrior Treaty (discussed in the 
following section), one Warrior pointed out that many of  the values enshrined by it, such as 
respect, equality and bravery were already part of  Pacific culture. This highlighted one of  the 
points of  connection between Pacific and Western activist cultures, but also the potential for 
frustration as the Warriors were presented with things they already knew, via the mechanism 
of  Western activist discourse. Jonah articulated this most clearly: 
In terms of what we did yesterday [the flotilla] like we had to do 
trainings and all this but to be honest with you, you put an Islander in 
the face of combat, without any training, his instinct, that warrior 
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spirit just comes out naturally. I mean you don’t need to nurture a 
Pacific Climate Warrior. We, in the island, we know who we are, you 
know. And we get threatened if someone wants to take that away 
from us, and we stand. (Jonah, 350 Fiji) 
 
These prior knowledges and pre-existing value systems are intrinsic to what makes a Pacific 
Islander model of  protest, and as much a part of  the process of  becoming Warriors as the 
campaign experiences and trainings. 
As well as very little previous experience of  protest, many of  the Warriors also had a very 
limited understanding of  climate change science, which one of  the organisers readily admitted 
to being the case. Staff  from another NGO which supported the flotilla took time to introduce 
one of  the Warriors to some of  the basics of  climate science, as the Warrior had no substantive 
prior understanding of  it. As discussed during the methodology chapter, in interviews with the 
Warriors, discussions about the impacts of  climate change in their home islands often fell flat, 
with the interviewees listing a rehearsed script of  generic effects, or offering to simply show me 
the scripted list rather than voicing it themselves. This is in stark contrast to the UK 
environmental movement, which has been criticised for seeking its validity through recourse to 
climate science, perhaps the epitome of  which can be seen during a 2007 protest against the 
proposed third runway at Heathrow Airport where activists marched with a banner that 
declared ‘We are armed only with peer-reviewed science’’ (Schlembach et al. 2012). 
However, this lack of  knowledge was not seen as a limitation by the 350 organisers in terms of  
the Warriors fulfilling their roles as climate activists. In one Warrior training, (which I observed 
and participated in, held six months before the flotilla action with members of  the Polynesian 
diaspora in Sydney), the explanations given of  350’s name in relation to parts per million of  
CO2 were tempered by an insistence that it wasn’t about the science, but foremost about 
experience, identity and faith. Similarly, during an early go-round during the Sydney pre-flotilla 
trainings when all the Warriors were asked to introduce themselves and explain why they were 
there, one of  the organisers explicitly chose not to speak about climate change at all but instead 
told the story of  her grandparents and their decisions to move or stay within the communities 
they had grown up in. Climate change activism and climate science were thus legitimised 
through their connections to Pacific identity and culture, as opposed to science acting as the 
source of  legitimation. This inversion can be seen as an enactment of  what Hulme has called 
for in terms of  a rejection of  the ‘de-culturating’ of  climate change (2008: 9), but one that is 
not just performed by academics, but by affected community members themselves. It also opens 
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a question regarding the relation between different epistemologies that will be explored in detail 
in Chapter Six. Turning next to the process of  training and participants actively cultivating 
climate activist subjectivities, this suggests both the importance of  knowledge building, but also 
of  centring Pacific culture and values in order to enact a specifically Pacific mode of  protest.  
5. Becoming Warriors 
 
From arrival right through to the days after the flotilla, the Warriors were subject to an 
exhaustive schedule of  workshops, trainings, briefings, visits and photoshoots. On the very first 
evening of  the training, the Warriors stood in a circle around the room and were asked to 
silently step forward if  they felt ready to become a Warrior –most feet in the room moved. The 
training programme was explicitly orientated towards this goal: encouraging the participants 
to step up as Warriors.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the training began with a visit to the Redfern Tent 
Embassy, giving participants the opportunity to learn about and connect with ongoing 
Aboriginal struggles, as well as share their own stories of  where they came from and how they 
had got involved. The Warriors also received a presentation on the current situation regarding 
coal and fossil fuel expansion in Australia, as well as campaigns against it, such as that in the 
Leard Valley, and took part in a media training, focusing on the telling of  their own personal 
stories rather than drilling in facts or soundbites. This emphasis again reflected the ethos that 
scientific knowledge was superseded by island connection.  
As part of  the induction process, the Warriors also attended a welcome event at the 
Campbelltown Art Centre, where the Warriors were addressed by a sympathetic local MP, and 
the two Warriors from Tuvalu spoke poignantly of  the way in which droughts and kingtides 
prevented children from going to school, threatened their livestock and livelihoods, and ran the 
risk of  separating families. The speeches were followed by performances by a local Maori 
cultural group and then a barbecue. The Warriors were subsequently encouraged to relax and 
enjoy free time, with some visiting a mall, and others hanging out at the pool near the home of  
one of  the organisers.  
Part of  the training process involved an explicit inculcation into certain non-hierarchical activist 
practices, common to Western social movements (Trapese Collective 2007), even while the 350 
Pacific organisers maintained greater authority within the group. For instance, the Warriors 
were introduced to the use of  wiggling hands to signify agreement (a gesture that originates 
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from the British Sign Language gesture for clapping and was referred to by the 350 organisers 
as ‘twinkling’) and the production of  collaboratively constructed group agreements, designed 
to act as a means of  consenting to the self-governing of  behaviour while avoiding the 
hierarchical imposition of  rules. ‘Prayer’ was suggested as a feature of  the group agreement, or 
Warrior Treaty, by one of  the organisers, who then almost ostentatiously checked for any 
disagreement, perhaps a direct response to the backlash she had previously received at a 
350.org event for emphasising the place of  faith (Tiumalu 2014). However, some aspects of  
activist practice did not fully translate. For instance, we were tasked with explaining the function 
of  the Warrior Treaty to the new arrivals. One of  the organisers facilitating that discussion had 
been at pains to emphasise that it wasn’t the same as rules, yet that was the explanation one of  
the Warriors supplied. This tension between consensual agreements and top-down rules was 
also due to emerge in relation to the risks of  the flotilla itself.  
Other conventions of  non-hierarchical activist organising were also brought into the Warriors’ 
campaign. For instance, ‘affinity group’ formations were used in travelling in convoy to 
Tarrawonga mine (described in greater detail in the next section), as the group divided itself  
into the different available vehicles and there were concerns about being stopped en route and 
having to manage encounters with police or mine security guards. Affinity groups are the ‘basic 
organizational unit’ (Graeber 2009: 288) of  direct action politics: they are composed of  roughly 
five to twenty people who have some basis of  connection and are working together towards a 
collective goal, have shared tactics (Razsa 2015) and have the ability to autonomously make 
decisions about their group’s form and level of  involvement in any activities. Clough (2012) 
expands on the idea of  affinity further, arguing that affinity is both ‘a feeling of  trust, closeness, 
respect’ as well as a means of  embodying a political ideal of  non-hierarchy (Clough 2012: 
1673). However, in practice, the units used to travel to Maules Creek were affinity groups in 
little more than name, given that the groups did not actually self-form on the basis of  pre-
existing trust and affinity, and were used just for the process of  transport, as opposed to a form 
of  action beyond that.  
At points the self-disciplining functions of  the training were readily apparent. Early in the 
training period one of  the 350 Pacific organisers introduced the notion of  ‘Warrior Time’ (an 
embodiment of  efficient punctuality) in contrast to the easy-going and often tardy nature of  
Island Time. Demands were made for the Warriors to get on Warrior Time to enable them to 
achieve their goals on the day of  the flotilla. Warrior Time was a rejection of  familiar islander 
practices regarding time-keeping and a championing of  Western clock time, yet packaged as 
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an authentically Islander practice through recourse to the Warrior discourse.  
One morning the whole group was punished for its failure to enact Warrior Time. As had been 
typical on all previous days the Warriors filtered in in small groups for the opening morning 
meeting, well past the advertised start time, with various participants still busy waiting for 
showers or fetching breakfast. The organiser made everyone wait in silence until every single 
Warrior had arrived, making everyone uncomfortably conscious of  the time being wasted, and 
then put the last Warriors to arrive on the spot, seeking an explanation for their lateness. One 
of  the Warriors was later furious at the organiser for this behaviour, as it unkindly humiliated 
the Warriors who had arrived last, but largely the Warriors began to accept the principles of  
Warrior Time and became rigorously self-disciplining.  
Different Warriors would volunteer to wake-up everyone else, and rise times that seemed at 
points excessively early began being enforced, with two to three hours allocated for the thirty 
Warriors to have washed and eaten breakfast. The very Warrior who had previously questioned 
the punitive approach to enforcing Warrior Time became one of  its strongest advocates, telling 
Warriors that were still on Island Time, whether they called it ‘Fiji Time, Tokelau Time or 
Vanuatu Time’ that it was their time that they were wasting and that they were breaking the 
first rule of  the Warrior Treaty, which was respect.  
Having established some of  the disciplinary practices involved in the cultivation of  Warrior 
subjectivities, I now turn my focus to the role of  affect in the transformation of  campaign 
participants, beginning with sorrow.  
6. Sorrow: we cry because that could have been our land and they are 
wasting it 
 
Driving up through rural New South Wales in a chartered fifty-seater coach filled with dozing 
Warriors, one organiser performed as an ad-hoc tour guide, gesturing left and right out of  the 
vehicle’s windows at the mines, refineries and rail lines used to transport coal. We stopped as a 
juggernaut of  a coal train passed across our tracks, crisscrossing the landscape as they did every 
twelve minutes (soon to be seven, if  the plans for the new mine were to go ahead). The affective 
power of  Maules Creek was evident from the outset, as our guide assured us that everyone had 
cried at some point while witnessing this landscape.  
Perhaps one of  the most formative experiences in the development of  Warrior subjectivities, 
beyond all the carefully facilitated workshops and trainings, was the visit to the site of  the 
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construction of  the Whitehaven coal mine in Maules Creek in the Leard Valley, in Northern 
New South Wales, and the affective experiences that engendered. In this section I focus upon 
sorrow as a key affect, recognising its role in the production of  the Warriors as political subjects, 
as through these painful and shocking encounters with people and places the Warriors were 
transformed and galvanised to action. I also contribute to literature that recognises protest 
camps as sites for significant affective encounters (Feigenbaum et al. 2013). 
The Warriors visited Maules Creek because it was due to become one of  the largest open-cast 
coal mines in Australia, and was also a site of  fierce resistance. The mine’s construction was 
being contested by a collective of  local residents, (Aboriginal and white settler), and 
environmental activists from further afield, who had established an ongoing blockade camp, 
Camp Wando, on the land of  a sympathetic farmer who himself  played an integral part in the 
anti-mine struggle. Camp Wando boasted an impressive array of  facilities on its dry and dusty 
site: rain-fed showers (with solar heated water), compost loos, a media office, a large kitchen 
and a meeting circle, as well as caravans and tents where the longer- and shorter-term residents 
slept. The camp had hosted a number of  mass direct actions against the mine’s construction, 
including ‘walk-ons’ onto the territory of  the mine, with people travelling from across Australia 
to participate. These walk-ons had resulted in around forty-five arrests, given the criminal 
rather than civil nature of  trespass as an offence in Australia. Thus, the Warriors came to Camp 
Wando to learn from other anti-coal activists, and to follow the coal from seam to sea, 
connecting the extraction process with the exportation via Newcastle Harbour and the eventual 
climate impacts in their homelands.  
The Warriors were hosted by the camp, learned about their ongoing struggle, and had space 
to recognise their cultural differences and connections as a group. One evening, sat on logs and 
deck chairs in a small meeting circle, the Warriors took turns locating their home island on a 
map and sharing key facts about their nation, such as Tokelau’s lack of  airport and its 
endeavours in renewable energy, or meaningful personal experiences of  extreme weather 
events, or even singing national anthems. The Leard Valley was thus also a venue for creativity, 
friendship and joy, as it was the site where the composite haka (discussed in the previous chapter), 
and the women’s dance was created, and enabled stronger bonds to form between the Warriors 
and with their hosts. While this section focuses on the feelings of  sorrow, these moments suggest 
the importance of  joy in the campaign as well, the significance of  which is further highlighted 
by Bennett’s vision of  enchantment, as she argues that ‘joy can propel ethics’ (2001: 2).  
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Yet the most catalysing moment during the Warriors’ three-day trip was the visit to the site of  
a nearby active coal mine, where they held a small photo shoot with banners (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11 - The Warriors and protestors from Camp Wando hold a demonstration outside Tarrawonga mine, standing in front of the mountain of 
overburden. 
Here at Tarrawonga, the Warriors bore witness to the towering mountains of  overburden15 that 
had been produced through the extraction process. The Warriors responded to this desecration 
of  the landscape with disbelief, sorrow and rage. Jonah spoke evocatively about this sight:  
When we were going up to Maules Creek… and I was just chatting 
about in the car, la-la-la, talking but then I saw the mountain that, 
the coal and then the mine, I was like ‘what’? Then it stirred a lot of 
emotions you know. I was heartbroken. (Jonah, 350 Fiji) 
 
In many cases these powerful affective responses were shaped by a sense of  Australia’s abuse of  
its relative altitudinal privilege (as discussed in the previous chapter), as an enormous island 
with great towering highlands, compared with its less elevated neighbours. Abel, a resident of  
one of  the smallest and most low-lying atoll nations, expressed this keenly:  
                                                        
15 Overburden refers to the soil displaced in order to access desired mineral deposits, in this case coal. 
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It was really...I had mixed feelings. I was angry, I was pissed off, I just 
couldn’t describe how I felt. Like coming from a small island where 
we’ve been deprived of so many things, like land for instance. And 
this country’s so blessed with these big pieces of land and what they’re 
using with this land is really heart-breaking. They’re just digging it up 
and leaving it there. What’s supposed to be under there, they’ve dug 
it out. And it’s polluting the environment, making people sick.  
(Abel, 350 Tuvalu) 
 
Parallels were frequently drawn between the size of  these artificial mountains and the smallest 
of  the Pacific Islands, with one Warrior observing that ‘that mound they had there: that could 
destroy about three islands’. These comparisons of  scale enable the same sense of  horror and 
violation to be imagined in relation to the Warriors’ own homelands. As one Warrior remarked:  
Just visiting those mines was really emotional because most of those 
mines are the size of our islands and how could you do this to land 
and then not give a...not be assed about it? How can you just dig 
something and not put it back to where it belongs?  
(Delilah, 350 Samoa) 
 
These evocations of  altitudinal privilege centred around a misuse and misplacing of  land, as 
the overburden had been left so visibly and disrespectfully where it should not be. As in Mary 
Douglas’ (2003: 36) famous phrase, the overburden functioned as ‘matter out of  place’: both 
literally dirt and a waste product in the eyes of  the mining company, and for the Warriors as 
something that was perversely not where it should be. One Warrior went as far as imagining 
not a restoration of  the landscape of  the Leard Valley, but the land itself  working to protect the 
Pacific, a magical-realist rendering of  Australian climate intervention, or perhaps another 
instance of  world enlargement as Australian land became Pacific. 
I think about other countries, other Pacific countries or other 
neighbours who are the low-lying islands that the ocean, yes sea level 
rise is increasing and causing them to sink. But these huge soil 
mounds are just wasted because they just destroy them and spoil the 
environment. I am imagining that if only I can perform some magic, 
I would take some of these wasted soils and deposit them on the 
islands in a way to prevent the impacts of climate change.  
(Jacob, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
The misuse of  land was also condemned in the light of  Pacific Island values and practices 
surrounding the inalienable significance of  land, and customary traditions regarding land 
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ownership. 
Still to this day the mining companies have just been really stubborn 
and not listening to the people of those lands. And I feel that’s very 
disrespectful. Like in our culture, this...like when it comes to land use 
and like it’s such a very sensitive topic and we...we have to respect the 
people of that land and honour their wishes and like for this...for me 
to see this thing happening it’s just so very disappointing.  
(Leah, 350 Marshall Islands) 
 
Leah’s statement harks back to the previous examination of  world enlargement, presenting the 
Pacific as a moral exemplar to its neighbour. It also expresses outrage at the lack of  respect for 
the traditional owners of  the land, as the proposed mine would be denying access to many 
sacred Aboriginal sites. Thus, these responses to the violence of  extraction were twinned with 
an anger at the injustice of  settler colonialism, and formed part of  ongoing efforts at solidarity 
with Aboriginal struggles by the Warriors (as discussed in the previous chapter). This concern 
for the propriety of  land, and the assault upon this that the coal mining represents, also 
highlights the importance of  the rurality of  the location. Through contrasting the desecration 
of  the mine with the vitality of  nature surrounding it, the Warriors emphasised the injustice 
being inflicted upon the non-human.  
On the way to Camp Wando we went through the Hunter Valley 
and I saw places there that I really thought were beautiful. I saw 
animals and creatures on the road that I was wondering what they 
were. And you know these are new places, and new things, new 
animals and stuff that I’ve never seen before. And you know it was 
also my first time seeing a kangaroo, and you know, it’s something 
that’s really beautiful for me to see, and then when you go further 
and then you see all these mines that have ripped apart the land. It’s 
such a very disappointing and sad thing to see because Australia has 
this really lush and beautiful land and then these companies, these 
mining companies come and rip, rip it apart and it... it creates a big 
hole there that...that’s going to be very, very hard to mend.  
(Leah, 350 Marshall Islands) 
 
In preparation for encountering the Tarrawonga mine, a local ecologist delivered a presentation 
to the Warriors about the rich biodiversity of  the area that was direly threatened by the 
proposed Whitehaven mine, and even brought along a selection of  live, native reptiles and 
amphibians for the Warriors to hold (Figure 12). There was a lot of  fear and excited trepidation 
at the prospect of  handling these creatures, especially as concerns had been expressed about 
the danger of  snakes while setting up camp only the day before.  
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Figure 12 - A Warrior encounters a reptilian native of the Leard Valley. 
The force of  these encounters resonates with the Bennett’s notion of  shock and wonder, which 
she frames as enchantment, as arising through a sensuous encounter or crossing with a non-
human other. These playful and vital encounters with animal residents of  the Leard Valley 
stood in stark relief  against the desecration embodied in the mounds of  overburden, making 
visible the violence enacted both upon the human and the non-human through the mining 
process. Abel’s words reiterate this juxtaposition of  luscious natural growth and its defilement: 
But to see these vast trees growing together here, trees growing 
beyond what I can see with my own naked eyes, it’s truly a blessing 
and what they’re doing with it, they’re just pulling the trees out which 
have grown there for ages. They’re just pulling it out and throwing it 
away as if it’s garbage. (Abel, 350 Tuvalu) 
 
Abel’s words echo the matter-out-of-placeness of  the overburden, with arboreal blessings being 
treated like dirt.  
As well as the reptilian residents there were also powerful, if  less joyous encounters, with some 
of  those who worked at Tarrawonga mine. The protest camp had had trouble from a number 
of  the security guards, and the Warriors’ presence was mooted as a possible positive 
intervention, as a number of  the security workers were Samoan or Tongan. However, attempts 
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to enter into dialogue with the guards were fruitless. Those that the Warriors approached 
turned out not to be Samoan and just told the Warriors that they were trespassing. Rather than 
building bridges, encountering the Tarrawonga mine and its staff  heightened feelings of  
antagonism amongst the Warriors. One participant spoke of  how she wanted to ‘smack’ a 
security guard, especially as he had no right to tell Aboriginal people they were trespassing, as 
it was Aboriginal land. Another Warrior joked of  putting aside ‘non-violence’ for two minutes 
as the trucks full of  coal drove past. While the Warriors did remain strictly non-violent 
throughout, these tense moments spoke to the anger and frustrations engendered in them by so 
clearly witnessing ecological destruction, and through their encounters with the mine’s security 
force.  
The way they stopped us from entering stirred up anger in me and I 
was really angry, or I had a hateful heart because all they are thinking 
of is money, but they are not considering the future and they are not 
also thinking about other people. So, I just felt really angry, but I also 
felt sorry for my brothers and sisters who are living in the low-lying 
islands because seeing such huge areas makes them to think about 
their tiny landmasses and they are finding it difficult to do gardening, 
play or enjoy themselves in their own place. So, it is to do with 
emotion, anger, devastation and all those things, yes. 
(Jacob, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
Jacob’s anger at this blinkered focus upon money at all costs was shared by many Warriors, who 
expressed similar condemnations of  capitalist economy compared with island values. It also 
highlights the interplay of  both anger and sadness in the Warriors’ responses to Maules Creek, 
mirroring the process Gould (2002) observes in the ACT UP movement, as activists deliberately 
channelled their grief  at death from AIDS into anger at government inaction; feelings that 
could therefore sustain their movement. Through witnessing and affectively engaging with this 
destruction, many Warriors began to expand the focus of  their antagonism to include the 
complicity of  the Australian state apparatus for supporting and enabling fossil fuel expansion. 
Like I wish the government would listen more to their people, to its 
people, rather than to people who are filling up the pockets. And I 
feel like the government has more connection to the mining 
companies than it does to its people. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands) 
 
Some critiques went as far as a general condemnation of  Australia’s actions, one that stands in 
tension with the ignorance and goodwill framing of  Australia, as explored in Chapter Four. 
Rather than acting unaware of  the consequences of  its actions, Australia was construed as 
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being ‘cruel and heartless’, a clear target for blame and responsibility.  
I’m really, really affected, it touched me very much to my heart, to 
the bottom of my heart, to see a lot of that. Actually, honest I see that 
Australia they ruin everything, not just for the Pacific, but for 
Australia, for the Australian, they harm the people’s lives, they are 
playing off Australian citizens’ lives. (Tobiah, 350 Tonga) 
 
Bearing witness to this destruction was not simply distressing for the Warriors: it was a catalyst 
for action. It both stoked the fires of  their anger and galvanised them to put that anger into 
antagonistic practice through the flotilla. Abel’s words neatly summarise this, while also 
reiterating the concern for the misplacing of  land:  
Maules Creek really stirred up my feeling of wanting to fight more in 
this campaign. It really give me an insight…of how cruel and how 
heartless these people are. (Abel, 350 Tuvalu) 
 
In response to the enormous mounds of  overburden the Warriors felt sorrow, anger and disgust. 
Their sense of  antagonism was strongly affectively charged and catalysed by an engagement 
with the geographically situated materialities (as opposed to abstract calculations) of  fossil fuel 
extraction. It also began to shift in terms of  its target, encompassing both the fossil fuel industry 
and the Australian state, and thereby complicating framings of  the latter. This critical discourse 
– encapsulated in Tobiah’s claim that ‘Australia, they ruin everything’ – does not lead to a gross 
simplification of  Australia. Instead it co-exists with the naive discourse of  Australian well-
intentioned ignorance (explored in the previous chapter), as well as one that celebrates 
Australians for standing in solidarity with Pacific Islanders. Holding these three divergent 
discourses together at once starts to give an insight into the multiple, complex and contradictory 
relations between the Warriors and the Australian state.  
The Warriors’ feelings of  sorrow were defined on specifically Pacific terms, as a violation of  the 
respect for land, and within the moral schema of  relative altitudinal privilege, suggesting an 
integrally Oceanic dimension to their activist identities. The episode at Maules Creek also 
highlights the significance of  a rural location and the witnessing of  injustice and suffering in a 
more-than-human context in generating feelings of  sadness, frustration and antagonism, in 
contrast to the post-politics literature’s current emphasis upon urban insurrections. The 
encounter at Maules Creek propelled the Warriors to transgressive action and the formation of  
dissenting selves, suggesting the power and potential centrality of  collective emotional 
experiences in the production of  activist subjectivities. It concurs with Jasper’s (1998) emphasis 
upon moral shocks in movement building, as well as Bennett’s vision of  enchantment: in their 
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encounters with the Tarrawonga mine the Warriors are ‘struck and shaken by the extraordinary 
that lives amid the familiar and everyday’ (Bennett 2001: 4). Yet rather than being consumed 
with marvellous wonder, this encounter fills them with a sadness that spurs them to acts of  
ethical generosity, acting (as described in the previous chapter) on behalf  of  the whole world. 
The next section of  the chapter follows the Warriors’ trajectory and manifestations of  dissent, 
exploring how these new subjectivities were expressed through the canoe blockade, in particular 
through confrontations with the Australian police force, along with concomitant affects of  fear 
and anger.  
7. Fear: embracing risk, uncertainty and sacrifice 
 
I contend that the next key affective milestone in the process of  becoming Warriors was the 
collective experience of  fear and uncertainty, and the Warriors’ dedication to continuing with 
the action despite the potential risks and sacrifice it entailed; a self-disciplining practice akin to 
the embodiment of  ‘Warrior Time’. I explore how theses fears were experienced and overcome 
by the Warriors, looking first at the fears expressed prior to the start of  the campaign: concerns 
emerging from the novelty of  the flotilla and expressed by the Warriors’ families, uncertainty 
surrounding visas as well as some of  the limitations of  the Warriors’ appreciations of  the risks. 
I then consider how the Warriors, once confronted by the extent of  the risks, internalised these 
fears, accepting the gravity of  the situation and the sacrifice it would entail. But I also suggest 
that at points these acts of  risk and sacrifice were in tension with Pacific family-centred values, 
indicating a challenge in the process of  becoming Warriors: cultivating a specifically Pacific 
mode of  activist selfhood. This tension is typified in the controversy surrounding which age 
groups of  Warriors could participate in the flotilla.  
A factor that exacerbated the Warriors’ uncertainties regarding the extent of  risk they were 
undertaking was the novelty of  the flotilla itself. The Warriors’ flotilla was the sixth such event 
to take place, yet what set it aside from its predecessors was its leadership by Pacific Islanders; 
the incorporation of  specifically Pacific cultural and religious practices into the action, such as 
an opening haka and a prayer led by a Samoan minister; and the use of  hand-crafted canoes 
from five different countries, that had been built for the action. This opened up the question of  
how a Pacific politics of  protest including the involvement of  those with precarious visa 
situations would shape the dynamics of  the day. While there had been very few arrests during 
previous harbour blockades organised by Rising Tide Australia, a series of  legislative and 
political changes since the last flotilla left no legal guarantees for the safety of  the Warriors.  
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In the run-up to the action at Newcastle Harbour many of  the Warriors expressed fears their 
families’ had voiced regarding their physical safety and negative legal consequences. As Jonah 
from Fiji explained ‘my family were worried about me coming in case I got arrested or get 
chopped up by the propellers. Yeah, but it had to be done.’ Jonah’s acknowledgement of  the 
dangers and his determination to continue despite these risks was a crucial part of  the activist 
self-building process.  
And the risks were not merely present in the minds of  concerned parents and spouses. Even 
prior to the flotilla itself, one 350 Pacific organiser acknowledged that there was a danger that 
some of  the Warriors wouldn’t get visas to enter Australia if  they were too transparent about 
their reasons for travel, and one of  the venues that was due to host the Warriors as part of  a 
Pacific Island community welcoming event refused to have the canoes present, out of  concerns 
of  associating the venue with the criminality of  the blockade action.  
Furthermore, it emerged that, prior to the pre-action briefings, a number of  the Warriors had 
not been aware of  the extent of  the risks involved. One Warrior from Tokelau acknowledged 
that, had he been fully cognizant of  what the organisers were plotting, he wouldn’t have 
personally agreed to participate, whilst one of  his compatriots admitted:  
Oh yes. I wasn’t really aware of what the risks really…I was only just 
building this thing [the canoe] and saying that look I might get 
arrested. But when I got all here and got all the information I was like 
‘oh really’? I am really going to get arrested! (Reuben, 350 Tokelau) 
 
While organisers provided a legal briefing, explaining that entering the shipping lane or 
obstructing the passage of  a ship did constitute an arrestable offence, the workshop was an 
onslaught of  information that many Warriors did not seem that engaged with. Speaking with 
some of  them afterwards there seemed to be some confusion about the possible consequences 
and the powers and reach of  the Australia state. For instance, one participant pondered whether 
her prestigious university scholarship from Australia would be jeopardized by her participation, 
yet she was still ready to take that risk, despite the level of  sacrifice that possibly entailed. 
In the run-up to the flotilla, the Warriors clearly internalised these emotions surrounding risk 
and fear. As documented in Fox (2016), the shortlist of  concerns included ‘drowning, arrest, 
run over by boat, all kinds of  sharks, jellyfish, getting punched, sea creatures, drifting away in 
currents into the Pacific Ocean, cultural disrespect, big waves’, as well as anxieties regarding 
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the need for elaborate thermal clothing to contend with Australia’s Spring weather, and the 
potential for deportation.  
In recognising their fears, the Warriors also embraced the gravitas of  the situation, in terms of  
the rationale for the blockade and its potential negative repercussions. For Joseph, it was vital 
that his family understood that it was not merely a fun day out on the water. 
[his sister] was like ‘How did you go? I bet that it was really fun’. I 
was like ‘What? Are you kidding?’...And then I said well it could be if 
fun if only you have the courage to take the risk. And she started like 
being serious about it. (Joseph, 350 FSM) 
 
Concomitant with the Warriors’ sense of  risk and fear was the sacrifice deemed necessary for 
the campaign, apparent through the emphasis upon ascetic discipline and hard work. As well 
as the potential sacrifices demanded by the flotilla, participating in the campaign as a 
representative of  one’s country was a sacrifice in and of  itself, and required rigorous self-
disciplinary practices. This included a lack of  sleep, due to the need to devote all waking hours 
to the project and keep to Warrior Time. Many participants emphasised the sacrifices they were 
making: 
I must go to represent my own country. I must go to fight against this 
climate change effects. Because I have the heart of my own island, 
back in my own village. So, I have to came over, to leave my family 
and my land, my belongings, everything, to come and stand and be 
present and fight for our country. (Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands) 
 
Priscilla’s words capture two key dimensions to the Warriors’ experiences of  fear and risk: that 
of  sacrifice with regards to family, and of  an undeniable moral imperative to act, beyond 
immediate familial commitments. The former was clearly present throughout the campaign, as 
a few of  the Warriors had new babies or very recent marriages that they were forced to take 
time apart from, and one admitted that he had been putting his own wages into canoe 
construction, rather than sharing them with his family. This level of  dedication despite family 
demands was most apparent in the case of  an organiser who received a phone call on the way 
to Newcastle informing her that her soon-to-be adopted son was going to be born earlier than 
expected, forcing her to choose between participating in the flotilla and being the first person 
to hold her child. Faced with such a choice, she called her mother, who offered to hold him first 
instead, and resolved to carry on with the flotilla, as she was doing it for him and future 
generations. However, these expressions of  dedication existed in tension with claims that a 
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Pacific mode of  protest was one that placed family first.  
The greatest conflict between these self-disciplining processes of  sacrifice and dedication on 
one hand and Pacific family values on the other occurred early on during the training process. 
Within the organising group there were strong concerns about the potential for Warriors to be 
arrested or deported, and the potential consequences for their future mobility, employment and 
family connections. A compromise was reached by the organisers that Warriors under the age 
of  twenty-five (and who lacked powerful New Zealand or Australian passports) should not be 
in canoes that entered the restricted zone – the shipping channel – but could participate on the 
beach or in the waters closer to shore. The organisers supported those aged over twenty-five to 
make their own decisions. The justification for this decision was framed in terms of  Pacific 
kinship structures. One organiser (herself  a Pacific Islander) argued that while all the Warriors 
may legally be adults, many were still socially children and under the domain of  their parents 
within a Pacific Islander context as they were not yet married with children of  their own. 
While the majority of  the Warriors were content with the agreed age division, for some it 
seemed an affront to the virtues of  youth empowerment that formed an explicit core of  350’s 
work. It undermined the egalitarian and united efforts of  the team, and denied the magnitude 
of  the threat of  climate change, in contrast with the 350 Pacific’s media narrative of  taking 
action out of  absolute necessity and for survival. As one dissenting Warrior put it, ‘climate 
change doesn’t leave you alone if  you’re twenty-four’. Another Warrior, who had expressed 
willingness to go as far as possible, even doubted his involvement in the project as a whole at 
this point as, for him, this prohibition on some taking arrestable actions suggested a wider lack 
of  support for the risks he himself  was willing to take.  
The organisers responded to these critiques firstly by dismissing notions of  activist bravado: the 
suggestion that being willing or able to be arrested made you more of  a Warrior, a conscious 
reaction against an ethos of  machismo risk-taking cultivated within some Western activist 
circles (such as documented by Clough in terms of  ‘riot-braggadocio’ (2012: 1674)). Instead, 
facing the fears of  being arrested, being separated from one’s family and home island, or 
entering potentially jellyfish-infested waters were all presented by organisers as equally 
legitimate experiences in the process of  becoming Warriors. These rejections of  bravado also 
dovetailed with the group’s emphasis upon humility as a virtue. For instance, the Warriors 
would not volunteer themselves for the daily rotating co-ordinator roles, but instead volunteered 
each other, and none who were volunteered refused the role. This process, in contrast to that 
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which I was familiar with from UK organising meetings, embodied the principles of  humility 
and reciprocity: no one offered to put themselves above the others, but humbly accepted the 
role of  working for the group when it was offered to them. These expression of  humility could 
be seen as at odds with expressions of  antagonism: willingness to express your will over and 
above that of  another. Perhaps therefore it is unsurprising, as will be seen in the following 
section, that the organisers faced challenges in either incorporating antagonism into or fully 
disavowing it from a Pacific mode of  protest.  
The complaints about the under twenty-five rule were also negotiated through further 
references to familial obligation. Organisers invoked the threat of  the shame that would be 
draped over the whole family, not just the individual Warrior, in the case of  arrest, with one 
organiser sharing such an experience following his previous involvement with Greenpeace. 
Having participated in an action against a coal port with a small group of  predominately white 
activists, there had been insufficient transparency about potential consequences, and no space 
for discussions that engaged with the familial dimensions of  those consequences, perhaps due 
to a cultural obliviousness on the part of  the white activists about the Pacific significance of  
shame. Creating the space to have this discussion about the relationship between activism and 
Pacific values of  family was explicitly presented as a feature of  what made this action Pacific, 
and thereby unprecedented, as opposed to ‘traditional white activism’.  
However the particular training session where the under twenty-five rule was introduced did 
not fully open a space for discussion, but announced a pre-agreed conclusion, and advanced an 
instruction that others were expected to adhere to. It therefore doubly violated the principle of  
individual autonomy, a fundamental cornerstone of  Western anarchist and anti-authoritarian 
environmental activism (Graeber 2009), both through its process and through the privileging 
of  family responsibility above individual freedom and agency. Consequently, it was both 
incongruous with my own Western conceptions and experiences of  activism, and was a key site 
for articulating Pacific difference.  
Thus, the actions of  the Warriors in the immediate run-up to the flotilla also testify to the role 
of  affect in the generation of  political subjectivities. These Warrior subjectivities were 
constituted through collective experiences of  apprehension and fear, when faced with an 
uncertain array of  physical and legal risks, as well as ascetic demands of  dedication and 
sacrifice, yet only sacrifice conceived of  as compatible with Pacific norms of  familial obligation. 
Indeed, as an explicitly Pacific model of  activism, space was created to discuss risk in relation 
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to values of  family, including the potential for shame. In emphasising these relations with kin 
as opposed to the autonomy of  the individual, the Warriors’ practices diverge from those 
examples of  activism documented by Graeber (2009), Clough (2012) or Williams (2008). As 
can be seen in the following section detailing the events of  the flotilla itself, the parameters 
governing the boundaries of  acceptable activist practice continued to be a point of  tension and 
contestation. In exploring feelings of  anger, questions of  antagonism (central to post-political 
analysis) and moments of  shock and encounter (integral to ideas of  enchantment) become most 
prevalent.  
8. Anger: generative encounters with police aggression 
 
As established in relation to the experience of  Maules Creek, by the time the Warriors reached 
Newcastle, the Australian state had also become a target of  their antagonism, in addition to the 
fossil fuel industry. As corporeal embodiments of  state power, perhaps it is unsurprising that, 
on the day of  action itself, the Australian police became a focus for the Warriors’ dissent. In 
examining the Warriors’ interactions with the police, particularly their outrage at officers’ 
behaviour during two key altercations, the most central emotional state is revealed to be anger. 
I recount the major actions taken by the police that fuelled this anger: threats, capsizing, the 
detaining of  two Tongan Warriors, and the sinking of  the Vanuatu canoe. The role of  the 
police in generating significant affectual encounters that transform activists’ viewpoints has 
been noted (Feigenbaum et al. 2013; Razsa 2015; Graeber 2009). Yet this anger is not just 
destructive. The actions of  the police in invoking this affect are shown to be generative and 
productive, in inspiring the Warriors to perform transformational acts of  dissent. These 
encounters with the forces of  law also highlight major tensions in the process of  producing 
Warriors. A number of  these transformational acts of  dissent exceeded the boundaries 
established by the protest organisers, highlighting the ambivalent relationship of  the group to 
acts of  confrontation and antagonism. 
There was considerable outrage at the conduct of  the police during the flotilla, due to what 
many activists perceived as deceitful behaviour and direct heavy-handed interventions (as was 
also noted in some news coverage). According to the accounts of  organisers on the day, officers 
wrongly informed the Warriors that the port was closed, while continuing to let a further ship 
through, and falsely claimed that the first ship passing through the harbour, a coal ship, was 
actually a grain ship, a move presumably taken in order to disperse the blockade. The Warriors 
considered the police to have lied and to have made very aggressive threats, in suggesting that 
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the Tokelau canoe would get crushed; that all those on board the Vanuatu canoe would be 
arrested; and the canoe itself  would be confiscated if  it re-entered the water.  
Activists were also pulled from their vessels, kayaks were capsized and confiscated, and those 
on tourist visas were threatened with deportation. One participant vented her frustration, 
describing how:  
At one stage one police came and pulled off our kayak to the shore. 
Yeah, so, it was very scary and also at one point that day I just 
screamed, I was screaming. (Eve, 350 Kiribati) 
 
During one of  the most dramatic incidents of  the day, the police temporarily detained two of  
the Tongan Warriors. As one of  the two previously-detained Warriors described during the 
debrief, they had set sail in order to check the buoyancy of  their canoe on behalf  of  their 
heavier compatriots, with a clear resolution to not take the risk of  entering the shipping channel. 
Yet they accidentally found themselves dragged right into the path of  the coal ship, and nearly 
underneath it, because the national flag they were flying had inadvertently acted as a sail (Figure 
13). 
 
Figure 13 - Two Tongan Warriors are rescued from the capsized canoe. 
After the canoe had begun to sink dangerously close to the coal ship, both Warriors were pulled 
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from the water by police who were initially kind and hospitable, yet put on their ‘mean faces’ 
as soon as they reached the police boat. There both Warriors were left cold, wet and fearful, as 
the police threatened them with arrest and deportation, and detained them without blankets 
for three hours. Recounting this story the following day, Tobiah, one of  the two Warriors, 
insisted that the greatest hardship was the loss of  the support and solidarity of  the other 
Warriors (as the police prevented the other Warriors from accessing the detainees), leaving them 
with the severe, unsmiling police. Not only despite but because of  the fear and discomfort of  
this experience, the police’s harsh disciplinary actions had a productive impact upon Tobiah 
and his companion. They enabled him to recognise a capacity for courage he had not previously 
anticipated, and challenged him to enact his activism in unprecedented ways. Rather than 
feeling ashamed or remorseful for his behaviour, speaking only three days later he was proud 
and exhilarated:  
Oh my God. That’s an unforgettable day, and it was unforgettable 
moment, the best moment I ever experienced. I feel I am so proud of 
what happened on Friday, of all the movements and stuff and all the 
actions. Yeah, you can imagine. I feel like I am so excited and more 
than excited of what I feel and all the actions, very amazing. I’m 
proud of everyone. Especially myself, I got arrested! 
(Tobiah, 350 Tonga) 
 
Yet perhaps the most significant altercation with police officers on the day centred around the 
capsizing of  the Vanuatu canoe. Differing accounts circulated regarding the cause of  the 
capsizing and the relative culpability of  the police. Samson, part of  the canoe’s crew, construes 
the incident as a malicious, violent act, that endangered the vessel’s passengers, including a 
nonagenarian war veteran:  
They [the police] got angrier at us cause they pushed us three times, 
and the whole time they didn’t even notice, actually they knew, they 
knew the old man was in front of us. But they rammed us and they 
broke the side of the canoe. And I said to them “Don’t move! Don’t 
move!” and they just looked they just looked at us and when the 
canoe flipped over the old man was drowning. Don’t be selfish. That 
is being selfish. It was there in their face, they saw it was going to 
happen and they just rammed us in the side and then looked straight. 
(Samson, 350 Niue) 
 
However documentary film maker Josh Fox, also aboard the Vanuatu canoe, recounts events 
differently in his cinematic portrayal, denying any deliberate wrongdoing on the part of  the 
police. His narration presents the severing of  the outrigger as the consequence of  a semi-
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comedic accident, while his footage doesn’t actually capture the ‘big wave’, or the contact 
between the police boat and the outrigger:  
All of a sudden, a few kayakers broke off and tried to make a run for 
it. They got out pretty far, causing the Australian coast guard to loop 
around and cause a monster wake, a big wave. When the wave hit us, 
we tipped side to side, not a problem. But it caused the police boat to 
tip as well, coming down on the pontoon side of the Vanuatu canoe. 
(Fox, 2016) 
 
Josh Fox’s account does not relay the feelings of  anger and antagonism expressed by many of  
the Warriors, and indeed his account of  this particular incident foregrounds the experiences of  
the Australian passengers, rendering the Warriors themselves almost incidental. Yet 
appreciating these sentiments of  anger is crucial for understanding the transformational 
consequences of  this encounter.  
For instance, Samson also described his horror at the police officers’ amoral actions, particularly 
in regard to the elderly passenger whom he had tried to pull from the water, but had been 
prevented from doing so by police officers:  
If that old man had passed away it’s their fault. They were being 
selfish and not thinking about their actions and just trying to do their 
jobs. You know, sometimes you just have to push aside your job and 
come and help us along. Because how can you live with yourself if 
other people are dying?...I don’t know how he’s going to live with 
himself but that’s what happened16. (Samson, 350 Niue) 
 
These intensive emotional experiences were not limited to those aboard the vessel. Jacob, 
watching from the beach, captures the affective complexity of  the encounter: 
So, I had all these feelings and when the police came, I was afraid, 
yes when the police came I was afraid because it was my first time 
and this was not in Vanuatu, they were police officers whom I have 
never met so it was my first experience. So, I was afraid of all these 
things. When they came, they threatened us, so I was angry and 
when I watched the canoe turn over, I felt it was very emotional. Yes, 
so it was every feeling that a man should have, I had it all in that 
particular moment. (Jacob, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
With the Vanuatu canoe and its crew in disarray, the coal ship steamrollered on past the other 
                                                        
16 The elderly passenger was ultimately fine, and even well enough to participate in one of the solidarity actions 
only a few days later, occupying the Sydney offices of Whitehaven Coal. 
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vessels, successfully exiting the port with its cargo. The failure to halt the ship and the 
destruction and distress endured by the canoe and its passengers brought many on the beach, 
including myself, to tears: 
When the canoes were wrecked, when the Vanuatu canoe was 
broken in half and capsized, I cried. I cried. And most of the 
Warriors on the beach cried…the building of the canoe is a spiritual 
thing for a Pacific islander and for someone just to go and break it. 
(Jonah, 350 Fiji) 
 
Reflecting on this moment during his documentary, Fox observes that ‘this was not our finest 
hour, weeping over a broken ship, a coal barge with thousands of  tonnes of  coal leaving port’. 
However, I contend that in many ways it was. Reflecting again upon Latour (2011)’s call to 
embrace the magnitude of  feeling demanded by ecological catastrophe, the Warriors 
demonstrated this feeling for the consequences of  climate change, irrespective of  its geographic 
and temporal displacement. Returning to Maria’s words in the previous chapters that work to 
bring climate change home, the tragedy of  this particular coal ship’s movements is made 
painfully evident: 
When we saw the coal ship pass by we all cried, it was so emotional 
because like we know what those coal boats...what the coal does to us, 
the Islanders, and so watching it go by, all that was in our head was 
like a family will lose their home today. A family will lose their 
livestock. A family will even lose their own livelihoods. Maybe their 
home. We just let one by. (Maria, 350 Fiji) 
 
The collective nature of  this emotional reaction –‘we all cried’ –was also crucial to forging an 
activist community of  affect, or what Gould frames as an ‘emotional common sense’ (2002: 
178). This community of  affect was not limited to those on the beach that day. Carrying back 
the stories of  their actions to their family and friends, the Warriors not only gave an account of  
what they did but built up an emotional common sense with others, highlighting the importance 
of  activist story-telling (Clough 2012). Jacob’s account following his return is testament to this:  
I told them the story of the main purpose of our tour. They only 
wanted to hear about the protest…So I related the story to them, 
starting in the morning, they wanted to know every detail of 
information…when the canoe turned over, and I told them at the 
moment we all cried and this made my family also cry, yes they 
cried…the result show that we managed to stop ten coal ships that 
should have entered. Yes, it was only two that came, and we went out 
 178 
to block them. So, this was the story I told them, and they were 
happy and excited about it. (Jacob, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
Unlike the examples of  activist bravado highlighted by Clough, Jacob’s words acknowledge his 
distress, and through doing so the audience are brought empathetically into the memory of  the 
action, crying as he cried, sharing the Warriors’ joy at their achievements. As Razsa and Clough 
argue, story-telling can also be seen as a major component of  the development of  activist 
subjectivity. In light of  this, perhaps the most significant legacy of  the campaign was the 
production of  activist selves.  
Finally, the breaking of  the Vanuatu canoe created a sublime opportunity for transformational 
disobedience, as the Warriors were catalysed by the police’s actions to further forms of  dissent. 
In contrast to imagery of  helpless, vulnerable islanders – ‘drowning’ –I witnessed ‘fighting’, as 
the Warriors were enacting a politics of  visceral defiance. One of  the Warriors framed his acts 
of  courage in terms of  a direct confrontation with those that sought to stop him, the police: 
I wasn’t afraid to get arrested. I was fighting for something I want. I 
was going to go down for what I want. That is why I kept on going in. 
No worry. First boat, I went in. They said, “paddle back” and I just 
kept on paddling, kept on paddling. No way, no way. And then when 
we hit the boat, we just kept on going. No way they were going to 
stop us. And then they pushed us away and we kept on going. No 
way. (Samson, 350 Niue) 
 
Similarly, another crew member from the Vanuatu canoe understood his newly found sense of  
bravery in relation to this head-on confrontation with the police as antagonists, while also 
suggesting previous negative experiences with the police:  
It is really a new thing for me. A new, new thing for me. I still cannot 
forget how my, how did I have that courage to do it, to do what I did 
yesterday…But it’s the first, it’s my first experience I actually ran 
towards cops, not ran away from cops. (Joseph, 350 FSM) 
 
Faced with these new obstacles and opponents, the previous slurry of  concerns regarding cold 
water and sea creatures seemed to melt away, and a spirit of  wilful and mischievous 
disobedience emerged in response to the police. While the day before there had been a group 
agreement to respect the police and not be cheeky (for example through pretending not to speak 
English) during the flotilla many pursued exactly that tactic. In order to resist leaving the waters, 
one Warrior from the Solomon Islands disguised his language skills, thereby refusing to hear 
police instructions, and successfully re-entered the sea after being seized three times until finally 
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officers snapped his paddle. One participant’s experience encapsulates this spirit of  defiance 
and dissent that emerged:  
One of the police who came to take us to the beach [so out of the 
water], he was like ‘Do you swim? Can you swim?’ But you know, 
coming from the Pacific, you know how to swim but you have to lie 
because otherwise if you say ‘I can swim’ they knock [you] in the 
water. So, it’s sort of very scary. I was very honest, ‘Yes of course I 
can swim’. I didn’t realise you know. And my other friend from 
Kiribati she realised what he would do if we said it, so she was like 
‘No, no, no I can’t swim, I can’t swim’ so he was like ‘Ok I’ll take you 
to the beach. Don’t come back again!’ But we went back.  
(Eve, 350 Kiribati) 
 
Most crucially, the Warriors refused to acquiesce to the destruction of  the Vanuatu canoe. It 
was tugged ashore and those returning from the waters were greeted on the beaches with tears 
and song. Without even a word, a Tokelaun elder stepped forth and with prayers and power 
tools the Vanuatu canoe was repaired, in direct defiance of  the orders of  the police on the 
beach. In fixing and returning the canoe to the waters, the Warriors refuted the treatment of  
the boat as no more than pieces of  wood, instead honouring the blessings bestowed upon it by 
priests, politicians and ancestors. 
The productive affects of  anger generated through antagonism with the police translated into 
activism that exceeded the expectations of  the organisers, opening up spaces for disagreement 
about the limits of  action for the protest group and how these reflected upon the group’s Pacific 
values. On the day of  the flotilla, many of  the younger Warriors chose to flout the under twenty-
five rule and sail out into the shipping lanes. This transformational sense of  disobedience 
continued through the following week, as solidarity actions were organised around the country 
by 350 Australia and other local activists, which were intended to amplify the message of  the 
Warriors and act in solidarity with them, but not actually put the Warriors themselves at risk 
of  arrest. Yet in the case of  the Melbourne action (which involved an occupation of  the main 
headquarters of  ANZ bank due to its financing of  Whitehaven Coal’s construction in Maules 
Creek) and the Canberra action (of  which more below), some Warriors became directly 
involved in the civil disobedience, and through doing so defied rules imposed by some 350 
organisers, highlighting a wider tension over the limits of  acceptable antagonism.  
In the case of  the Canberra action at the office of  the National Minerals Council, the three 
Warriors attending were explicitly told by one of  the organisers that they should stay outside, 
 180 
otherwise they risked arrest. However, one Warrior refuted the logic of  the organisers, insisting 
upon the necessity of  law-breaking risk-taking by the Warriors themselves:  
They say this is a solidarity movement to support the Pacific Climate 
Warriors and if the Pacific Climate Warriors is not going [to get] 
arrested with them it’s not really meaningful. And if I get arrested 
with them it would be some really powerful thing we should do. 
(Moses, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
Consequently, Moses lied to his Warrior companions, falsely reassuring them that he would stay 
outside with them, and then also entered the office to stage a sit-in with the Australian activists. 
He eventually exited the building, narrowly avoiding the police, only after a 350 Pacific 
organiser commanded him via phone to cease his involvement in the protest.  
This scenario reflects a range of  tensions in the Warriors’ relations to direct action activism, 
including a further imposition of  leaders’ decisions over and above individual autonomy and a 
clash between the spirit of  civil disobedience and the more risk-averse approach of  the paid 
organisers. At the centre of  this is a question surrounding where the acceptable limits to 
confrontation lie. The flotilla was framed as a ‘nonviolent but intensely contested battlefield’ in 
one organiser’s journalistic account of  the campaign, followed by an insistence that the 
approach must be ‘confronting’ in order to engage in the next ‘peaceful battle’ (Packard 2014). 
The near contradiction of  the notion of  the ‘peaceful battle’, the invoking and simultaneous 
disavowal of  the language of  violence reflects the group’s complicated relationship to the 
politics of  antagonism.  
At the Sydney Warrior training held some months in advance of  the flotilla itself, an organiser 
reassured the workshop participants that there would be a legal team working ‘to make sure no 
one will be doing anything to break the law’. In a similar vein, another organiser repeatedly 
referred to the action as a ‘legal protest’, in reference to the legality of  being on the beach and 
in the water (excluding the shipping lanes). Both cases indicate a denial of  the fundamentally 
illegal intent of  the action, and suggest a desire to distance the campaign from associations of  
criminality or legal transgression. The Sydney workshop organiser also insisted that ‘we’re not 
anti-government, not against the system’ but ‘we’re pro-Pacific, pro-awareness’, suggesting a 
disconnect between politics and practice, as the actions of  confrontation with forces of  the state 
integral to the flotilla were not underpinned by a systemic critique of  state power. These 
understandings on the part of  the organisers put the campaign at odds with more anti-
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authoritarian and anarchist cultures of  protest, and from a post-political lens inhibit an analysis 
of  the event as a ‘return of  the political’, given this explicit denial of  systemic critique.  
However, this aversion to confrontation and illegality was not shared by all in the campaign. 
One Warrior much later expressed frustration and confusion that there wasn’t a more 
confrontational or at least directly meaningful dimension to their time at Maules Creek. While 
they were in a space that had been created to facilitate direct action, and hearing many stories 
of  it, the Warriors themselves were just used for photo shoots.  
Perhaps at the core of  this tension over antagonism was a desire by the organisers to articulate 
a specifically Pacific mode of  activism, in distinction to Western confrontation-orientated forms 
of  protest. One organiser, with nearly nine months of  hindsight, reflected that ‘it was quite 
spectacle-focused, quite putting up a fight, which is not, you know, that Pacific’. Linked to this 
conception of  a Pacific mode of  protest as non-antagonistic was the valorisation of  affects of  
calmness and peace, rooted in faith, as opposed to anger. However, this opens a question 
regarding the space to legitimately feel anger, given its potent transformative effects.  
In recognising the crucial role that affect plays in the generation of  political subjectivities, 
feelings of  anger, especially those produced in contestations with the police, were central. These 
encounters with police, including threats of  arrest or the capsizing of  canoes, while largely 
perceived negatively by the Warriors, were generative, helping to produce the Warriors as 
activists, a process previously noted by Razsa (2015) and Graeber (2009). The transformational 
impact of  these encounters is evident in the way they galvanised the Warriors to take steps they 
didn’t previously see themselves as willing or capable of  doing, such as repeatedly returning to 
the water despite threats of  deportation, facing up to police jet skis, and sailing right towards 
the coal barges in the middle of  the shipping lane. These transformative encounters also 
motivated some Warriors to take action that exceeded the action parameters agreed by the 
campaign organisers, such as under-twenty-fives entering the shipping lanes or Warriors 
directly participating in the solidarity actions. This further highlights a tension, already raised 
in the previous section, about the relationship between individual autonomy and group 
authority and leadership. This tension works to differentiate the politics of  the Pacific Climate 
Warriors from other climate activist groups with more avowedly non-hierarchical or anarchist 
politics, suggesting another potential dimension of  a specifically Pacific mode of  protest.  
These feelings of  anger were also mixed with moments of  sorrow, such as witnessed in the 
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destruction of  the Vanuatu canoe. Again, these intense affective moments – the tears shed upon 
Horseshoe beach – suggest what Latour identifies as an engagement with the magnitude of  
feeling demanded by the Anthropocene. The Warriors cried and felt rage both due to the 
proximate sacrilege performed upon the ancestrally-blessed canoe as well as due to the passage 
of  the coal ship and the consequent damage climate change would wreck upon their homes 
and the homes of  distant others, again straddling concerns of  the local and the global. In this 
moment of  intense emotional intimacy, the abstraction and geographic and temporal 
displacement of  climate change is overcome.  
9. Being Warriors 
 
While these intense affective experiences – feelings of  sorrow, fear and anger – in shocking 
encounters with ravaged landscapes; threats of  injury and arrest; and heavy-handed behaviour 
by the police were contained within a period of  less than a month, the transformational impacts 
of  the campaign continued well beyond that point. The shaping effect of  these emotions upon 
the Warriors’ subjectivities has continued to propel them towards ethical action. 
As noted in their action debrief  and in follow-up interviews, all of  the organisers recognised 
the campaign as a transformative process for them and the others who were involved:  
I think I can say it changed every single Pacific Climate Warrior that 
was part of it. And like I think they’ll always look back on it like a 
life...an incredibly memorable and life changing experience.  
(Daniel, 350 Pacific) 
 
In terms of  how these changes manifested, for some it was the forging of  this enduring activist 
identity that continued with them.  
So being a Climate Warrior I feel like this is now my…this is my 
whole life. I am going to take these fights for my whole life… I’m just 
fucking doing this thing until I die. It’s really...I mean I cannot quit 
this job. It’s just makes me really happy that I’m doing, that I’m 
doing important things for people and also for me and also my 
children, for my future children, so this is like this is it. (Moses, 350 
Vanuatu) 
 
At the end of  the campaign many of  the Warriors spoke of  how inspired they felt to do more, 
back in their home countries, channelling those intense affectual experiences. A clear succession 
of  actions has flowed from the flotilla, from attempts to enter ANZ Bank in Port Vila, Vanuatu, 
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in order to demand divestment action (with protesters’ slogan-scrawled bare chests mimicking 
that of  the Melbourne Solidarity action), or a protest against the threat of  becoming climate 
refugees, organised by the COP21 Pacific Civil Society Observers at a training in New Zealand, 
to a kayak flotilla down the Seine during the COP in Paris itself. The Pacific Climate Warriors 
have continued to spread their message in Paris and Rome (as described in the opening chapter), 
and in Canada, linking up with First Nations activists resisting the Kinder Morgan pipeline.  
Thus, while the campaign has many legacies, including being labelled the ‘David versus Goliath 
campaign of  the year’ (Buckingham 2014), or stopping those ten coal ships, perhaps the most 
enduring legacy is the production of  activist selves.  
10. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have brought together three different literatures: post-politics, enchantment 
and the geography of  social movements. Post-politics has helped me to recognise the value of  
focusing upon the Warriors as political subjects, the centrality of  this political agency to 
contestations of  the drowning islands discourse, and to recognise the shifting points of  
antagonism within the campaign, from the fossil fuel companies to the Australian state, 
including their embodiment in the form of  the police. However, a post-political analysis alone 
is insufficient for three reasons. Firstly, in its focus upon the urban it neglects spaces such as 
Maules Creek as sites for the re-injection of  the political. Secondly, the emphasis upon 
antagonism is in tension with the ambivalence expressed towards antagonism by the 350 Pacific 
campaign organisers, in terms of  the limits they imposed upon the protest, and the suggestion 
that a conflict-driven approach was at odds with a Pacific ethos. This is reinforced by 
McNamara and Farbotko’s analysis of  the campaign, as they describe how in the use of  the 
term ‘Warrior’ they are ‘shedding its combative conceptual lineage’ (2017: 21), and they are 
engaging in ‘symbolic, discursive battles’ (2017: 24), as opposed to targeting particular enemies. 
This is not to suggest that the Warriors’ actions aren’t political, but that they do not fall with a 
post-politics confrontation-focused definition of  the political. Finally, a post-political approach 
does not sufficiently centre affect in its analysis of  protest movements.  
Consequently, I have turned to both Bennett’s concept of  enchantment and the geographies of  
social movements literature to explore the significance of  affect. I have demonstrated the 
importance of  affect in the production of  activist subjectivities, highlighting the role of  sorrow, 
fear and anger. In describing these processes, I have borrowed Bennett’s language of  crossings, 
shocks and sensuous encounters in order to understand the different affectively-charged 
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moments the Warriors experienced. Yet while powerful and shocking, encounters with the 
mounds of  overburden at Maules Creek are not exactly wondrous: it is still a far cry from Buck’s 
‘charming Anthropocene’. Thus, I have taken Bennett’s underlying principle (that shocking 
encounters have a transformative impact that engender future ethical action) but brought it to 
bear on less joyous moments, calling upon the difficult and distressing emotions the Warriors 
experienced. In this reflection upon challenging emotions, I have drawn upon the geography 
and anthropology of  social movements literature, as authors such Clough, Razsa and Graeber 
have documented how fear and anger, particularly in encounters with police, can have 
galvanising impacts upon activists’ subjectivities and their future actions. Yet one of  the 
limitations of  these literatures is their disproportionate emphasis upon secular, Western, 
anarchic models of  protests. In this chapter I have also sought to outline some of  the qualities 
of  a distinctively Pacific form of  protest.  
I propose that some of  the features of  a distinctively Pacific manifestation of  protest are land, 
family and faith. The significance of  land can be seen in the responses to Maules Creek: the 
invocations of  relative altitudinal privilege, distress at matter out of  place, and comparison 
between the mounds of  overburden and the Warriors’ own home islands (comparisons that also 
emerged with respect to the tar sands in the Warriors’ 2017 visit to Alberta), as the devastation 
of  the former becomes a metonym for the threat to the latter. Reflecting again upon Latour’s 
call to embrace the emotional enormity of  the Anthropocene, the Warriors’ response to Maules 
Creek can be situated in this light. They were literally empowered by their tears: spurred on to 
take action and in doing so develop new activist subjectivities in response to sadness and anger 
that they felt. These feelings can also be linked to Albrecht et al.’s (2007) notion of  solastalgia, 
the nostalgia for a place that one is still in but is irrevocably altered by environmental change. 
Fittingly, one of  the earliest applications of  this concept is in response to the ravages of  mining 
upon the New South Wales landscape. Here the Warriors take solastalgia to a new level, 
expressing not just distress at the loss of  a place through change, but misery at the 
transformation of  a place that they themselves have never previously known, but which they 
project onto their own homelands and the future that may await them. Thus, the Warriors can 
be freed from any accusations of  nimbyism or limited self-interest, showing deep empathy with 
the suffering of  others and solidarity with a foreign landscape. Again, the forces of  world 
enlargement are at play, with Oceania acting and feeling for the world.  
Secondly, the value of  family to the Warriors’ expression of  activism was apparent in the 
previous chapter in terms of  the sibling-like bonds and optative kinship that formed between 
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the Warriors. It continues to be of  consequence in this chapter in terms of  the threat of  shame 
that arrest through direct action presents to the Warriors’ families, the familial responsibilities 
the 350 Pacific organisers adopt towards the younger Warriors via the under twenty-five rule, 
and the sacrifices the Warriors make with regards to their own families, having to be away from 
young children and spouses or giving money directly to the campaign rather than financially 
supporting their relatives. And in these invocations of  family some of  the greatest tensions 
emerge between how 350 Pacific organised their action protocols compared with more non-
hierarchical models of  organising that privilege individual autonomy. Family can be seen as the 
fundamental motivation and underlying principle of  why the Warriors took action: acting on 
behalf  of  the world, but also to safeguard their own homes and kin, again bridging the universal 
and the particular. 
And finally, unlike the movements described by Clough, Razsa or Graeber, faith is another 
defining feature of  this Pacific form of  protest, from the inclusion of  prayer in the Warrior 
treaty to the opening of  the flotilla with a prayer and the unity that collective worship brought 
the Warriors. And it is this question – the place of  religious responses to climate change – that 
I will pursue further in the following section, looking beyond the Pacific Climate Warriors to a 
plethora of  actors in Vanuatu and how faith informed their understandings, actions and the 
stories they tell about climate change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Three stories of Noah: exploring hybrid knowledges and 
political imaginaries through religious narratives of 
climate change in the Pacific Islands 
 
Having focused in the previous two chapters on the actions of  one particular climate activist 
network, in this final empirical chapter I extend my field of  analysis, drawing upon fieldwork I 
conducted in Vanuatu, and placing it in dialogue with secondary sources from across the Pacific 
Island region. I use this broader empirical scope to address three main concerns. Firstly, that of  
the academic marginalisation of  religious perspectives on climate change in the Pacific (as 
observed by Rubow 2009 and Kempf  2017), the demand for ethical and spiritual re-framings 
of  climate change (Hulme 2009; Nunn 2017) and the dearth of  social scientific literature 
exploring religious understandings and responses to climate change (Haluza-DeLay 2014). 
Consequently, I am placing religious responses to climate change at the centre of  my analysis, 
and thereby hope to contribute to this under-explored area of  research.  
Secondly, as highlighted by Rubow (2009) and Kempf  (2017), much of  the existing negative 
appraisal of  religious perspectives on climate change – the treatment of  religion as a barrier by 
scholars such as Kuruppu and Liverman (2011), Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop (2010), and 
McAdam and Loughry (2009) – seems to emerge from an attempt to expunge religious belief  
in favour of  scientific expertise. Conversely, I propose to hold these various knowledges 
(Christian, kastom17, and scientific) in balance, exploring their convergences, connections and 
tensions, using an approach I term tufala save, a phrase borrowed from one of  my participants. 
This recognition of  spiritual and not just secular knowledges also dovetails with a concern for 
ethical action motivated by a sense of  enchantment, as opposed to disenchanted rationalism 
(Bennett 2001).  
Thirdly, through this focus upon religious responses and hybrid knowledges, I continue my 
concern with the need for new narratives of  climate change and the Anthropocene. I achieve 
this through focusing on one main religious narrative – the biblical story of  Noah and the flood 
– and explore how different articulations of  this tale have a shaping effect on political 
imaginaries, investigating the nuanced relationship between the beliefs articulated and the 
actions deemed appropriate and possible. This both connects with the previous chapter’s 
                                                        
17 Kastom can be defined as ‘loosely, indigenous knowledge and practice’ (Taylor 2013: 139), while Mitchell 
(2011: 37) alternatively glosses it as ‘the hybrid set of discourses and practices that encompass the cultural 
knowledge, sociality, and social processes that are unique to ni-Vanuatu’. 
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concern with the political, and responds to Hulme’s (2009) call for further research into the 
heterogeneity of  religious responses, as through using Noah as a narrative frame I explore the 
multiplicity of  faith-based understandings. Returning to my research’s overarching aim, I 
evaluate the potential for these religious discourses to form part of  a more empowering, 
alternate framing of  climate change and the Pacific Islands that contests the inevitable 
inundation discourse. 
1. Chapter outline 
 
In order to affirm the importance of  religious perspectives on climate change, I begin by 
establishing the significance of  Christianity across the Pacific Islands, and then outline the 
complex relationship between Christianity and kastom beliefs in Vanuatu (Section 2). Following 
this, I recognise the extent and importance of  Church involvement in proactive responses to 
climate change, globally, regionally across the Pacific Islands (Section 3), and nationally, with 
respect to Vanuatu (Section 4). I acknowledge the place of  the Church in terms of  awareness 
raising, engaging in adaptation projects, and facilitating resettlement occasioned by worsening 
climatic conditions. I then contend that existing examinations of  faith-based responses to 
climate change have not gone far enough. There is a need to look beyond churches merely as 
convenient institutional frameworks for information dissemination and community 
mobilisation, and to also consider the power and potency of  religious ideas themselves. In doing 
so, I argue for the necessary desecularisation of  climate discourse and a rejection of  the 
supremacy of  scientific thought in favour of  embracing tufala save: an enmeshing and balancing 
of  both scientific and religious knowledges (Section 5). In order to substantiate this assertion, I 
tackle one of  the most contentious biblical narratives with respect to climate change in the 
Pacific Islands: the story of  the flood, Genesis 6-9, a tale that has been at the heart of  the 
scholarly rejection of  religious understandings of  climate change in the Pacific.  
While Kempf  has explored the Noah Story in great depth in the context of  Kiribati, he 
primarily focuses upon only one of  many discursive manifestations of  the story, while 
acknowledging the potential for other interpretations, ‘translations and reticulations’ of  the tale 
(2017: 43). In this way I hope to build upon his work, expanding knowledge of  the multiple 
ways in which the Noah story is currently invoked in the Pacific, and through doing so 
recuperating some of  the potential for religious thought to act as a resource (Hulme 2017: 15), 
rather than barrier, for action on climate change. I contend that different articulations of  this 
narrative have symbolic and material power, and become entangled with and enable particular 
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understandings of  and responses to climate change. I trace three discursive manifestations of  
the Noah story within the Pacific Islands (Section 6). I then consider the implications arising 
from these narratives in terms of  the political imaginaries they generate, focusing on questions 
of  sin, trust and agency (Section 7). Loosely focused on each narrative in turn, I consider the 
relationship between trust in the divine, prayer and action (Section 7A), divine warnings and 
the sin of  carbon emissions (Section 7B) and divine accompaniment and the rejection of  
retributive suffering (Section 7C). I conclude by recognising that these diverse religious framings 
all have the potential to act as the basis for counter-narratives that contest the drowning island 
discourse (Section 8), as in contrasting ways they all foreground Islander agency. This thereby 
affirms the value of  exploring religious perspectives on climate change.  
2. The significance of Christianity in the Pacific Islands 
 
In considering the place of  religious thought and action in relation to climate change, I here 
concentrate exclusively upon Christian faith practices, due to the overwhelming dominance of  
Christianity across the Pacific Island region. As Tomlinson and McDougall (2013: 2) highlight, 
utilising data from the 2004 World Christian database, across all Pacific Island states (with the 
exception of  Nauru and Fiji) more than 80% of  inhabitants identify as Christian, and in most 
cases the proportion of  Christians is higher than 90%. Meanwhile Operation World (2018) puts 
six Pacific Island countries in its list of  the 15 most Christian countries by percentage of  
population.  
The significance of  Christianity in the Pacific does not just lie in its statistical prevalence. 
Tomlinson and McDougall contend that Oceania is ‘solidly Christian’ because ‘Christianity is 
the dominant cultural force throughout the region’ (2013: 4) and it fundamentally shapes 
politics. Indeed, Douglas (2007) argues, that given the way that Christianity is built upon local 
beliefs in Melanesia, it is not experienced ‘as foreign or imposed…but as a lived spiritual reality’ 
(2007: 162).  
The importance of  Christianity is as true for Vanuatu as for the wider Pacific Island region. 
According to the latest national census at least 80% of  the population identified with one of  
the major Christian denominations (VNSO 2009)18. Christianity has also been identified as ‘the 
key national symbol’ (Douglas 2007: 161) in Vanuatu, as it brings greater unification to the 
                                                        
18 The survey includes nearly 30,000 respondents listed under ‘other’, some of whom may also be members of a 
less populous Christian denomination, such as the Mormons, who are not accounted for under the main survey 
divisions. 
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country than the very many different localised manifestations of  kastom. Part of  the power of  
Christianity may derive from the role of  the church in the colonisation of  the New Hebrides 
(as Vanuatu was formerly known). Indeed, Eriksen (2013) argues that the colonial Christian 
missions enabled governance on the village level, disciplining and regulating communities, and 
thus contests the idea that Vanuatu has a weak state, instead suggesting that the state project 
was to some extent successfully enacted through the churches. Post-independence, Eriksen 
argues that the nature of  the churches’ power has changed: it is dispersed rather than 
disciplinary, as through their partnership with NGOs, churches produce state effects, through 
providing services normally granted by government. This provision of  state effects and wielding 
of  state-like powers is highly pertinent to the question of  the role the Church plays today in 
climate change communication and adaptation.  
While my predominate focus is therefore upon Christianity as an organised religion in the 
Pacific, in Vanuatu the significance of  kastom cannot be overlooked. Few Ni-Vanuatu exclusively 
religiously identify with kastom practices – only around three and a half  percent of  the 
population according to the most recent census – (VNSO 2009), yet it still culturally informs 
many people’s spiritual outlooks. As Douglas (2007) highlights, Christianity and kastom are both 
formally enshrined in Melanesian constitutions, as leaders of  the newly independent nations 
embraced a form of  ‘Christianised kastom’ (2007: 160), such as Vanuatu’s first Prime Minister 
Walter Lini, who in his inaugural prime ministerial address claimed that ‘God and custom must 
be the sail and the steering-paddle of  our canoe’ (Douglas 2007: 161). Thus, the two belief  
systems are by no means necessarily antithetical, but are instead in dialogue with each other 
(Tomlinson and McDougall 2013). The mass conversion to Christianity did not lead to a total 
loss of  indigenous beliefs and practices, partly due to points of  compatibility between 
Christianity and kastom (Taylor 2016a).  
During my fieldwork I also noted a common acceptance of  select dimensions of  kastom. Those 
who strongly advocated traditional methods of  developing food security and the preservation 
of  customary knowledges also appreciated the damaging impacts of  some kastom practices upon 
gender relations, particularly observing how certain kin relations and the rights of  kastom 
marriages could legitimise sexual violence and undermine sexual consent. The negative uses of  
kastom were also more generally decried, such as the expression of  jealousy through the 
destruction of  roads, machinery or the sending of  rain to ruin festivities. Yet the use of  kastom 
power for positive purposes was not portrayed as inherently incompatible with Christian faith, 
at least by some priests from Presbyterian and other non-charismatic denominations.  
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Indeed, relationships with kastom vary by denomination, with the Anglican, Catholic and 
Protestant churches more willing to assimilate various aspects (Douglas 2007: 160), in contrast 
with more vehement rejection of  kastom by the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) and newer 
evangelical churches (Taylor 2016a), who often emphasise the potentially murderous 
dimensions of  sorcery. In terms of  my research focus, I am predominately concerned with 
churches that are inclusive of  some kastom practices, (which are also those that have the greater 
number of  members (Eriksen 2013)) with the exception of  the SDA. While recognising the 
dialogue between Christianity and kastom in Vanuatu, the significance of  Christianity in the 
Pacific Island region and its potential to shape perspectives on climate change is apparent. Next 
I turn to the actualisation of  that potential.  
3. Global to regional religious climate initiatives 
 
Firstly, the active engagement of  religious institutions in climate change advocacy on a global 
scale must be acknowledged. From the participation of  the Church of  England and the 
Methodist Church in the global fossil fuel divestment movement (Brown 2015), to the People’s 
Pilgrimage led by former Philippines UNFCCC COP delegate Yeb Sano, a ‘spiritual journey’ 
on foot from Rome to Paris in advance of  the 2015 climate negotiations (Scammell 2015), the 
increasing prominence of  faith-led responses to climate change is clear. Perhaps mostly notably 
the release of  Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato Si: On Care for Our Common Home has also brought 
the potential positive interrelation between religious institutions and climate advocacy efforts 
to global attention. The encyclical directly addresses the calamities of  climate change, as well 
as poverty and inequality, and the need for a worldwide ecological response, and has been 
lauded as a ‘profound analysis of  humanity’s earthly predicament’ (Hulme 2015: 16), modelling 
the moral leadership on climate change that has been called for (Dasgupta and Ramanathan 
2014). 
On a regional level, the proactive response to climate change by faith institutions is most evident 
with respect to the work of  the Pacific Conference of  Churches (PCC), an ecumenical 
organisation, and the regional division of  the World Council of  Churches. The PCC has been 
active around climate change for decades, first releasing a statement concerning the issue 
through its General Assembly in 1997 (Edwards 2014). This was followed in 2004 by its Otin 
Taai declaration (World Council of  Churches 2004) which called upon churches in the 
industrialised world to act in solidarity with the Pacific and for companies to facilitate the 
transition to low-carbon economies. The Otin Taai declaration also explicitly recommended 
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that Pacific churches allocate money in their budgets for climate change education, develop 
sermons regarding creation, and work through existing church structures to disseminate 
awareness, avenues that have to some extent been pursued in Vanuatu, as will be seen in the 
following section. The concerted environmental concern demonstrated by the PCC builds upon 
its history of  political and ecological engagement, particularly with regards to opposing nuclear 
testing (Edwards 2014).  
The PCC has also been strongly advocating a relocation agenda for those most threatened by 
sea level rise (Edwards 2014). The PCC General Assembly first tackled the issue of  relocation 
in response to climate change in 2007, culminating policy-wise in its Moana Declaration in 
2009, which emphasised the right of  communities affected by climate change to resettle in other 
Pacific Islands. The PCC has conducted research and worked directly with Pacific Island 
governments over the issue of  climate-induced relocation, as well as with communities in Fiji 
to help them develop relocation plans. In doing so, the PCC also embraces the spiritual 
dimension to its work through ideas of  the ‘accompaniment’ (Edwards 2014: 210) of  both 
displaced and receiving communities, tending to their ethical and emotional needs, through 
visiting and witnessing the stories of  those affected. The practical role churches can play in 
cases of  displacement is also demonstrated in the case of  the Carteret Islanders in Papua New 
Guinea, as the Catholic Church donated four parcels of  land for them to relocate to in 
mainland Bougainville. However, such a strong focus upon relocation could also be questioned, 
given the extent to which it might bolster rather than rebuff  the drowning islands discourse.  
According to Edwards, the success of  the PCC and their members’ efforts emerges from the 
unique status of  the church in terms of  its ability to build networks. She claims that ‘no other 
organisation is as close to the people affected nor as influential and independent in its advocacy 
role’ (2014: 210). Within this context she argues that the role of  church leaders is crucial, due 
to the respect they hold within society, and their capacity to communicate with and mobilise 
communities is unrivalled. Thus, the long-standing engagement of  the PCC in ecological 
concerns, the extant work they have achieved in terms of  policy and practice regarding climate-
induced relocation, and the influence they identify faith leaders as holding all testify to the 
significance and potential of  faith-based organisations in responding to climate change in the 
Pacific Island region.  
4. Faith-based climate initiatives in Vanuatu 
 
The inclusion of  faith organisations in climate initiatives is also evident on a national scale in 
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Vanuatu. The Vanuatu Government works in partnership with faith bodies with regards to its 
climate change operations, although indirectly. The National Advisory Board and Project 
Management Unit, the coordinating bodies of  the government’s climate change and DRR 
activities, co-operate with the Vanuatu Christian Council (VCC)19 via a consortium of  local 
NGOs. Many international NGOs, when establishing village-based committees to oversee new 
climate adaptation projects also make a practice of  ensuring there are representatives from local 
religious institutions included, and utilise time in church services as a means of  advertising the 
new initiatives.  
Usually we use the Church as it’s already a structure in place that 
mobilise a lot of the communities...the easiest way is to go through the 
Church because they do disaggregate the groups of the community 
already and make the service at different times. So, they just come 
and make like five minute or ten minute awareness.  
(David, ex-patriate NGO worker) 
 
Church-funded climate awareness projects are already in operation, taking a diverse range of  
approaches from training to preaching, tackling food security to construction. I heard reports 
of  the Anglican Church at work in the Torres Islands, in the far north of  the country, and of  
Presbyterian ministers preaching on climate change. The VCC was engaged in a project with 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation establishing nurseries and home 
gardening projects (encouraging families to grow food in the area immediately next to their 
houses, as opposed to solely in the traditionally established gardens which are located at a 
distance from residences) and has also trained community members as part of  climate change 
adaptation and DRR programmes. Meanwhile the Presbyterian Church has been engaged in 
a project regarding seawall construction in Nguna (one of  the islands closest to the capital 
island) and is also working with a community on an island off  Malekula who may need to 
resettle on the mainland.  
Moreover, while many Churches are already active on this issue, there appeared to be a 
consensus across my participants working in climate-based projects (as opposed to my 
participants formally positioned within the Church) that the Church offered huge unrealised 
potential in terms of  expanding climate change communications and they generally advocated 
                                                        
19 The VCC is an ecumenical body representing all Christian denominations within the country, and a national 
subdivision of the PCC. 
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the Church’s greater involvement.  
They are in places where the government does not go. They have 
networks that the government doesn’t have, and they have systems 
that are in place that we could explore and use to advantage.  
(Elijah, former government official) 
 
Among the perceived advantages of  greater engagement via the church was the existing formal 
structures for information dissemination and governance present in all villages across the 
country. This is a system of  enormous reach compared to the capillaries of  the Vanuatu state, 
or the capacity of  NGOs, and similarly to Reale’s (2014) analysis of  the Church’s power in the 
Solomon Islands, could fill a governance gap. With respect to the institutional presence of  the 
Church, other interviewees highlighted the significance of  the Churches’ existing youth groups 
and recreational and social programs, which could easily incorporate topics of  climate concern, 
and which could amass far greater audiences than an externally derived meeting regarding 
climate change ever could. As one interviewee emphasised, working through the Church would 
also give community members greater ownership over the programs, if  they occurred within 
‘that space that’s something that belongs to them’.  
Consequently, the underutilisation of  Church connections and resources was a common theme 
among responses by those professionally engaged in Vanuatu-based climate advocacy. As Elijah, 
the former government official further observed: ‘They are doing some things now, but it’s on 
a very, very minute scale’. This enthusiasm for an expanded place for the Church in climate 
advocacy was also shared by some pastors. Some ordained participants saw spreading 
awareness of  climate change and the threat it presented to their communities as well as the 
actions that parishioners could take in response as a crucial part of  their role. Other pastors 
also recognised that they held a greater degree of  authority and sway over the community than 
external initiators and thereby had the potential to encourage a greater participation in 
initiatives. As one representative of  the PCC quipped ‘academics have graduates but church 
leaders have flocks’, emphasising the far-reaching influence church leaders have within 
communities.  
On the other hand, some ex-patriate NGO workers expressed considerable resistance to the 
idea of  working more closely with the Church or explicitly incorporating scriptural passages. 
This scepticism was often justified with reference to the impartiality of  the organisation and the 
risks of  discriminating or dividing communities through denominational difference:  
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No, I try to be like, not using any church...because you don’t know 
who you’re having...here there are so many churches... so you never 
know to who you are talking to. So, I don’t want after they feel like, 
‘Oh we’re different’ you know. So, I’m not taking any political…as an 
NGO we don’t have any church and politics point of view, so we are 
completely blank on that. (Naomi, ex-patriate NGO worker) 
 
This suggests some scepticism towards the Church’s role, mirroring analyses that present 
religion as a barrier or that prioritise scientific knowledge, as will be discussed in the following 
section.  
5. Embracing tufala save 
 
Thus, it can be surmised that while some faith-based organisations are included within 
responses to climate change in Vanuatu, and regionally across the Pacific, this inclusion 
currently falls far short of  what is largely envisioned to be possible both by those at helm of  
climate initiatives and those within the Church. I contend that in order for churches to be 
maximally engaged in climate communication, adaptation and advocacy, there is a need to look 
beyond churches merely as convenient institutional frameworks for information dissemination 
and community mobilisation, but also to consider the power and potency of  religious ideas 
themselves. As a basis for this, I argue for an endorsement of  what a number of  my participants 
have referred as tufala save, a balancing of  both scientific and religious knowledges. For instance, 
as one participant reflected in relation to the appearance of  a rainbow in the story of  Noah:  
Oh well that’s like kind of climate change, coz you know the rainbow 
came out, that’s a promise, but and then scientist say it’s like, coz of 
the water or something, spectrum, creating a spectrum. It’s good to 
have two beliefs. Both of them are right. (Ruth, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
This simultaneous acceptance of  both beliefs (that a rainbow can at once be both no more and 
no less than a divine covenant and the refraction of  light through water droplets) challenges the 
hierarchy of  climate knowledges, contesting the pre-eminence of  scientific forms of  thought 
and also thereby motions to desecularise climate discourse. This is at odds with the existing 
negative appraisal of  religious perspectives on climate – the treatment of  religion as a barrier 
by scholars such as Kuruppu and Liverman (2011), Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop (2010), and 
McAdam and Loughry (2009) – which seems to emerge from an attempt to expunge religious 
belief  in favour of  scientific expertise. Moreover, while a number of  participants advocated the 
need for science and religion to work together, in balance, this notion of  balance does not equate 
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to an equal degree of  authority or validity for the two respective knowledges. Many proponents 
of  the tufala save approach firmly held the notion that in this relationship Christian forms of  
knowledge reigned supreme. As a Presbyterian pastor expressed it:  
Yeah, we can by scientific research say something will happen but if 
God says there will be rain, there’ll be rain. So, people believe that 
yes, we can say something, but God is sovereign.  
(Peter, Presbyterian Church) 
 
This supremacy of  religious knowledge sometimes manifested as a humouring of  scientific 
understanding.  
There’s scientific evidence and then there’s God’s view. So, I am a 
Christian person… but I like weighing things. Like scientists, like they 
are from this world and you know they’re smart, they know what they 
are talking about but then the Bible already talked about it…so if I 
am a Christian and I approach a scientist, I wouldn’t want to point 
the finger and say, “oh you’re wrong”. That wouldn’t be nice but just 
nodding and agreeing with him and say, “oh yeah, that was bound to 
happen”, like that. (Ruth, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
Or similarly some participants saw the provision of  scientific knowledge as a beneficent act of  
God. As one pastor explained ‘God gave us scientists to work with them on this issue’, a 
sentiment echoed in Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop’s (2010) research in Tuvalu, where some 
interlocutors concluded that the scientists were a conduit for God’s warnings. These approaches 
act as an inversion of  the manner in which cultural and religious understandings are often 
brought to the table as a lesser complement to the overall authority of  scientific thought. This 
also highlights the necessity of  embracing multiple, divergent knowledges, akin to what Kempf  
(2017) advocates as a relational approach, and to Hulme’s (2017) recognition of  the limitations 
of  purely scientific framings of  climate change, and the need for religious perspectives that 
provide a ‘thick’ account of  moral reasoning.  
Part of  the impetus for this bringing together of  these two forms of  thinking is not just because 
of  the Church’s organisational capacity, as previously discussed, but also because of  the cultural 
resonance of  biblical narratives as a means of  understanding climate change. As one SDA 
member explained it:  
We have stories about things in the Bible that we can relate to people, 
we can relate it to churches, so that it’s more applicable to the what 
 196 
we are facing now because history seems to be repeating 
itself…Those kinds of stories, when you talk to Christians they will 
understand it. (Isaac, NGO worker) 
 
Working through the lens of  religious thought can thus be understood as an avenue for situating 
climate change as locally meaningful and morally resonant (Hulme 2008; Nunn 2017). 
Others have issued this call for not just a focus on religious structures, but theological wisdom. 
For instance, the PCC’s Otin Taai declaration recommends that ‘Members of  the governing 
bodies of  [fossil fuel] companies should consider the theological views of  churches that address 
climate change and recognise what their companies are doing to God’s creation’ (World 
Council of  Churches 2004). This suggests not only an existing theological deficit, which some 
of  those who are active around climate change wish to rectify, but also a relationship between 
theological thought and the broader ethics of  climate justice in relation to fossil fuel 
consumption, which will be explored further in this chapter.  
This principle of  tufala save is already being enacted through partnerships between some NGOs 
and churches within Vanuatu. Many Ni-Vanuatu interviewees were open and positive about 
the prospect of  engaging with biblical scripture as part of  climate change communication, 
including those working on climate change from within the government. Some participants 
advocated the use of  the pulpit specifically as a site for climate advocacy, recommending the 
preaching of  sermons that explicitly addressed these issues.  
The German development organisation, GIZ, has put together a sermon on climate change 
that pastors can use, and which has been presented in some Presbyterian churches and been 
circulated further afield. The presentation draws upon scripture in order to demonstrate the 
foreshadowing of  current climate change impacts, as well as giving practical advice about steps 
that can be taken as part of  community-level climate adaptation, bolstered by the weight of  
biblical authority. For instance, in the presentation the current blight afflicting the leaves of  the 
laplap plant (which have a central role in many traditional meals) is explained with reference to 
Luke 21:11 ‘There will be famines and pestilences in various places, and fearful events and 
great signs from heaven’20. However, this text has been notably amended with the removal of  
references of  ‘earthquakes’, presumably in order to forestall the association of  all natural 
disasters with climate change. This is far from the only example of  liberal editing of  scripture. 
                                                        
20 All biblical quotations are taken from the New International Version, in line with that used by GIZ. 
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While parallels between existing climate change impacts and biblical precedents are clearly 
drawn, the latter are often dramatically decontextualised and stripped of  symbolic meaning. 
For instance, James 3:12 ‘A salty spring cannot produce fresh water’ is treated as a literal gloss 
of  the problem of  salt water incursion into a fresh water lens, yet when considered in the wider 
context of  James 3 is used metaphorically to refer to the character of  the human tongue with 
respect to the challenges of  taming it, and the problem of  a mouth that puts forth curses being 
able to praise God. Similarly, Ezekiel 17:8 (‘It had been planted in good soil by abundant water 
so that it would produce branches, bear fruit and become a splendid vine’) is treated as spiritual 
endorsement for the construction of  compost toilets as a means of  creating ‘good soil’. Yet 
descriptions of  the vine in question are commonly theologically interpreted as an allegory for 
the status of  Judea in relation to Egypt following the Babylonian invasion (Fishbane 1984) as 
opposed to a genuine horticulture recommendation. Thus, this presentation highlights some of  
the tensions between scientific and religious knowledges, and the fluidity with which biblical 
material can be used to tell a multiplicity of  stories, as will become further apparent in the 
discussions of  Noah. While the presentation is undeniably instructive with regards to climate 
change adaptation, it does not take advantage of  what the Bible does present with regards to 
climate change: a means for people to meaningfully relate to climate change as a moral and 
ethical issue.  
Pastors I spoke with from the Presbyterian, SDA, and Catholic Church all reported having 
delivered sermons regarding climate change, and a number of  my Presbyterian interviewees 
had attended services which explicitly addressed questions around climate change and extreme 
weather events. However other pastors and parishioners from a range of  denominations 
revealed that they had not delivered or witnessed any services concerning these matters, 
suggesting that while the pulpit is increasingly a site for climate communication, this is far from 
universal. This further confirms my participants’ assertions that the Church’s potential for 
climate advocacy is currently far from being fully realised.  
This also highlights a question regarding the scope of  my research with respect to 
denominational difference (a concern previously highlighted in Section 2 regarding relations 
between Christian thought and kastom knowledge). According to the most recent census, 28% 
of  Vanuatu’s population is Presbyterian, 15% are Anglican, another 12% are Roman Catholic 
and 12% are SDA (VNSO 2009). The remaining 13% of  the Christian population is spread 
across a number of  different smaller denominations, including the Church of  Christ, the 
Assemblies of  God, the Neil Thomas Ministry and the Mormon Church. The pastors I spoke 
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with all hailed from the four largest churches, as did the vast majority of  my research 
participants. Thus, although this research cannot claim to speak to all Christian denominations 
currently present in Vanuatu, it does consider the practice of  the four most popular, who 
collectively make up almost 84% of  the country’s Christian population.  
Thus, I have established the significance of  the Church in the Pacific Island region, and 
highlighted the vital and influential role it can play in climate change communication and 
adaptation. This is due not just to its institutional form but the alternative forms of  knowledge 
it disseminates, which have the potential to complement scientific knowledges and resonate 
more profoundly with Pacific Islander communities. Therefore, I now turn to the question of  
how these knowledges are being applied. In order to do so, I will focus upon one particular 
biblical narrative: the story of  the flood, Genesis 6-9.  
6. The biblical story of the flood 
 
The story of  the flood has been identified as the ‘archetypal account of  climatic disaster and 
existential threat’ (Hulme 2017: 83) across multiple faiths, and as an apocalyptic myth present 
in contemporary artistic depictions of  climate change that could serve to undermine pro-
environmental action (Salvador and Norton 2011). My reason for selecting this story over and 
above other examples from scripture are threefold. Firstly, it was a reoccurring feature of  
discussions with pastors and parishioners, and thus held meaning and relevance for many of  
my participants. Secondly, it has been at the centre of  a controversy regarding the relation 
between religious thought and climate discourse, and has been used as an excuse by some to 
dismiss the potential of  biblical knowledges in relation to climate advocacy. While the Noah 
story has legitimised an attempted purification of  scientific and religious knowledges (Kempf  
2017), I wish to use it as a means to explore the balance, enmeshment and tensions between 
different epistemologies.  
And thirdly, due to the contrast between the meanings my participants had garnered from it 
and those present in its more controversial form, it highlights the polysemic potential of  
scripture. As Salvador and Norton note, ‘subtle changes in mythic form can fundamentally alter 
the construal of  contemporary social and political issues’ (2011: 47). I contend that different 
articulations of  this narrative have symbolic and material power, and become entangled with 
particular and distinct understandings of  and responses to climate change. I trace three 
discursive manifestations of  the Noah story within the Pacific Islands. I consider the 
implications arising from these narratives in terms of  the political imaginaries they generate, 
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focusing on questions of  sin, trust and agency. Loosely focused on each narrative in turn, I 
consider the relationship between trust in the divine, prayer and action; divine warnings and 
the sin of  carbon emissions; and divine accompaniment and the rejection of  retributive 
suffering. Thus, the multiplicity of  interpretations possible highlights the importance, in Donna 
Haraway’s words, of  ‘which stories tell stories’ (2016b: 39), of  which readings are shared, for 
what reason and to what consequence. And I am indeed looking not just at the story of  Noah, 
but at what stories that story tells. This also again reiterates the wider power of  climate change 
narrative (Hulme 2009, Tsing et al. 2017), and its potential to either reinforce the inevitable 
inundation discourse or echo the counter-claim that islanders are ‘not drowning but fighting’. 
But first, I begin with a reminder of  the biblical passage itself. Genesis 6-9 recounts how in 
response to the sin and violence that filled the Earth, God unleashed waters from windows of  
the heavens and the fountains of  the deep, subsuming all land and wiping all living creatures 
from the Earth. All bar, Noah, his family, and diverse members of  the animal kingdom, who 
safely weathered the storms in an ark, hand-built by Noah to divine specifications. After more 
than a year at sea, this homeless menagerie disembarked, to be welcomed by a promise from 
God that such a fate should never befall them or their descendants again. Most pertinent to the 
first articulation of  the Noah tale is its conclusion during which God declares: 
I have set my rainbow in the clouds, and it will be the sign of the 
covenant between me and the earth. 
Whenever I bring clouds over the earth and the rainbow appears in 
the clouds, 
I will remember my covenant between me and you and all living 
creatures of every kind. 
Never again will the waters become a flood to destroy all life. 
(Genesis 9:13-15) 
 
6A. The first reading: the rainbow covenant and climate denial 
 
The ramifications of  this covenant extend far beyond the Old Testament itself. As has been 
documented by research into the Marshall Islands (Rudiak-Gould 2009), Kiribati (Loughry and 
McAdam 2008) and Tuvalu (Mortreux and Barnett 2009; World Council of  Churches 2011) 
this promise has been mobilised as a vehicle for climate change denial across the atoll states of  
Oceania, those countries often depicted as being on the front lines of  climate change. For 
instance, more than half  of  Mortreux and Barnett’s participants in Tuvalu reported that they 
were not concerned by climate change, and rejected climatological predictions of  sea level rise. 
These repudiations were based upon the premise that the rainbow covenant was a holy promise 
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that God would not flood the earth again and would safeguard Tuvalu. Such sentiments have 
been echoed by Harry Tong, Kiribati opposition leader and brother to the recent President, 
who publicly stated ‘Climate change is an all-natural phenomenon. You can’t really do much 
about that, unless you can talk to God and negotiate with God…He made a promise to Noah 
that he will never again destroy this earth with flood’ (Reed 2010). Teburoro Tito, a former 
President of  Kiribati, has also used religious grounds to espouse climate denial, contending that 
‘God is not so silly to allow people to perish just like that’ (Reed 2011).  
Interviewees I spoke with who were from or had worked in Tuvalu or Kiribati reiterated the 
presence of  this narrative, although none condoned it themselves: 
In the past when we tried to educate our own people…So they 
believe that the Bible said you know when God promised Noah he 
would never send floods and that’s what our older people used to 
think and they believe. In 2009 when I went back to Kiribati a lot of 
them are saying ‘are you saying that God will break his promise? God 
will never break his promise’ you know. (Eve, 350 Kiribati) 
 
This first reading of  Noah has three primary consequences. Firstly, it impedes local attempts to 
raise awareness, and stimulate proactive adaptation activities. One of  my I-Kiribati 
interviewees spoke despondently of  the resistance she faced from elderly members of  her 
congregation, rejecting her role as a climate advocate, and utilising the story of  the rainbow in 
order to do so.  
The elderly people, they always say when I talk about climate 
change...they always say ‘Oh no, this is not your task. Because you 
are pastors, ministers, church ministers, you have been telling us from 
the past until now, we are in this age now, we believe that there is a 
God, we’ve been saved... the sign of the rainbow which is the no 
more flood to be on the Earth to destroy the Earth. But now you are 
coming to tell us that this, all things like climate change, which means 
we are being destructed by another flood’. So they don’t want to hear 
about it. (Esther, I-Kiribati preacher) 
 
Secondly, this particular narrative manifestation has been condemned as detrimental to 
Islander agency in the face of  climate change. As Loughry and McAdam note, whether climate 
change is denied based on the rainbow promise, or is seen as a form of  divine punishment, 
these understandings ‘restrict the people of  Kiribati’s sense that they can be active in addressing 
the climate changes they are experiencing’ (2008: 51). Finally, this particular interpretation of  
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Genesis can be used to tarnish the potential for religious understanding and religious action on 
climate change more broadly. As Mortreux and Barnett have noted ‘faith that God will protect 
Tuvalu is such a strong belief  within the community that some officials identified religion as a 
barrier to awareness of  and adaptation to climate change (2009: 110 my italics). As Kempf  
(2017) highlights, this has resulted in an attempted purification of  scientific and religious 
knowledges by some social science scholars, and a derogation of  faith-based responses, thereby 
neglecting the potential of  religiously-informed messaging (Nunn 2017). 
While this reading raises issues that are pertinent to Vanuatu (such as the relationship between 
trust in God and agency), which will be discussed in Section 8, I did not encounter this narrative 
itself  during my Vanuatu-based fieldwork. It was not apparent in sermons, church publications, 
climate change workshops or village discussions, and when I directly asked a few NGO workers 
and pastors about this reading of  the tale they explicitly rejected it. However, other 
manifestations of  the Noah story did emerge.  
6B. The second reading: preparation and sin 
 
In a post-Cyclone Pam Port Vila, awash with discourses of  national resilience and sacks of  
donated rice, the story of  Noah was repeatedly invoked as a parable for the need for greater 
preparedness. One SDA member explained to me that: 
People in the past they have faced famine, they have faced flood, you 
know, I mean, we as Christians, we believe in the story of the flood, 
there was a flood, you know. So, Noah prepared, he prepared. He 
built a boat so that he can save all the animals. (Isaac, NGO worker) 
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Figure 14 - Winning entry by Biliso Osake in the Pacific category of the 2012 UNDP Asia-Pacific Cartoon Contest on Climate Change and 
Human Development. 
I encountered this interpretation of  the tale in discussions with pastors from the Presbyterian 
Church, the Anglican Church and the Seventh Day Adventists, as well as Ni-Vanuatu NGO 
workers and youth climate activists. In contrast to the first reading - where the story of  Noah 
was used to enable climate change denial - the second reading uses Noah as an instructive 
against the dangers of  denial itself. As one climate adaptation project worker presented it:  
Noah’s story is a good one that I think I’ve used... when it came to 
hard questions which were asked and I can feel that these questions 
are doubts, doubt questions from community then I use this to push it 
if I know it is a religious community. So, I will say the example of 
Noah. He warned people on the vision he saw but they were 
ignorant, and then what happened? (Sarah, NGO worker) 
 
Thus, here the story of  Noah is not a vehicle for doubt, but explicitly mobilised as a weapon 
against it, encouraging shameful identification not with the successfully prepared Noah, but 
with the doubting masses who foolishly did not heed the signs. 
Explicitly drawing parallels between Noah’s predicament and Vanuatu’s current challenges 
with respect to climate change adaptation and enduring extreme weather events, some pastors 
encased the biblical teaching in the language of  disaster risk reduction. For instance, one official 
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from the Presbyterian Church described how:  
God talks to Noah and he starts to prepare. Many people laugh, but 
he does it. When disaster strikes, he is prepared and puts all the 
animals inside. The same as with climate change, the same as with 
tsunami. They reach land, the dove goes out, they are at the 
rebuilding stage, building it back up again. The disaster strikes 
because there was a covenant with God before, and it is broken. But a 
new covenant is made and they can rebuild.  
(Cornelius, Presbyterian Church) 
 
Far from the world-changing and apocalyptic, the eventual receding of  the waters is envisioned 
as a familiar, manageable and predictable point in a cyclical disaster response process: ‘the 
rebuilding stage’. This reframing of  scripture within NGO discourse is also apparent in the 
Pastors and Disasters handbook, a guide which has been circulated to some Anglican ministers in 
Vanuatu, where Noah’s acts of  preparation are framed as ‘a strong risk mitigation plan’ 
(Episcopal Relief  and Development 2014: 1.1).  
As well as Noah, the figure of  Joseph was invoked by a handful of  participants as an icon of  
sage preparation. Thus, additional biblical stories were used to bolster the narrative of  Noah. 
One SDA interviewee drew explicit parallels between the seven years of  famine the Egyptian 
people faced and the ongoing threat to Ni-Vanuatu food security presented by climate change:  
Joseph, during the time of famine, famine in Egypt, there was seven 
years of harvest and seven years of drought, you know? For that seven 
years it is the seven years of preparation, you know. You must have 
plenty food and everything. And after seven years, that’s climate 
change, you know. I mean, they foresee that there’s going to be a 
drought and Joseph was the person who tell everybody ‘plant as 
much as you can because we’ll be having drought for another seven 
years’. (Isaac, NGO Worker) 
 
As a slight variant, another SDA member also emphasised the pertinence of  Joseph’s actions, 
but interpreted the plentiful and lean years in Egypt as corresponding to the annual cycle of  
extreme weather events in Vanuatu.  
Some of these preachers they preach about Joseph’s time, the 
drought, the seven years plentiful and the seven years of drought. 
And that we translate it into Vanuatu per year on a yearly basis six 
months safe climate conditions, and six months disaster climate. So, 
what we are trying to learn here is to make people prepare within the 
six months, food security and prepare for shelter and food 
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preservations and then we wait for the next six month seasonal which 
is not really safe season for climate. And then we see how, if any 
cyclone happen to come, at least people they are ready and using 
those concept, those principles from the Bible.  
(Adam, ecumenical organisation) 
 
Thus, rather than potentially having to prepare for an open-ended and ongoing state of  
suffering (when the famine acts as a substitute for climate change), the years of  famine are 
normalised and brought within the framework of  a manageable and predictable regular cycle, 
akin to the reference to the post-flood period as the ‘rebuilding phase’. This manageability, 
achieved partly through a linguistic fusing - an NGOisation of  scripture - is also apparent in 
the same participant’s contextualisation of  the story: 
We have lessons learned from the drought in the Bible where Joseph 
was the key coordinator in Egypt. (Adam, ecumenical organisation) 
 
As well as bestowing Joseph with an incongruous title, more redolent of  international 
development discourse than Genesis, he incorporates the ever-present post-Pam evaluative 
mantra of  ‘lessons learned’. Again, this tone is echoed by Pastors and Disasters, in reference to 
Genesis 41. The Archbishop for the Anglican Church of  Burundi describes how the Pharaoh 
acts by ‘choosing Joseph to become the steward of  that huge DRR project for the Egyptian 
people’ (Episcopal Relief  and Development 2014:1.4). However, this does suggest the potential 
for an affinity between spiritual belief  and adaptive practice as Archbishop Ntahoturi further 
affirms that ‘disaster preparedness is an ideal for everyone who loves the Lord and His creation’ 
(2014: 1.4).  
Thus, this second narrative of  Noah – emphasising preparation and climate belief  as opposed 
to denial – was also reinforced with other biblical stories, and through a merging of  NGO and 
theological discourse, indicating the multiple knowledges that participants were engaging with. 
Through its contrast with the first story of  Noah the heterogeneity of  religious perspectives 
becomes apparent. However, in other renderings of  the tale, Noah’s role was less celebrated. 
6C. The third reading: those outside of the ark 
 
The third and final reading of  this tale emerged during an interview with Ezekiel, a church-
based Tuvaluan climate advocate who was actively working to contest the rainbow covenant as 
denial discourse in his home country and to generate new scriptural understandings. This 
reading stands in contrast to the first, as it reaffirms the Rainbow Covenant while denying its 
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relevance to climate change due to the latter’s anthropogenic rather than divine origins, and 
thereby like the second framing emphasises the need for human action. 
I am not saying that we are losing hope in the covenant. We are still 
part of the covenant. And God is still part of the covenant. And he 
remains faithful to his words. I think the problem is with us human 
beings. And that is the good news. The issue of climate change is 
nothing to do with God. But it’s something to do with us. Therefore, 
there should be a solution somewhere. Because if it is to do with God, 
therefore it’s beyond our capabilities, beyond us. But since this is a 
human made catastrophe, therefore there should be a human 
solution from below, not above. (Ezekiel, Church of Tuvalu) 
 
But it also refutes the basic premise of  the second framing, by rejecting the presentation of  
Noah as an aspirational figure. In his radical re-reading Ezekiel argues that: 
Sometimes we tend to ignore the cries of those who were outside the 
ark. And many animals were died outside the ark. And we also tend 
to ignore those kinds of readings. We always go to the conclusion that 
Noah was the hero in the story and he should be praised for what he 
has done. But disregarding the cries of those who were outside of the 
ark. Those outside the ark need to be liberated and I think God is 
with those who are outside the ark. God is struggling with them, 
trying to alleviate them while Noah he is enjoying the luxury life, you 
know. And those who are outside the ark: I think we can identify 
ourselves with those who are outside the ark. Those who don’t have 
the resources to be on Noah’s ark. So, I think we are more related to 
those who were floating outside the ark. (Ezekiel, Church of Tuvalu) 
 
Another Tuvaluan scholar, Reverend Lusama, General Secretary of  the Ekalesia Kelisiano Tuvalu 
(the Tuvalu Christian Church), mirrors Ezekiel’s scorn for Noah who is ‘enjoying the luxury 
life’ while many around him drown, as he argues that: 
We have seen that the ark has taken a sharp change in shape and 
form, it has ceased of being a lifeboat, it has ceased to be a divine 
instrument of life affirmation, but it has become a human made ark, 
which favors not the innocent but the value of money. It ignores the 
cries of the poor, the powerless and the marginalized while it tends to 
the voices of the rich and the powerful…Therefore, the boarding 
ticket onto our present ark is no longer innocence, but profit.  
(Lusama 2004: 92). 
  
Thus, those whose actions perpetuate ecological destruction are rewarded, while the innocent 
are punished. In Lusama’s words, ‘literally, they are overboard while the guilty are on-board 
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the ark of  salvation’ (2004: 97).  
While this reading is theologically unorthodox, it is highly pertinent to the question of  which 
narratives constitute the Anthropocene. It forefronts the suffering of  those during the flood and 
extends this concern beyond solely the human. Indeed, with the mention of  the ‘many animals’ 
who died outside the ark, Ezekiel invokes the sentiments of  multi-species compassion 
highlighted by Kate Rigby (2008) in her account of  the ark, and advocated by Tsing et al. 
(2017). With popular media discourses ever regurgitating representations of  Tuvalu as a sinking 
paradise, the canary in the global coal mine, it is not such a conceptual leap to consider those 
so imminently threatened as those outside of  the ark. And reconsidering the story of  the ark in 
this light is part of  an explicit plan by Ezekiel to ‘try to find a Tuvalu position on reading those 
texts’, and thus an attempt by Pacific Islanders to reassert control over the discourses concerning 
them. Having described the three tellings of  the Noah story that I encountered during my 
research, I next turn to the different political imaginaries they generated or foreclosed.  
7. Meanings of the ark: political implications and hybrid knowledges 
 
As Tsing et al. (2017: M8) observe, ‘some kinds of  stories help us notice; others get in our way’. 
Similarly, I contend that these three different evocations of  the story of  Noah (rainbow covenant 
as denial, Noah as icon of  preparation, and Islanders as unjustly outside of  the ark) offer up 
different political imaginaries in response to climate change. They open up some possible 
avenues of  thought and action, while foreclosing others, suggesting the heterogeneity of  
religious responses to climate change. The constraints of  these political imaginaries centre 
around intertwining themes of  sin and responsibility as well as questions of  trust in divine 
providence versus individual agency (which may be bolstered or inhibited by the 
aforementioned trust). Bearing these key themes in mind, I will discuss the political imaginaries 
generated by the three stories in turn.  
7A. Trust in the divine, prayer and agency 
 
In response to the first narrative, I explore the extent to which faith can lead to apathy in the 
face of  climate change. I highlight the potential for trust in the divine to produce a lack of  
agency, probing the relations between action and prayer and thereby questioning the limited 
political imaginaries generated by this discourse. However, cynicism regarding faith-based 
responses to climate change in Vanuatu can be tempered by recognising the multiplicity of  roles 
prayer can play in relation to action. Rather than entirely dismissing the first manifestation of  
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the Noah story, I acknowledge the arguments of  Kempf  (2017) and Rubow and Bird (2016) 
who contend that this use of  the Noahic covenant as a rejection of  climate science is also in 
itself  a counter-discourse which refuses to sublimate all other sources of  knowledge to the 
Western scientific.  
The rainbow covenant as denial narrative presents examples of  religious beliefs leading to 
inaction in response to climate change, in Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands. I begin 
therefore by exploring the extent to which religiously-based apathy or fatalism was also present 
in Vanuatu. Firstly, while not invoking the rainbow covenant as example, some participants in 
Vanuatu did still legitimise climate inaction through their religious understandings. As one 
member of  the Anglican Church explained to me:  
The foundation of Vanuatu is built on the Christian faith and the 
word of God says that it is not for you to worry about the 
weather…God is the boss of the clouds and all of the other things up 
there, he sends rain to come, he sends wind to come…nature is 
controlled by God. Then for us to try to solve climate change, we 
can’t. Because only God will say what happens tomorrow…When 
people come and talk about climate change with us, we understand it 
as a natural disaster so there’s no need to worry about it. Because if 
you worry about it, it’s not your business. It’s not my business. It’s 
God’s business. (Deborah, Anglican Church) 
 
This echoes Donner’s (2007) argument that within a Pacific Islander context especially the 
weather and the climate are seen as part of  the domain of  the gods, in contrast to the land, 
which is under the dominion of  humans. While this expression of  unconcern was anomalous 
among my participants, the suggestion that climate change was in God’s hands, and therefore 
beyond the purview of  human action, did chime with the sentiment voiced by another 
participant that the only avenue open to those in Vanuatu was prayer. This was most notably 
in relation to the actions of  neighbouring Australia, who was acknowledged to have caused the 
pollution that was affecting Vanuatu. 
If after that, Australia doesn’t want to do that [to change], then the 
people of Vanuatu will pray ‘Father God, you keep climate change as 
it has been for all time and you keep us safe’. Because of all of the big 
countries we can’t go to them and say you must stop. Only people of 
that country can go and say to their countries they must stop. It’s like 
that. (Gabrielle, Anglican Church) 
 
This approach stands in stark contrast to that of  the Pacific Climate Warriors as explored in 
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Chapters Four and Five (whose demonstration can be understood as exactly that which 
Gabrielle cautions against) and taps into a wider question of  the tension between prayer and 
action. One participant mapped this opposition onto the distinction between Christian religion 
and kastom, as a critique of  the approach of  the former:  
When we talk about the Bible, the Church talks about how we should 
pray, we should pray. But with kastom, we make it with our hands, we 
do it through action… like we pray to God to hear us, but with 
kastom, we make something with our hands, with our thinking, yes. 
(Abraham, chiefly authority) 
 
Thus, the tension between trust and agency, or fatalism as opposed to choice is again echoed, 
but with these differing positions occupied by different bodies of  knowledge (kastom versus 
Christian) as opposed to different theological stances. On the other hand, kastom and scientific 
knowledges were not without their own tensions, in relation to disaster preparation. One 
employee at the Meteorological Office recounted a row he had had with a chief  in the 
immediate build-up to Cyclone Pam. He urged the chief  to tell all the people of  his village to 
take precautions against the impending hurricane, but the chief  assured him that him and those 
with the strongest kastom were working their hardest to deflect the cyclone and did not need to 
alarm the others. Without disrespecting kastom nor chiefly authority the Meteorological 
employee desperately tried to convince the chief  that kastom alone was insufficient preparation, 
and was unfortunately proved correct. With some schadenfreude the employee remarked that 
as soon as telecommunications were restored the chief  was one of  those who most urgently 
demanded food rations, tents and tarpaulins as his village had been savagely hit. In spite of  
incidences such as these, the shape of  the cyclone’s path, as it almost entirely avoided the 
northern Vanuatu islands of  Malekula and Santo was commonly attributed to the fact that 
those communities were known to keep strong kastom. Overall, this suggests that even if  both 
scientific and kastom knowledges provoke proactive responses to climate change and disasters, 
the nature of  the actions encouraged may be at odds with each other.  
There are other way in which faith-based apathy towards climate change could emerge. 
Understanding climate change as a divine rather than human matter, with prayer as the only 
recourse, could also result in a fatalistic apocalypticism. As one 350 Vanuatu member who was 
very active in climate advocacy explained:  
Most of the people are Christians and people believe in climate 
change, that climate change is happening and most of them believe 
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that you know, it’s just Jesus coming back again and it’s the last 
days…They have all this thinking and so they do believe, they really 
had this concern like ‘we have to pray hard, we have to’ you know? 
And they keep on praying, praying, without doing something which is 
really actioning, like go plant something to stop coastal erosion and 
they just keep on praying. And so, they have like confusion. It’s all 
confused them that they just keep praying but Jesus isn’t coming back 
again but sea is coming up and they lost all...so that why we try to we 
try to like keep on praying but just do something, you know, to keep 
all your resources in place so that you can have the accessibility to it. 
(Moses, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
Others also spoke of  the threat apocalyptic interpretations presented to effective climate 
communication. Indeed, a number of  participants who referenced the Bible as a warning or 
foretelling of  climate change adopted an apocalyptic tenor. Interviewees mentioned the book 
of  Revelations, the prophecy of  the end times presented in Matthew 24, and the shocking time 
of  Daniel 2 in relation to current and future impacts of  climate change. One pastor postulated 
that climate change was the consequence of  sin, springing from the disconnection of  humanity 
and God, and thereby destined to end in Armageddon.  
Climate change is a sign of catastrophe that has hit the world. Slowly 
it will increase in the sense that if we see it as a sign of the problem of 
sin which affects man and disconnects him from God so man 
becomes selfish…When man does not connect with God, man 
disconnects himself and becomes wicked due to selfishness, then man 
creates a sign to show that God will be angry and destroy this world. 
This world will be destroyed. (Amos, SDA preacher) 
 
This argument was reinforced again with reference to Noah, through emphasis upon the fallen 
world surrounding him that God is forced to wash away. 
If we take it as a sign we will say that man has become selfish. We 
look back at the story of Genesis in Chapter 6, we look at Noah’s 
story, the Bible tells us that this world becomes so wicked. People 
forget God. That is why God decided to put an end to this problem. 
(Amos, SDA preacher) 
 
Consequently, even while this first telling of  the ark is not knowingly in circulation in Vanuatu, 
the potential links between religious understandings and failure to take action due to a faith in 
divine intervention (or a sense of  inevitable damnation) are present. Moreover, the scepticism 
regarding faith-based responses to climate change, highlighted by Kempf  (2017) in his analysis 
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of  existing accounts of  the rainbow covenant discourse in Kiribati and Tuvalu, was also not 
unknown in Vanuatu. In a conversation about the role the Church can play, a participant 
described how when discussing this on the island of  Epi:  
They all started laughing and they said ‘Church is always just 
pointing up here. Just keeps pointing to God’. So, they don’t deal 
with down here, they point up there. (Andrew, ex-patriate NGO 
worker) 
 
Others also indicated that they suspected the Church was more preoccupied with otherworldly 
spiritual preparations rather than contemporary corporeal concerns, particularly in the case of  
certain denominations such as the Neil Thomas Ministry. So far, such an analysis could align 
with those scholars who seem to suggest religious perspectives inhibit rather than enable 
proactive responses to climate change. The first manifestation of  the Noah story, and the 
concurrent emphasis upon prayer rather than action, and upon spiritual futures rather than 
worldly presents suggests a limited political imaginary, with little room for Pacific Islanders to 
play an active role in the face of  climate change. It seems to resonate with rather than challenge 
the inevitable inundation discourse. 
Yet I contend that the relations between trust in the divine, prayer and agency, and the 
implications of  the first reading of  the Noah story are far less straightforward than this. Firstly, 
Hereniko (2014) defends Islanders who in the face of  climate change choose to place their faith 
in God rather than scientific research. He postulates that it is the most prudent and sensible 
option, given the greater dependability of  God compared with the large industrialised nations 
who had created the problem in the first place, a contrast to the emphasis by the Pacific Climate 
Warriors upon the naivety yet goodwill of  Australia in Chapter Four.  
Secondly, denouncing prayer as a simple opposition to action does not reflect the experiences 
and understanding of  many participants. For instance, one official from the Presbyterian 
Church insisted upon the importance of  prayer, but also of  taking responsibility for action in 
addition to it. He explained that for example when faced with a cyclone one should pray to 
God for protection, but one must also take actions such as cutting down the trees nearest the 
house. One cannot simply pray, as one can depend on God excessively, and thereby fail to take 
responsibility for oneself. Meanwhile, in the Pastors and Disasters handbook, Archbishop 
Ntahoturi interprets prayer not as in opposition to or a complement to action, but as a 
precursor, as he recommends ‘praying for and receiving God’s inspiration so that people in the 
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position of  taking actions can understand what God wants them to do’ (Episcopal Relief  & 
Development 2014: 1.5). These two articulations of  the combined role of  prayer and action 
also highlight the theme of  warnings and foretelling, which will be explored in Section 7B. 
Finally, the circulation of  the rainbow covenant discourse, and the denial of  the severity of  
climate change can itself  be seen as an example of  agency, and reclaiming of  control over 
Pacific Island futures. As Kempf  (2017) argues, the rainbow covenant denial narrative is in itself  
a rejection of  the inevitable inundation discourse, and to some extent has been produced as a 
backlash against scientific and political pronouncements that hasten the demise of  Kiribati. 
Consequently, Kempf  interprets this first reading of  Noah as a ‘religious-political 
counternarrative’ (2017: 24). He observes the way it is mobilised in Kiribati by the 
parliamentary opposition, to delegitimise the current government and to resist the scientific 
narrative of  climate change currently imposed upon Kiribati. Similarly, Rubow and Bird (2016) 
argue that in referencing the rainbow covenant, Tuvaluans are denying the inevitable 
inundation discourse by instead professing a faith in the ongoing continuity of  the world, in a 
way that reflects the interconnectedness of  land-sea-air that is central to much Oceanian eco-
theology. This is rejection of  impending disaster in favour of  continuity is confirmed by Kempf  
who argues that this Christian counter-discourse gives Islanders recourse to a higher authority 
than that of  the scientists, and allows them to project a different vision of  Kiribati’s future, one 
of  ‘continuity and stability’ (2017: 34) as opposed to total loss. This agency, expressed through 
disrupting the hegemony of  scientific knowledge is captured by former President of  Kiribati 
Teburoro Tito who claims ‘I laugh because I don’t give in totally to science’ (Reed 2011). 
Consequently, even the much-maligned rainbow covenant discourse does present instances of  
agency, and contests the supremacy of  scientific knowledge, presenting instead a political 
imaginary rooted in faith and continuity. However, the other two narratives of  Noah appear to 
present a more fruitful convergence of  scientific and religious knowledge, as well as more 
explicit emphases upon Islander agency. To this end, I now consider the theme of  warning and 
foretelling, as emerged in the second Noah reading and the story of  Joseph and the Pharaoh.  
7B. Divine warnings and the sin of carbon emissions 
 
In response to the second narrative, I begin by examining the place of  warning and foretelling, 
moving onto a consideration of  the failure to heed messages and act. Recognising the frequent 
understanding of  climate change and Cyclone Pam as messages that encourage changes in 
behaviour, I consider the relationship between sin and carbon emissions. I explore the extent 
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to which some Ni-Vanuatu take on the burden of  climate change causation, and how this sense 
of  climate sin can be situated in the wider context of  perceived moral decline. I therefore 
highlight the generation of  a political imaginary dominated by localised individual action.  
Firstly, central to the interpretation of  Noah as parable of  preparedness was the emphasis upon 
heeding or failing to heed warnings, acting either as Noah or the others of  his time did. One 
facet of  this was a reiterated observation by many participants of  the extent to which the Bible 
warns of  or foretells climatic changes. 
I mean if you read about the Bible and there’s verses in which they, 
they speak about something’s going to happen and if you take the 
things happening I mean compare with all this climate change stuff, 
it’s really, it’s really happening like. What it says in the Bible it’s 
happening now. (Moses, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
Climate change was often recognised as being part of  the domain of  the gods (Donner 2007), 
just as the flood of  Noah’s time and the famines that Joseph and Pharaoh faced were. Yet while 
during the first narrative this led to the conclusion that human action was inconsequential, in 
this second retelling, participants followed in the footsteps of  Noah and Joseph, advocating the 
importance of  preparation.  
Then for us to try to solve climate change, we can’t. Because only 
God will say what happens tomorrow. But we have to prepare. We 
must prepare because we don’t know what will happen tomorrow. 
(Gabrielle, Presbyterian Church) 
 
Thus, in this reading human agency – the capacity and willingness to prepare – is still crucial, 
not just in spite of  but because of  the unknowability of  God.  
Discussion of  warnings and foretellings often moved from the generality of  climate change to 
the specificity of  Cyclone Pam. Many I spoke with affirmed knowledge of  the cyclone through 
means other than the broadcasts of  the Meteorological Office. One preacher spoke of  a vision 
a few days prior of  a saucepan over-boiling that she saw as a portent of  a coming disaster, and 
another described many of  the auguries witnessed in nature, from the way to the clouds were 
flying, the appearance of  unusual birds, to the rippling of  the ocean, all of  which he understood 
as God’s revelation through nature.  
While the cyclone’s death toll was very low, some were still critical of  the failure to heed 
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warnings and prepare, again couched in the relation to Noah as an example.  
Noah was approaching a disaster, but Noah prepared for that 
disaster. And an awareness had gone to everyone already and 
something was coming but they didn’t worry like that. It’s just like 
Vanuatu. Vanuatu, when they recognise the red light is coming, they 
don’t worry, they just walk all around, a lot of them, like I’m saying, 
drink kava and then they are surprised, and they run all around and 
then where will they go? Where will they go now, for the wind is 
strong? Everything is blown down, like that. But if everyone had 
prepared, you would come to Vanuatu and look, and you wouldn’t 
even know a hurricane had passed. (Deborah, Anglican Church) 
 
Again, this answer reflects the NGOisation of  scripture: while translated from the Bislama, the 
phrase ‘awareness’ as a singular noun appears in English in the original, bringing divine 
pronouncements and contemporary development communications under the same umbrella. 
Linked to these ideas of  preparation and warning was an emphasis on the importance of  
interpreting the divine significance of  Pam’s coming. For instance, the same preacher also 
emphasised the cyclone as a holy lesson:  
So, when the cyclone came and gave us a disaster, you can see that 
the people of Vanuatu are all over the place, because everyone 
understood that God had come to teach, or that God had given us a 
warning, that we must look at how we are living. So, we understand it 
that way. (Deborah, Anglican Church) 
 
Others followed suit, interpreting the cyclone as an instruction for those in Vanuatu to change 
their lifestyles to be more in accordance with God’s plan. 
And creation being God’s revelation, God is speaking to us through 
nature, so when Cyclone Pam strike people say, ‘What is God saying 
to us?’. Maybe God is speaking to us through nature maybe because 
of the way we live so we need to change the way we live. So, the 
hurricane was not only described as a hurricane but the issue of what 
is God speaking to us through the hurricane.  
(Peter, Presbyterian Church) 
 
The idea of  climate change and Cyclone Pam as divine imperatives for behaviour change 
highlights the importance of  sin, particularly the sin of  carbon emissions. This is demonstrated 
in a recent sermon by Fiji-based preacher Richard A. Davis. He rejects the denialist 
reassurances of  the first reading of  the flood, but uses the promise of  the rainbow as evidence 
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of  climate change’s anthropogenic nature, as is also found in the third reading. He postulates 
that ‘instead of  coming from God’s hand, the rising waters of  climate change are the waters of  
human sin’ and argues that ‘in some ways we deserve the punishment of  a worldwide flood as 
people implicated in the causes of  climate change. Some have more emissions than others, but 
we all have emissions and many of  us use beyond what is acceptable for a stable climate’ (Davis 
2015). Thus, the language of  ‘carbon indulgences’ (Nerlich and Koteyko 2009) with its religious 
connotations moves from the metaphorical to the literal.  
Both this interpretation and the narrative emerging in Vanuatu, appear to align with what Peter 
Rudiak-Gould (2013) has identified as a framing of  ‘universal’ climate blame. All are held 
equally responsible for causing and responding to climate change, while recognising that their 
contributions to the problem may be at different degrees of  magnitude. This interpretation 
clearly aligned with the ethical stance of  some participants:  
If we say that ‘No, we don’t make emissions’, but think about when 
you’re burning a tire how much poison is in the tire which will affect 
the environment…We all contribute to cause the climate change 
problem. Ah, even the human body produces heat, yes it produces 
heat and it is good heat that’s coming out of the body. But otherwise 
we all contribute one way or another, maybe in the islands small scale 
and in bigger countries bigger scale. (Amos, SDA preacher) 
 
Linked to this was a refusal to direct accusations of  blame at the larger industrialised countries, 
and thus a rejection of  a model of  ‘industrial blame’ as Rudiak-Gould (2013) categorises it.  
I think it’s everyone’s business. I mean obviously pointing fingers 
hasn’t worked so far and so I’m not going to say industrialised 
countries are responsible for this. I mean there’s probably a degree of 
accountability yes, but I don’t think responsibility should lie in their 
hands because we’ve seen that it doesn’t work. (Martha, 350 
Vanuatu) 
 
There is a clear pragmatism to this argument—that apportioning blame solely to the global 
north has been ineffective—yet it also stands in stark contrast to the antagonistic politics of  
blame enacted by the Pacific Climate Warriors with respect to Australia. Others sympathised 
with this position, with for instance one pastor explaining ‘Ah we can pass this [the buck], we 
can point fingers at people, you can do that but four fingers will always come back to you’. 
These sentiments suggest that Vanuatu could be legitimately pointed at in terms of  climate 
change responsibility, a notion that may be at odds with historic emissions records but not with 
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the attitude of  many participants.  
Linked to this emphasis upon the need to prepare and take collective responsibility for climate 
change, many respondents also talked about the need for those in Vanuatu to mitigate their 
own carbon emissions: burning less rubbish, taking less truck rides, using less wood to make 
cooking fires. Some preachers explicitly incorporated these guidelines for more sustainable 
living into their preaching. For instance, one pastor outlined some of  his key advice to 
parishioners:  
Don’t cut down trees. Be careful with your plastics. So, we go along 
with the government in promoting non-plastic society where we carry 
a basket to go shopping rather than get plastics and bring pollution... 
So, we talk about protecting trees and careful of burning the trees, 
cutting down trees but protecting them because they give us air. And 
also, the way we bring pollution. Like people are getting a lot of tin 
stuff, they eat and then they throw them all over the place and they 
bring pollution and let tin into the sea and bring poison to the fish or 
into the river. So simple steps where a community can look after 
themselves, not so complicated. (Peter, Presbyterian Church) 
 
This attitude is mirrored by Tuvaluan theologian Fusi, who, while condemning the ‘Big Homes’ 
of  those who have sought wealth and power and thereby caused anthropogenic climate change, 
also pinpoints Islander moral responsibility. He argues ‘the blame must not always be upon the 
big countries of  the world because the people of  Tuvalu have also failed to look after their only 
home’ (2005: 17). He consequently invokes the current ecological predicament as an 
opportunity for Tuvaluans to act as stewards towards their homeland, a theme that also 
reoccurred across my interviews.  
These messages of  environmental conservation as well as emissions reduction were also being 
disseminated in secular contexts. For instance, at a food security workshop in Malekula, a large 
island in the North of  Vanuatu, participants asked whether they shouldn’t burn wood because 
of  climate change and were told by the presenter that indeed they shouldn’t burn too much. 
The same question emerged in a similar workshop regarding disaster relief  gardening vis-a-vis 
mulching cleared vegetation or using the more traditional swidden approach: while the former 
was encouraged as being more sustainable, this was in tension with the cultural respect for slash 
and burn. Villagers were also encouraged to replant in order to replace any logged trees. 
Similarly, in a workshop focused on planning the goals and targets of  350 Vanuatu, some of  
the participants discussed the need for all villages that were using benzene for light to move to 
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solar, and suggested that people should walk short journeys, rather than take the bus. These 
emphases upon the potential and necessity for Islanders in both urban and rural contexts to 
reduce their own carbon emissions suggests an extreme localisation of  responsibility for a global 
issue.  
While NGO workers advocating these messages did not place blame on Islanders acting 
without awareness of  the climate consequences, they did insist on the need for better climate 
communication and education, in order for Islanders to be able to rectify their behaviour.  
It is not our grandfather’s fault if he doesn’t know, if he doesn’t plant 
or he digs out sand, it can cause sea level rise. It is not Auntie’s fault if 
she doesn’t stop to burn plastic, it continues to heat up the 
atmosphere. So I think that we should do more…maybe media or 
organize some more things to give out information… It is important 
for us to inform… for what they should do, what they should not do, 
what they should reduce. (Sarah, NGO worker) 
 
And many of  those spreading these messages clearly practiced what they preached. For 
instance, one NGO worker spoke proudly of  the changes she had made to her own lifestyle:  
Using my own basket like when I go down to the shop or to the 
market, thinking ‘I have to take my own bag’, put in all the foods that 
I want, not taking too much plastic to go home...and also one another 
thing is sometimes I decide to walk, going back home, just for a short 
distance, don’t need bus, I have to walk and one other action that I 
have like growing my own food. (Abigail, NGO worker) 
 
Meanwhile a public official spoke of  how she had embraced green technologies at home in the 
form of  solar, and reframed many of  the domestic features of  her life that are common across 
Ni-Vanuatu households (such as not using a fridge or electric heater) as forms of  sustainable 
living.  
Like myself at home I use solar. I don’t use electricity…Now we use 
solar for water as well. We don’t have water supply, but we have rain 
water tanks and a ground tank but when we...like small things like 
when we do gardening we don’t burn the bush anymore like before… 
Avoid burning big bush, it’s small but we avoid smoking, burning of 
plastics and wheels and all that. We just burn that around our area 
and we also plant a lot of trees, but like coconuts and sandalwood. 
We plant a lot of them, a lot of flowers as well, green areas eh? So, 
this, I have a small place, so this is what we try to do. We don’t allow 
burning of plastics and leaves and all that. We just compost them. But 
nothing major but we decided not to use electricity power, we just use 
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solar. So, we don’t have fridge, we don’t have heater, we had them, 
but we decided not to use them because we don’t want to consume 
electricity. (Oprah, Government employee) 
 
However, some strongly disagreed with the emphasis upon Islander mitigation as a practical or 
ethical response to the climate crisis. One of  the NGO workers criticised the hypocrisies present 
in climate change communication: 
We have taken almost two times a plane to say that and then we will 
blame somebody that normally walk by foot, but he takes three times 
a year a truck. It’s kind of stupid now. No, it’s much more good to 
avoid to take the blame to do that and then you will reduce the 
impact, you know. So, yeah, I’m not really comfortable to blame the 
people who have really small impact and this kind of stuff. I would 
not recommend to do that. We are here to help the people. We are 
not here to say, ‘No, you do not need to use the truck. You have to go 
back to the kastom. So, if you have somebody sick you will have to 
carry them’ and then us we live in town and we have a huge impact. 
(David, ex-patriate NGO worker) 
 
This highlights questions raised by Agrawal and Narain (2012) about the failures to distinguish 
between ‘luxury emissions’ compared with ‘survival emissions’: the emissions Pacific Island 
villagers produce in order to meet their basic needs are put on a par with high carbon Western 
consumerist lifestyles. And in many ways my conclusions initially concurred with Agrawal and 
Narain, as well as those of  the above participant. As many social scientists might (Rudiak-Gould 
2014: 366), I perceived this as a flawed political imaginary. In this narrative of  sin, preparation 
and universal responsibility it seemed the wider injustices, the disproportionate nature of  the 
causes and consequences of  greenhouse gas emissions are at danger of  being overlooked. This 
approach fails to hold industrial nations thoroughly to account as those who the big nations 
owe the most too have already shouldered the responsibility of  building their own boats.  
While this political imaginary may be incompatible with narratives of  historic responsibility 
and colonial legacies, it still offers possibilities for rethinking notions of  ethics and agency in 
response to climate change. Reflecting back on the first story of  Noah, what originally appeared 
to lead simply to fatalism and denial, through Kempf ’s (2017) interpretation can be read as a 
counter-narrative, one that affirms the superiority of  locally endorsed religious knowledges, in 
contrast to externally imposed scientific epistemologies. Similarly, this narrative of  Islander 
responsibility can be read as a political imaginary that centres Islander agency rather than the 
responsibility and capacities of  the industrialised nations. Hereniko shares this view, arguing 
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that the damage that Islanders have caused to their island environments and the carbon dioxide 
emissions that Oceania is responsible for need to be taken into account. In doing so, Islanders 
are able to take action, rather than action just being the prerogative of  bigger continental states. 
He declares that ‘the sooner we realise that we are also contributors to our own demise, the 
sooner we will empower ourselves to be part of  the solution and not part of  the problem’ (2014: 
234). This perspective also echoes Hau’ofa’s world enlargement, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
as it centres Oceania as the site for the resolution of  global problems. Rudiak-Gould echoes the 
agentive potential of  having carbon sin, as he argues that ‘innocence implies impotence’ (2015: 
58).  
Indeed, as Peter Rudiak-Gould (2014) has comparably highlighted with respect to 
understandings of  universal climate blame in the Marshall Islands, there is a great sense of  
empowerment to be found with the solutions to climate change being in local rather than 
distant foreign hands. As one NGO worker who was taking positive sustainable steps in her own 
life and with her community explained: 
It gives me strength like I’m not waiting, I’m not depending on...yeah 
and I can do, like individual people can do something else to reduce 
their own emissions and everybody, it’s everybody’s business to adjust 
their own lifestyle and it gives me strength to influence...that strength 
can help me and my family and other people in my community that 
we can do something and we do do something.  
(Abigail, NGO worker) 
 
As Hulme (2009) has highlighted, climate change can be mobilised in support of  a multitude 
of  ideological projects. Consequently, this sense of  collective responsibility for climate change 
becomes more comprehensible through a framework of  wider moral decline, again a parallel 
with Rudiak-Gould’s (2012) work in the Marshall Islands. In a process he refers to as 
‘promiscuous collaboration’, explanations for sociocultural changes are brought under the 
umbrella of  anthropogenic climate change in locally meaningful ways. Thus, in Vanuatu, 
scientific knowledge is used to supplement religious and kastom understandings of  the world. As 
one pastor explained, the failure to enact these more sustainable lifestyle practices, for example 
through not littering, leads to a despoiling of  creation and a failure of  stewardship.  
We see that many things are coming and before Vanuatu was just 
natural. When a leaf falls it rots, but plastic cannot rot, metal cannot 
rot. With good life, easy life it has implications as well. There are 
impacts that will hit us hard if we are not careful. We have to 
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properly dispose plastics, tins that we use. Care for the environment 
because when we do, the environment will help us. Without that, the 
environment can become our enemy. That’s probably why our world 
is changing, and climate change is happening. We will ask why? God 
has created it perfectly, but we humans maybe are not careful.  
(Amos, SDA preacher) 
 
Some embraced the tufala save approach, welcoming the extent to which science now supported 
biblical arguments for moral decline. This mirrors a process identified by Kempf  with respect 
to the first reading of  Noah, in which ‘the Western climate narrative was co-opted on the basis 
of  Biblical exegesis’ (2017: 42). Similarly, here science is used to bolster pre-existing religious 
understanding, as opposed to being superior or in antagonism with it.  
Speaking from a Christian point of view, we know that this world is 
never going to be a good world because you know because it’s going 
to get worse and worse, worse as we come, you know, because of 
many things that happen, because of the human activity, what we 
have done is against, against the nature, you know…Because of this, 
as we develop, we will get those consequences…And science has 
proven that. Even though we have not proven that as a Christian, but 
science has proven that, yes. This world is becoming hotter and 
hotter. So, we are glad that science has proven that.  
(Isaac, NGO worker) 
 
This despoiling of  creation was not limited just to human impacts upon the natural world but 
spoke to the wider moral infractions occurring within Ni-Vanuatu society. For instance, one 
Presbyterian pastor spoke of  how the cyclone could be seen as an admonishment of  changing 
sexual practices:  
What is God speaking to us through the hurricane? In Vanuatu 
there’s a lot of corruption in high places and also the homosexual 
issue has never been mentioned but now people are recently that 
publicly, prostitution issues are becoming visible and sex before 
marriage is now common. These are the areas that people are saying 
maybe we’ve gone so far in these areas that maybe God is speaking to 
us like Sodom and Gomorrah. (Peter, Presbyterian Church) 
 
A thread that connected these concerns was that of  a systematic movement away from devout 
Christian practice and the maintenance of  kastom traditions (highlighting the interrelation 
between Christian and kastom knowledges), and in its place the adoption of  a Western selfish 
individualism.  
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In Vanuatu’s context before, people lived together and shared things 
in common, everything is under the chief’s authority and everything 
is in common with people, but today different cultures have come, 
many different attitudes changing the mentality of man. It makes 
man more individualistic. So, man becomes more self-centred. He 
wants this and that. He wants a truck, a good house, he wants 
everything…So people are yes, compared to before, people nowadays 
only want things for themselves. (Amos, SDA preacher) 
 
While this critique was levelled at Ni-Vanuatu society in general, accusations were particularly 
targeted at young people who were living in urban areas, rather than remaining on their islands 
of  origin and contributing to the agricultural work of  the family. As one Catholic priest 
explained:  
Now, because some of them have been to school too much. So now 
they want to study. They’ve been overseas, and they’ve seen that 
lifestyle, and now they want to take that lifestyle. It’s good that they 
bring it, but that they adjust it with life here, then they can build back 
their relationships. Because sometimes when they go there and come 
back, the relationships that we have here, they don’t have it anymore. 
Like now, this only using the phone, but there’s no real contact.  
(Joel, Catholic preacher) 
 
This concern about moral decline in Vanuatu, including the loss of  respect for elders and move 
away from kastom practices is well documented (Mitchell 2011; Smith, 2016; Taylor 2016b). It 
also highlights further tensions surrounding which knowledges are valorised. At the centre of  
this repeated refrain, that chastised the population for letting go of  their traditional knowledge 
and their resilience, failing to act like the prepared and resourceful Noah and succumbing 
instead to the dependency and lethargy of  Western lifestyles, was a yearning for a future past. 
One NGO worker put it bluntly:  
It’s the attitude of the people. I think it’s just the people, they need to 
be trained, they need to be you know trained to go back to the way 
our ancestors were living before. Make their own gardens. We have 
more and more youth in town. What are they doing here? Nothing. 
They are supposed to be sent back there, work with the community, 
those people who are like our fathers and grandfathers, going to the 
garden. This youth is supposed to be following the grandfather, going 
to the garden and learn all the techniques, instead of you know...To 
me, if food is an issue, it’s just because it is our responsibility. We are 
lazy, sorry to say that, but it’s true. In fact, in the island I think people 
are sitting there crying ‘we have no food because of Pam’. Pam just 
came in. Our attitude of making gardening and drinking kava and 
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then during the day we sit, relax, we waste a lot of time, when we 
should be out there in the bush. Pam just came in and addressed the 
issue that yes, we are not working hard enough, like our ancestors. 
So, I think for me, I think, there needs to be a lot of awareness, for 
people to start going back to the garden to olden days.  
(Phoebe, NGO worker) 
 
There is an undeniable romanticism to this vision of  the better times before, one that is far from 
unique to Vanuatu. Indeed, it mirrors Tsing et al.’s (2017) call to shift away from the linear, 
teleological march of  progress that has occasioned the Anthropocene, and instead ‘return to 
multiple pasts, human and not-human’ (2017: 2G). Further, what is significant is the manner in 
which climate change and extreme weather events have moved beyond a purely scientific 
domain of  causation and consequence, and are made locally meaningful through being situated 
within this pre-existing moral framework. This moral dilemma between ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’ played out throughout discussions of  Cyclone Pam. As just one example, of  the 
thankfully few deaths that happened during the cyclone, many were reportedly caused by flying 
copper sheeting, torn from the roofs. In many accounts I heard of  those, responsibility wasn’t 
centred on the relationship between excessive emissions in faraway countries and increases in 
extreme weather events, but the failure to keep kastom, traditional practices and beliefs. Kastom 
thatched houses aren’t deadly if  they collapse in high winds, whereas those who had perished 
in the cyclone had become literal victims of  Westernisation and its dangerous and unstable 
brick houses.  
Jacka (2009) highlights how the impacts of  El Nino in the Porgera Valley in Papua New Guinea 
were accommodated within Christian narratives of  punishment and apocalypse or were 
understood as revenge for the destruction of  significant ritual sites through colonial road 
building. Both Jacka’s work and examples from my own fieldwork problematise the 
anthropogenic dimension of  climate change. Potentially Ni-Vanuatu, Western scientific and 
Porgeran accounts can all concur regarding the human responsibility for global warming, but 
not in terms of  which human actions have caused it. This raises the question of  whether it is a 
case of  religious infraction, cultural corruption or excessive carbon emissions, and to what 
extent these different narratives of  causation converge or diverge from each other.  
It must be recognised that this discourse of  local responsibility and preparedness reflects a wider 
sentiment: Vanuatu becomes the centre not just of  the problem but also the solution. Naomi 
Klein (2014) in one of  her recent volumes envisions climate change as an unrivalled opportunity 
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for positive social transformation. Within Vanuatu it became evident that climate change was 
an opportunity to articulate the importance of  indigenous knowledge, the practical and moral 
superiority of  Ni-Vanuatu kastom practices, Christian forms of  connection and care for nature 
and community, and potentially advocate for a renaissance of  pre-capitalist values and forms 
of  livelihood, in the face of  increasing urbanisation and Westernisation. This mirrors Rudiak-
Gould’s argument that emphasising local responsibility for climate change as a means of  
reinforcing existing cultural narratives ‘carries postcolonial and counterhegemonic 
potentialities of  its own’ (2014: 367). 
And following the logic of  this political imaginary, all can become Noah, righteously following 
God’s path in the spite of  the sin and scepticism that surrounds them by building their arks. 
Thus, the second reading of  Noah, like the first, becomes the vehicle for agency, although in 
this case, also tied to fervent climate change belief. Rather than being in opposition, kastom, 
Christian and scientific knowledges form a productive entanglement, that highlights the 
contributions spiritual understandings and religious institutions can make to climate change 
responses.  
7C. Divine accompaniment, global justice and the rejection of retributive suffering 
 
Both the first and second Noah stories produce political imaginaries that centre Islander agency, 
albeit in different forms, and based upon different configurations of  knowledges. While the first 
emphasises the supremacy of  religious knowledges over scientific knowledges, to the point of  
denying the later, the second story illustrates a convergence of  religious, kastom and scientific 
knowledges, with the former two bolstered by the latter. Agency is demonstrated in the first 
story by the very act of  validating biblical perspectives, and potentially through acts of  prayer 
and an emphasis upon spiritual concerns. By contrast, the agency of  the second narrative is 
focus upon the worldly, particularly the world as pertains to Oceania, both in terms of  
Oceania’s responsibility to adapt to and mitigate climate change, and the attempt to restore a 
former moral order. Yet neither of  these approaches capture the religious perspectives nor 
political imaginaries expressed by the Pacific Climate Warriors’ actions. Their protest 
encompassed both the importance of  prayer and trust in the divine but as tied to climate change 
belief, and emphasised worldly agency, yet laying moral responsibility at the feet of  the 
industrialised nations, rather than Pacific Islanders themselves.  
Consequently, in response to the third narrative, I highlight ideas of  divine accompaniment 
(faith that God is always by one’s side), and in doing so I problematise the retributive suffering 
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highlighted by the Noah story. Instead, I will emphasise injustice, and the moral responsibility 
of  those nations historically and currently to blame for the greatest proportion of  carbon 
emissions.  
Firstly, the third telling of  Noah refigures the meaning of  the rainbow. No longer is it a promise 
built on false hope, as in the first telling, nor a warning of  sin and coming disaster, as emphasised 
in the second. Instead Ezekiel, one of  the third narrative’s major proponents, argues that:  
Although the rainbow is there, it’s just a sign showing that God is 
with us. God is present in our struggle. I think that’s one message of 
hope. (Ezekiel, Church of Tuvalu) 
 
This reading resonates with Upolu Vaai’s (2015) work on Samoan embodied theology, where 
he contends that a common misreading of  the Noah story is that there will be no more floods. 
Instead, God is promising through his rainbow to be with humankind in their suffering, and it 
has pained Him to unleash such suffering upon his creation through the flood. This telling’s 
message of  divine accompaniment, of  God being beside Pacific Islanders in this time of  trouble, 
did resonate with the sentiments of  many pastors. For instance, one Catholic priest spoke of  
Luke 8, the story of  Jesus and his disciplines crossing a tumultuous lake, in order to help his 
parishioners understand climate change. He explained:  
It’s that at bad times or good times, He is still with you. He won’t let 
you go. Because sometimes, we feel like He has abandoned us. But 
He is still there. Like in this boat, as it is going to sink, the disciples 
are leaving the boat, but He is still there. So whatever situation they 
are in, He is with them. (Joel, Catholic preacher) 
 
Cyclone Pam was also addressed in a similar manner by many pastors. One parishioner relayed 
the metaphor his preacher had used—that of  a tree that stands—to recognise the place of  God 
alongside those in struggle. It was the tree that had lost all its branches, yet still stood that had 
felt the full force of  the cyclone, compared to that which had been uprooted. Thus, in order to 
endure a cyclone one needed to be firmly rooted in faith: ‘you just have to have faith in God 
that God will take you through a cyclone’. With the lack of  action and fatalism this could 
potentially engender, this reaffirms the tension between trust in the divine and action, as 
explored in Section 7A.  
And this sense that God was beside them during troubling times was something a number of  
participants shared in terms of  their own experiences of  the cyclone. The same parishioner 
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described how his faith had kept him and his family safe during the height of  the winds. 
Right throughout the night I was walking around the room praying 
and everyone was sleeping. And I said, ‘I need you guys to join me in 
faith’ and we were going to go through the cyclone with God. And we 
did not receive a scratch on the house. The roof, nothing.  
(Elijah, former government official) 
 
Indeed, one preacher attributed her survival to direct divine intervention.  
I said ‘God, you look for a small place like this, and you will protect 
me, give me a way out’. When I said that, I saw that the word of God 
came to me then. He said, ‘You’re going to be out.’ He opened the 
back door; the door was heavy because the wind was strong. The 
door came out, I fell down with it. It threw me down. When it threw 
me down like that I carried the door and I threw it away and I went 
under a small roof like that one and I said ‘God, you don’t take out 
this one. You leave this one like it is’. So, this place, like I said, ‘Please 
don’t come, please don’t fly away’, it stands to this day, right there. 
(Gabrielle, Anglican Church) 
 
This sentiment of  recognising God’s protective presence during struggle was also shared by 
many of  the Pacific Climate Warriors in the run-up to the flotilla. One Warrior spoke of  her 
lack of  fear due to the confidence that God was beside them, in their boats. 
I believe that God will go with us, yeah. So, there will not...nothing 
will happen to me. (Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands) 
 
Reflecting back on the social movement literature, the notion that God accompanies activists 
in their struggles resonates with Skrimshire’s (2008) analysis of  faith in environmental protest 
groups in the UK. He argues that direct action involves both practical risk, such as the 
possibility of  arrest or injury, (similar to the Warriors’ fears documented in Chapter Five) as 
well as epistemological risk, as participants are inevitably acting under a condition of  
uncertainty regarding the scale and timing of  climate impacts. He contends that given this 
uncertainty direct action therefore requires faith: faith not in the security of  religious salvation, 
but in the value of  ongoing human life. Skrimshire’s words are valuable here, as Pacific Islander 
activists face far greater climate uncertainty than their UK counterparts. However, I reject the 
secular binary Skrimshire presents: the Warriors demonstrate that one can act buoyed by faith 
both in the value of  life and in salvation.  
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For many Warriors the sense that God was on their side also dovetailed with an understanding 
that through their action they were doing God’s work, recognising their climate activism as a 
form of  spiritual devotion. As highlighted in Chapter Four, the Warriors’ shared spirituality also 
helped to unify the group, creating familial-like bonds and overcoming national differences. 
One of  the Warriors spoke of  how through his involvement in 350 Pacific he felt certain that 
God had a plan for him that he was now able to fulfil, and another echoed similar thoughts, 
interpreting climate change as a righteous challenge that brought the Warriors together.  
In order for God to answer your prayers you need to work towards 
for it, you need to work hard for it. So, I think this is God’s way of 
bringing youth together, raising issues to fight and work towards the 
solutions...Because in my personal opinion, God works in miraculous 
ways and that he loves to work in the right time, the time you least 
expect it. (Maria, 350 Fiji) 
 
For one Warrior the sense that God was on their side and they were doing His work was again 
framed within the story of  Noah. During a speech at a post-flotilla speaking event in 
Melbourne, Reuben from Tokelau invoked the flood as an example of  human failure to care 
for creation, leading God to set an example through His act of  global destruction. The same 
mistakes committed by humanity before the flood were being repeated in this day and age, 
through deforestation, oil spills and the pollution of  creation. Therefore, through the act of  
blockading coal ships and occupying financial institutions that enabled the expansion of  the 
fossil fuel industry, the Warriors were acting like Noah. They were following his commandments 
and upholding their part of  the covenant. This interpretation resembles that of  the second 
reading through the identification with the figure of  Noah, and the positive relation between 
trust in God and action. However, it radically differs in terms of  how holy work is understood: 
rather than preparing themselves through ensuring their own safety in the face of  calamity, the 
Warriors are directly confronting those who seek to secure themselves at the cost of  defiling the 
planet.  
Fusi, a Tuvaluan scholar, also concurs with some dimensions of  this. He suggests that the people 
of  Tuvalu must begin ‘protesting against injustices in the governments of  the world and the 
ways of  the big and rich nations of  the world’ (2005: 31-32), but sees these acts of  challenging 
injustice as a form of  repentance and renewing of  relations with God, and thereby living in a 
more godly way, again suggesting that climate activism can be a realisation of  one’s duty to 
God in the world.  
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Some even understood their involvement in activism as potentially an act of  salvation. As one 
Warrior expressed it, climate activism was a means for them to prepare their own soul for 
judgement and to safeguard the souls of  others:  
It’s like you know we’re trying to save the Earth you know. With our 
Christian belief, in my Christian belief, I also believe that it’s also a 
time to prepare, like spiritually you have to prepare your soul. You 
don’t know, anything could happen to you any time and so it also 
falls on individual people you know, to actually prepare themselves, 
not just talking about climate change and but it’s also you have to 
prepare yourself…So if I help to campaign and stop climate change 
it’s also like saving the souls of some people who are struggling and if 
they died from climate change or anything related to climate change. 
(Moses, 350 Vanuatu) 
 
As well as demonstrating how trust in God (via faith in divine accompaniment) can combine 
with action, and highlighting how climate activism can be interpreted as a form of  spiritual 
devotion, this third story also challenges the narrative of  sin presented in the previous section 
(7B). Following Lusama (2007), I argue that the ‘outside of  the ark’ reading of  Noah moves 
away from a retributive model of  suffering (suffering as a deserved punishment) and instead 
attributes sin to those causing climate change on a global scale.  
Lusama (2007) recognises some of  the incongruity of  applying the Noah story to the current 
situation regarding climate change in the Pacific Islands. While Noah can be seen as a figure 
of  righteousness in contrast to the sin surrounding him, and consequently does not lose his life, 
those currently most affected by climate change, such as those in Tuvalu, are the poor and the 
marginalised, not the wrongdoers. This is thus at odds with a retributive theory of  suffering 
(2004: 23). The reverend rejects the minimal emissions of  the atoll state as justification of  their 
predicament, in clear contradiction to the second narrative, contending that:  
The people of Tuvalu have no part at all in the sin that brought 
about global warming and its negative impacts. They are so innocent 
that to believe that they have been punished for being innocent is 
impossible to comprehend. (Lusama 2007: 23) 
 
Thus, Lusama also rejects the first narrative’s divine punishment dimensions. Continuing with 
the ark metaphor, he directly advocates for the place of  Tuvaluans on the ship, but noting their 
absence suggests that perhaps ‘they were mutinied and thrown overboard the ark’ (2007: 25), 
leaving them indeed outside of  the ark as Ezekiel suggests. Indeed, in a more extended piece, 
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Lusama articulates a more systemic critique of  capitalism, globalisation and consumption as 
the root causes of  climate change, arguing that ‘lying behind this problem of  global warming 
and sea level rise are the major systems of  injustice that serves only the good of  a few powerful 
in the whole world’ (2004: 6). This is mirrored by Davis, who despite emphasising the sin of  
Islanders is also adamant that ‘Capitalist greed, originally and primarily of  the West but now 
extending its tentacles over the whole globe, with its continued and ever more aggressive 
violations of  mother Earth is what lies behind climate change’ (2015: 39). Returning to the 
second narrative and the emphasis upon moral decline in Vanuatu, these different moral 
outlooks have a clear point of  convergence: both highlight selfishness and greed of  Western 
consumerist lifestyles. However, the previous perspective emphasised the impacts of  these at 
their most marginal outposts (Pacific Islands), whereas this reading highlights the source.  
While both Lusama and Ezekiel stress the position of  Islanders as metaphorically overboard, 
Fusi argues that being outside of  the ark actually gives them a stronger voice. He contends that: 
We will never be silenced even if we sink. Our sinking itself will 
amplify our voice in urging the nations and peoples of the world as a 
whole to do something about the global warming before it is too late. 
(Fusi 2005: 46) 
 
To reiterate this position in terms of  the Pacific Climate Warriors, Fusi’s stance seems to be that 
‘in our drowning, we are fighting’. His analysis also echoes yet inverts Farbotko’s (2005) concept 
of  ‘wishful sinking’. Fusi suggests that climate change is a holy message to the world that is 
articulated through the loss of  Tuvalu, as it is ‘God’s will and purpose, making Tuvalu become 
landless so that the world may be saved from worse situations in the future caused by global 
warming’ (2005: 42). Here, instead of  a passive sacrifice that demonstrates the severity of  
climate change (‘wishful sinking’), Tuvalu is presented as a martyr, acting for the sake of  the 
globe, another instance of  world enlargement, and portraying Tuvalu in an almost Christ-like 
position. 
Indeed, for Lusama it is the figure of  Jesus, not Noah, who sheds most light on the situation, as 
Jesus’ death epitomises the undeserved suffering, such as those in Tuvalu now face, and 
demonstrates that God is by the side of  those who are so afflicted, reaffirming the emphasis 
upon divine accompaniment. Moreover, he invokes the figure of  Christ as a rallying cry for 
Islander-led justice, arguing that ‘Tuvalu, though small in size and population, has the 
obligation to stand for justice, this is the lesson we learned from the Cross’ (2007: 23). He 
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suggests that in blaming some humans, rather than God, for climate change, it enables us to 
fight with rather than against God, in opposition to systems of  oppression and inequality. 
Echoing the words of  the Warriors in Chapter Four, in their world enlarging claims that their 
actions are not for the islands alone, but on behalf  of  a global population, Lusama also notes 
that ‘Tuvalu is not alone in this, even though Tuvalu is probably the most vulnerable country 
to the devastating impacts of  global warming and sea level rise, salvation from such scenario is 
a collective salvation, and should be sought as such’ (2007: 23).  
Therefore, in this rejection of  local blame and pinpointing of  the sin of  industrialised nations, 
this third reading of  Noah provides a religious basis for political action that directly confronts 
those most responsible for carbon emissions, as is manifested in the case of  the Pacific Climate 
Warriors. It returns to the question of  trust in the divine posed by the first narrative, and 
incorporates that into a call to action, emphasising divine accompaniment: one can have faith 
in God’s presence despite the unjust suffering caused by climate change.  
8. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated not only the social and cultural importance of  Christianity 
in the Pacific Islands, but also, through examples from Vanuatu and across the Pacific Island 
region, the potential for faith-based institutions to engage in climate change responses. In doing 
so, I have made three main contributions. Firstly, I have looked beyond institutional capacity 
and also considered different instances of  religiously informed thought and action, thereby 
addressing the shortage Haluza-DeLay (2014) has identified of  social scientific accounts that 
address how religion shapes what people are saying and doing about climate change. Secondly, 
I have attempted to challenge scholarly representations of  religion as a barrier to climate 
change communication, and instead highlight the potential of  religious belief  as a resource. 
Thirdly, in identifying these instances of  thought and action, I have sought to elucidate the 
heterogeneity of  religious responses. I have highlighted some of  the potential for multiple faith-
based narratives regarding climate change, recognising how different understandings of  climate 
change emerge from different ethical positions (Hulme 2009: xxvi). Through this focus on 
narrative – primarily the biblical story of  Noah and the flood – I have also contributed to my 
wider thesis goal of  exploring counter-narratives of  the Anthropocene, which disrupt that 
inevitable inundation discourse.  
I focused on the story of  Noah because of  its presence in Pacific discourses of  climate change, 
its rich polysemous nature, and because of  the controversy surrounding it and faith-based 
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climate denial. Following Rubow and Kempf, I recognise that those presenting religion as a 
barrier to climate responses often correspondingly demand a purification of  scientific and 
religious knowledges, to the exclusion of  the latter. I have utilised the Noah story to an alternate 
end: to highlight the interrelationship between multiple knowledges of  climate change 
(religious, scientific and kastom) and the potential for both convergence and tension between 
these. Moreover, I have argued that these different combinations of  knowledges and ethical 
positions generate different narratives – different readings of  the Noah story – that present 
different possibilities for action, highlighting some political imaginaries and foreclosing others.  
The three tellings of  Noah showcase different tensions and entanglements between scientific, 
religious and kastom knowledges. In the case of  the first story, there is evidence of  an antagonism 
between knowledges, as opposed to a tufala save balancing of  multiple ways of  knowing. Tied to 
this pitting of  the scientific against the religious, there is a consequential belittlement or 
distancing of  religious modes of  thought (and consequently a failure to recognise their value) 
by scholars who are disturbed by the climate scepticism present in the narratives. There is also 
an emphasis by advocates of  this narrative on faith in divine protection in a manner that inhibits 
action, and excludes the scientific. Meanwhile both the second and third stories demonstrate 
productive convergences between scientific and religious knowledges, yet convergences that 
produce very different and even contrary political imaginaries.  
All three narratives engaged to different extents with matters of  sin: a theological reframing of  
the questions of  blame and responsibility for climate change that have been considered in 
Chapters Four and Five. Given our postlapsarian state, in the first story’s denial of  an oncoming 
flood there is not necessarily a confirmation of  Islander innocence. Yet in the more apocalyptic 
manifestations of  this first narrative, there is a greater emphasis upon the coming destruction 
of  the material world and on spiritual welfare, with our primary duties being to God, as opposed 
to the two other narratives’ focus upon worldly endeavours. While questions of  sin and moral 
decline were central to that second narrative through the concern with Islander climate 
mitigation, the encroachment of  Western consumerism and loss of  kastom practice, in the third 
narrative Islanders were by contrast labelled innocents, in comparison with the sin of  the 
polluting nations. The third story transcends the retributive theory of  suffering suggested by 
the second story, shifting its focus from Noah and the individual, to Christ and collective 
political action.  
None of  the narratives explored were inimical to a focus upon Islander agency, yet they 
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presented relationships between trust in the divine and action in highly contrasting ways. With 
the first narrative – the rainbow covenant as denial – while the potential for fatalism and apathy 
was highlighted, the very act of  faith was itself  an exercise in agency through a valorisation of  
religious knowledge and rejection of  the externally imposed scientific understanding of  the 
ecological futures of  the Pacific Islands. Meanwhile both the second and third narratives 
combined spiritual faith with a belief  in scientific prediction, yet reached different conclusions 
regarding appropriate courses of  action. The third narrative emphasised political action 
orientated towards the major polluting nations; in the preparation narrative, the focus was more 
local and self-directed.  
While Chapter Four demonstrated how climate change created an opportunity for the 
performance of  Oceanic regionalism and a contestation of  power relations between the Pacific 
Islands and larger neighbouring states, this examination of  religious perspectives on climate 
change presents a further example of  ‘what climate change can do for us’ (Hulme: 2009: 326). 
Within Vanuatu it became evident that climate change was an opportunity to articulate the 
importance of  indigenous knowledge, the practical and moral superiority of  Ni-Vanuatu kastom 
practices, Christian forms of  connection and care for nature and community, and potentially 
advocate for a renaissance of  pre-capitalist values and forms of  livelihood, in the face of  
increasing urbanisation and Westernisation. 
None of  these narratives are the right one: none should be treated as an exclusive vehicle for 
future climate communication. But the diversity of  courses of  action they demonstrate suggests 
the richness and heterogeneity of  religious responses to climate change and the potential for 
fruitful connections between religious and scientific knowledges. Returning to the ‘horror 
stories’ of  the Anthropocene Buck warns us of, the limitations of  purely scientific responses to 
climate change noted by Hulme, and the lifelessness of  the rationalist unenchanted world that 
Bennett rejects, these stories offer us an alternative. They demonstrate the potential for more-
than-scientific yet not anti-scientific responses to climate change, that are locally meaningful, 
morally compelling, and in their own manner challenge the disempowering narratives of  
climate doom and victimhood that surround the Pacific Islands. The Warriors’ words carry 
through all these stories: while the first denies the very act of  drowning, the latter two show us 
what a spiritual battle against climate change might look like. 
7. Conclusion 
 
Yumi no draon, yumi faet! The crowd’s chant, a Bislama translation of  the 350 Pacific slogan, 
intensifies in the half  light of  the beach on Nguna, a small island off  the coast of  Efate. The 
slogan has become literalised, corporealised, as it is viscerally manifested in the figures of  two 
men boxing in a temporarily constructed ring, surrounded by an exuberant audience of  all 
ages. One of  the boxers, a champion across Vanuatu, encourages onlookers to step forward 
and challenge him: in doing so, he instructs them not to fight him, but to fight climate change. 
He fights generously, letting many men score a victory against their meteorological foe.  
I conclude with this image, as in it many strands of  this thesis coalesce. The contest was the 
festive conclusion to a week of  workshops run for and by Ni-Vanuatu volunteers from across 
the country. It reflects the research’s focus on Islander agency in the face of  climate change, as 
it was an opportunity for them to share knowledge about conservation and climate change 
adaptation. With a number of  pastors participating, discussions of  faith and the value of  
scripture permeated throughout the workshops. The fight also reiterates the sensual encounters 
and affectual charge of  the Warriors’ actions, centring the role of  combat and antagonism, 
while foregrounding joy - the affect that is paramount to Bennett’s notion of  enchantment - 
through the exhilaration of  the crowd.   
The encounter in the ring also suggests the inability of  authors to tame and control narratives, 
or to foresee the shapes they may take. In the vision of  the assertive yet non-aggressive Warrior 
laid out by 350 Pacific, and manifested in the peaceful direct actions of  the Newcastle flotilla, 
this flurry of  playful punches is not anticipated. In this moment, we are literally asked to witness 
the human face of  climate change, not in terms of  the impacts endured or opposition 
marshalled against it, but in the form of  one man standing in as climate change, in order that 
others can pummel out their fury. And here the second narrative of  Noah, the universal 
acceptance of  responsibility for global warming, as well as the ethical questions posed by the 
Anthropocene reach their logical, embodied conclusion: as humans we must bear the brunt of  
the impacts we have had upon the Earth.    
*** 
I begin by summarising the key insights of  the preceding chapters, focusing first on the 
substantive empirical contributions and then turning to the main theoretical developments my 
research provides. I then offer a number of  critical reflections upon this research, indicate 
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potential areas for future research, and end by considering the subsequent actions of  the Pacific 
Climate Warriors and shifts in the terrain of  Pacific climate change advocacy since my 
fieldwork.  
1. Summary of chapters 
 
In Chapter Two, I introduced some of  the main debates surrounding the emergent epoch 
commonly but not exclusively known as the Anthropocene, highlighting the work of  Tsing et 
al., Haraway and Buck and their concerns regarding existing narratives of  the Anthropocene. 
Particular shortcomings included an emphasis on the apocalyptic and discourses that were 
exclusively secular, rationalist and scientific. Following Rudiak-Gould in interpreting climate 
change as a metonym for the Anthropocene, I noted parallels between these discussions and 
those regarding the framings of  climate change. Having established the global significance of  
climate change in Oceania, I identified the inevitable inundation discourse found across 
journalistic and academic accounts of  the Pacific Islands as a dominant yet inadequate 
narrative framing of  climate change. I outlined its limitations such as the denial of  Pacific 
Islander agency, the disincentivising of  climate change mitigation, the sensationalism of  sea 
level rise and marginalisation of  less dramatic climate change impacts, and the congruence 
between this narrative and depoliticised environmental discourses. Consequently, as a further 
contribution to the critical literature challenging the inevitable inundation discourse, and a 
response to the call for new stories of  the Anthropocene, I have endeavoured throughout this 
thesis to illuminate alternative narratives of  climate change and the Pacific Islands.  
My methodological process was recounted in Chapter Three, as I explained my rationale for a 
qualitative case study approach and adoption of  participant observation and interviews as my 
main research methods. I highlighted the deviations from my original research design, made in 
order to engage with a broader range of  participants and to enable a deeper contextual 
understanding of  practices and perspectives in one country, rather than multiple national 
settings.   
During the process of  reflecting upon my research practice, I have made three methodological 
contributions. Firstly, I have highlighted the insufficiency of  the presumed default of  anonymity 
and requirement for this demanded by UK data protection regulations. As I have shown, 
anonymisation can be at odds with both indigenous research methods in terms of  an insistence 
on participant ownership of  stories and recognition, and with the faith-based perspectives of  
participants, who are seeking to share their truth with the world. Consequently, I follow Kaiser 
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(2009) in advocating an ongoing dialogue about confidentiality and the precise uses and 
purposes of  participants’ data, recognising that participants’ views on this may shift over the 
course of  the research process. I have also built upon Chilsa’s notion of  methodologically 
appreciating ‘sagacity’, as opposed to imposing Western epistemologies. Through focusing 
upon the scriptural knowledge of  priests and the application of  their wisdom to climate change 
as an issue, I have managed to explore questions that are resonant and meaningful to my 
participants and which re-configure power relations between researcher and participants, while 
also addressing a current gap in the literature. Thirdly, I have demonstrated that, despite best 
intentions, reciprocity or ‘being useful’ (Taylor 2014) may most meaningfully take the form of  
practical contributions towards groups and initiatives, as opposed to academic insights.  
In Chapter Four, I presented an alternative narrative of  Pacific Islander strength in the face of  
climate change, in contrast to the inevitable inundation discourse’s representations of  weakness 
or victimhood. I found resonances between Hau’ofa’s analysis and the Pacific Climate Warriors’ 
practices, and thereby translated his Sea of  Islands vision onto an empirical case study. Through 
the production of  fictive kinships and the performance of  fluid Pan-Pacific identities, his vision 
of  Oceanic regionalism was being enacted. I also interpreted the Warriors’ actions as examples 
of  world enlargement. I identified the manner in which the Warriors, in their movement from 
islands affected by climate change to the coal-exporting Australian port that could be partially 
held responsible for these impacts, brought Pacific concerns home to Australia, concerns that 
could no longer be contained within the islands but engulfed their larger neighbour. Climate 
change activism also presented an opportunity for the Warriors to contest the existing 
hierarchies between Australia and the Pacific, resisting the representation of  the Islands as 
peripheral and instead placing Oceania at the centre, through their claims to action on behalf  
of  the world and their desire to re-educate Australia. I deem this an example of  world expansion 
as it re-sized Oceania in terms of  its significance and potency. 
Using the Sea of  Islands as a lens to understand the Warriors became increasingly apt when 
their shared shortcomings became apparent, namely the inequitable representation of  the 
different island groups and overall Polynesian bias. There were other inequities at play in this 
manifestation of  Oceanic regionalism, namely in terms of  gendered power dynamics. However, 
I contend that this model of  regionalism centres on a recognition of  difference, particularly 
with regard to the differential exposure to climate impacts, a concept I term relative altitudinal 
privilege. I argue that Hau’ofa’s work helps us to understand the actions the Warriors took and 
the manner in which they were contesting the marginalisation of  the Pacific. Not only that, but 
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the threat climate change poses to the Pacific, the manner in which the Pacific Islands have 
been presented as an iconic victim of  it, and the opportunity this presented for the Warriors to 
challenge not just the inevitable inundation discourse but the more general belittlement of  
Oceania, helps us to understand Hau’ofa and what his vision can look like in practice and what 
it can achieve.  
In Chapter Five, the alternative narrative that I conveyed was that of  the Pacific Climate 
Warriors as determined political actors, again as opposed to the passive victims of  the inevitable 
inundation discourse. I explored the process of  becoming Warriors: the production of  activist 
subjectivities through disciplinary processes and transformative affectual encounters. In 
particular I highlighted a series of  key emotional events: experiences of  sorrow, particularly 
when encountering the mined landscapes of  Maules Creek; fear and uncertainty, in 
anticipation of  the risks the Warriors would endure through taking direct action, such as the 
possibility of  injury, arrest or deportation; and anger, when faced by the punitive actions of  the 
Australia police force, such as the capsizing of  kayaks, detaining of  Warriors, and damaging of  
the Vanuatu canoe. Throughout this chapter I noted the ambivalent and mutable role of  
antagonism in the Warriors’ campaign. Firstly, in terms of  the shift in focus of  antagonism from 
the fossil fuel companies to also include the Australian government, and secondly, in the 
attempts to manage antagonism by the 350 Pacific organisers, through their setting of  limits on 
permissible actions by the Warriors, particularly those aged under twenty-five. Consequently, I 
highlighted a tension in organisational practice between Western activist emphases on 
individual autonomy and 350 Pacific’s attempts to curtail individual actions through an 
emphasis upon the risk of  familial shame. Thus, another theme that emerged through these 
stories was that of  a decidedly Pacific mode of  activism, one that was supported by existing kin 
relations and formed new ones; one that emphasised an obligation to the group at points that 
exceeded the autonomy of  the individual; and one that treasured compassionate connections 
to the land and placed Christian faith at the centre of  their practice. 
In Chapter Six, I built upon this concern with faith and explored narratives of  climate change 
that directly challenged the secularity of  the rationalist horror stories of  the Anthropocene. I 
identified the actions taken in the Pacific region and Vanuatu by ecumenical organisations and 
churches to promote understanding of  climate change and encourage practical adaptations. I 
highlighted a need to look beyond the role of  the church simply in terms of  institutional 
capacity, and instead consider the place of  scripture in the shaping of  climate change narratives, 
given the moral and ethical questions about how we wish to live that climate change poses. 
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Focusing upon one small element of  scripture – the story of  Noah – I illuminated three 
manifestations of  this tale in the Pacific Island region. The first, already commonly noted in 
the literature, utilises the promise of  the rainbow covenant as a basis for climate change denial, 
whilst the second centres Noah as an aspirational figure, a parable of  preparation, and therefore 
resonated with the practical actions Ni-Vanuatu pastors and parishioners had taken in response 
to Cyclone Pam. Meanwhile the third critiques the actions of  Noah as selfish and identifies 
Pacific Islanders with those who have been left to suffer outside of  the ark. These three different 
articulations of  the same story opened up highly contrasting avenues for action, be it purely 
trusting in the divine, contributing to climate change mitigation projects as a means of  
absolving carbon sin in spite of  the Pacific Islands’ meagre contributions to global greenhouse 
gas emissions, or rallying together to encourage greater action on the part of  the industrialised 
nations. This therefore highlighted the heterogeneity of  religious responses, as well as 
demonstrating the contrasting ways in which agency could be exercised in response to climate 
change, with greater or lesser degrees of  alignment with global narratives of  climate justice that 
generally portray Pacific Islanders as undeservingly punished by climate change.  
2. Theoretical contributions 
 
Having established the empirical contributions of  this thesis, I now turn to my five main 
theoretical contributions. Firstly, I have furthered critical discussions of  the inevitable 
inundation discourse, building on the work of  authors such as Bettini, Farbotko and Barnett 
and Campbell, by highlighting alternative co-existing narratives of  climate change and the 
Pacific Islands that could be offered in its place. Bettini describes two waves of  critical discourse 
concerning climate change and migration, that, based on empirical and political/ analytical 
grounds respectively, critique the inevitable inundation discourse. The approach that I have 
taken, which illuminates alternative discourses rather than simply further refining refutations 
of  the dominant discourse, constitutes a third wave of  critique. This third wave addresses the 
concerns with disempowerment and the absence of  Islander voices raised by the second wave 
by centring alternative Pacific Islander perspectives on climate change, rather than simply 
focusing on deconstructing dominant narrative framings. Crucially it also reduces the emphasis 
on migration and Pacific Islanders as potential climate refugees, and instead more holistically 
illuminates the multitude of  ways in which Pacific Islanders are actively responding to climate 
change, such as through practically adapting to extreme weather events, mitigating their own 
carbon emissions, and acting as global advocates.     
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Secondly, I have contributed to Pacific Studies through my analysis and application of  
Hau’ofa’s Sea of  Islands theory. I have not only sought to empirically investigate and validate 
Hau’ofa’s work through substantively applying it to a case study, but have critically reworked 
his previously under-utilised concept of  world enlargement, to fit not just movements of  
diaspora but the globalised intentions and actions of  Pacific Islander climate activist networks, 
exploring further ways in which other nations could be conceptually subsumed within Oceania. 
In doing so, I have expanded upon the manner in which actors may seek to contest the 
belittlement of  the Pacific, inverting both power dynamics between Pacific Islands and their 
continental neighbours and challenging concepts of  relative scale and size. I have also addressed 
the concerns raised about the inclusivity of  his vision of  Oceania and the extent to which a 
vision occludes divisions and disparities between different Pacific nations. In my identification 
of  the concept of  relative altitudinal privilege I have demonstrated an empirical resolution of  
such a concern, in the expressions of  regional unity that are predicated upon a recognition of  
difference. Such an approach could have further global application in understandings of  
regional identity and cooperation.    
Thirdly, I have placed different bodies of  literature in novel arrangements, seeking to temper 
post-politics’ emphasis upon antagonism with Bennett’s concerns with affect, transformation 
and joy, and to trace links between Bennett’s theory and the experiences and practices 
documented by the geographies of  social movements literature. I have attempted to reground 
post-political discussions of  environmental discourse in sites other than the urban, and return 
attention to climate change as an issue, focusing less on post-politics’ critique of  depoliticisation 
but rather on its insistence upon the need for novel political entanglements with climate change, 
a shift from policy to politics. Consequently, this research should be of  interest to researchers 
working in the field of  climate change and migration, as I have emphasised understanding those 
threatened by climate-induced migration as political subjects, a framing, according to Ransan-
Cooper et al., that is sorely underexplored. And while my account of  emergent, specifically 
Pacific modes of  activism is predominately empirical, it contributes to a wider debate 
crosscutting activist scholarship and practice regarding the decolonisation of  environmental 
justice movements, and the need to decentre Western perspectives and foreground indigenous 
understandings and practices (Smith 1999; Chilisa 2011; Virasami and Wanjiku Kelbert 2015).  
Fourthly, I have contributed to the literature concerning religious responses to climate change, 
raising questions that have a bearing on social science scholarship beyond a regional or 
theological focus on the Pacific and Christianity. I have highlighted the inadequacy of  existing 
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accounts of  religious understandings of  climate change, following Kempf  (2017) in contending 
that the academic ‘religion as a barrier’ narrative is often accompanied by attempts to purify 
religion and science. Rather than ceding to this purification or the marginalisation of  religion, 
I have made two theoretical contributions. Firstly, I have emphasised a model of  tufala save 
which seeks to balance different, at points contrary, epistemologies of  climate change. And a 
tufala save model could be adopted far beyond Vanuatu: it speaks to a need, highlighted by the 
horror stories of  the Anthropocene (Buck 2015) and Hulme’s (2009) renunciation of  a purely 
scientific approach to climate change, to keep multiple perspectives and framings of  climate 
change in view at once. No one framing will resolve all the questions of  ethics, magnitude, costs, 
responsibility and meaning that surround climate change. New narratives of  climate change 
must be sought and placed in dialogue with other framings in order to expand our 
understandings of  it and our capacities for action. Secondly, and relatedly, I have absolved the 
Noah Story of  its purely climate denial based associations in the Pacific, and contributed to 
literature concerning the heterogeneity of  religious responses (Hulme 2017), through 
highlighting the multiplicity of  tellings of  particular biblical stories, and the concomitant 
diversity of  avenues of  political action emerging from one tale. This multiplicity of  articulations 
also reflects again the tufala save emphasis upon placing manifold different narratives in relation 
with each other.  
Finally, I have contributed to the emergent literature regarding narrative framings of  the 
Anthropocene through demonstrating what Anthropocenic story-telling might look like, 
through an emphasis upon plurality and care. Firstly, with regards to plurality, I follow Stenmark 
(2015) in her argument that story-telling helps to ameliorate an excessive dependence upon 
myths of  the Absolute. She defines such myths in terms of  an indisputable and infallible 
certainty beyond the human. Such myths can motivate us in times of  despair yet can also inhibit 
action if  they create an expectation of  a certainty that can never be met. She argues the latter 
to be the case with climate change as a ‘wicked problem’ (Hulme 2009), as no one neat, certain 
solution can be reached. Looking back on the horror stories of  the Anthropocene described by 
Buck – disenchanted tales of  ‘calculability or control’ (2015: 376) – and the attempts by social 
scientists to negate religiously-based narratives of  climate denial with increased quantities of  
scientific facts and ‘awareness’, both can be understood as suffocating entanglements in myths 
of  the Absolute. To counter such myths Stenmark recommends embracing the ambiguity, 
complexity and partiality of  story-telling, a suggestion echoed by Hulme (2017). I contend that 
such an approach both responds to Haraway and Tsing et al.’s calls for new stories of  the 
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Anthropocene, and encapsulates the method of  story-telling I have demonstrated in this 
research. Stenmark observes that one should ‘explore the plurality and multiplicity within each 
story’ (932), as I have done through eliciting the diverse and contrary readings of  the Noah 
story. She also contends that stories let us ‘hold these different perspectives in tension without 
ever resolving them’ (932), a practice embodied by tufala save and the balancing of  different 
epistemologies of  climate change. My efforts to represent such a plurality of  narratives of  
climate change suggests a means of  story-telling the ambiguities and uncertainties of  the 
Anthropocene.  
Following Haraway and Tsing et al., as a further contribution to Anthropocene story-telling, 
this research attempts to embody an ethics of  care and compassion. It is embedded within my 
methodological approach through my concern with reciprocity, and also my fears about the 
harm I could cause participants through an insufficiently sympathetic dissection of  their 
perspectives and actions. It also unites my three empirical chapters. It is the Warriors’ care for 
each other, expressed through their forging of  sibling-like attachment, that lays the foundation 
for their regional cooperation. It is their care for land that is experiencing or facing destruction 
(be it their homelands or the mountains of  overburden in northern New South Wales) and their 
care for the wellbeing of  distant others (manifested in the Warriors’ world enlarging actions 
taken on behalf  of  everyone) that motivates them to take action. And it is the act of  caretaking 
for the world entrusted to us by God, acts of  Christian stewardship, that unite the different 
denominations in their responses to climate change. Perhaps my theoretical unease with 
dimensions of  post-political analysis emerges from the emphasis upon confrontation and 
antagonism, at the expense of  solidarity and compassion. And it is this care for others, crossing 
national, religious and species divides, that is integral to both storying and living in the 
Anthropocene.    
3. Critical Reflections 
 
Having established my main academic contributions, I now reflect upon questions that have 
permeated throughout my thesis, empirically, theoretically and methodologically. These 
coalesce around one main theme: questions of  representation and representativeness. I 
acknowledge the current enthusiasm for moving beyond representation in social theory, yet 
argue for the importance of  attending to questions of  representation, as it remains a politically 
significant practice, even while acknowledging its limits as a concept.   
These questions initially emerge in the literature review, as I critique the triad of  over-
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representation, misrepresentation, and under-representation. The first can be found in the 
excessive focus upon Pacific Islands as subject to existentially threatening sea level rise, whilst 
marginalising other more immediate climate change concerns. The second, misrepresentation, 
is seen in the portrayal of  Pacific Islanders as passive, helpless victims and the third is apparent 
through the failure of  the inevitable inundation discourse to convey the perspectives of  Pacific 
Islanders, particularly those taking action in response to climate change. Having identified these 
issues with the extant literature, it is important to ask whether I successfully navigate them in 
my own research. 
Questions of  representation persisted through my methodology, especially with respect to the 
suitability and demographic breadth of  my interviewees, and thereby bring up the issue of  
research validity. While I have been rigorous in my recruitment of  interviewees, transcription 
and analysis of  data, potentially this research contributes to an over-representation of  the 
Warriors themselves. There is still generally a shortage of  Pacific Islander voices in the climate 
debates. However, as a consequence of  the media attention garnered by the Newcastle 
blockade, the ten Warrior media spokespeople have been repeatedly asked to speak for all 
Pacific Islanders in dozens of  media accounts, and are also becoming the focus of  increased 
academic attention. Thinking back to the Anthropocene literature, despite Buck’s cautions 
against the dangers of  hero stories, in the centring of  these figures who I have followed through 
an emotional gamut of  anger, sadness and joy, I fear I have fallen afoul of  that same narrative 
form. Yet unlike the heroes Buck cautions against, these Warriors are not isolated, spear-
carrying individuals. Instead the complex patterns of  kinship and interconnection they have 
formed, the multiple knowledges of  climate change they articulate, and the affectual embodied 
experiences that have transformed them all speak more to Le Guin’s holistic carrier bag model 
of  story-telling, in its emphasis on bringing together diverse components and their rich 
connections.  
The issue of  potential misrepresentation brings to light the question of  my ability as a white, 
Western researcher to accurately and meaningfully represent the Warriors’ and Ni-Vanuatu 
participants’ perspectives. I recognise that there is an inescapable partiality to all academic 
accounts, and that I can never fully extract myself  from the text that I produce (Haraway 1988). 
In my selection of  arguments, vignettes and interview extracts inevitably some details that may 
be meaningful to my participants will be excluded or occluded. However, the debates I raised 
regarding anonymity in Chapter Three make this issue somewhat thornier. Torn between 
indigenous and faith-based demands for recognition on the one hand, professional and legal 
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strictures regarding anonymity on the other, somewhat paradoxically I have produced a thesis 
about telling and re-empowering stories of  climate change, in which the names of  the authors 
of  these stories have been censored. While this has given me more freedom as a researcher to 
reflect critically upon these narratives, it also distances them from their origins. In spite of  this 
remove, I hope that as much as possible this thesis has continued to document how Pacific 
Islanders are representing their own understandings of  and responses to climate change, as 
opposed to simply my representations of  those Islanders.  
Finally, there is a question of  who my research participants represent, and correspondingly, how 
representative they are of  wider populations. This can first be considered with respect to the 
demographics of  the Pacific Climate Warriors. As established in Chapter Four, the group does 
not represent all Pacific Island nations, but nor could it ever represent all Pacific Islanders 
meaningfully, if  we move from a national to an island-level of  affiliation. And with regards to 
those islands and nations that have a formal delegate, can the Warriors themselves be said to 
be representative of  the communities they speak of  and on behalf  of ? As I observed during the 
campaign, and as one of  the organisers also admitted, many of  the Warriors held positions in 
government, were in higher education, or were closely related to elite political figures. Perhaps 
they were not the ‘ordinary Pacific islanders’ Hau’ofa hoped for. The extent to which they were 
predominately based in urban rather than rural settings, and largely employed in salaried 
positions, as opposed to relying primarily on subsistence agriculture may also have put them at 
a distance to many of  the climate change impacts of  which they spoke, compared to the 
experience of  many of  their compatriots. Yet the urban environment of  Port Vila is a far cry 
from say that of  London: many of  those who were formally employed still took enormous pride 
in working the land, growing their own food, and championing self-sufficiency.    
Yet this question of  the distance between the Warriors and the climate change impacts of  which 
they spoke is also present in the discourses of  relative altitudinal privilege. Many of  the Warriors 
disavowed their own future suffering compared to those from lower lying nations. This is in 
contrast to the very format of  the protest and overriding message of  the campaign, which 
positioned them as being on the climate change front lines. Thus, how the Warriors represented 
themselves was at points at odds with how they were represented in Western-oriented media 
narratives. A parallel can be drawn between this and the invoking of  the narrative of  universal 
responsibility for climate change in Vanuatu, again a rejection of  the mainstream climate justice 
narratives.  
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However, in the Warriors’ refusal to represent themselves in such a way, through instead 
recognising their own relative altitudinal privilege, they prevent homogenisation of  the Pacific 
and resist victim status. Again, this resonates with the expressions of  agency associated with the 
second Noah story: the emphasis upon Islander mitigation efforts and refusals to point the 
finger of  climate change responsibility at the larger nations. This suggests the problem lies not 
in the deviations of  the Warriors from representations of  themselves as the apotheosis of  
climate change suffering, but in the media and NGO narratives that seek to represent 
indigenous communities in such a way.  
What does this mean for the alternatives to the drowning islands discourse, and the stories we 
are telling for earthly survival? I reconcile myself  with the question of  their representativeness 
with the reasoning that they, as well as the priests, climate activists and NGO workers I worked 
with in Vanuatu, are chiefly placed to be story-tellers. In their positions of  relative privilege they 
have the potential to shape narratives and weave stories that will reach across the globe, so these 
are some of  the voices that we need to be listening to if  we are looking for new tales for the 
Anthropocene.  
4. Areas for further research 
 
I suggest two further areas of  research that could complement and develop the ideas presented 
in this thesis. Firstly, the concern with care, as illustrated in Section 2, could be expanded upon. 
Haraway (2016a) and Tsing et al. (2017) in their demand for new stories of  the Anthropocene 
promote a multispecies ethics through an emphasis on multispecies storytelling. One potentially 
fruitful new avenue of  research into climate change and the Pacific Islands is that of  the more-
than-human, documenting not just connections to land (which has substantial coverage in the 
literature) or to ecosystem services, but reflecting upon the new relations of  care or competition 
between humans and other creatures that are generated by changing climatic conditions. It 
opens the questions of  the extent to which the vision of  cross-species compassion invoked by 
Rigby’s (2008) reading of  the ark manifests in the waters or sands of  Vanuatu. And the boxers 
and spectators of  the chapter’s opening vignette might provide an empirical starting point for 
this, as many of  them are volunteer environmental stewards who have spent years tagging 
rather than killing turtles, or tending to coral through the building of  marine nurseries or the 
removal of  crown of  thorn starfish, enacting an ethics of  care and conscientious action, albeit 
from a human-centred perspective.  
Secondly, the examination of  the heterogeneity of  religious responses highlighted by Hulme 
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(2017) is also far from complete. My work has showcased the diversity of  meanings and political 
avenues that derive from the multiple readings of  one biblical story, in one geographical region, 
by members of  a handful of  Christian denominations. Largely absent from my account are the 
smaller yet increasingly popular evangelical churches, distinguished by their intolerance of  
kastom and their pre-millenialist approach, an outlook which can interpret climate change as a 
necessary precursor to the time of  divine rule, as opposed to an environmental ill to be 
remedied (Hulme 2009: 154-155), and which is characterised by a temporal concern with 
prophetic time as opposed to the near future (Guyer 2007). Such a theological disposition is 
likely to produce different epistemological tensions, convergences and courses of  action than 
those documented here, as are the perspectives of  other faiths. In addition to considering 
religious responses to climate change, there is also a need to bring religious perspectives to bear 
on the concept of  the Anthropocene itself: what does it mean for our purpose on this planet if  
we have encroached upon the domain of  the gods (Donner 2007), to the extent that acts of  
God now bear human origins?   
5. Epilogue: still fighting 
 
While I myself  am pursuing new courses of  research, the Warriors too have taken steps in new 
directions since the time of  my fieldwork, 2014-2015. Cyclone Pam has been succeeded by the 
destruction of  Cyclone Winston in Fiji and Cyclone Gita in Tonga, new record breakers. In 
2016 another flotilla was held in Newcastle Harbour, organised by 350 Australia, yet led by 
members of  the Pacific diaspora in Sydney, front-runners of  world enlargement.  
More distant continents have been enveloped within Oceania’s concerns by the Warriors’ 
actions. A trio of  the original Newcastle contingent visited Canada to meet with First Nations 
communities. Upon witnessing the Albertan tar sands, the Warriors again spoke of  the heinous 
disrespect paid to the land and, as with Maules Creek, recognised that the area being desecrated 
dwarfed many Pacific Islands. Together with members of  the Tsleil Waututh Nation, they 
prayed upon the waters, asking Prime Minister Trudeau to reverse his decision on the Kinder 
Morgan pipeline. Warriors have held kava ceremonies in Bonn at the COP23, led the People’s 
Climate March in London, and sailed in a flotilla down the Seine in advance of  the Paris 
Agreement. Tears have been shed in the Rhineland by those who bore witness to similar 
desecration at Maules Creek.  
The composition of  350 Pacific has also significantly shifted since the 2014 blockade: the one 
white member has moved to a different area of  focus within 350.org, enabling 350 Pacific to 
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be truly Islander-led, and his successor unexpectedly passed away in summer 2017, mourned 
by the hundreds who had been touched by her words, actions and spirit. The tactics employed 
by 350 Pacific also appear to have morphed since the start of  the Stand Up for the Pacific 
campaign. While, as already indicated, they continue to be aquatic in nature, they appear 
considerably less confrontational than the original flotilla. The missive to the Pope with which 
I opened the thesis epitomises this: a year on from the Newcastle blockade, instead of  direct 
action, instead of  issuing a demand for the Vatican to divest from fossil fuels (the campaign 
within which the visit was originally situated) the Warriors laud the pontiff ’s achievements and 
petition in a classical sense. This suggests that the place of  faith is still central but that the tactics, 
membership and processes of  Pacific Islander climate advocacy are still evolving. While I 
cannot see where their campaign will go next, I hope that they and their nations will continue 
to fight, not drown.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Sample consent form 
  
Informed Consent Form            
                                                                          
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an 
explanation about the research.  
Title of Project: Responding to climate change in the Pacific 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 5819/001 
 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take part, the person 
organising the research must explain the project to you. 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please 
ask the researcher before you to decide whether to join in.  You will be given a copy of this Consent Form 
to keep and refer to at any time.  
Participant’s Statement  
 
I  
 
 - have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet (or have heard the researcher’s 
explanation), and understand what the study involves. 
 - understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this project, I can notify the 
researcher involved and withdraw immediately.  
 - consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. 
 - agree that my non-personal research data may be used by others for future research. I am assured that 
the confidentiality of my personal data will be upheld through the removal of identifiers.  
 - understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with 
the provisions of the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
 - agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to 
take part in this study.  
 
Signed:         Date:  
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Appendix 2 – Participant information sheet 
 
Information Sheet for Participants 
                                                            
Title of Project: Responding to climate change in the Pacific  
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 5819/001 
Researcher Hannah Fair 
Work Address University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT 
Contact Details  hannah.fair@ucl.ac.uk 
I would like to invite you to participate in this research project.             
Why am I doing this research? 
I am passionate about tackling climate change  and have been involved in climate change activism in the United 
Kingdom since 2008. I believe that the voices of those who may be most affected by climate change (such as 
Pacific Islanders) are the ones that need to be most urgently listened to and that those are the people who should 
be leading the debate. The aim of this study is to learn more about Pacific climate change campaigning, in 
particular what motivates activists and what futures they want to see in the Pacific.  
Who am I looking to interview? 
I am looking to interview people involved in climate advocacy in the Pacific, particularly the Pacific Climate 
Warriors and individuals who have actively supported or been involved in the Pacific Climate Warriors 
campaign. If you agree to take part in the interview then I will ask you a series of questions and the interview will 
take approximately up to one hour to conduct. You are free to choose to not answer any of the questions that 
you do not wish to. You are free to end the interview at any time. I may also invite you to follow-up interviews.   
What will happen to the information that I collect? 
If you wish, I will remove any identifying personal information when I transcribe the interviews and publish my 
data. All information will be stored securely in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
I plan to share the results of the research with 350 Pacific and all the participants who wish to receive it, either 
via a presentation before the end of the research project or in a written report using anonymised data. I hope 
that my research will be beneficial to everyone involved in 350 Pacific, as it will document their work, preserving 
an account for the future, it will help reflect on the work of climate campaigners and what is successful and what 
could be improved, and it will raise international awareness of the work of Pacific climate campaigners. The 
results of my research will also be used to produce my PhD thesis at University College London, and presented 
at international conferences and in academic publications.  
What if you don’t want to be involved? 
No worries. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you are still free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. You may also withdraw your data from the project at any 
time up until October 2015.  
Please discuss the information above with others if you wish or ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information.  
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 Appendix 3 – Research consent from 350 Pacific  
This Facebook discussion was forwarded onto me via email. The names and Facebook profile 
pictures of  350 Pacific members have been anonymised. The opening message is from the 350 
Pacific co-ordinator that I began discussions with in April 2014.  
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Appendix 4 – Interview Schedule (Phase I) 
 
Contextual Information 
 
1. Which country are you from? 
2. How many other people from your country are here? 
3. Did you all know each other before you came?  
4. Have you met anyone else involved in the tour before? 
5. Do you belong to a church? Which church?  
 
Relationship with 350 Pacific 
 
1. How long have you been involved in 350 Pacific? 
2. Why did you get involved in 350 Pacific? 
• How did you get involved?  
3. Have you been involved in campaigning before? 
4. What roles have you played in the campaign? 
• Are you a media spokesperson? 
• Were you involved in building a canoe? 
• Can you tell me a bit about that?  
5. What has the best part of being involved with 350 so far? 
6. What do you hope this campaign will achieve? 
 
350 Pacific: local context 
 
1. What do your friends and family think about you coming on this tour? 
2. Are any of your friends or family involved in 350 Pacific or other forms of campaigning 
or advocacy? 
3. How many people are involved in 350 Pacific in your home country? 
4. Have you tried to make other people in your home country aware of what you’re 
doing? 
• What sort of things have you been doing to raise awareness? 
• Did you hold any events about 350 Pacific in your home island before the tour?  
5. How have other people responded to the campaigning that you have been doing? 
• Have other people helped out at all? 
• Does 350 Pacific in your home country work with any other local groups or 
organisations?  
 
Climate Change 
 
1. Have you noticed any kinds of environmental changes in your home country? 
• Have these affected everyday life? If so, how? 
• What do you think are the biggest environmental challenges facing your island? 
• How has the government responded to these challenges? 
• How have people responded to these? 
• Are there any NGOs or civil society groups active in this island who have 
responded to these challenges? 
 
2. What do you know about the predicted impacts of climate change on your home 
 265 
country? 
3. What do you know about the predicted impacts of climate change in other parts of the 
Pacific? 
4. Why do you think we are facing the prospect of climate change? What do you think is 
the cause of the problem?  
5. Who do you think should be responsible for tackling climate change? 
• Do you think it is the responsibility of the United Nations? 
• Of the Australian government? 
• Of island governments? 
• Of companies? 
• Of everyone? 
6. What do you think should be done about climate change?   
7. What future do you want to see for your home country? 
• for the Pacific? 
• for the planet? 
 
Warriors 
 
1. Can you tell me more about what being a Pacific Climate Warrior means to you? 
2. What message do you want to get across to the people of the Australia?  
3. What do you hope people in Australia who see this campaign will learn about Pacific 
Islanders?  
4. What motivates you to campaign against climate change?  
 
Closing Up 
 
1. Have you taken part in academic research before? 
• Can you remember what it was about? 
2. Have you taken part in any media interviews before?  
3. Would you be happy to potentially take part in a follow-up interview in the future? 
4. Do you have any questions for me or any thoughts you’d like to add? 
 
Thank you for your time!  
 
  
 266 
Appendix 5 – Appreciation from 350 Vanuatu 
